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Spaces of Danger

CULTURE AND POWER IN THE EVERYDAY

EDITED BY HEATHER MERRILL
AND LISA M. HOFFMAN

VISIT…

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GEOGRAPHIES OF JUSTICE AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

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HEATHER MERRILL
LISA M. HOFFMAN
With a Foreword by Paul Rabinow

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In loving memory of Allan Pred,
we dedicate this book to the future—
the next generation of scholars

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FOREWORD

Light in Dark Times

The Anglophone necrophilia that surrounds certain European thinkers is distressing. I experience this daily in the way the work and person of Michel Foucault is taken up. The result is nothing short of obscene. The cultism is a betrayal of the entire form of life of these thinkers. But I also know how hard it is, what kind of burden it imposes, to work and live in the wake of the scattering of twentieth-century thinkers by whom one's life is challenged at times to the point of humiliating despair as well as opened up to horizons and illuminations beyond the bureaucracies, conformities, status games, and petty disciplines of the academic world.

When Allan Pred approached me many years ago to co-teach, I was flattered but a bit reticent. I was flattered because Pred was already a widely published scholar, admirably thoughtful and serious, with broad historical and comparative reach. I felt I could learn a great deal from his commanding understanding of macrostructures of capitalism at historical periods close at hand as well as a bit farther back, archaeologically speaking. And I did. It always amazed me how much Pred knew about technical issues of finance, markets, and the like. The man knew what he was talking about. He wore it lightly.

Yet I was also reticent in that it seemed clear that one reason for Pred wanting to co-teach with me was my engagements and involvement with French and German traditions of critical thought as well as their (then) current manifestations. Although the Anglophone cult of Foucault or Deleuze was just taking shape in the early 1980s, the mania for Walter Benjamin was fully tumescent. The obligatory vaguely German pronunciation of his last name (but not his first) invariably set off surface immune responses on my part.

I soon discovered, to my pleasure and immense benefit, that Allan Pred as a scholar, a thinker, a teacher, and a person was neither pretentious nor trendy. Although I continue to draw little nourishment or solace from the works of Walter Benjamin, I did learn a great deal from Pred about the nourishment and solace that might well be drawn from this quirky, unorthodox, and basically idiosyncratic thinker.

Actually the thing I most cherish from my years of accompanying Allan Pred in discussions, seminars, coffees, and the like was the meaning—or bet-

ter, the possibility—of friendship. Leaving the autobiographical in the shadows where it belongs, Pred showed me elements of what philosophic friendship in the broadest sense of the term could be. I think of the overflowing joy that Allan displayed when discussing his encounters with Gunnar Olsson. More to the point here: Allan treated Walter Benjamin as a friend. He cherished and protected their encounters. He respected the learning and critical insights of this man so different from himself. He sympathized with the cost of the horrifying struggles of the interwar years that Benjamin had to endure and cope with in one manner or another. He understood that big labels did not help much in a friendship: after all one Frankfurt Marxist, Adorno (as well as Horkheimer), had engaged in savage and destructive criticism of Benjamin's most cherished project. He showed us that having predecessors was invaluable and yet that the key to loyalty was not to mimic them. He struggled with the limits and flaws of things he held dear—Sweden in his case.

Dame Fortune smiled on me when she sent Allan Pred my way. I am forever in her debt. The glimmers of hope in these dark times continue to emanate from those rare friends, not just their magnificent work, but the way they lived—the way they patiently, unobtrusively, caringly, and thoughtfully taught us how to live.

Paul Rabinow

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This volume is the result of the collective support and labor of a number of individuals. We began envisioning a book inspired by the ingenious and path-breaking work of Allan Pred, one of the leading human critical geographers of the twentieth century, several years ago. With Rebecca Dolhinow we organized a double session, "Passages of Pred," at the Association of American Geographers (AAG) meeting in 2008. Allan had recently passed after battling cancer, and as his students we found ourselves grieving and yet inspired by the time we had with him. The project gained momentum when Heather presented an earlier version of her chapter included here at Colgate University, and it took shape as a book proposal when we formally gathered contributors in 2010. The Geographies of Justice and Social Transformation Series at the University of Georgia Press recognized the value of a Predian approach—one that draws on a cultural Marxist tradition, but is also decidedly about pushing boundaries and being "un-disciplined"—and offered a home for this collection.

We would like to thank everyone who participated in the original AAG session: Caroline Desbiens, Rebecca Dolhinow, James Freeman, Marta Gutman, Cary Karacas, Katharyne Mitchell, Damani Partridge, Jessica Zacher, and Andrea Zemgulys, as well as others in our graduate cohort that moved between anthropology, urban studies, and geography at UC Berkeley, and indeed, our other advisors there who encouraged such transdisciplinary work (Aihwa Ong, Paul Rabinow, William Shack, Ruth Wilson Gilmore). Heather would like to express a special gratitude to Geraldine Pratt for her inspiration by suggesting that we put such a volume in motion and for her continuous generosity throughout the journey. This volume would not have been realized without her. We would also like to express great appreciation to Michael Watts for his unwavering guidance and support.

Special thanks also to Gillian Hart for providing guidance along the way. Heather would also like to thank Jason Weidemann for early conversation and encouragement, and Lisa would like to thank Monica DeHart, Yonn Dierwechter, Jennifer Hubbert, and Jim Thatcher for their feedback. We are especially grateful to Hope St. John, our student research assistant who, while taking a full load of courses, provided excellent and detailed manuscript

preparation and proofing. We greatly appreciate the Hamilton College Dean of Faculty Office and Africana Studies Department for their financing of the indexing. Heather is grateful to Lisa Hoffman for her exacting scholarly standards, the unique anthropological perspectives she brings to the volume, and her incredible commitment to the vision. It has been for Heather an enormous gift to work with Lisa on this project. It is indeed rare to have collaborations that are moments of growth, accomplishment—and fun. Lisa would like to thank Heather Merrill not only for her deep intellect, creative vision, and profound commitment to this project, but also for the laughter and joy defining this shared work. To be clear, without Heather's vision, expansive knowledge of Allan's work, and determination, this volume would not be what it is today. Lisa is greatly appreciative of all that Heather has done. Together we would like to extend our deep gratitude to all the contributors for their resolute commitment, flexibility, and contribution of outstanding original essays informed by the work of Allan Pred. Special thanks go to Trevor Paglen for sharing his images.

We are grateful to the editors at the University of Georgia Press for taking this project under their charge and shepherding it through. In particular we would like to thank Derek Krissoff for his early support and Mick Gusinde-Duffy and his excellent team for bringing this project to fruition. Mick was a true advocate of this project, and we would especially like to thank him for his commitment and vision. Gratitude also goes to Barbara Wojhoski for her meticulous copyediting and John Joerschke for his creativity in finding solutions for the many images in the volume and his work with the index. We are greatly appreciative of the senior editors of the series, Deb Cowen, Nik Heynen, and Melissa Wright, for embracing the volume and bringing it to print.

We received helpful comments from two rounds of reviewers at the proposal and full manuscript stages and thank those individuals for their insight and time invested in the project.

Finally we would like to extend our gratitude to the Pred family, Hjordis, Michele, and Joseph Pred. Special thanks to Michele for her support and the wonderful art that graces the cover of this book.

Throughout, we have felt the indomitable spirit of Allan Pred encouraging us to forge ahead. His commitment to a critical geography that, as Michael Watts describes in this volume, is deeply immersed in the everyday details of history, attentive "to the deep grammar of places and how they are shaped by historical contingency, the ever-present structures of power and domination, the deadweight of collective amnesia and forgetting ('the unspeakable,' as he put it)" and taken-for-granted racial, gendered, and other forms of oppression informed and motivated our every word. The love we have for Allan Pred's

inspirational work is of a measure equal to the love we felt for him as a mentor and friend. As Paul Rabinow writes in this volume, Dame Fortune smiled at us when she sent Allan Pred our way. We will forever be deeply indebted to him for offering to us the rare kind of mentoring that teaches one how to approach scholarship and to treat each other with patience, kindness, and dignity.

We certainly wish to honor Allan with this volume, but this project also is about seeking ways to understand what is at stake in what we study. Allan refused to simplify analyses and always insisted on rigorous critique—asking us to think critically about power and who does what, when, and where. We are hopeful that this volume will open and help translate Allan's eclectic approach to others, especially the next generation of scholars. With that in mind, we dedicate this book to our children, Nicolas and Eliana Carter, and John Saul and Anna Driscoll.

We close our acknowledgements with the deepest gratitude to our partners, Donald Carter and Bill Driscoll, who have encouraged us, supported us, and known when to give us time to write.

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Spaces of Danger

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Making Sense of Our Contemporary Moment of Danger

HEATHER MERRILL AND LISA M. HOFFMAN

> What matters is not to know the world but to change it.
> —FRANTZ FANON, *Black Skin, White Masks*

> Inquiry into the current moment of danger calls for moving out of bounds, for undisciplined acts.
> —ALLAN PRED, "Out of Bounds and Undisciplined"

On July 22, 2011, a tragedy struck Utoya Island in Norway that has traumatized young people, pained families, and challenged a nation. On that day a thirty-two-year-old far-right activist clothed as a police officer opened fire on a Labor Party youth camp, killing sixty-nine innocent people and maiming many more. The vast majority of the victims were between fourteen and nineteen years of age. Their attacker also placed bombs in a government building in Oslo, an action that killed eight and wounded at least 110 others. How can we make sense of this? How might public intellectuals shed light on such a tragedy?

In a 1,500-page manifesto in English posted on the Internet hours before Anders Breivik engaged in this massacre, he referred to himself as a "Marxist hunter" and declared "preemptive war" targeting "Cultural Marxists" who propagate a "multiculturalist" ideology to which he attributed the decay of Western European and American "civilization and culture" and the promotion of a pro-Islamic "Eurabia." What needs to be understood about this situation is not only what the content of the killer's easily downloadable manuscript reveals about far-right thinking but also how the significance of the event was concealed and silenced as it was interpreted for the public by journalists and political figures. As with the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing in the United States, the initial response was to blame "Muslim fanaticism," but once it had become clear that the terrorism was homegrown, the dominant discursive (mis)rendering was that Breivik's acts were simply the expressions of a deranged madman

who had turned to violence of his own accord. This individual criminal narrative redirected public discussion of the killer away from the collective right-wing nationalism and localism, racism, and Islamophobia that have resurfaced and proliferated throughout Europe and the United States in the last decade. The regimes of truth and systems of power sustaining such dangers were silenced, and the focus was on a single social anomaly—the madman.

By characterizing Breivik as an evil aberration and abstracting his acts from the social and political context in which they took place, persuasive political arbiters and media reproduced what geographer Allan Pred referred to as *situated ignorance*, "the production of fear-filled forms of situated knowledge . . . infused with distortions, misrepresentations, and disinformation, and otherwise largely comprised of gaping holes" (2007, 364). The characterizations of Breivik initially as a Muslim terrorist and then as an individual madman silenced the connections between power and knowledge, dispossession and racism, violence and culture, preventing people from making sense of the events. These madman narratives distracted the public from examining the content of Breivik's manifesto and the political logic of his acts, which were linked to a diffuse culture of hatred in Europe associated with an "extended moment of danger" of magnified capitalist modernity and the promotion of militarization.

Upon close examination from a critical perspective, Breivik's position is not discontinuous with the growing size and confidence of the anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim Right as part of a strategy for national and European "unification," what Bachmann and his colleagues term "a broader European moment of 'cultural crisis'" (2012, 192; see also Partridge, this volume). This tragedy, which will be memorialized by a piece titled *Memory Wound* in which a gap is cut through the peninsula to signify the "symbolic wound" to the nation,[1] signals a "persistent moment of danger" (Pred 2007, 364). In this moment of danger, the European public tends to acquiesce to the use of violence by accepting the racialized argument that the threat to the collective good is external and identified among a selected group of usual suspects (Arabs, Muslims, people of African descent, and their white political allies). Through this cultural logic or "imaginative geography" of securitization, an act of "M(ass) D(istraction) and D(eception)" is performed (Pred 2007, 366), (re-)producing the Other as an embodied, identifiable danger that belongs on the other side of the border and lacks any claim on national or European/North American empathies.

This volume, in contrast, takes the view that the tragedy in Scandinavia requires a decidedly different kind of analysis. The critical approach offered here, for instance, interrogates the very discourses proliferating as explanation, creating much more richly textured understandings of social and spatial transformations of the present, the discursive formations and situated practices

to which they give rise. The ideas and perceptions of an international network of the far right expressed in Breivik's manifesto and the production of knowledge by political and media figures in response to the events, this volume's perspective suggests, are *only the entry points* to a critical understanding of the cultural and material practices that produce them. Moreover, making sense of this tragedy in fact requires drawing on just the sort of critical, cultural Marxist approach to the relationship between everyday practices, cultural politics, social hierarchies, and political economy that is so maligned not only by Breivik but also by a coterie of ideologues and leaders of right-wing social networks and hate groups in Europe and the United States referenced in Breivik's manuscript, for instance, the Knights Templar, the English Defense League, the Counter Jihad Movement, the American Freedom Defense Initiative, and Stop Islamization of America. Yet while this volume draws on the cultural Marxist tradition, it does so through a broad *transdisciplinary* approach, offering analytical and conceptual tools *to interrogate the taken-for-granted* and *to make visible* and legible that which is silenced, providing deeper understandings of the forms of power shaping our lives.[2]

(Re)cognizing the Cultural Marxist Tradition

Cultural Marxism is invoked by far-right groups as the metaphor of a disease contracted by some sort of alien group of leftist radicals whose promotion of "multicultural" politics, "political correctness," and deployment of "critical theory" is destroying traditional institutions, most notably, the family. This is of course a gross reduction of cultural Marxist critique, which has among other things given rise in recent years to nuanced analyses of the cultural and material history of labor struggles in response to the acquisition of land by large agribusinesses (Mitchell 1996), the emergent narratives and ways of seeing that efface the workings of capitalists' interests and structures of power (Harvey 1989), the transformation of livelihoods and forms of knowledge in relation to development schemes and global economic restructuring (Katz 2004), imaginative human struggles over material and cultural conditions during moments of capitalist creative destruction (Pred and Watts 1992), the impact of political upheavals and global markets on women and family life, and the emergence via intensified travel, communication, and mass media of a mobile transnational public who represent the fluidity of capitalism (Ong 1987, 1999). Such explorations unfold in the present "hypermodern" moment, an extended moment of danger characterized by modernity magnified and accelerated, the shattering of everyday taken-for-granted sensibilities in relation to global processes of privatization and deregulation; the relative absence of critique (i.e., dissent); and the

engineering of distractions, silences, and forms of collective amnesia that ignite historically sedimented fears, virulent expressions of nationalism, and acts of direct and indirect racist violence (Pred 2000, 2004, 2007).

In many ways cultural or neo-Marxist theory has informed scholarship across the social sciences and humanities for almost a century, first activated and developed by the Institut für Sozialforschung at the Goethe Universität in Frankfurt, Germany, known as the Frankfurt School, and the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham, England, known as the Birmingham School. One of the fascinating lines of thinking in this tradition is the positing of the autonomy of culture in response to a critique of economic determinism, along with the insistence that culture and ideology cannot be separated from social and material conditions and transformations. Critical theory from the Frankfurt School initially emerged in the 1920s as a response to frustration over the limited ability of historical materialism to make sense of the absence of critical consciousness among the working classes, and it interrogated the "cultural" components of histories framed by global political economic transitions. Antonio Gramsci, Walter Benjamin, Louis Althusser, and more recently Stuart Hall have shared the view that cultural forms emerged in specific historical situations to serve particular social and economic interests and functions while appearing as "natural," and part of a taken-for-granted "common sense," therefore often rendered invisible and eluding incisive criticism. They viewed culture as a mode of ideological reproduction and hegemony as well as a potential form of resistance and counter-hegemony in capitalist society. These theorists have shaped many subsequent conversations by examining the state of play between the economic and the cultural and developing rich theories of hegemony, ideology, and historical and cultural critique.

Walter Benjamin was an especially innovative critical-cultural Marxist scholar whose writings prefigured more recent concerns in the humanities and social sciences with the fetishism of commodification and the proliferation of images in an era of global post-Fordist capitalism. Benjamin created a unique approach to cultural history by focusing on subjectivities and everyday practices to understand the continual flux and turbulence of experience in urban industrialized societies. Building on this tradition, a central concern of the chapters in this volume is to approach the production and reproduction of power and inequality by examining strategically deployed misinformation, diversions, and silences instantiated in practices and subjective reworkings.

It is also from Benjamin's philosophy of history that we derive and employ the notion of *moments of danger* in this volume. The concept offers us an analytical and political stance that refuses to repress critique and turns away from

simplified clear-cut answers, such as explaining the tragedy in Norway as the work of a "madman." Rather, embracing this Benjaminian perspective compels us to question our everyday realities and to challenge the status quo. As he writes in *Theses on the Philosophy of History*, "The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism" ([1968] 2007, 257). This perspective actively resists a linear and "additive" approach to history, instead offering a "more revolutionary and more 'messianic' orientation to temporality" that can lead us not only to understand how collective and personal amnesia is (re)produced but also to identify forms of power shaping our lives (Mitchell, this volume).

Also framing the chapters is the work of geographer Allan Pred, who drew inspiration from these cultural Marxist traditions and especially from Walter Benjamin, while highlighting the spatial situatedness of these dangers. Pred refused to collapse the complexity of place and subject making into any easy frameworks, instead developing an "eclectic" approach, or what Katharyne Mitchell (this volume) calls an "idiosyncratic form of cultural Marxism" that emphasizes the simultaneity of capitalist disjunctures, cultural formations, quotidian practices, and forms of power in the making of histories and geographies (see also Watts, this volume). Refusing to be confined to disciplinary boundaries, Pred enacted a transdisciplinary approach that drew on Marxist, feminist, and post-structuralist ideas, offering a geography that "is never only about physical spaces (although these matter greatly) but, fundamentally, about the emerging contours of power shaped by human decision and institutional agency (Pred 1985: 2000)" (in Ong 2008, 117). He wrote of the highly differentiated and hierarchical spaces and practices of hypermodern capitalism through which societies make particular things visible, while concealing and silencing others. Pred also used Benjamin's work to interrogate the ways in which the past is discarded and repressed yet repeated in unreconciled constellations in the present (see the essays of Olsson, Postero, Partridge, Gregory, and Katz in this volume).

Pred also employed Benjamin's technique of montage as a method of opening up the possibility of a different recognition of the interweavings of modern politics, economy, and culture. Montage, for Pred, was a strategy for exposing the radical heterogeneity, heteroglossia, and multivocality of everyday life, juxtaposing art and society in order to bring alive multiple ways of knowing and sets of meaning, "to allow differently situated voices to be heard, to speak to (or past) each other—as well as to the contexts from which they emerge—and to

which they contribute" (Pred 1995b, 25). Pred's textual experimentations—his use of montage, multiplicity, and ambiguity—was intended, then, to contest and undermine linear and authoritarian approaches to social analysis (and history) that merely reproduced taken-for-granted forms of knowledge and power (Katz, this volume).

Pred's pathbreaking work was fundamentally focused on "re-cognizing" the taken-for-granted knowledge employed in popular discourse and situated practices, as well as among social analysts. In his "eclectic cultural marxism,"[3] he approached social analysis with a philosophical perspective focused on how ontologies were made through geographically situated practices that could not be understood through unattached categories of culture or economy. Highlighting how his work brought together trends in critical theory that were often isolated, this volume aims to connect disciplinary conversations that have tended to be segregated. Pred, for instance, radically interrogated our popular and scholarly uses of everyday knowledge of self and other, male and female, here and there, suggesting that employing habitual "either/or" categories rendered social complexity impermeable to us (see Olsson and Merrill in this volume). The paths of life (material and cultural), Pred argued, are differentiated by relations of power such as gender, class, and the social division of labor, and by race. Situated practices, Pred insisted, inscribe the body and mind with meanings that may or may not diverge from the dominant discourse and basis of knowing, as places cannot exist without participating individuals. Suggesting that the categories we use, as in the Breivik tragedy, particularly those that are binarist, define the world in ways that erect barriers and perpetuate epistemic violence, he asked, "How are we to inquire into the world and re-present it without self-consciously selecting social (cultural) ontological categories that strive to redraw reigning maps of meaning?" (1995a, 1069). He argued that if we use our habitual binarist categories and forms of explanation, social and cultural complexity is invisible to us. "Where," he asks, "are those phenomena subject to social inquiry that in act-uality are boundary confined?" (1995a, 1066).

In his later work (starting in the 1990s), Pred approached the study of social life as an "extended moment of danger" fueled by a magnified capitalist modernity, and sped up by the circumstances associated with urban and socially engineered industrial and postindustrial worlds, politically volatile, and tumultuous, producing what some term "precarity" (see Muehlebach 2013), and others have noted as a "memory crisis" (see Landzelius 2009). He sought to make sense of how this danger captured experiences, sensibilities, tastes, and norms that were transformed along with capitalism, and how this extended moment of crisis had ignited, particularly in Europe and the United States,

heightened fears and feelings of insecurity, new social tensions, and what he would describe as a sense of profound despair and even rage. He did this in studies of situated, everyday practices and the production of racisms, collective amnesia, and state terrorism (Pred 1995b, 2000, 2004; Gregory and Pred 2007). These conditions of "capitalist hypermodernity," Pred suggested, bred experiences that were "culturally and politically reworked into expressions of racism, into expressions that allow historically sedimented or latent forms of racism to resurface in new guises" (2000, 10; also Partridge, Hart, Postero, and Merrill in this volume). As in Oklahoma in 1995 and Norway in 2011, this is not only a pressing issue but a matter of life and death, making it essential for critical analyses such as those offered in this volume to be engaged, published, and circulated. The past may be reworked in the present in ways that are dangerous to genuine democracy as subjectivity is informed by a nexus of power relations, visible and invisible geographies that deafen and blind many to the suffering of those most at risk or already multiply displaced. The "current moment of danger is intensified" then by misguided attention to explanations that disarm, paralyze, and "deflect attention away from those processes responsible for the insecurities, injustices, anxieties, and dissatisfactions" (Pred 1995a, 1085).

The chapters in this volume highlight taken-for-granted *situated ignorances* and embrace the concept of a *moment of danger* to invoke simultaneously visible and invisible geographies of power. As a helpful conceptual tool for critical analysis of the contemporary, this approach also provides a useful pivot as the chapters encounter diverse themes of language, history, culture, political economy, subjectivity, and material social and spatial practices at multiple scales. In highlighting culture and power, we intend to underscore the production of spaces, subjects, and inequalities—material, cultural, and symbolic—through transdisciplinary dialogue, especially that of anthropology and geography, and to stretch our approaches to making sense of power. In exploring various contours of the present moment of danger and discussing the social theoretical optics needed to apprehend the complexity of contemporary social forms and practices, the contributors draw on cultural Marxist traditions, as well as an expanded field of feminist, postcolonial, post-structuralist, and critical race scholarship. By underscoring the geographical tradition in interrogating power, this volume also recognizes the transdisciplinarity of geography more specifically (Gilmore 2005) and the *necessity* of working across disciplines to make sense of the complexity of global processes, the persistence of new iterations of everyday racism, anti-immigration sentiments and practices, warfare, feminist and counterhegemonic politics, social movements, environmental degradation, the postcolonial state, and other pressing issues of a highly complex present.

Thus this transdisciplinary volume includes work by both geographers and

anthropologists in particular, a partnership, nourished at the University of California, Berkeley and elsewhere, that has spawned some of the richest and most innovative social theoretical directions of the day (Pred, Watts, Harvey, Katz, Ong, Rabinow, Pratt, McDowell, Nast, Gregory, Smith, Gilmore, Twine). Allan Pred, a cornerstone of those partnerships and what may be called the "Berkeley School" of geography, had a great deal to say about geographies of power and over the course of his years of scholarship generated an innovative approach capable of capturing the highly complex interplay of body and practice, spatiality and materiality, biography, culture, and meaning at a wide range of interconnected scales. Through pioneering co-teaching, Allan Pred and Paul Rabinow also forged significant links between anthropology and geography at Berkeley, shaping how many students were trained to think about space, subjects, and power. This innovative approach, what we term here a "*Predian*" *perspective*, is rooted in geography yet highly transdisciplinary in its scope, refusing to be confined by boundaries or predetermined by narratives. A Predian analytic is focused on "re-presenting the present and its modern antecedents" and making intelligible the ways in which power gains its meanings and traction as histories are produced through actual bodily engagement in locally situated practices embedded in hubs of material and relational flows intersecting multiple scales. It is an eclectic "cultural marxist approach" and decidedly distinct from popular narratives of the tragedy in Norway.

A Predian perspective is attentive to the ways in which culture and hegemony are lived in systems of values and meanings, constituted and constitutive in part through exposure to mass media images, political narratives, and ways of seeing and being seen. In this perspective one's biography resonates with the conditions of one's life, so that human geography and social and economic histories cannot be pried apart, or as Pred put it, "The construction of human geographies and the formation of biographies are enwrapped in one another and inseparable from the dialectical intertwinings of human practice, power relations, and consciousness" (1990, xv). But consciousness is also importantly given expression in language, which imposes culturally arbitrary classifications of the world that become second nature (see Olsson, this volume). Perceptions of the world are classified and differentiated in languages that are living processes in the everyday, part of ineluctably historical "situated practices" always in a state of becoming. In other words, language cannot be separated from the temporally and spatially specific conditions under which people live, for it (re) produces norms and truths both visible and invisible, shaping what we know and who we are. The exercise of power on the ground requires the absorption of language, including "a consistent recognition of the gender-, age-, class-, or

group-directed terms and phrases indicating who may or may not do what, when, and where" (Pred 1990, 3). There are always multiple and frequently discordant languages and heteroglossia, and these have to be measured against ideals of the "correct language" (Merrill, this volume). Situated and place-based analysis is needed to interrogate these processes, and it is significant that Pred's own work was located in Sweden, where he drew on place-based materials at a remove from the standard Anglocentric analytic that has influenced so much of contemporary social theory.

We suggest in this volume that present dangers revealed in conjunctures like the shocking devastation in Norway are made intelligible through a Predian perspective that sees the past not as once upon a time or "the way it really was," but instead when "the then (and There) and the (Here and) Now come together into a constellation like a flash of lightning," what in Benjamin's words is to "seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger" ([1968] 2007, 255). Making sense of the tragedy in Norway requires a more situated approach, placing it in the context of the legacy of the European right wing, for "Breivik's targeting of Norway's social democrats is in line with the general fascist paranoia that sees 'cultural Marxism' across the progressive political spectrum" (Bhattacharyya 2011). His perceptions and ideas resonate with and incite an international network of contacts that take as their principal targets Muslims, multiculturalism, and "cultural Marxists" and whose ideas have become diffuse.

This volume argues that we need an uncompromisingly critical understanding of spatiality that calls on theories of power and culture developed by cultural Marxists like Walter Benjamin, Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall, and others, but that extends them by insisting on the scrutiny of "situated practices" and their attendant meanings and power relations in a Predian perspective that is transdisciplinary and eclectic in its analytic. It is a tall order to move between material social practices, perceptions, biographies, and representations requiring complex geographical and anthropological sensibilities, but this is necessary if we are to make sense of the social and spatial transformations of the present moment and identify what is at stake in them. How else are we to understand such issues confronting us as the rise of new forms of inequality, or power, and their imbrications with race and gender (see Hart, Postero, Partridge, and Merrill in this volume)? How the social and political geographies of postcolonial nations are formed around oil and an oil complex (see Watts, this volume)? The meanings of proxy wars and drone attacks (see Gregory, this volume)? The social effects of toxins in the form of brownfield development (see Krupar, this volume)? The meaning of "Europe" today (see

Merrill and Partridge, this volume)? The framing of innovation and competition (see Walker, this volume)? Shifting identities and spatialities (see Mitchell, Katz, and Merrill, this volume)? This extended moment of danger, when capitalist modernity is accelerated and everyday taken-for-granted(s) are repeatedly shattered, when there is crisis of collective identity, and a loss of faith in political leadership? A time when people are driven individually and collectively to wonder, "What in the world is going on here? Where in the world am I, are we? Who in the world am I, are we?" (Pred 1995b), when it seems that "things are falling apart, again" (Fortun 2012, 449), and indeed, when even "the concept of crisis" reigns as a defining paradigm (see Roitman 2014)? These are some very challenging problems to unravel.

The authors of these chapters all follow the pathways of thought carved out in the work of this highly innovative thinker Allan Pred, whose theoretically rich critical interrogations and "re-presentations" of hypermodernity are rooted in an insistence on historically, geographically situated practices. Each scholar struggles with the nucleus of theoretical notions generated by him to pursue pressing questions of his or her own distinctive research endeavors. The chapters follow various Predian theoretical threads that seem vast but are linked through an insistent critique of that which goes unnoticed such as the way the past and the present enfold within one another, everyday life and spectacular capitalism, biography and the making of identities and places through lived geographies and bodily engagements in locally situated practices, the relationship between language, spatiality and power, capitalist space economies, the culture and materiality of the state, and the production and contestation of racialized collective identities.

Through the innovative work presented in this volume, we hope to make accessible significant new research that is of its very nature transdisciplinary. The volume also argues that Allan Pred's work offers in a compellingly unique way new paths for critical scholars to understand and address contemporary reconfigurations of power, place, subjectivity, and economy. The essays are clustered around two central themes, one surrounding patterns of contemporary Western everyday racisms, and another that addresses social and economic issues. All the authors peel back layers of "situated practices and their associated meaning and power relations" in order to demonstrate the making of subjectivities in the past and the present, and the dangers of silencing and forms of collective deception. This work resonates widely with interest across the academy, and we hope it will build bridges to new scholarship that may be inspired by the novel directions initiated here by those compelled to go beyond the confines of their disciplines to test theoretical frontiers yet unexplored.

The volume is divided into five parts that examine and expand on themes developed in Pred's writings: critical spatiality; situated practices; the urban and the spectacular; historical geographies of the present; and situated biographies.

Part 1. Critical Spatiality

Questions of spatiality in critical social theory are taken up in two chapters by Katharyne Mitchell and Gunnar Olsson. As noted previously, early critical Marxist theorists posited the autonomy of culture in response to economic determinism and yet insisted that culture and ideology operate in unison with social and material conditions. Gramsci and Althusser, for instance, examined the state of play between the economic and the cultural, leaning toward the economic as determinate "in the first instance," while foregrounding the materiality and agency of cultural meanings and representations. These theorists, including Walter Benjamin, tended to be preoccupied with questions of how capitalist modernity affect and are affected by time, focusing little direct attention on space as more than a receptacle.

Critical and feminist geographers have argued that space is an agent in social and economic transformation, and this crucial understanding is taken up by Katharyne Mitchell, who underscores the importance of attention to spatiality in a Predian perspective. Through an exploration of Walter Benjamin's ruminations on potentially revolutionary or messianic time, Mitchell notes how Pred moved "these ideas into new configurations of possibility with the addition of spatially situated practices and subjectivities." The attention to situated subjectivities and politics offers social scientists a way to probe the taken-for-granted and the past for critical analysis and transformative potentiality. Mitchell turns this concern to our current moment of danger, the here and now, through an engagement with Bernard Stiegler and the implications of consumer capitalism, the extensive technologization of life, and the constitution of collective memory for generations to come.

Also discussing the kinds of politics that emerge from critical spatialities, but through a distinctive angle, Gunnar Olsson adopts a Predian approach to the National Historic Museum of Stockholm to uncover the hidden relations of power under the glass cases of a traveling show, in which race, power, and the inchoate fringe of language and visual culture transform the taken-for-granted into evidence of what lies just below the skin. Olsson explores what Pred might have called visible forms and invisible meanings, and the central thematic articulation of power and language deeply integrated in the Western museum culture. Through the examination of the grotesque and the taken-for-

granted in Titian's *The Flaying of Marsyas*, Olsson explores the very nature of visual communication, contrasting the language of images to the constraints of creative expression and at times arbitrary limitations placed on language.

Part 2. Situated Practices

Interrogating the geographic, cultural, and historical situatedness of power relations, identities, politics, and regimes of truth is taken up by Gillian Hart, Heather Merrill, and Damani Partridge. A great deal of interdisciplinary interest has been addressed to practice since the appearance of Pierre Bourdieu's *Outline of a Theory of Practice* in the late 1970s. Bourdieu applied a neo-Marxist perspective to develop a theory of the production and reproduction of taken-for-granted social and cultural structures and symbolic systems through embodied, material practices. This concern with the way subjectivity is formed through systems of knowledge as they are produced and practiced in daily life was also central to Michel Foucault's analytic of power and to a theory applied to the spaces of everyday urban life by Michel de Certeau. Drawing on all these perspectives along with Walter Benjamin's insights on the production of modern urban life, Allan Pred advanced a geographical concept of practices as situated in social and economic history. This is a highly dynamic conception of space and society as produced through temporally specific practices, forms of knowledge, and individual biographies.

In her essay, Gillian Hart employs a Predian approach to the intersection of culture and materiality to explore the production of nationalism and the legitimacy of the state in post-apartheid South Africa as it intersects race and sexuality. Her examination of the controversies around Brett Murray's *The Spear*, a painting of President Zuma, reveal an open critique of racialized masculinity and a hidden appeal to hypermasculinity that shields collaboration with global, neoliberal capital. The controversies surrounding *The Spear* serve as a point of departure for Hart's examination of the broader political stakes of a Predian understanding.

While Hart takes up the direct employment of racial discourse as a form of state legitimization, Heather Merrill and Damani Partridge interrogate the silences surrounding the taken-for-grantedness of racial hegemony in contemporary Europe. The tensions and conflicts around social and cultural diversity are, as we have discussed, a pressing issue in Europe and globally. Heather Merrill, whose essay was the springboard for this volume, deploys Pred's concept of situated practices and the critique of binarist categories along with critical race and feminist theory to explore how situated practices inscribe the body and mind with taken-for-granted meanings about race and belonging that do

not diverge from the dominant discourse, *even in* counterhegemonic or ostensibly alternative feminist and intercultural sites. Through the concept of situated intersectionality, Merrill discusses the emergence of overlapping multicultural and feminist spaces in Italy and the politics of antiblackness, highlighting the invisibility of multilocal identity for migrants of African origin.

In his essay, Damani Partridge explores the production and contestation of space by migrant youth in Germany. Partridge adopts an unconventional approach derived from Pred's writings to examine the power constellations and subjectivities that are emerging as Europe is reconstituted. He examines how the monumentalization of the past via Holocaust memorials in Germany may serve to silence links between past genocides and persistent iterations of racism, creating new specters of exclusion that posit "migrant youth" as the primary purveyors of anti-Semitism. The past, he suggests, is being reworked in contemporary Europe as a kind of blank slate on which German and European interests can be written, but a Predian analytic both refuses the lack of critique and the situated ignorance of contemporary racisms.

Part 3. The Urban and the Spectacular

In urban studies, a great deal of attention has been given to the relationship between an increased mobility of capital and spatial and social transformations in cities. Debates about place wars and interurban competition, globalization and potential cultural homogenization, economic concentrations and the production of "global" cities, and innovation and creativity have dominated in recent decades. These studies have raised questions about the relationship between capitalism and spatial transformation, the emergence of subjects in relation to "creative" and "innovative" cities, and what in his early work Allan Pred termed "the enormously complex links between behavior and economic-geographic phenomena" (1967, 64). In his essay, Richard Walker provides a cautionary tale about the more "popular" urban economic models by returning to Pred's early work and its contributions to our understanding of flows/networks; cities as chief economic nodes; and city systems as containing cities of all sizes. Significantly, Pred drew upon Keynes and Myrdal in his analysis of the long-term benefits or "threshold effects" of agglomerations, particularly for what is termed innovation, leading to a critique of the "innovation diffusion" perspective. Walker's essay thus underscores earlier manifestations of an eclectic Predian cultural marxism that insists on the role of cultural systems through information flows; accounts for spatial inequalities of labor and capital; and approaches history not as a progressive chronology but rather as a source of understanding, critique, and inspiration.

The complexities of urban spatial economies may also be analyzed through the great world expositions and the centrality of spectacle to such urban events. From the dawn of these spectacular exhibits in the nineteenth century, the peculiar marriage of representations, and the sale of various and sundry items including industrial know-how and consumer goods from beer to candy, the infusion of national identity began to be projected through narrative and image. Converging with the moment of European expansionism, the exposition cycle displayed evidence of conquest with the erection of entire re-creations of African villages and in North America the posing of well-known recently vanquished Native American figures to demonstrate the power of the West and its "great civilization" (see also Olsson, this volume). That which was represented took place in lieu of actual villages and the lives of distant peoples elsewhere; rather than experiencing and acknowledging the West's indebtedness to other cultures, one consumed distorted representations that for the price of admission could stand in for the real. But the representations began to infuse every aspect of social life, for as Guy Debord notes "the spectacle is the moment when the commodity has attained the 'total occupation' of social life—a world in which one sees only the commodity" (cited in Pred 2000).

While spectacle is also taken up by Michael Watts in the next part, here Shiloh Krupar examines the spectacular production of a futuristic urban world in the Shanghai world exhibition of 2010 through an analysis of what she calls soil hermeneutics and the dangers of "sustainable spectacle." Krupar considers the particularities of a "developing" country hosting a world exhibition on sustainable urban development through a Predian approach intersected by a Foucauldian analytics of power. Explicitly resisting an easy critique of the expo as "greenwashing" that requires "a split between the material and discursive dimensions of the expo," Krupar instead examines it as a governing arrangement that produces territories (brownfields, eco-cities), subjects (crowds), and ways of knowing (contamination, waste, human use). Moreover, she cautions us that sustainable spectacle not only produces dangers both now and in the future, but it also "forestalls ethical consideration of the way the past persists in conditioning the complex social-ecological relations at present."

Part 4. Historical Geographies of the Present

Another key insight of Walter Benjamin that was taken up by Pred and is engaged by the three authors in this section is that modern historical time does not "progress" with a linear systematicity. Rather Pred advanced a vision of spatialized time in an effort to demythologize taken-for-granted perceptions and assumptions. Deploying this vision as well as Benjamin's montage method,

Allan Pred "re-presented the present and its modern antecedents," furthering a dynamic and dialectical rendering of history not as a continuum out of the past and impelled by progress into the future but as instead "apprehended from our vantage point in the present as ruptured moments that take on significance because of their relationship to the present" (Susan Willis cited in Pred 1995b, 23; also Mitchell, this volume). In this conception, the present (hyper)modern moment repeats in reworked forms the nightmares of the past haunting the living.

In his essay, Michael Watts examines two insurgencies and their claims on belonging in Nigeria. Building on Pred's penchant for historical detail, the deep grammar of places and place making, and cultural struggles of hypermodernity, Watts considers both an Islamic-oriented movement and a resource-oriented movement to argue that these "insurgencies represent a state of emergency that questions the very existence of an entity called Nigeria." Both movements build on collective memories, are articulated with global capitalist resource extraction (i.e., oil), and are legible to disenfranchised youth as cultural struggles over belonging.

Attention to the "trialectical" tensions between situated practices, meanings, and power relations is also examined by Nancy Postero in her discussion of a historically and geographically contingent "progressive extractivism" and its contestation by indigenous peoples in Bolivia. Advancing Pred's theoretical framework of cultural articulation, Postero focuses on the ways that Evo Morales's "Left" government is a part of the reworking of race and racism as "capitalism undergoes yet another transition in the contemporary era." As Morales aimed to build a "plurinational" Bolivia that was decisively postneoliberal, the project not only produced racist reactions from white-mestizo elite but also accusations of racism against Morales himself from indigenous communities sacrificed to the extractivist development model. In this moment of danger, people drew on legible "cultural materials" to make sense of the political and economic restructuring they experienced, reproducing and reconfiguring racisms.

Derek Gregory's examination of the genealogy and geography of the drone as a technology of war reveals an "enduring sameness" and also some compelling differences in the conduct of later modern warfare. Targeted killings from the sky have a long history, but drones represent the enlistment of new photo-cartographic imaginaries, technologies of vision that serve even more dehumanized methods of military violence. As killings take place from ever-increasing distances and crews survey targets without being seen, sometimes for months, troubling contradictions between heightened detachment and invasive, voyeuristic intimacy emerge. As the risks of warfare are transferred to overseas populations and the locus of warfare is wherever an individual enemy

prey happens to be living, the drone has become a vector of the current empire. And yet critical focus is overwhelmingly on the legal ramifications of these actions instead of the way in which this technology of war transforms other lifeworlds into deathworlds.

Part 5. Biographical Montage of the Present

In the final part of this volume, Cindi Katz employs a Predian and Benjaminian method of using montage to explore the imbrications of history and geography through three Bronx childhoods intertwined in time and space. Her chapter offers an innovative method for exploring "topographical consciousness," or how biography is shaped through the intertwining of memory and place. Walking through a Bronx neighborhood and talking about what was once there, Katz suggests a methodology for re-cognizing time spaces, revealing new constellations and ways of thinking about present moments of danger.

This volume offers a groundbreaking collection of essays that propel into the future an expanded and enriched Predian perspective. Written by students and colleagues influenced by Allan Pred through their time at UC Berkeley and/or through close collegial relationships with Pred, the volume speaks to his prescience in realizing the need for transdisciplinary thinking in order to make sense of the present. Pred spent his prolific career at Berkeley, where he played a pivotal guiding role as a central luminary of the "Berkeley School," publishing twenty-two books and countless articles, mentoring junior faculty, leading the geography department as chair, and training graduate students across campus. Through his complex interpolations via ethnography into the simultaneities of society and space, language and power, history and practice, culture and materiality, Pred addressed problems in social theory that have preoccupied scholars in the humanities and social sciences for decades, providing new guideposts. His interventions, as Michael Watts has suggested, "seem to throw down a theoretical gauntlet, putting into question the established orthodoxies" (Watts 2010). By bringing together work influenced by Pred, this volume draws together various strands of thinking in social theory that have tended to be separated or ignored. Pred was ahead of others in his expansiveness and disregard of disciplinary gatekeeping canons, extracting nourishment for his theoretical and methodological innovations from a wide range of critical neo-Marxist, feminist, and post-structuralist social theories. Remember: "Inquiry into the current moment of danger calls for moving out of bounds, for undisciplined acts" (Pred 1995a, 1086). Much is at stake.

> Are YOU prepared to take advantage of what you have learned here of the inevitable situatedness of all knowledge? Of the fact that what people do or do not know, the discourses they have or have not been exposed to, the taken-for-granteds that inform their actions, can in absolutely no way be separated from the on-the-ground-embodied and situated practices in which they have participated—or have been excluded from?" (Allan Pred, Geography Commencement, University of California, 2006)

NOTES

1. http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2014/mar/06/norway-massacre-memorial-jonas-dahlberg-anders-behring-breivik.

2. At the time of our writing, a number of critical works have emerged such as Tietze, Rundle, and Humphrys (2011); those in the "Bloodlands" collection (Bachman, Bialasiewizc, and Sidaway [2012]); and Fekete (2012). We distinguish our critical approach from the more psychological (including some of the gender-based analyses) and media studies interpretations of the Utoya tragedy.

3. To underscore the eclectic, idiosyncratic, and transtheoretical approach engaged in by Allan Pred, here we use the term "cultural marxist" rather than "cultural Marxist."

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PART ONE

Critical Spatiality


מוזיאון ישראל, ירושלים
the israel museum, jerusalem
متحف اسرائيل، اورشليم القدس
Museum of Contemporary Art
Negotiating Rapture: The Power of Art to Transform Lives
MCA, Chicago: June 21-October 20, 1996
X.96.34/Cat.34
Paul Klee
New Angel (Angelus Novus), 1920
12-1/2 x 9-1/2 in. (31.8 x 24.2 cm)
The Israel Museum
#17

Previous page: Angelus Novus (from back), image by Trevor Paglen.

CHAPTER 2

It's TIME

The Cultural Politics of Memory in the Current Moment of Danger

KATHARYNE MITCHELL

> The original task of a genuine revolution . . . is never merely to "change the world," but also—and above all—to "change time." Modern political thought has concentrated its attention on history, and has not elaborated a corresponding concept of time. Even historical materialism has until now neglected to elaborate a concept of time that compares with its concept of history.
>
> —GIORGIO AGAMBEN, "Time and History"

One of the many themes that Allan Pred pursued in his work was the motif of time. Time was also a central concern of Walter Benjamin's, and Pred frequently employed many of the famous passages from *On the Concept of History* in his own poetry, montages, and vignettes. He was fascinated by the possibilities inherent in the "tiger's leap into the past," especially in the invocation of a disrupted time that he perceived as inherently revolutionary (W. Benjamin 1968, 261). In the following discussion, I detail some of Benjamin's insights and show how Pred drew on them while adding his own reflections, based largely on his empirical research in Sweden. In his major later works, especially *Recognizing European Modernities* (1995) and *The Past Is Not Dead* (2004), Pred focused on transformations in time that resonated with Benjamin's work but moved these ideas into new configurations of possibility with the addition of spatially situated practices and subjectivities.

Benjamin engaged with time in many of his works, but most notably in his meditations on the philosophy of history. He drew on the concept of *Jetztzeit* (Now-time, or the Here and Now) to contrast with and give an alternative to positivist or vulgar-Marxist concepts of what he termed "homogeneous, empty time" (1968, 261). The latter relied on a historicist and evolutionist conceptualization of history, which Benjamin eschewed in favor of a more revolutionary or "messianic" orientation to temporality.

Benjamin's approach to time and history was revolutionary in that it called attention to the normative assumptions of Enlightenment thought about historical time, particularly the presupposition of a slow but steady and insistent progress toward a higher goal. Benjamin elucidated how this goal, which was enlightenment, and progress toward this goal—progress itself—often fused to become one and the same thing. Thus, in conceptualizations of the Enlightenment such as Kant's, "the goal itself is the telos"; in other words, progress is both the movement and the goal, both perfectible *in* time (A. Benjamin 2005, 1). This is a problematic position, as Andrew Benjamin points out, both in the "acceptance of a pregiven goal thought within the determining presence of teleology" and in the ways in which it elides conflict as one of the key dimensions and conditions of historical change (2005, 1).

One of Walter Benjamin's great insights was to reject this utopian (conflict-free and inexorable) orientation to progress and instead to celebrate interruption, agonism, and "messianic standstill" as the heart of political modernity. Many scholars have noted that his "messianic" concept of time does not intend an apocalyptic vision of the end of time but rather its fulfillment: *Vollendung* (Khatib 2010). In other words, rather than shutting it down, the messianic is employed as a way of opening up the chamber of the past and its opportunities for political action; it is a way to "blast open the historical horizon of capitalist modernity" and to wrench specific bodies, experiences, and moments out of their locked spaces and comfortable narratives so that they can be (re)employed in revolutionary struggle (Khatib 2010).

One of the most powerful "blasts" that Pred employed in this struggle was in his genealogy of racism in Sweden. In *Even in Sweden*, he excavated details of the "dirty tricks" of the past that had been collectively erased from national narratives. And in *The Past Is Not Dead*, he brought into the foreground the life story of Badin, an Afro-Caribbean slave who lived much of his life in the Swedish royal court. Through his empirical work on the actual experiences, ideas, writings, and utterances of historical figures such as Badin and the many immigrants, Muslims, and others assumed to be non-European in Sweden, Pred exposed these biographies (and the reactions to them) to the light, thereby "open[ing] up the chamber of the past" (Pred 2004). In so doing he showed how fictional accounts, stereotypes, and processes of collective remembering and forgetting led to commonsense, taken-for-granted ideas about Swedish national identity. These ideas were simultaneously facilitated and buttressed by material racisms such as discrimination in employment and housing. And as an imagined national past was culturally and materially reworked through time, so too was the imagined present and future.

In bringing about a "messianic standstill," forcing the juggernaut to a halt,

Pred relied on the possibilities inherent in interruption and conflict, as difficult as these were for him to engage in personally. He wrote in the preface to *Even in Sweden*, "Racism, regardless of where it occurs or the forms it takes, is not a pleasant matter, not a subject matter readily written about with detachment. Almost unavoidably then, the writing of this book has frequently proven agonizing, painful, and (di)stressful. At times it has been as if walking on a field of jagged broken glass" (2000, xi). In taking this difficult journey, however, he was able to augment the work of Benjamin by manifesting the critical articulation of different axes of power, in this case racism and capitalism. Further, he was able to make these articulations vivid and unforgettable through his invocation of the lived experiences and biographies of real people.

In these books, as in many of his works, Pred introduced alternative ways of articulating time and theories of history for a specific purpose: to break free from linear, hegemonic narratives that mask asymmetries of power and preserve the status quo. Like Benjamin, he was determined to open up and critique the taken-for-granted, which often relies on the weight of history and historical trajectory to create a commonsense understanding of the present and the future. Pred was in constant conversation with Marxist thought, but without adherence to a particular script. There was never a hint of a necessary or likely progression through events or even vis-à-vis events relating in a specific dialectical formation to each other. Like Benjamin, but with more attention to the multiple axes of power in society, he practiced an idiosyncratic form of cultural Marxism—his own particular take on the Frankfurt School and the complex relations between economy and culture.

Benjamin's use of specific crystallized events from the past to illuminate larger forces and constellations in the present was also a very particular kind of historical materialism, one that was at odds with both the Kantian idealism of Enlightenment thought and also with the meta-historical position of orthodox Marxists. Slavoj Zizek writes of this unique framing, "What specifies his historical materialism—in contrast to the Marxist doxa according to which we must grasp events in the totality of their interconnections and their dialectical movement—is its capacity to *arrest*, to *immobilize* historical movement and to *isolate* the detail from its historical totality" (1989, 139). The "congelation" of events captured and illuminated in a single detail rather than the historical dialectical process as a whole provided, for Benjamin, the tools needed to recover and thereby reactivate a revolutionary animus; it was not the continuous flow leading forward but rather the fragments and failures of the past that could provide the source and sustenance of deep change in the "real" world (Buck-Morss 1991).

Indeed, Benjamin's critique of homogeneous, empty time took direct aim

at both the vulgar-Marxist theoretical reliance on a transhistorical trajectory of succession and at the real-world complacency of the Weimar-era social democrats. Among other problems, the latter group promoted and naturalized visions of future redemption for the working class, rather than preserving cultural memories of historical oppression. Thus "progress" was projected as inevitable, irresistible, and boundless, encompassing all within its fold and automatically leading to a better place for all humankind. But collective memory, the source of *real* revolutionary progress for Benjamin, was left to wither away. He wrote of the dangers of this smug reliance on a futurist orientation to time: "Social Democracy thought fit to assign to the working class the role of the redeemer of future generations, in this way cutting the sinews of its greatest strength. This training made the working class forget both its hatred and its spirit of sacrifice, for both are nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than that of liberated grandchildren" (1968, 260).

The concept of *Jetztzeit*, or Here and Now, encompasses the fullness of historical memory that is collectively archived yet constantly transformed through reactivation in the present. The archive is composed of fragments, glittering shards of the past that can be retroactively appropriated and redeemed, despite their weak or failed originating effects. Indeed, this understanding of historical montage as collective agency in the now not only provides an alternative historiography, but as Sami Khatib writes, it "aims at a new concept of history affecting the ontological status of the past happening. History is never completed or perfect but radically *imperfect* and open to its retroactive modification" (2010).

Pred took these ideas to heart in his tripartite examination of three major exhibitions in Stockholm in 1897, 1930, and 1992 (the Globe). Using the first two moments as springboards into the past and linking them to the more contemporary Glob(e)al arena allowed him to trace the episodic blasts of capitalist modernity as expressed in spectacles of commodification and consumption across time and space. As articulated in the title and subtitle to his book, recognizing the modernities of Europe required both a "*re* cognizing" and a "montage of the present." In other words, European modernities presented a paradox—that of the "ever changing (that is) always again the same" (Pred 1995; Pred pers. comm.).[1] How to uncover and elucidate this paradox demanded—for Pred—the use of montage, the bringing together of the past and the present in a constellation. Unsurprisingly, Benjamin's famous epigram is thus used to introduce the book (Pred 1995, flyleaf):

> It isn't that the past casts its light on
> what is present or that what is present casts its
> light on what is past; rather, an image is that in

which the Then [and There] and the [Here and] Now
come together into a constellation like a
flash of lightning.
WALTER BENJAMIN (1972–1989), VOL. V

Throughout *Recognizing European Modernities*, Pred meditates on the nature and usage of time by way of montage. Rather than merely saying or saying in only one register—that of the academic—Pred attempts to show the meaning of Swedish Modern through multiple forms of articulation. These forms include illustrations, cartoons, poetry, strings of quotations, flyers, maps, posters, photographs, and bits and pieces of analysis, all juxtaposed to (re)tell the story of multiple modernities that are "always again the same." Through this montage Pred manifests the relationships between the ruptured moments of the past and the present and also between the spectacular spaces of exhibitions and the biographies and practices of those who attend them or labor on their creation.

The concept of history as radically open and imperfect disrupts linear and evolutionist models of time, but neither Benjamin nor Pred equated this with randomness or choice. It is not just any individual detail that can illuminate the larger whole and activate the claims of history that have long been buried. In this, it is the two scholars' attention to power relations and to the connections between the theoretical and the empirical that provide the limits to relativist or a-contextual understanding of the imperfectability of history. For example, Benjamin's theoretical musings on time were affected by the *real-time* passage of events in Weimar and fascist Germany, and the intrinsic connections between the historical unfolding of events such as the Stockholm exhibitions and specific kinds of power relations in Sweden during those years quite literally grounded everything that Pred wrote.

Attention to situated practices, power relations, and lived biographies was a key feature of Pred's work, which was one of the reasons he gravitated to Benjamin's ideas toward the latter part of his career. But in some respects Pred went further with these key themes—of time and memory and collective experience situated within the here and now of modernity. In his thesis on the social democrats and the importance of collective memory quoted here, for example, Benjamin writes how memory of past antagonism and injustice is vital because of its potential for "nourishment" of the types of affect that underpin revolutionary action. But contemporary scholars, including Pred, have noted the importance of collective memory not just for class "nourishment" but even more vitally for the constitution of subjects themselves.

In *Lost Words and Lost Worlds*, Pred takes these ideas to their fullest poten-

tial, investigating the complex interrelationship of language, collective memory, economic change, and subjectivity formation in a full-length monograph on fin de siècle Stockholm. He is particularly interested in the ways in which cultural meanings, everyday practices, and the biographies of individuals are always interlocked and dialectical. He writes, "The language through which the consciousness of individuals is given expression and through which certain impressions of the world are differentiated, classified, retained, and creatively combined cannot be separated from the temporally and spatially specific conditions under which people live" (1990, 1). In this and other works, Pred signals the vital importance of the socioeconomic world and collective formations of understanding and memory for the expression and indeed constitution of the individual and for forms of individual and collective representation such as language.

Here Pred's strong stance on the negative repercussions of industrial capitalism is clear as he demonstrates both the anomie and the cultural alienation experienced by workers in late nineteenth-century Stockholm and also notes the material dislocations and horrific working conditions of the era. Characteristically, however, Pred spends a considerable amount of time also enumerating the many forms of physical and symbolic resistance expressed by industrial laborers during this time of upheaval. For example, he lays out the particular linguistic expressions of "discipline-avoidance and retaliatory tactics" in an extensive glossary of "lost words." These encompassed literally hundreds of words from the past that Pred excavated from dusty Swedish archives and blasted into the present, thus helping to preserve and re-collect the collective memories of the generation (Pred 1990).[2]

Pred was fascinated and appalled by the changes wrought by capitalist modernity, whether it was in fin de siècle Stockholm, or in the current "moment of danger." While Benjamin famously identified and repudiated the rise of consumer capitalism in the early twentieth century, he could not completely foresee the emergence of the postwar "hyper" capitalism that was a source of great interest and inspiration to Pred. In *Reworking Modernity*, which he cowrote with Michael Watts, Pred examines various forms of time-space compression as it plays out in the implementation of new kinds of labor processes and relations, the physical deployment of new technologies, and the experiences and practices of everyday life (Pred and Watts 1992, 113). The book links past, present, and future through its investigation of the spatially and temporally uneven nature of capital accumulation and capitalist crisis, particularly the ramifications of these episodic moments as experienced consciously and expressed and represented symbolically.

Reworking Modernity, which appeared in 1992, was prescient vis-à-vis its

interest in time, technological transformation, fast capitalism, and subjectivity formation, as these themes have been widely taken up by numerous scholars in the past decade. In the following section, I give a brief introduction to the work of the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler, who has worked on many of these same ideas. I then follow with an illustrative case study from my research with Sarah Elwood on neogeographies and youth. In particular, Stiegler's recent focus on youth, technologies, and the importance of collective memory provides a helpful way of thinking through the possibilities of alternative theories of time and history in the tradition of Benjamin and Pred.

Time, Technology, Subjectivities

In his three-volume opus, *Technics and Time,* Stiegler focuses on the relationship between the human and technology and how, in the contemporary period of consumer capitalism, the acceleration of technological innovations produced a crisis in this relationship (1998 and 2009). Of central concern for him are questions of deep attention, collective memory, and individual consciousness, and how these are being negatively affected by the speed-up associated with, in Benjamin's language, our current "moment of danger." For Stiegler, the current moment is one marked by a profound but often unrecognized crisis of the human spirit and of human development and potential. This crisis is being activated and incited by forms of technological speed-up in the context of consumerist societies that are leading most people to operate in short-term and reactive ways rather than vis-à-vis feelings of long-term desire.

Stiegler argues that the substitution of instant gratification for long-term desire is having and will continue to have serious consequences for the constitution of subjects because long-term desire is essential for the move from immaturity to maturity (i.e., from a kind of childhood to the responsibilities associated with adulthood, especially systems of care and concern). He argues that it is only through long-term desire and deep attention that humans can learn the attentional knowledges and techniques of care for the self and others that are necessary for human growth and the development of full human potential (Stiegler 2010; see also Sinnerbrink 2009; Barker 2009; Mitchell and Elwood 2013).

One of the critical elements in the move from short-term drive to long-term desire, and from immaturity to responsibility, is collective memory. For Stiegler, collective, or "tertiary," memory is comprised of inherited forms of memory that are stored through technical means in a cultural archive on which everyone draws. This cultural archive provides the foundation or underpinning of a generalized knowledge/memory that conditions the emergence of

individual consciousness. In this view, individual consciousness develops from the complex, layered accretions of collective memory, which are both transmitted and transformed as they pass through the generations via various forms of "education" writ large (including relational forms of caregiving, etc.; Stiegler 2010).

Stiegler argues that the speed-up and forms of stimulation associated with consumer (what Pred would term "hyper") capitalism and new disorienting technologies have reduced the time and attention necessary for the educational transmission of collective memory between generations. The stimulation of short-term drives or wants (e.g., for consumer goods) over longer-term desires destroys the ability to maintain long-term investments in anything, including relationships. This short-circuits the critical link between generations and the production of and access to collective memory. In a lengthy philosophical discussion, he shows how this ultimately damages the processes of "transindividuation" necessary for the constitution of healthy subjects.[3] Ultimately, he argues, it is only through restoring time in the form of deep attention and care that healthy subjects and relationships can be reconstituted.

Stiegler's work relates to that of both Pred and Benjamin in recognizing the destructive influence of modern consumer capitalism on subjects, as well as the importance of thinking about history and memory alternatively. As mentioned earlier, Pred noted the importance of collective memory not just as it relates to the nourishment of class awareness and revolutionary consciousness but even more profoundly, for the constitution of subjects. Pred, Benjamin, and Stiegler thus share an interest in how the past, and our collective preservations and excavations of it, may provide the greatest possibilities for the formation of alternative futures.

The key point in drawing on the Benjamin-Pred-Stiegler lineage is the emphasis on rethinking our understanding of time, while at the same time linking this highly theoretical pursuit with a very grounded examination of contemporary capitalism, and how both are integrally related to the constitution of individual being. While many scholars have pursued in-depth investigations of all these themes independently of one another, few have tackled the difficult task of linking them and of grounding the theoretical in the empirical and theory to praxis. Yet it is exactly this type of constellation, as Pred often expounded, that provides the ontological framing necessary to understand the very things we wish to study—including the lived experiences and practices of people in distinct and specific times and places.

Stiegler's emphasis on deep attention, collective memory, and long-term desire is one way of subverting the naturalized presentism of short-term consumer desire and hyper-speed technologies; Benjamin's use of montage is

another—vis-à-vis subverting the naturalized presentism of thinking, which relies on linear and "homogeneous, empty time" theories of history. Pred's attention to situated practices and the importance of spatial history and consciousness in the formation of subjects is a third method that invokes time and the past in alternative ways. In recent research we sought to reinvigorate the positive potential of all these reflections and methods through interactive and intergenerational online mapping with children. By making some of Seattle's "hidden" historical spaces of inequality visible through the techniques of computer mapping, we hoped to awaken a critical spatial citizenship and enhance the potential for greater civic engagement among young people.[4]

Our research involved twenty-nine girls in a single-sex, independent middle school in a relatively poor area of South Seattle. Girls of color constituted 45 percent of the children involved in the project, and 30 percent received some form of financial aid. The interactive mapping component that we introduced to the class augmented a teacher-directed project in which each girl was working in a team of four or five students conducting archival and interview research on the history of a specific group in Seattle. Out of the many possibilities presented to them, two teams chose to research the spatial history of African Americans, two teams worked on the spatial past of women, and three teams worked individually on the historic places and activities of the Chinese, the Filipinos, and the Japanese in Seattle.

An early problem noted by the researchers was the inability of the students to identify "history" with "place," even with the places that were part of their everyday landscape. With help, however, the students began to make more-direct connections between research articles or stories pertinent to their group and the Seattle neighborhood where the event or set of processes took place. The questions we wanted the students to consider included historical and contemporary exclusions, segregations, or banishments from urban space; the formation of community-building institutions and enclaves; who the key players were in these types of spatial productions; and how these patterns recurred or changed through time.

We worked with the students for two weeks, joining the class daily for two-hour segments of collaborative mapping and commenting. The interactive Web-based platform we designed allowed the students to zoom in and out of different scales, to create and locate features using one of three symbols (areas, points, lines), and to append additional content to maps such as text, photos, sketches, and videos. Collaborative learning was facilitated through a commenting function, which enabled a running exchange of comments and responses associated with a map object and also allowed students to add additional content to the map objects created by others.

The collaborative component of the exercise was fruitful almost immediately. In one of the first sessions, for example, one of the girls from the African American team mentioned that she wanted to map Jackson Street—a street close to the girls' school that was an important site in the development of West Coast jazz, and which had been mentioned in one of her interviews with a community activist. The information about jazz in Seattle, however, was initially difficult for her to find. (Significantly, the Seattle jazz scene was an important one in the history of music, yet it remains largely invisible in most histories, and in virtually all the tourist guidebooks of the city.[5]) Deriving the location and "pinning" it on the map with a point prompted a girl from another team to ask, "What is it on Jackson Street that you want to map?" Following this exercise, their dialogue and discussions with us began to link the visual and the historical-political, beginning with a place and leading from there to a critical discussion of urban events and racially based absences in the historical record.

Within a few days, the students began to employ a wider range of representational choices, mostly the addition of lines to show movement from one place to the other or to indicate a distant location. For example, in the Japanese team, one of the students placed a line between Seattle and Texas to show the location of an internment camp where some Japanese from Seattle had been interned during World War II. She wanted to indicate the particular location in Texas but also the great distance from Seattle that the interns were forced to travel. Another student placed a pin in Idaho at the Minidoka National Historic Site, where she wrote, "Minidoka was once an incarceration camp. One of the people that we interviewed was interned in Minidoka as a teenager."

While the history of the internment of Japanese from the Pacific Northwest is readily accessible to those who know where to look, it is nevertheless rarely studied in much detail in formal school lessons in Washington State, and even more rarely linked with the everyday places and people encountered by middle school students in Seattle. Connecting the experience of internment, brought home through an interview with an elderly Japanese man, with the point placements to Idaho and Texas internment camps on the maps made this history more visceral and more personal to the students. In a group discussion, for example, one of the students remarked, "I knew that the internment camps were far away, but now know exactly how far away they were, and how isolated the Japanese Americans were. They had very little space for such a big population." This kind of emotional moment of awareness and empathy is made possible only through the multiple archives of collective memory that can be accessed through educational processes writ large—blasting the past into the present and reconfiguring the shards in new forms.

In another mapping exercise, a student from the team studying the Japanese in Seattle placed a point on the Seattle Courthouse and explained that it was an important site because of Gordon Hirabayashi, a university student who had defied the government order to evacuate to the internment camps. In her comment about this map point, she wrote how Hirabayashi had "refused the evacuation," and in his legal defense, invoked the Fifth Amendment in court. Two other students offered supportive comments after viewing the post. They also added additional information, including a related Web site. Significantly, one of the more advanced students in the class wrote considerably more about this event after the teacher posed a question about the Fifth Amendment's relevance to the Japanese internment struggles. She showed her own understanding of the concept of due process and at the same time helped the other students to make further connections between the historical event of the internment and the idea of due process as a right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.

After several sessions together, the researchers observed that the students were thinking more critically and in more detail about the historical sites and social processes associated with their group than they had been at first. In the initial two sessions, for example, most of the map objects and comments reflected very basic knowledge at the neighborhood scale, with the historical significance of the group articulated in broad terms such as "this is where Filipinos are." By later sessions, however, the map notations were more complex and showed far greater detail—including comments on the successful activism of specific individuals in fighting for their community, forms of group resistance such as that of the Black Panthers, spatial processes like the Japanese internment—and corresponding analysis and socioeconomic transformations such as women's entry into the industrial work force at Boeing during World War II.

In our penultimate session with the students, we began by reviewing and commenting on the Filipino team's map point at Port Townsend, indicating where 339 Filipinos were quarantined in the late 1920s because of the "threat" of spinal meningitis (a threat that appeared to have been fabricated at the time). When we asked whether other groups were also separated physically from the dominant society at some point, several students raised their hands and spoke about the experiences of their own groups. For example, the team working on the Chinese experience talked about the Chinese Exclusion Act, telling us quite a bit about the social implications of these types of exclusions. The African American team spoke passionately about the historical redlining of black neighborhoods.

The main geographical connection that was made at this session was the relationship between the separation of ethnic groups, or segregation of various

kinds, and relations of power. In addition to negative, external forces leading to segregation such as redlining and quarantining, however, some girls also noted the importance of social groups advocating for their political rights as part of a socially and spatially distinct committee or organization, such as a benevolent society in the International District or the Black Student Union at the University of Washington. Others, such as the Filipino team, also spoke about the importance of sociocultural feelings of membership, which might be achieved through the formation of ethnic enclaves and community centers.

The students' increased awareness of these types of spatial historical processes led to a growing interest in their own neighborhoods in Seattle. This was manifested in their answers on a civic-engagement worksheet that we had them fill out during one of our later sessions. Here we posed a number of questions related to the social and spatial "problems" that their groups had faced in Seattle. Three members of the African American team responded to these questions by noting "redlining" and "discrimination" as well as the fact that "people couldn't get jobs because they were black." To the question of what members of the community did to solve these problems, the students responded by giving specific examples of individual and community actions that had been taken historically and also noted that all these actions or processes had been represented on their map. In response to a final question about how their class or they personally might get involved in solving any remaining problems that their group encountered, many students wrote specific things that they felt they could accomplish.

On the whole, we observed a growth in spatial awareness among the students as well as a strong new concern about "spatial politics" related to the positive and negative geographical processes affecting group identity. We found that accessing hidden or obscured spaces of the past and collectively visualizing these spaces can enable a new consciousness and feelings of greater personal agency and responsibility. The spatial patterns the students uncovered were perceived not as fixed but rather as processes with ongoing effects that must be constantly negotiated and in some cases overcome. Among the insights that many of the students derived, a key one was the growing understanding that both discriminatory actions such as redlining, *and* the creation of affirmative locales are profoundly spatial processes critical in both scope and impact to historically subordinated groups. Literally "placing" people, institutions, and events into the students' own neighborhoods by locating them on a map of the city and attaching historical and contemporary documents to each mapped space helped them to graphically and visually connect both geography and history to the present time and place and make it relevant to their own lives.

Excavating alternative histories and yoking these to greater geographic learning through a collaborative mapping project helped the students to understand how minority communities are formed in and through space, and how important space is for maintaining solidarity and resisting oppression by dominant groups. Further, through the process of researching, mapping, and talking with one another and with us about their own city and neighborhoods, the students began to understand history as not necessarily a set of seemingly abstracted events that happened "back then" and "out there" but rather as things that happened that are unevenly remembered and acknowledged and which may be continuing to happen here, in our space, to us. Collectively visualizing and discussing historical acts such as the quarantining of Filipinos (there were two girls of Filipino descent in the class) or redlining in the African American neighborhood where several of the girls lived, for example, galvanized a sense of collective responsibility for these spaces and the people who continue to inhabit them (see Mitchell and Elwood 2012a, 154).

The process through which the girls were able to recognize historical inequalities via examining the social-spatial boundaries of the past informed their understanding of the present. It also aided in the formation of their own sense of possibility: how actions for greater justice have made a difference and *can* make a difference. Recovering consciousness of this kind is possible only when collective memory is retained and archives exist that can be accessed socially and intergenerationally. Benjamin, Pred, and Stiegler all engaged, in different registers, with these ideas of time, history, and memory, knowing full well the seriousness of struggles over representation and the profound importance of alternative histories.

Re-presenting Power, Poetics, and Politics

> All purposeful manifestations of life, including their very purposiveness, in the final analysis have their end not in life, but in the expression of its nature, in the representation of its significance.
>
> —WALTER BENJAMIN, *Illuminations*

Pred's fascination with wordplay and with history expressed through language was manifested in both his research and his own writings. Hannah Arendt once remarked that Benjamin had "the gift of thinking poetically," which could also be used to describe Pred and his work (Arendt 1968, 1–58). He reveled in abstract analysis that was fleshed out through metaphor and expressed in concrete utterances, juxtaposed with fragments of history. As the editors note

in their introduction to this volume, he was always interested in linking the abstract to the empirical, and the practices and biographies of people to the real-world situations in which they moved, thought, and expressed themselves.

Pred rarely invoked politics directly in his work, in the sense of an activist project of social change. Yet his constant references to power relations, to a historical context of modernity that was firmly embedded in a specific capitalist regime, and to Marxist, feminist, and postcolonial language and thought made him an emphatically political thinker. Rather than dogmatic exhortations or repetitions, he preferred to use montage, presenting the material of his research and the ideas of carefully cultivated thinkers—such as Benjamin—in delicate poetry and vignettes, which invited the reader to comprehend history in the detail and to join (or not) in shared projects of radical thought and action.

It was through forms of representation—of collective memories and alternative histories in all their fragmentary, linguistic luminescence—that Pred put forward his political project. This is important to recognize in the current moment of danger, as it is antithetical to many forms of contemporary scholarly thought that eschew both representation and history. In certain threads of nonrepresentational theory (NRT), for example, representations such as "words" are understood to be insufficient for grasping certain kinds of emotions and also for the intersubjective feelings that might flow between individuals at specific moments or events (Thrift 2000). NRT aficionados celebrate flow, affect, encounter, and assemblage over modes of thought that may be considered more intentional or linear. The emphasis is on the actions and emotions of the present moment, which are seen as exceeding the capacity of normative social science categories to capture in representational forms.

The common response of those drawing on NRT is thus to focus on the present and to elide the forms of collective memory that inform and structure the present and the future. This frequently leads to ahistorical reflections, which tend to underplay structural forces and power relations in society.[6] But as Pred shows us in so many of his scholarly works, it is precisely in the shards and fragments of the past, retained and made accessible in the archives of collective memory, that inequities and injustices can be seen and can reawaken and reilluminate a revolutionary present. It is through excavating the power relations and structural forces materialized in the "debris of mass culture" that a different future can be imagined (Buck-Morss 1991, ix).

Words and politics were inextricably linked for Pred, and thus the final "after" word here should belong to him. The penultimate ending of his book *Recognizing European Modernities* references Lenin, but then, characteristically, Pred continues with two final sentiments, those of hope and challenge:

> What other montages of the present are to be devised, what other practices of heretical empiricism are to be brought to bear, so as to enable some re*cognition* of the mutual entanglements of modern politics, economy and culture.
>
> What other histories of the present are to be devised so as to make visible the multiple pasts layered within the present moment? . . .
>
> What are the tension-riddled images to be evoked?
>
> What is to be shown?
>
> What is to be done?
>
> Every moment of danger is also a moment of opportunity to be seized upon.
>
> Or what? (1995, 264)

NOTES

1. This particular phrase is one that Allan wrote in the book he gave us: "For Katharyne and Matt—who know full well that recognizing modernities is an exercise in paradox—in recognizing both the ever changing and the always again the same. Allan."

2. See, for example, the marvelous words and expressions in glossary 4, part 1, beginning on page 72. (For example, *blindgubbar*: blind old men: fictive workers reported by a construction foreman in order to collect extra wages for his own pocket; *luftlass*: air load: nonexistent load of excavated materials reported by construction workers or livery-stable drivers.)

3. Stiegler draws largely on the work of Gilbert Simondon in his discussion of transindividuation, a process wherein the individual and the collective are coproduced—as conditioned and enabled by the retentional apparatuses supported by the technical milieu (see Stiegler 2004, 106).

4. Our research was supported by Spencer Foundation grant no. 20100052 and National Geographical Education Foundation no. 2008-U103. The data introduced briefly here was coproduced with Sarah Elwood, who has generously given permission for its use in this essay. For a more extensive introduction to our work on this project, see Elwood and Mitchell 2012 and Mitchell and Elwood 2012a. Portions of the following section are adapted from Mitchell and Elwood 2012b.

5. See, for example, the discussion in De Barros 1993.

6. For a contemporary critique of nonrepresentational theory, see Mitchell and Elwood 2012c.

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CHAPTER 3

Skinning the Skinning

GUNNAR OLSSON

ALLAN PRED—for me the most valiant comrade in the struggle with the taken-for-granted. His friends' friend, loyal beyond loyalty, but also—since he was such a determined politician—sworn enemy of his enemies. A man full of courage and integrity, hence at the same time disarmingly naive and frighteningly sophisticated. An embodied oxymoron who never took a no for a no, one of the most diligent workers I ever came across, his notebook and ballpoint always ready for yet another report from the analyst's office, language itself on the couch. Therefore, cup your ears and, like Theseus in the last act of *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, you too will learn that

> Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
> Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend
> More than cool reason ever comprehends.
> The lunatic, the lover, and the poet
> Are of imagination all compact.
> . . . . . .
> And as imagination bodies forth
> The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
> Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
> A local habitation and a name. (5.1.7–8, 5.1.14–17)

And for that reason we were fully aware that just as imagination is the faculty that enables us to make the absent present and the present absent, so it is by selecting and naming his fix-points that the cartographic reasoner knows not only where he is but from whence he came and to where he is heading.

No wonder that our critics occasionally thought us mad, allegedly fancying ourselves as updated versions of Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon, even Dr. Livingstone I presume. But mad we were not, merely smitten by the conviction that no truth is forever, indeed that truth—*like the powers it serves*—is inherently evasive, always hiding, always on the move. "What, then, is truth?" asked Friedrich Nietzsche, himself immediately replying that "truth is a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms and anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical and obliga-

tory to a people: *truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are*; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins" (1976, 46–47; emphasis added).

With these quotations as take-off points, I am now launched back to the academic year of 1980–81, a period when the Pred/Olsson relation turned from occasional to serious, he enjoying one of his recurring sabbaticals in Stockholm, I still recovering from the shock of returning from Michigan to Sweden. In retrospect this was a most crucial period for both of us, and once a week we met for a well-greased afternoon at the outer limits of language, the expression

—/—

the symbol around which we were performing our rain dance.[1] The challenge was to explore the void of the excluded middle, for already at that stage we were convinced that it is exactly in the taboo-ridden abyss between categories that power has its well-guarded residence; thus, while we took the two dashes (— —) to stand for individual and society (more correctly identity and existence), the dialectical slash (/) represented the abstract space of the in-between; in both cases a local habitation and a name, in its totality a combination of map and compass, a minimalist guide to, in, and through the landscape of power. So profound were these insights that the present essay may be best described as a set of assisted ready-mades, a collage of quotations (see Olsson 2007b).[2]

As firm believers in the epistemology of extremity, we were convinced that truth lies in the periphery rather than the center, in the slips of tongue rather than the nodding of the head, in the statistical variance rather than the mean. That given, I was surprised to notice how the truths of the marginal often seemed to make him so uncomfortable that like the prophet Job he fell into silence. Thus unable to carry his analysis beyond the surface level, the road to deeper insights was automatically blocked, the off-limits presumably too forbidden to enter. Understandable, yet sadly ironic, for how could the forbidden stay forbidden if it were not because it is protected by those same power structures that were the very target of our critiques. Taboo is nevertheless the taboo, a concept that is etymologically connected not merely with the terms "under prohibition" and "not allowed" but with the words "sacred" and "holy" as well. What is forbidden is consequently doubly anchored, first in the forbidden itself, then in the ultimate form of the taken-for-granted, the latter important enough to be blessed by the gods themselves, like the state of exception by definition beyond reach (Agamben 1998, 2002). The idea of devoting my professional life to anything less was for me never an alternative, a fault not without its consequences.

And therein lies perhaps the crucial difference between Allan and myself that in my mind he (like so many of our common friends) was not radical enough, he more focused on the practices of changing the world, I on the theories of understanding, he obsessed by the *what*, I by the *how*. Yet both of us were keenly aware that the real challenge lies not in telling the truth but in being believed when you do so, he never a parrot of the politically correct, I the staunchest critic of the world as it is. *Och natten gick hän, och det grydde till dag, och de seglade ständigt*, or, less poetically, "the prow sheared through the night into the dawn" (Lagerlöf 1957, 2.434; Homer 1963, 2.434). Scylla on the port side, Charybdis on the starboard.

In that mood I now return to the morning of July 7, 1999, and our joint visit to the National Historical Museum in Stockholm. The occasion was the exhibition of selected pieces from Hartkopf's Wax Cabinet and Anatomical Museum, a kind of Wunderkammer that in the 1890s had drawn large crowds of visitors, essentially a freaky collection of curiosities: big diamonds, dressed-up queens, chained criminals, nude women in various stages of pregnancy, Siamese twins, babies with animal heads, syphilis infected genitals, a gorilla carrying off a young white girl. Nothing real except everything looked real much as it does in today's fashion stores where the plastic gets mistaken for gold and the gold for plastic. No real flesh, merely a set of oddities molded in wax. An orgy in bad taste. Then,

> imagine, now, *if you possibly can*, amid this stunning array of the seductive and the repulsive, amid this assemblage of the arresting and the awe-inspiring, amid this hodgepodge of the pleasurable and the fascinatingly unpleasant, a stop-you-in-your-tracks glass-topped display case containing a horizontally laid-out door-sized wooden panel. And, fully stretched out and nailed to its constituent planks, *the skin of a black African "native."* And within that same case, a smaller case. Housing an object a few inches in length. Beside it, a card labeled with impeccably neat penmanship: *A Negro penis*. In the former case, no claims to mere verisimilitude, no insistence upon an equivalent simulacrum, no resort to auraless mechanical reproduction. But assertion of the real "native" thing. In the latter case, pure detachment. Nothing more or less. Imagine that! (Pred 2004, 154; emphasis in original).

In Allan's own words something unspeakably unspeakable, something indescribably hateful. Yet there it was, reality in its faked corporeality, his own taken-for-granted concretized, dignity crushed. We were equally stunned, he by the somewhat dingy specimens from the past, I by the nakedness of his reaction, glaring eyes, foaming mouth. Had he had a hammer, he would have

smashed the glass, torn the things out, yelled and screamed and been arrested. A Luddite in a professor's gown, alienation in the making.

The story lacks confirmation, yet the question remains: Why were our reactions so utterly different, especially given that none of us can be called a close-minded dupe or a compassionless bigot? Why was *he* shocked into silence, while *I* was launched into yet another loop of self-referential understanding? Why did he see the artificial skin as an image of racism, in his own words a practice beyond words, while to me it raised the question of what it means to be human? Why was he illuminated by Walter Benjamin's aphorism that "there is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism," and I by Ludwig Wittgenstein's observation that all I know is what I have words for (Benjamin quoted in Pred 2004, 177). Why did he (despite his typographical experiments) fail to see that "*the limits of my language* mean the limits of my world," that "we cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot *say* either," that "the subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world" (Wittgenstein 1961, 5.6, 5.62, 5.632; emphasis in original). And thus spoke Zarathustra about the despisers of the body: "You say I and you are proud of this little word. But greater than your word is your body, which does not say I but performs I" (my translation).[3] Likewise with the taken-for-granted, regardless of whether spoken or unspoken.

Nietzsche's insight was intimately tied to the circumstance that every individual simultaneously *has* a body and *is* a body. As a consequence, I am limited by my own skin, and this is why penetrating another is to transgress the boundaries of that person's self, to trespass, to sin, to break a taboo. Since the skin is escape proof, it is in a very concrete sense the limit of what and who we are; while in Renaissance thinking the skin was the casing of the soul, in modern psychoanalysis it is not only "the erogenous zone par excellence [but] it is also the entrance and the exit door for many emotions and situations that mark us," *the* foundation for the ego development (Ulnik 2008, 268; Anzieu 1985). Therefore, harbor no doubts that regardless of how hard you try to capture me in your categorical net and regardless of how violently you try to force my differences into your identity, I will never let you succeed! I am not to be raped by your mistranslations, no matter who you are! I am not the thingified "a=b" that you are insinuating. Instead, *I am who I am*, like the expression "a=a" a non-rephrasable tautology.

A power struggle of formidable proportions, the iconoclastic controversy, the Danish Muhammad pictures, the blown-up Buddha images, the burned books in Mali all in their proper light. To put in bluntly: Who is the rightful owner of the brand name "a=a," I myself or the powers outside me? Before you answer, just recall that it was none less than the Lord himself—by definition

always true but never informative—who long ago decreed "I will cause all my goodness to pass in front of you, and I will proclaim my name, the LORD,[4] in your presence. I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. But . . . you cannot see my face, for no one may see me and live." And then—in a most remarkable passage—that same power of power makes his address public, the exact coordinates of his castle precisely defined, invaluable information for any potential terrorist. Thus, he says, "There is a place near me where you can stand on a rock. When my glory passes by, I will put you in a cleft in the rock and cover you with my hand until I have passed by. Then I will remove my hand and you will see my back; but my face must not be seen" (Exod. 33:19–23 New International Version). Rephrased: It is in the unfathomable abyss of radical Otherness that the cleft between categories takes the form of an invaginated skin. Freud was on the right track. The unavoidable question poses itself: Who shall be the master?

So much understanding left to understand. No wonder that Allan fell silent, no wonder that on this occasion he failed to be abstract enough, failed to acknowledge that the exhibited "skin" was not a skin but a Nietzschean illusion, a Tivoli replica made of wax, a coin that had lost its picture and no longer was a hide but a fetish. Why did he fail to see that the racism against which he so rightly reacted is but a special case of the more general issue of identity and difference, the ensuing power struggle by definition a struggle over limits, the struggle over limits always a matter of drawing a line, of pointing, and of naming. Well-trodden territory, for it was in his attempts to find the way through this swampy terrain that Immanuel Kant invented the distinction between the marking of limits (*Schranken*) and the drawing of boundaries (*Grenzen*), the main difference being that what lies inside the limits of language can be shared, what lies outside its boundary cannot (Kant 1966, A 758/B 786). To be precise, "ignorance is a limit in knowledge, but such limit can be of two kinds. It may be a limit that derives simply from the fact that there are things with which we are acquainted, or it may derive from the way in which our knowledge is determined, and so limited, in its very nature. Ignorance that arises on the basis of the former may be termed accidental or contingent, while ignorance that arises on the basis of the latter may be termed necessary—so we can come to know things of which we are now ignorant, but we can never overcome the ignorance that follows from the nature of knowledge as such" (Malpas and Thiel 2011, 199; also see Olsson 2012). While the Schranken mark the unstable limits of current knowledge, the Grenzen are woven into the conceptual net itself.

Perhaps I am mistaken, but I strongly suspect that in his barrage of rhetori-

cal questions Allan was confusing the *Schranken* and the *Grenzen*, the skin of the container and the racism of the contained. But what else could he possibly have done, well knowing that had it not been for his parents' emigration he too would have been herded to Auschwitz, there to get his hair cut, his teeth pulled, his skin turned into a lamp shade. Perhaps the museum curator was right to withhold her comments, for not even Kant—the philosophical land surveyor par excellence—could always tell the *Schranken* and the *Grenzen* apart. At any rate, "the metaphor of skin makes of the subject something that is defined by its boundary rather than by an inner kernel" (Rösig 2013, 101).

The difficulties are staggering. And for that reason I am fully aware that my critique of Allan's form of cartographic reason may reveal more about my own taken-for-granted than it does about his. With that possibility clearly in mind, I went to see Abdellatif Kechiche's reality-based movie *Vénus noire*, as it turned out some of the most horrifying 166 minutes in my life, unlike the items in the wax cabinet an unparalleled show of racial and sexual humiliation. The gripping story is about Saartje Baartman (in the film played by Yahima Torres), a Khoikhoi slave who in 1808 leaves South Africa with her Afrikaan master Hendrik Caezar, both of them lured to London by the hope of freedom, fame, and riches. Once there, however, their dreams materialize in a traveling freak show in which Saartje is exhibited as a dangerous and sex-brimming animal, Caezar her whip-slashing tamer, *Hottentot Venus* the name of the performance. Too much even for the carnival goers, and Caezar is brought to court accused of the crime of keeping a slave. Saartje, though, assures the judge that she has a will of her own, that she is a free artist guaranteed half the profits. Little does she then know that she is about to be sold to the French bear tamer Réaux, who promptly takes her to Paris, where she is forced to stage the same type of performances as in London, first in the halls of beer-drinking workers, then in the champagne-flowing salons of the aristocrats, later among the libertines of the bourgeoisie, finally in the brothels and street prostitution of *Here Comes Everybody*. The only way she can take it is to be constantly drunk. In 1817, at the age of twenty-seven, she dies alone in a Paris hotel room, most likely from a combination of pneumonia and venereal disease. Everything sadder than sad.

That, however, is not the full story, the intoxicated crowds not the worst offenders of human decency. These are instead a group of French naturalists who take a strong Linnaean interest in Saartje's unusual anatomy, especially the large buttocks and elongated labia so often associated with the Khoikhoi. Immediately after Saartje's death, Réaux sells her body to the anatomists, who with no delay cut it up into pieces; weigh the skeleton, brain, and genitals; measure and put them into jars of formaldehyde. Convinced that they have discovered the missing link between man and ape, they proudly exhibit the

specimens at the popular Musée de l'Homme. There they stayed for almost two centuries until, after a formal request from President Nelson Mandela and heated debates in the French National Assembly, the remains were released and in May 2002 flown to Saartje Baartman's homeland, where the body-turned-icon was given a statesman's funeral. Tear-soaked was my shirt when in the cinema seat my body experienced how the consciousness of my existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of other things outside me.

In comparison, the poor quality of the Hartkopf figures left me cold and embarrassed. Much like an afternoon stroll along rue Saint-Denis.

With that idea of artistic quality as my compass, I now move on to the Archbishop's Palace of Kromeríz, the picturesque town in Moravia that is the home of Titian's picture *The Flaying of Marsyas* (figure 3.1), by Iris Murdoch dubbed the greatest in the Western canon and by Susan Sontag claimed to be so cruel that she could not stand looking at it. One of the most gruesome paintings ever made, a groundbreaking study of representation, a map of what it means to be human, the expression "—/—" in disguise. A gold mine for art historians (Neumann 1962; Wyss 1996; Bohde 2003; Cranston 2007; Hart 2007; Rösig 2013).

The underlying myth has its roots in book 6 of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. Cut to its bare bones it tells about a musical duel between the god Apollo on the seven-stringed lyre and the satyr Marsyas on the shepherd's *aulos*, the latter most likely a kind of flute, perhaps a prototype bagpipe. At issue is who of the two is the better musician, the highbrow Apollo or the folksy Marsyas.

To settle the case a contest is arranged, the two sides agreeing that the judge should be King Midas and that the winner would be free to do with the loser whatever he fancies, in the satyr's fantasies almost certainly something of a sexual nature. When the muses sense that the prize might be given to Marsyas, they decree that a second round must be arranged, a performance in which the contestants are asked to play the same tunes as before but now with their instruments turned upside down. Easy to do with the lyre, impossible with the pipes. And with that rule change the outcome is determined in advance: Marsyas is eventually hung in a pine tree and flayed alive. No death more cruel, no fate more humiliating.

What we see in Titian's picture is a triptych with Marsyas placed at the center of the in-between, a crucifixion in which the victim's body has been rotated around the nave of its own navel (*the* mark of the satyric union of fur-covered beast and skin-encased man), the hooves up in the tree and the arms forming a nimbus around the head, its left eye begging for our attention. To the left is the godly realm of the flaying Apollo adorned with a laurel crown accompanied by

FIGURE 3.1. Titian, *The Flaying of Marsyas*, 1575–76. Oil on canvas, 212–207 cm. State Museum, Kromeríz.

his violin-playing double, the eyes of the latter focused on the *aulos* in the tree above him. There is also the assistant butcher, a hatted craftsman working on the goat's leg, the knife angled for castration. In dialectical contrast the right panel depicts the realm of nature with its assemblage of fauns and satyrs, King Midas the commanding figure shown self-absorbed with the elbow on his knee and the chin in his hand, Rodin's *Le Penseur* three centuries before it was cast. Next to him a horned satyr with a bucket of cleaning water, a big dog held back by an innocent faun, and a smaller one licking the sacrificial blood. Grippingly gripping. But how was the painting painted? And what does it mean?

In our search for an answer, it should be recalled that Titian lived to be

almost ninety and that the *Flaying* (like the present paper) was one of his last pieces. As a consequence it has often been interpreted as the artist's attempt to investigate how the creative act is actually performed, the result according to some critics a child born from the Venetian's intercourse with the materiality of the paint itself, the distinction between figure and ground on the verge of disappearing, the cartographer's fix-point, scale, and *mappa* all fused into an unbreakable unit. Indeed, it is generally agreed that the key to Titian's success lay in his skill as a tactile painter, a genius capable of showing not merely how something *looks* but how it *feels*, Marsyas's skin and flesh sculpted by the master's brush, knife, and fingers. Not an imagination cast *onto* the canvas, but an image growing *out of* it, layer layered upon layer. And in that sense the *Flaying* actually *is* what it is *about*, the magic art of ontological transformation when it works, perhaps because the skin is our largest erogenous organ (Freud 1972, 78). As Roland Barthes puts it, "Language is a skin: I rub my language against the other. It is as if I had words instead of fingers and fingers at the tip of my words. My language trembles with desire. . . . Language experiences orgasm upon touching itself" (1978, 73).

And who is watching it all? Midas, of course, the Phrygian king to whom Dionysus had given the power of turning everything he touched into gold. Seemingly a wonderful gift but only until the recipient realizes that also his food and wine change into metal, his daughter as well. Praying to Dionysus for help, the once greedy is told to take a swim in the nearby river, and, when he does, the blessing-turned-curse immediately leaves him. An experience so overwhelming that like a latter-day hippie, Midas retires to the countryside, where he becomes a worshipper of Pan, the latter, like Marsyas and himself, a satyr, hence neither man nor beast but a creature of the in-between. In revenge for the intended insult, Apollo then adorns the dethroned king with the ears of an ass, a shame meant to follow him for the rest of his life. Not in Titian's painting, however, for there the ears are barely visible under the kingly crown.

It is this same Midas whom Titian depicts as a figure full of thought, presumably brooding about what he in his long life might or might not have achieved, a figure, furthermore, with features very reminiscent of the artist's own. And for that reason the *Flaying* is to me a self-portrait, like other mappings an exercise in triangulation—one fix-point in Marsyas's navel, the hook on which Titian hung the mirror in which he could reflect himself; another in Apollo's elbow, the lever of cruelty; a third in Midas's hand sealing his mouth, the wordless glance that leaves the viewer no rest. Know thyself, my mate!

In my own interpretation Titian's painting is yet another rendering of human tragedy, everything beautifully right in the beginning, horribly wrong in

the end, no one to blame in between, the punishment scandalously out of proportion to the crimes committed. And so it is that I hold his late works to be on par with the classics of Sophocles and Shakespeare, the painter producing the same effects with his paint as the poets with their words. The message is unequivocal: you and I are neither gods nor beasts but citizens of the land in-between, long-term residents in the notorious Bar de Saussure, the Nietzschean hangout where not a member is sober. Human, all too human, the lunatic, the lover, and the poet of imagination all compact.

Such is indeed the crucial difference between the humans and most other species (some apes excluded) that we are uniquely blessed with the faculty of imagination. And whoever masters the art of imagination thereby also knows how to play the magic trick of making the absent present and the present absent; of lying and of telling the truth; of bringing forth what has never been said or heard before; to journey through the maps of ontological transformations. As a kind of summary—and at the same time an illustration of how the Sovereign would not be sovereign if he sat still—all that now remains is to follow the word "power" itself as it moves through the parts of speech, at every step along the way becoming less and less mimetic, more and more abstract.

The starting point of that journey is in the fist, the whip, the bomb (in the present case represented by *A Negro penis* and *The skin of an African "native"*), the word "power" as a *concrete noun*, one physical object hitting another. True! Yet not true enough. For on closer reflection "power" readily shows itself to be less a concrete than an *abstract noun*, not merely a material thing but a social relation, not merely a sound but an insult; not a faked body but an African slave, not just any train but a shipment of Jews. As William Blake (in his lifetime by many considered insane) so famously put it, "Prisons are built with stones of Law; Brothels with bricks of Religion. . . . And as the catterpillar [*sic*] chooses the fairest leaves to lay her eggs on, so the priest lays his curse on the fairest joys" (Blake 2000, 114–15). True! Yet not true enough. For in the blinding light of the torture chamber, neither victim nor perpetrator ever doubts that power is a doing, hence that "power" is a *verb*. Not just any verb, though, but a battery of modal verbs, more exactly those three- and four-letter words that modify what *can*, *may*, *must*, *will*, and *shall* be done. True! Yet not true enough. For when the overripe existentialist now listens to his own conscience, then he hears it whisper that killing is sometimes good and sometimes evil, sometimes a duty, sometimes strictly forbidden. And in that twist of deontic logic the word "power" changes once again, on this occasion into an *adverb*, even an *adjective*. True! Yet not true enough.

The journey goes on, for no act is ever performed in a vacuum but always in a dialogue between an I and a Thou, "power" on that account a *pronoun*, *us* and *them* the politically most prominent. For it is undeniable that the alternative positions of us and them reflect their respective standings in the landscape of human action, the *I* in Swedish ideology the most taboo-laden of all words. Seemingly an example of political (in)correctness but in reality an issue of *conjunctions* and *numbers*. Among the latter the figure *3* is to the triangulating social scientist the first in an endless row, while zero, despite its appearance, is not a number at all but a position, *the* anchoring point of every measure, the origo of debit and credit, the standpoint rather than the vanishing point of the painter's perspective.

And once that much has been grasped, the word "power" finally comes out as what it really is—a *preposition*, literally a position assumed in advance. As the cubists knew, there is a profound difference between standing inside the house looking out and standing outside looking in, between the radical choice of being *at* a limit, *on* a limit, *in* a limit. Beware, though, because no matter how well you master a foreign language, a faulty preposition will eventually give you away.

True! And finally true enough: the ego-skin of the African native, the slashing whip of the slave trade, the Zyklon B of the gas chambers, all bodied forth in the prepositions of Titian's fix-points, paint, and canvas. And therein lies perhaps the root of our different reactions to the exhibits in the National Historical Museum. To paraphrase Edmund Leach: "Of one thing I am quite certain. Unless we pay much closer attention than has been customary to the personal background of the authors of anthropological works, we shall miss out on most of what these texts are capable of telling us about the history of anthropology" (Leach 1984). The thought of a tabula rasa is literally unimaginable.

Still. Why did *he* get so angry and *I* so inquisitive? What made him so set on changing the world and me on understanding how I understand it?

King Midas resurrected! Blake as well, for even though Allan in my minimalist eyes was a maximalist, he too had a flare for seeing a world in a grain of sand and a heaven in a wildflower.

Self-evident. Yet it took the country-boy a lifetime to discover, from beginning to end an epistemological journey of stunning discoveries, "heretical empiricism" a fitting term for a power-filled reality that refuses to sit still (Pred and Watts 1994). And that experience has in turn convinced me that contrary to the basic axiom of time geography, we actually can be in several places at the same time. For me yet another vicus of recirculation, for Allan a constantly haunting nightmare.

NOTES

1. The earliest report from that joint venture is in my "-/-" (1982) and further elaborated in *Lines of Power/Limits of Language* (Olsson 1991). Allan—for his part—sought to anchor those same ideas in the daily life of the historically contingent, first in his *Place, Practice and Structure: Social and Spatial Transformation in Southern Sweden: 1750–1850* (1986), then—and more ambitiously—in his *Lost Words and Lost Worlds: Modernity and the Language of Everyday Life in Late Nineteenth-Century Stockholm* (1990).

2. In that context, see the recollections in Olsson 2007b.

3. Compare with Nietzsche 1959, 146.

4. Usually translated as "I am I" or "I am who I Am." In the analysis of Gunnael Jensson's sculpture *Mappa Mundi Universalis* (2000), the denotation "a=a" is itself an icon of the primordial "a." For further elaborations, see Olsson 2007a and Jensen 2012.

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PART TWO

Situated Practices



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New Theses B

History deals with connections and with arbitrarily elaborated causal chains. But since history affords an idea of the fundamental citability of its object, this object must present itself, in its ultimate form, as a moment of humanity. In this moment, time must be brought to a standstill.

The dialectical image is an occurrence of ball lightning[4] that runs across the whole horizon of the past.

Articulating the past historically means recognizing those elements of the past which come together in the constellation of a single moment. Historical knowledge is possible only within the historical moment. But knowledge *within* the historical moment is always knowledge *of* a moment. In drawing itself together in the moment—in the dialectical image—the past becomes part of humanity's involuntary memory.

The dialectical image can be defined as the involuntary memory of redeemed humanity.

The notion of a universal history is bound up with the notion of progress and the notion of culture. In order for all the moments in the history of humanity to be incorporated in the chain of history, they must be reduced to a common denominator—"culture," "enlightenment," "the objective spirit," or whatever one wishes to call it.

New Theses C

Only when the course of historical events runs through the historian's hands smoothly, like a thread, can one speak of progress. If, however, it is a frayed bundle unraveling into a thousand strands that hang down like unplaited hair, none of them has a definite place until they are all gathered up and braided into a coiffure.

The basic conception in myth is the world as punishment—punishment which actually engenders those to whom punishment is due. Eternal recurrence is the punishment of being held back in school, projected onto the cosmic sphere: humanity has to copy out its text in endless repetitions (Eluard, *Répétitions*).[5]

The eternity of punishment in hell may have sheared off the most terrible spike from the ancient idea of eternal recurrence. It substitutes an eternity of torment for the eternity of a cycle.

Thinking the idea of eternal recurrence once more in the nineteenth cen-

Previous page: From Allan's notes on Benjamin, image by Trevor Paglen.

CHAPTER 4

Exposing the Nation

Entanglements of Race, Sexuality, and Gender in Post-Apartheid Nationalisms

GILLIAN HART

On Friday, May 18, 2012, I arrived in O. R. Tambo Airport in Johannesburg and, as is my habit, stocked up with newspapers to read on the flight to my second home in Durban. On opening the *Times*, the daily version of the *Johannesburg Sunday Times*, I stared in disbelief at an image of a painting of President Jacob Zuma with his genitals exposed.[1] Titled *The Spear*, the (now-defaced) painting by Cape Town artist Brett Murray took off from a depiction of Lenin striking a triumphal pose in a 1967 Soviet propaganda poster.[2] The painting provoked a fierce national debate that raged like wildfire over the following two weeks, laying bare deep fault lines that underpin post-apartheid South Africa. The conflagration over *The Spear* was overshadowed by the Marikana massacre two months later, when police and paramilitary units assassinated thirty-four miners on strike for higher wages from the Lonmin platinum mine outside Rustenburg in the North West province. Yet, as I will argue in this essay, there are important threads connecting the two events that are crucial to understanding the ongoing crisis in South Africa.

The analysis is indebted to Allan Pred's work on many levels. My initial reaction was to see *The Spear* as an act of political lynching. In trying to think through this argument, I was drawn immediately to *The Past Is Not Dead: Facts, Fictions, and Enduring Racial Stereotypes* (2004)—a process that vividly recalled illuminating discussions about race, gender, and sexuality with Allan in 2002 when Sarah (Saartje) Baartman's remains were being reburied in South Africa.[3] As I tried to locate the uproar over *The Spear* on the larger canvas of post-apartheid dynamics, many other aspects of his work became powerfully salient, as I will show in this essay.

The essay unfolds in three steps. First, I narrate how the painting entered the domain of public debate, along with a series of spectacular events in the second half of May 2012 that drove the controversy in new directions and redefined the terrain of debate. Second, I take the controversy as a point from which to delve

more deeply into how sexuality and gender are deeply entangled with race and class in the constitution of South African nationalisms, drawing on Pred's work on racism and nationalism in *Even in Sweden* (2000) as an illuminating counterpoint. Finally, I bring the furor over *The Spear* into direct conversation with *The Past Is Not Dead*.

Spearing Zuma: The Shifting Contours of Controversy

> Representations of the racialized Other—once entered into local and wider discursive networks, once repeatedly given voice, once given redundant expression, once made subject to multiple exposure—are apt to become name-etched, word-wired, meaning-meshed. Are apt to become self-resonating, self-reverberating, self-reinforcing. Are apt to become essentialized reductions more or less indelibly stereo-typed upon the individual mind, deeply inscribed within the collective popular imagination. Open to reshaping and reworking with shifting context. Open to being acted upon, performed with concrete results . . . But seldom easily erased or unlearned.
> —ALLAN PRED, *The Past Is Not Dead*

On May 10, 2012, Brett Murray's exhibition titled *Hail to the Thief II* opened at the Goodman Gallery in Parkwood, an upper-middle-class suburb of Johannesburg, with no immediate public reaction either to *The Spear*, or to the other critical representations of the Zuma regime and the African National Congress (ANC) in the exhibition. The furor was set in motion on Sunday, May 13, when *City Press* published a review of the exhibition that featured an image of *The Spear*. In a statement on May 17, the ANC expressed outrage over the painting, demanding that it be removed from the gallery and the *City Press* Web site. Both the gallery and the newspaper refused, and the following day the ANC launched an urgent court application to prevent the Goodman Gallery and *City Press* from displaying the image. The issue of the *Times* that I picked up at the Johannesburg airport on May 18 reported on the opening salvos of what quickly became a ferocious national debate.

That weekend *The Spear* went viral, dominating the press, radio, television, and social media. The debate pivoted around two closely related issues. First was the figure of Zuma. The official ANC position was that the painting was a grievous assault on the dignity of the president, expressed in a press release in terms of his individual rights: "The image and the dignity of our President as both President of the ANC, President of the Republic and as a human being has been dented by this so-called piece of art by Brett Murray at Goodman

Gallery. We are also of the view that this distasteful depiction of the President has violated his individual right to dignity as contained in the constitution of our country" (Mthembu 2012). The dominant view in the mainstream English press was that Zuma's promiscuous behavior in the name of "tradition" invited precisely the sort of critique embodied in the painting—that Zuma had it coming to him, so to speak, and that Murray had provided a critique that was both incisive and amusing.[4] The predominantly white, liberal Democratic Alliance issued a press release referring to *The Spear* as "brilliant as a work of political satire, which is also why it became an instant icon" and condemning any effort to censor it (Smuts 2012).

An overlapping debate turned around a sharp distinction between African cultural traditions that had been offended and violated and liberal rights to freedom of artistic expression guaranteed by the constitution that were under threat from a corrupt ANC elite and barbarous "traditional" forces.[5] Anton Harber, chair of the Freedom of Expression Institute, summed up concisely the standard liberal position:

> The work is one of a number in Murray's exhibition which collectively make a strong protest against corruption, greed, nepotism and other issues of governance. It is a strong intervention, and I can see no reason why Murray should be bound by the ANC's notion of good taste or acceptability. Our Constitution protects our artists' rights to be rude, mocking, even disrespectful, and we should enjoy and appreciate that, even when it makes us uncomfortable. Or maybe especially when it makes us uncomfortable, as this is what we expect from our artists. (Gibbons 2012)

Echoing, I suspect, the reaction of many white South Africans, Harber later confessed to his enjoyment of the "open and hearty public debate about race and representation, about the limits of free speech, about the role of the artist and the size of the president's penis" in the first phase of the debate (2012, 28). I spent that weekend in Ladysmith, mostly hanging around in a provincial hospital where a close friend was extremely ill and talking with a group of older black South African women, all of whom expressed anger, hurt, and a deep sense of violation that went far beyond the figure of Zuma. I vividly recall reading the Sunday newspapers on the evening of May 20 and reflecting on the arrogant incomprehension of liberal white South African society.

On May 21, the online *Daily Maverick* published an article by Chris Gibbons that began by acknowledging this mutual incomprehension and went on to suggest a reconciliation that stunningly reinscribed the situated ignorance of white liberalism (along with its fixation on the size of the president's penis):[6]

> Turn to this weekend's Sunday *Times* and look for the image of Canada's Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, reclining nude on a lounger with a small dog at his feet. Says his spokesman, via Twitter and quoted by the Sunday *Times*, "We're not impressed. Everyone knows the PM is a cat person." A skillful deflection, a smile, a little wit. No howls of outrage, no club for the enemy. Crisis—if there ever was one—defused and the storm remains in a very small tea-cup. What would have happened, for example, if [ANC spokesperson] Jackson Mthembu had Tweeted something similar: "ANC unimpressed . . . real Pres. Zuma is man of far greater . . . ahem . . . stature!" End of story. The fire in the crowded theatre quickly extinguished and the audience left laughing. Wouldn't that have been a far better outcome for all of "us," whoever "we" are? (Gibbons 2012)

Over the course of the following week, three key events fundamentally reconfigured the terrain of public debate, making clear that for large numbers of South Africans *The Spear* was distinctly unfunny. On Tuesday, May 22, two men—one black, the other white, and apparently acting quite independently



FIGURE 4.1.
Barend la Grange paints a red cross over the Zuma painting. Courtesy of ETV News.

FIGURE 4.2.
Louis Mabokela smears black paint over the Zuma painting. Courtesy of eTV News.

of each other—walked into the Goodman Gallery with pots of paint and defaced the painting (*TheJournal.ie* 2012). First, Barend la Grange painted red crosses over the image of Zuma's genitals and his face; Louis Mabokela then smeared black paint all over the painting (figures 4.1 and 4.2). As La Grange stood around casually chatting with reporters, Mabokela was wrestled to the ground and brutally beaten by a security guard.

In a television interview a few days later, La Grange (described as a fifty-eight-year-old Christian and an Internet businessman) explained that he thought the furor over *The Spear* had shifted from a political to a race issue, and that "when it became a racist issue, the situation was very dangerous" (eNCAnews 2012). Since whites were responsible for the painting and for the gallery, La Grange told the interviewer, he felt that as a white Afrikaner it was his duty to demonstrate opposition to the painting in order to defuse racial conflict. Mabokela, a twenty-five-year-old taxi driver who had traveled to Johannesburg from Limpopo province to deface the painting, explained that he was angered by disrespect for Zuma.

On Wednesday, May 23, the *Times* published an eloquent article by S'Thembiso Msomi that played a major role in transforming the debate by vividly conveying the depth and intensity of hurt invoked by the painting (see box 1).

Msomi's reference to Sarah Baartman was powerfully effective in underscoring the stakes of the debate—as well as the situated ignorance of large swathes of the white South African population. Several of the journalists who had been most adamant in their demands for freedom of expression subsequently admitted to having been shamed into backing down.

BOX 1 Zuma Has Become the 21st-Century Saartjie Baartman

S'THEMBISO MSOMI *Times*, May 23, 2012

I am a descendent of those who were dispossessed of their land; coerced into disposing of most of their prized livestock and then compelled to pay an onerous poll tax to the colonial administration.

Broke and risking lengthy jail sentences if they failed to pay the tax, they were forced to abandon farming and migrate to Durban and other urban centres where they were to feed the colonial economy's avaricious appetite for cheap black labour.

Like many others who made the trek down the coast to swell the ranks of the then-emerging black proletariat, my ancestors were made to strip naked in public and—like cattle—walk through a dipping tank filled with disinfectants before they could be allowed to live and work in the city. All in the name of "protecting" the city's inhabitants from the diseases allegedly borne by natives from the inland.

Even when the native happened to have been born in the city, like many of my father's generation, he still had to be subjected to the dastardly deed of having his genitals exposed in public for city officials to decide if they were healthy enough to work or had to be deported to some "homeland" in the yonder. And this was as late as the 1970s.

You don't believe me? I'll let the late Steve Biko, who spent a few years of his tragically short life in the Banana City, tell the story.

"You are made in some instances to stand naked in front of some doctors supposed to be running pus off you, because you may be bringing syphilis to the town, he tells you," Biko told a Judge Boshoff during the trial of a group of Black Consciousness leaders in May 1976.

Scene from the film *Drum: Stories from Sophiatown*, taken by EML Wessels.

"Now it is inhuman the way it is done. Three people are lined up in front of him, all naked, and he has just got to look at all of you. Now I must feel that I am being treated as an animal, and as you enter the room where this is done in Durban there is a big notice saying: Beware—Natives in a state of undress."

This practice of forcing "natives" to be in this "state of public undress" wasn't a mere aberration on the part of sadistic Durban city officials. It was common racist practice across the country.

Surely we have all seen the disturbing pictures taken secretly by the courageous photojournalist Bob Gosani in the 1950s of black prisoners at Hillbrow's Fort prison being forced to do the degrading "Tauza dance." To perform this compulsory "dance," prisoners had to be stark naked and expose their private parts to wardens to prove that they were not concealing any contraband.

That the Fort, or Number 4—as the notorious prison was commonly known then—now forms part of the Constitution Hill precinct, the home of democratic South Africa's most important court, is testimony to the giant strides we have taken as a young nation towards healing our deep and painful wounds of the past.

This national reconciliation was not as a result of some inexplicable miracle. It took a lot of hard work, political maturity and magnanimity on the part of most South Africans.

It demanded of us that we be more sensitive to each other's history and regard our diversity as a point of strength rather than a source of racial division.

But recent events, especially the currently raging debate over Brett Murray's disgusting painting of President Jacob Zuma, demonstrate that we are rapidly losing sight of what has so far made our country—with all its fault lines—work.

I am all for freedom of expression, which includes the right to artistic creativity. But such a right should be exercised with utmost responsibility and respect for human dignity—especially given our country's history of racial humiliation and oppression.

What has been most disappointing for me about the debate is the refusal by Murray and his cheer-leaders to acknowledge that the painting, which portrays Zuma posing with genitals exposed, reopens old and painful wounds.

Flawed as Zuma is as the head of state, husband and father, no one deserves to be humiliated in that way. Especially not in a country with a long and shameful history of publicly putting its black males in "a state of undress."

As one outraged reader wrote on one of the websites this past week, it is difficult to look at that painting without concluding that Zuma is being turned into a 21st-century Saartjie Baartman.

Even with the best constitution in the world, we would not succeed in building a stable and economically successful home for all unless we all acknowledge where we come from and avoid actions and utterances that would make some believe that despite a new flag, they remain second-class citizens who can be stripped of their dignity at will in the land of their birth.

BOX 2 Memories Evoke Tears

AMUKELANI CHAUKE *Times*, May 25, 2012

New layers of complexity were yesterday added to the controversy surrounding Brett Murray's The Spear.

A crowded gallery in the Johannesburg High Court—gathered for the ANC and President Jacob Zuma's application for an order that the painting be removed from the Goodman Gallery and from *City Press*'s website—watched in shock as Zuma's advocate wept.

Senior counsel advocate Gcina Malindi walks out of court after collapsing in tears following persistent questioning. Photograph: Alon Skuy / *The Times*.

The salience of this reframing was made vividly and painfully clear the following day (May 24), when Zuma's lawyer Gcina Malindi broke down in tears in the Johannesburg High Court at a hearing to have the painting removed from the Goodman Gallery and the *City Press* Web site (see box 2).

The court immediately adjourned and later ordered the media not to broadcast images of the lawyer weeping. By chance I was listening to the radio on that Thursday afternoon before the ban went into action and will never forget Malindi's gut-wrenching sobs.

In an Op-Ed column in the *Sunday Times* on May 27, Justice Malala drove home forcefully to readers of the newspaper how the controversy over *The*

Senior counsel Gcina Malindi had been engaged in a heated debate with Judge Neels Claassen about the relevance of claims of racism in relation to the painting, the artist, the gallery and the newspaper.

Malindi was in court to ask three high court judges—Claassen, Lucy Mailula and Fayeeza Kathree-Setiloane—to interdict the gallery and City Press from continued display of *The Spear* because the painting violated Zuma's dignity.

Malindi said the order would enable Zuma to litigate against any organisation or individual that subsequently published the image.

He argued that such an order would go a long way to soothing Zuma's battered feelings.

But Judge Claassen had asked how the case could be racist, and how the image could be banned from the internet, referring to a British court ruling that stated that such an order would be an insult to the law and the constitution.

In response, Malindi said: "Access to water is a basic human right in South Africa, but not all our people have access to water. Does this mean our constitution is [an] insult to our people?"

After Claassen expressed his dissatisfaction with his response, Malindi sat down, buried his head on the desk and sobbed loudly. Another advocate, Muzi Sikhakhane, tried to console him.

Malindi afterwards told journalists that the exchange had brought back "painful memories."

"I think it is because, as a former activist, it brought back a lot of things. The exchanges between me and the judge just brought back things that happened 25 or even 30 years ago. It [the breakdown] should not have happened but unfortunately it did," said Malindi. . . .

Kebby Maphatsoe, the chairman of the Umkhonto weSizwe Military Veterans' Association, said forcing Malindi to talk about people's daily struggles had reminded the advocate of the time when he was arrested.

"He was among the people arrested during the Vaal uprisings when he was an activist in the 1980s, and those painful memories just came back and he was overcome by emotion."

Spear extended well beyond the frame of the original debate the previous week—a debate in which Malala himself had come out in support of an orthodox liberal position. His explanation underscored many of Msomi's arguments (see box 3).

Immediately following Malindi's breakdown, ANC officials called for a boycott of *City Press* and announced plans for a march on the Goodman Gallery. On Monday, May 28, *City Press* removed the image from its Web site, and Goodman Gallery owner Liza Essers apologized: "Certainly, it was never my intention to hurt anyone by displaying the artwork. I am very sad by the divisiveness that the exhibition has caused because art is meant to bring social

BOX 3 Why Malindi Cried

JUSTICE MALALA *Sunday Times*, May 27, 2012

EVERY so often something comes along that affects you so deeply, it shifts the very essence of your viewpoint. When Advocate Gcina Malindi, the senior counsel arguing for President Jacob Zuma in *The Spear* case, broke down and cried on Thursday, something happened to me.

The very centre of my being moved. I remembered a huge chunk of what I had put away in the deepest recesses of my mind.

I remembered, I was forced to remember, that there is hurt, there is pain, there is anger and there is even hatred in my and my fellow black people's hearts about what has happened here. I remembered apartheid.

I remembered the disdain with which, whenever I went into the Pretoria city centre, white people treated me. I remembered how, when I was working as a gardener when I was 15, a white man made me work all day and at five told me he was not going to pay me because he did not have money. After an hour of this tawdry squabble, which he thought was hilarious, he finally paid me.

I have had this feeling several times in the past few weeks.

When F. W. de Klerk, the last president of apartheid South Africa, told Christiane Amanpour of CNN that blacks "were not disenfranchised, they voted. They were not put in homelands, the homelands were historically there," I recoiled with shock.

I grew up in a village called New Eersterus, in the Hammanskraal area just north of Pretoria. The first residents of this village had been forcibly moved from the "coloured" Eersterus near Pretoria because they were too dark, not "coloured enough." Those of us who came afterwards and were incorporated into the heinous Bophuthatswana homeland knew this homeland "democracy" was a sham.

Not once did the people of my village vote for Lucas Mangope, the puppet who acted for De Klerk's government. When the Bop army attempted a coup in 1988, guess who came to Mangope's rescue? The apartheid government, of course. So much for sovereignty.

cohesion and healing. To the extent that this exhibition has caused divisiveness, I am deeply saddened by that."[7] The march took place on May 29, when an estimated four thousand to five thousand ANC supporters sang and danced the three kilometers from the Zoo Lake to the Goodman Gallery, where they were addressed by ANC and South African Communist Party (SACP) officials and the head of the Young Communist League. The ANC Youth League and its recently dismissed president, Julius Malema, were notably absent. On Wednesday, May 30, the ANC and the Goodman Gallery announced a peace deal that included the removal of the painting from the gallery's Web site.

Recently, a friend of mine in Cape Town participated in a charity bike ride. Afterwards, he went to a bicycle shop stall and asked to try out their cycles. He and his two boys hopped on the bikes and rode out.

"Stop that thief!" shouted the shop owner. Tens of people ran after my friend. He is black. Virtually everyone there was white. The shop owner, a white man, refused to acknowledge he had acted in a racist manner.

All these incidents, small and large, bring back that hurt, that pain, that remembrance that once, not so long ago, we were subhuman in this country. They bring back the remembrance that the black man was viewed as a sex-obsessed, lazy . . . well, animal, really. We were not human here.

In the sound and fury that has accompanied the decision by Zuma and the ANC to take the Goodman Gallery to court for displaying the Brett Murray painting of Zuma with his genitals exposed, I have been firmly on the side of those who declared the action ill-advised, nonsensical and a poor pandering to one man's whim above those of our constitution. I wrote that Zuma brought this upon himself: the past seven years have been defined by his flaunting of his sexuality in the guise of nebulous precepts of "African culture."

Yet I cannot escape the raw and real pain and hurt that Malindi's breakdown in court underlined. Perhaps, in my defence of the freedoms to express oneself, the freedoms to artistic creativity, I missed something. Perhaps I—and many of the people who have been batting on this side of the field—forgot that these freedoms cannot be exercised in a vacuum.

There is a hurt that is still not processed. There is a pain so infinitely deep and huge that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has done virtually nothing to assuage it. To many of the people outside court this week, this pain is raw and immediate. To them, Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu, with talk of reconciliation, are deluded dreamers.

I know this is true because one of my best friends was standing outside court supporting Zuma on Tuesday. For him, the Murray painting is an assault on blackness. He feels that "whiteness" still has the upper hand and that it continues to dictate to and defile black people in South Africa today.

In the flood of commentary on *The Spear*, remarkably little attention has been given to questions of nationalism. This is true even of Anne McClintock, the preeminent scholar of postcolonial nationalisms in relation to race, sexuality, and gender (1995). In a commentary titled "The Best Way to Deal with *The Spear*" published in the *Mail & Guardian*, she asserted, "Most critically at stake is how far the notoriously litigious Zuma and his ruling party are now willing to use the penis brouhaha to quell dissent"; might "paintergate," she went on to ask, "be the mordant symptom of a factionalised political elite in need of a headline-grabbing diversion?" (2012). Pointing to the dangers of censorship,

she recommended collective democratic action to keep "cultural critique and dissent alive."

While there is no question that key figures in the ANC and the SACP made strategic use of *The Spear*, I suggest that this was about not just quelling dissent but also tapping into widespread popular anger and racial hurt that the painting invoked. For many South Africans, the ANC's resolution of *The Spear* controversy represented the defeat of an arrogant racist white liberalism. For the ANC it was also an opportunity to reinvigorate official articulations of African nationalism through an infusion of moral authority that was rapidly eroding. In *Rethinking the South African Crisis: Nationalism, Populism, Hegemony* (2013), I argue that official articulations of nationalism are simultaneously crucial to bolstering the ANC's hegemonic project and a source of vulnerability. In the discussion that follows I draw on the furor over *The Spear* to elaborate and extend these arguments, and then bring them into conversation with Pred's analysis of European racisms and nationalisms to reflect more broadly on the entanglements of race, sexuality, and gender in the constitution of contemporary nationalisms.

Valences of Post-Apartheid Nationalisms

Let me start by outlining the contours of post-apartheid nationalisms, in relation to which *The Spear* episode can be seen as a key moment.[8] When former president F. W. de Klerk unbanned the ANC and other liberation movements in 1990, the "South African nation" was deeply in question. Quite literally, it had to be conjured into existence from the rubble of a deeply divided past. At that same time, powerful South African conglomerates were straining to break away from the confines of the national economy and to reconnect with the increasingly financialized global economy from which they had been partially excluded during the 1980s by sanctions, exchange controls, and the heightening crisis of the apartheid state.

These tensions are most usefully understood in terms of simultaneous processes of denationalization and renationalization that have been playing out in relation to one another in increasingly conflictual ways (Hart 2013). "Denationalization" includes the extremely conservative package of neoliberal macroeconomic policies set in place in 1996 but also precedes and extends beyond them. Focusing on the heavily concentrated character of South African corporate capital, denationalization encompasses the highly advantageous terms on which these conglomerates engineered their reengagement with the increasingly financialized global economy through their relations with strategically placed forces in the ANC; how the conglomerates have restructured and

denationalized their operations; massive and escalating capital flight; the formation of a small but powerful black capitalist class allied with white corporate capital; understandings of the "economy" fostered through these alliances; their ongoing influence over ANC government policy; and the multiple ways these forces continue to play into and intensify brutal inequalities and the degradation of livelihoods of a large proportion of the black South African population.

Denationalization does *not* refer to political intervention in the "economy" conceived as a separate sphere. It signals instead the simultaneously economic, political, and cultural practices and processes that are generating ongoing inequality and "surplus" populations, and the conflicts that surround them. The forces of denationalization must also be understood in relation to, and as deeply entangled with, the practices and processes of *renationalization*, encompassing official efforts—mainly by the ANC—to produce a new nation, and how these play out in multiple arenas of everyday life.

There are at least three key dimensions of renationalization. First are inclusive discourses of the "rainbow nation" associated with Mandela—the liberal, ecclesiastical discourse of forgiveness that made possible the negotiations to end apartheid, which found further expression in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Discourses of inclusion were not just imposed from above—like the "national question" discussed later, they had (and to some degree still have) popular appeal. Yet they abstracted from and papered over historical geographies of racial oppression, exploitation, and racialized dispossession—and were falling apart by the end of the "Mandela decade" (Sitas 2010).

A second key dimension of post-apartheid renationalization is found in the ANC government's immigration policies and practices. Rainbowism coincided with "fortress South Africa"—the ANC government's continuing use of apartheid-era immigration legislation (the Aliens Control Act) premised on control, exclusion, and expulsion. The Aliens Control Act was repealed in 2002, but the bounding of the nation through immigration policy and practices—as well as popular vigilantism, abuses by police, and brutal detention of "aliens"—have ramped up and fed into xenophobia.

Third, the most important elements of post-apartheid renationalization are embodied in the keywords of the ANC and its alliance partners (the SACP and Cosatu, the Congress of South African Trade Unions): the "national question" and the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). South African understandings of the national question were forged in the context of fierce debates over race, class, and nationalism since the early twentieth century; further elaborated during the anti-apartheid struggle; and reworked in the context of the transition. An aspect of the national question, the NDR refers to the first stage in a two-stage theory of revolution adopted by the SACP in 1962, and subsequently

by the ANC, in which the overthrow of the apartheid state would inaugurate a phase of bourgeois national democracy, paving the way for the second-stage socialist revolution. In the post-apartheid period, this aspect of renationalization makes clear that it is not a separable "political" process, but instead makes the case for accommodation to the inequalities of post-apartheid capitalism as a transitory phenomenon, to be superseded by the (ever-receding) second phase.

The discursive power of the NDR both historically and in the present lies in its capacity to frame in flexible ways the articulation of three key ideological strands of the liberation movement: liberal-democratic leanings that go back to the African bourgeoisie that founded the movement at the turn of the twentieth century; a fairly narrow African nationalism brought to prominence by the ANC Youth League in the 1940s; and a broadly socialist tendency. The late Neville Alexander, a Robben Island veteran, noted astutely that "the particularity of one or other political tendency was determined by the way its exponents blended or interpreted these three discursive strategies" (2010, 3), all in various degrees of tension with one another and emblematic of the diverse social forces brought together under the banner of the liberation movement. In the post-apartheid era, mounting conflicts within and between the ANC and its alliance partners are frequently expressed in terms of fights over the meanings of the NDR (Hart 2013).

The stakes in these seemingly internecine battles are first and foremost ethico-political, turning around moral authority and ownership of the languages of suffering, struggle, and national liberation that are crucial to the ANC's hegemonic project. Official invocations of the nation and liberation continue to have deep popular resonance because they conjure up histories, memories, and meanings of racial oppression, racialized dispossession, and struggles for freedom. At the same time, they are shot through with tensions and contradictions because of the way renationalizing practices and processes operate in relation to denationalization.

It is in relation to these dynamics that I want to situate the furor over *The Spear*. By making vividly clear how the articulations of race and class that permeate post-apartheid nationalisms are deeply entangled with sexuality and gender, this analysis adds an important dimension to the contradictory dynamics through which denationalization and renationalization play out in practice.

In a pioneering effort to link sexuality with post-apartheid nationalisms, Deborah Posel (2005) offers an intriguing discursive analysis of former president Thabo Mbeki's AIDS denialism as an aspect of his nation-building project. Focusing on how sex became commodified and politicized in new ways in the post-apartheid era, Posel maintains that "Mbeki's position on AIDS [was]

an assertive and angry intervention in the discursive constitution of sexuality and the contestations associated with it" (2005, 142). He denied the connection between HIV-AIDS and sex in two ways, she argues. First, by exclusion, arguing that AIDS is a syndrome of familiar diseases associated with poverty and malnutrition (and by implication not sex); and second, by his refusal to countenance the possibility that AIDS could be sexually transmitted. Such denials—in effect efforts "to police the discursive constitution of sexuality in relation to AIDS"—were shaped in turn by "his aspirations as champion of the nation-building project" (145). Calling attention to the degradations and brutalizations of colonial oppression and the disappointments of the first phase of postcolonialism in other African countries, Mbeki's nation-building project invoked "the theme of redemption from a dark, oppressive and morally tainted past" (146), and South Africa's liberation as the rebirth of the continent—embodied in his vaunted notion of the African Renaissance. Hence "the symbolic association of nationhood with order rather than chaos, life rather than death, with sexuality at the fulcrum, [was] at the very heart of Mbeki's imagery of nation-building—with a particularly strong evocation of the forces of chaos and death which threatened to destroy the fledgling nation, at the very vulnerable moment of birth" (146).

In his biography of Mbeki, Mark Gevisser points as well to how Mbeki drew on the work of Charles Geshekter, a historian closely associated with the main HIV/AIDS dissident group in the United States, who had worked in East Africa and focused on how colonial and Western medicine had pathologized Africans: "He [Mbeki] had come to share Geshekter's analysis that 'racist myths about the sexual excesses of Africans are old indeed'" (Gevisser 2007, 748). While Gevisser makes no mention of Posel's thesis about how Mbeki's denialism operated through the discursive articulation of sexuality and nationalism, he does seem to concur on Mbeki's need to repress questions of sexuality: "If we are dying because we have too little [of the material conditions of life] (or too much, too quickly) then Mbeki's mission—and the ANC's *raison d'être*—prevails. If, on the other hand, we are dying because we cannot control our primal urges, Mbeki's own liberatory paradigm is shattered. We are the Africans that our colonial oppressors said that we were, and we have not been able to liberate ourselves from their definition of us" (764).

Hein Marais (see 2011 and 2012) has more recently argued that laying the blame for denialism at Mbeki's door ignores a much wider complicity: "For most of that drawn-out debacle, scarcely any ANC figure of note publicly broke ranks, including stalwarts revered for their independence of thought and the courage of their convictions" (2012). Such complicity was not simply a matter of coercion but of "seduction and self-discipline, spiked with a hint of intimi-

dation" (2012). Like Gevisser, he argues that AIDS denialism "was fed in part by stinging memories of how colonial power and science (including medical science) converged in the lives of subjugated communities" (2012) and enabled a self-gratifying sense of resistance to imperial bullying: "In South Africa, denialism functioned as a grammar—and a substitute for broader political and ideological affirmations and tussles. It presented opportunities to denounce racism. It vented frustrations and passions that had been stifled during the 1990s, when stability and makeshift conciliation were the priorities. . . . It also chimed neatly with key themes of the then-in-vogue 'African renaissance,' by affirming Africans' right and duty to describe their own realities, define their own futures, and reject the imageries imposed by the West" (2012). Yet denialism also operated within key limits. Although expressed as a form of nationalist defiance, that defiance was not extended into other realms: "Economic policy was off limits; corporate capital had instilled a docile aversion to heterodoxy on that front. It was as if the embrace of economic and technocratic orthodoxy in post-apartheid South Africa demanded . . . resistance [that took the form of] anti-imperial posturing—for which AIDS became the stage" (2012).

Taken together, these analyses make clear how articulations of sexuality and race were crucial and deeply contentious dimensions of renationalizing practices and processes during the Mbeki regime (1999–2008)—and how they operated in relation to the dynamics of denationalization.

In December 2007 Jacob Zuma triumphed over Mbeki to become president of the ANC, and in September 2008 the ANC's National Executive Committee called for Mbeki's resignation as president of the country more than seven months before he was due to step down. Zuma's victory was made possible in part by his deployment of a militant masculinity that represented a profound *rearticulation* of sexuality, race, and nationalism. Precisely this rearticulation was vividly at play in the furor over *The Spear*, which, along with the history of racial and sexual affront, provided the ruling bloc within the ANC with an extraordinary opportunity to reassert its moral leadership of the national liberation movement and remind large numbers of South Africans of Zuma's status as a patriarchal figure.

Let me elaborate this argument with reference to three key moments. First, the title of the painting is a deliberately provocative reference not just to Zuma's hypersexuality but also to Umkhonto weSizwe—the Spear of the Nation—the armed wing of the liberation struggle launched in December 1961 in response to the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960, when police killed sixty-nine people protesting apartheid pass laws. The turn to armed struggle quickly came to embody a militant masculinity that remains a pervasive force in South Africa today that Zuma picked up and elaborated (Hart 2013). While the painting

reanimated for many South Africans the racio-sexual affronts suffered by black men in the past, its brazen title also brought into focus the history of armed confrontation with the forces responsible for these affronts and redounded powerfully to the advantage of the ANC.

A second, related point is that the painting's reference to Umkhonto we-Sizwe also served as a reminder of Zuma's prominent role in the armed struggle, which he used to great advantage in his titanic battle with Thabo Mbeki (Hart 2013). Emblematic here was his wildly popular theme song, "Awaleth' Umshini Wami" (Bring me my machine gun), accompanied by a sinuous dance routine. Liz Gunner's extraordinary article titled "Jacob Zuma, the Social Body and the Unruly Power of Song" (2008) points to the dangers of dismissing "Umshini Wami" as no more than an unpleasant manifestation of Zuma's hypersexualized militant masculinity, which he used to mobilize the manipulated mindless masses. With its deep links to liberation songs of the struggle era, Gunner explains, people recognized it as part of a language that they knew:

> The song . . . broke into popular public memory by recalling an earlier and more dangerous way of being. It evoked the years of pre-1994 resistance to the apartheid regime, the tense urban gatherings and the mass funerals. It forced back into the public imagination memories and stories of the long marches through the bush, the lost family members, and the camps to the north in the countries which had hosted the freedom fighters. These were all sites marked by song as an expressive tool. Song was a means of capturing and giving expression to the aspirations, the anxieties and the vision of people in that particularly turbulent and painful moment in South Africa's history. (Gunner 2008, 38)

Like many liberation songs, "Umshini Wami" is "embedded in a largely masculinist conception of militarism and nationalism" (Gunner 2008, 38), "with its weighty solemnity carrying the gravitas of a Zulu war song, the weight of heavy masculinity" (48). At the same time, it is far more than just an ethnic Zulu composition: "It was a song of the dispossessed and of the citizen-to-come. Perhaps at the heart of the song is the verb '-letha' (bring) suggesting a movement of process, of moving towards something yet to be made; suggesting too that the action is sanctioned by the giver or bringer. The instrument of the machine gun, umshini wami, suggests not so much brute power of war but that of agency, and the ability of the individual sanctioned by the group to bring about change" (43).

Yet the machine gun also "sent a warning to any complacent settling into a negotiated liberal democracy at the very same time that it gave hope to the longing for social and political change" (Gunner 2008, 40). An important part of what was at play in the furor over *The Spear* was the deep tension between

liberal complacency and the limits it has imposed on longings for social and political change—the fallout of which the ANC must manage with nationalist appeals.

A third reference in the painting—to Zuma's having been charged with rape in November 2005—also redounded to his advantage and that of his faction within the ANC. In April 2006, Zuma was acquitted of having raped a thirty-five-year-old woman in a trial that horrified and infuriated many feminists, and he called forth massive ridicule when he explained that he showered after intercourse to protect himself from contracting HIV-AIDS. Yet, if anything, the rape trial served to enhance his popular appeal—including to very large numbers of women.

Drawing on long-term ethnographic research in a northeastern region of KwaZulu-Natal, Mark Hunter (2011) offers important insights into how Zuma was able to resonate with the everyday lived experiences of millions of poor black South Africans. Hunter shows how the long-term contraction of employment that many label the "crisis in social reproduction" in South Africa is deeply entangled with transformations of intimacy—signified by a sharp reduction in marriage, the inability of a large proportion of the younger generation to "build a home" (*ukwaza umuzi*), and intensifying gender conflict, "as women deride men for failure to marry them and men deride women for their new independence" (2011, 13). At the time of the rape trial, Hunter argues, women in the settlement where he worked regarded Zuma not as a rapist but as a respectable patriarch, willing and able to support his wives and children, and having offered to pay bride-price (*ilobolo*) to marry the woman who accused him of rape. This analysis accords closely with my own observations in the areas where I work—namely, that the rape trial served, if anything, to consolidate support for Zuma among women and underscore a sense of his having been betrayed. More generally, Hunter argues,

> It is precisely Zuma's ability to talk to society's tremendous economic *and* personal upheavals . . . that allowed him partly to transcend generation, ethnicity, and gender. For the youth, he brought hope of work, service delivery, and a remooring of gender relations now in turmoil; for the old, he could also stand for a renewed sense of generational respect. If many South Africans felt a strong sense of betrayal towards their political leaders, Zuma somehow stood inside and outside government: he connected in new ways (and quite contrary to the famous feminist slogan) the *personal* and the *political*. (Hunter 2011, 20)

Far from contradictory, the militant nationalist masculinity of "Umshini Wami" and the respectable, responsible patriarchy described by Hunter are

mutually reinforcing. Both resonate deeply with memories, meanings, experiences, and practices in the multiple arenas of everyday life, meshing together to solidify a "common sense" understanding of Zuma as a powerful and compassionate leader.[9]

Together they also illuminate how and why *The Spear* as critique backfired so spectacularly. By May 2012 this broadly based empathy for Zuma was wearing thin, and he was also coming under fierce attack from Julius Malema, the firebrand former leader of the ANC Youth League whom the ANC had recently dismissed, and an opposing coalition within the ANC that was backing Malema.[10] Through complex entanglements and articulations of race, sexuality, gender, and class, *The Spear* reanimated for many South Africans a positive understanding of Zuma that was unraveling at that moment and, simultaneously, provided the ruling bloc in the ANC with an extremely valuable cache of nationalist resources with which to renovate its hegemonic project and fend off the challenge to Zuma.

Yet this fillip was short-lived. Two and a half months later, on August 16, 2012, police and paramilitary units shot and killed thirty-four striking miners near the town of Marikana on the northwest platinum belt. This was by far the most traumatic event of the post-apartheid era, evoking images and memories of the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and the Soweto uprising in 1976. Over the weekend following the massacre, Julius Malema was cheered by large crowds of angry mineworkers and their families at a moment when ANC officials were terrified to set foot in the area. In July 2013 he formed the Economic Freedom Fighters party under the banner of nationalization of the mines and expropriation without compensation of white-owned land. The horrors of Marikana provide Malema with ongoing opportunities to drive home the "truth" of his rearticulation of nationalism in terms of race and nature (Hart 2013)—and they constitute as well a profound threat confronting the ANC.

Part of what Marikana also did was to disrupt the complacent white liberalism that was so prominently on display in the furor over *The Spear*. As I've shown in this essay, the huge irony of this furor is that the white liberal establishment's pompous oblivion to racio-sexual affronts helped to enhance the militant masculinity and nationalist credentials of the ruling bloc in the ANC, thereby bolstering its hegemonic project—at least temporarily. When Peter Bruce, editor of *Business Day*, commented shortly after the massacre that Marikana was "the end of the beginning of the end" he was in effect acknowledging that the capacity of the ANC to contain popular discontent was running out of steam. Marikana underscored, in other words, how predominantly white corporate capital relies heavily on the ANC to contain popular discontent

through ongoing articulations of nationalism, while at the same time generating the conditions of impossibility because of the way denationalizing processes play out in practice.

Thus far I have paid close attention to Pred's analysis of nationalism and racism in *Even in Sweden*:

> Whatever their particularities in any given instance, nationalism and racism were . . . not merely mutually articulating discourses with repeatedly recharged meanings that at once legitimated the authority of the state and the overseas activities of domestic capital, but also an interconnected set of practices that at once socially normalized and corporeally excluded. Together, both types of discourse and practice constituted an interfused "unity of opposites." In so far as coexisting discourses of gender and class difference were also couched in terms of a biologically given hierarchy . . . those discourses constituted gender and class "racisms" belonging to the same "unity of opposites." (Pred 2000, 27)[11]

In concluding, I will draw a more direct line of connection between my arguments in this essay and *The Past Is Not Dead*.

Reflections through a Predian Lens: Re-Cognizing Racisms

> Every "Western" city has its unspeakable spaces. Its spaces where racisms past and present are on exhibit, enfolded within one another, but silenced, rendered unspeakable. . . . Its spaces where stereotypes of threatening hypersexuality and other negatively charged images of the Other are still activated more or less instantaneously. . . . Its spaces where the dialectics of not seeing are still operative, still privileging the modern Us over the never-can-be-modern Them. Its spaces where the (con)fusions of fact and fiction demand to be refused, to be reimage(in)ed.
>
> —ALLAN PRED, *The Past Is Not Dead*

A driving force in *The Past Is Not Dead* is Allan Pred's incandescent rage over a 1999 exhibition in the National Historical Museum in Stockholm. This exhibition included items from Hartkopf's Wax Cabinet and Anatomical Museum, exhibited in the late nineteenth century:

> Imagine now, *if you possibly can*, the presence of *the skin of a black African "native"*—once again stretched out and nailed down, figuratively and literally fixed in place; the presence of *a Negro penis*—once again faultlessly hand-labeled and set aside in a separate case . . . ; *and* the absence of any well-publicized calling into question, the absence of any widely broadcast statement of critical concern

> or ethical dismay, the absence of any controversy or debate in those mass media outlets where the arts and other elements of *Kultur* are reviewed and extensively discussed. (Pred 2004, 181)

Pred directed his fury not just at the curator of the exhibition and the owner of these cruelly obscene wax objects; he excoriated as well the public silence that accompanied their display. Why, he demanded in his inimitable Benjaminian fashion, "when the Then-and-There of 1895–1898 and the Here-and-Now of 1999 were brought into constellation, was there no visible flash of lightning, no illumination, no awakening with a startled shout (from the fantasy-filled [bad] dreamworld of nineteenth century racism), no fleeting revelation converted into written expression, no shock of re-cognition followed by a critical explosion of words, no dialectical image worth speaking about, but a dialectics of not seeing?" (Pred 2004, 185–86).

His enraged response to these "unspeakable spaces" of reproduction of late nineteenth-century racisms in the present was to transport his readers to an earlier moment in the nineteenth century and remind them vividly of Sarah Baartman:

> *She who was labeled "The Hottentot Venus" and fetishized, she who was encaged and reduced to a commodified sexual freak; she whose naked body was inspected and gawked at "in the jungle of European barbarism," she who was discursively linked with "primitive" nature rather than "civilized" culture; . . . she who was reduced to a scientific specimen; she whose brain and genitalia were preserved in formaldehyde and, along with a cast of her (in)famous body, placed on exhibit in Paris at the Musée de l'Homme, where they remained accessible for public 'edification' until 1974.* (Pred 2004, 182–83; emphasis in original)

He draws attention as well to how Sarah Baartman's remains were returned to South Africa in 2002 despite opposition from the director of the Musée de l'Homme, and to how the elaborate official burial ceremony organized by the South African government contrasted so sharply with contemporaneous Swedish silences over racio-sexual affronts. In his remonstrance of Swedish indifference, Pred cites an excerpt from Thabo Mbeki's speech at the burial taken from a newspaper report: "The story of Sarah Baartman is the story of the African people. It is the story of the loss of our ancient freedom. . . . It is the story of our reduction to the state of objects who could be owned, used and discarded by others. . . . It was not the lonely African woman in Europe who had been deprived of her identity and native country who was a barbarian, but those who treated her with barbarian brutality" (Pred 2004, 182).

I was in South Africa at the time and recall mailing this and other news-

paper clippings to him (online newspapers were not widely available then), as well as our subsequent conversations. In retrospect I can see with much greater clarity than at the time how important the return of Sarah Baartman's remains was to Mbeki's rearticulation of nationalism. This rearticulation turned importantly around AIDS denialism as I have argued earlier, linked in turn to a history of racio-sexual affront. It also needs to be seen in relation to the failure of discourses of the Rainbow Nation in the second half of the 1990s. This failure, as Ari Sitas (2010, 22) argues, can be attributed to white intransigence and to the self-serving indifference of many whites to the "new South Africa." Sitas goes on to observe that the "straps of racism were too close to white hearts" and that the refusal of the white population to own the past frightened and angered Mandela. It also helped to propel Mbeki's rearticulations of nationalism. The Baartman burial was an act of remembering that enabled Mbeki to issue a sharp reminder that the past is not dead. But we also need to recall the point made earlier about how the critique of white racism associated with Mbeki's rearticulations of nationalism was limited by the ongoing power of corporate capital, embodied in the practices and processes of denationalization.

In conclusion, let me return to *The Spear*. The rambunctious reaction to the painting of course stood in dramatic contrast to the silent "unspeakable spaces" against which Pred was railing in his critique of the National Historical Museum exhibit. Yet there is an important continuity. In the furor over *The Spear*, the figure of Sarah Baartman played much the same role as that assigned to her by Allan Pred and also by Thabo Mbeki in 2002—namely as a medium for re-cognizing racisms in the present.

By drawing vivid lines of connection between Sarah Baartman, the historical affronts suffered by black men in South Africa, and ongoing racisms, S'Thembiso Msomi's article that reconfigured debate over *The Spear* exemplifies what Pred was calling for: an insistent bringing of the past in relation to the present so as to detonate racio-sexual stereotypes. It was as if—at least at the level of public debate—those who dominated the liberal demands for freedom of expression could only re-cognize the brutality of the painting through the medium of Sarah Baartman.

NOTES

1. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Spear_%28painting%29.

2. The original, titled *Lenin Lived, Lenin Is Alive, Lenin Will Live*, is by Victor Ivanov.

3. Sarah Baartman, a woman of Khoikhoi descent born in 1789, was working as a slave on a farm in the vicinity of Cape Town in 1810 when she was taken to Europe and exhibited in freak shows. After her death in 1815, her brains and genitals were preserved

in formaldehyde and put on display in the Musée de l'Homme in Paris until 1974. For the official South African story of Sarah Baartman and more on her reburial ceremony, see SouthAfrica.info 2012.

4. In addition to Zuma's having been charged with rape (and acquitted in 2006), much commentary focused on his multiple wives and his twenty children, including a child he fathered out of wedlock by the daughter of an eminent soccer magnate (and for which he apologized in 2010, following a national outcry).

5. Including a demand from a spokesperson of the Nazareth Baptist Church that Murray be stoned to death, which he subsequently retracted (City Press 2012).

6. Incisive commentary on this fixation was provided by Gillian Schutte (2012).

7. Reference and video.

8. Parts of the text in this section are paraphrased from Hart 2013.

9. With "common sense" here interpreted in Gramscian terms as *senso commune*, or that which is taken for granted.

10. I discuss this challenge more fully in Hart 2013.

11. He is in conversation here with Etienne Balibar's observation that "the connection between nationalism and racism is neither a matter of perversion (for there is no 'pure' essence of nationalism) nor a question of formal superiority, but a question of historical articulation. This is to say, by the very same token, that the articulation of nationalism and racism . . . requires a dialectics of the unity of opposites" (1991, 50).

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CHAPTER 5

In Other Wor(l)ds

Situated Intersectionality in Italy

HEATHER MERRILL

> I love animals . . . but when I see pictures of Kyenge I cannot but think of—even if I'm not saying she is one—the features of an orangutan. Maybe Kyenge should be a minister in her own country [sic] . . . she is only encouraging illegal immigrants to dream of success.
> —ROBERTO CALDEROLI, member and former vice president of the Italian Senate

> Why does no one rape her, so she can understand what the victims of atrocious crime feel?
> —DOLORES "DOLLY" VALANDRO, Party official of the Northern League, referring to Cecile Kyenge, Italy's first Black cabinet minister

> As dangerous as anything within the current extended moment is the politics of resentment, and profound despair or discontent, if not rage, now occupying center stage in all highly industrialized commodity societies. . . . In this post–Cold War moment, in this moment of the supposed "end of history," in this moment of neoliberal triumphalism, in this moment when capitalism is the God-name which may not be uttered in vain, those feelings are . . . frequently merged—in nationally and locally variant ways—with other shallowly or deeply sedimented sentiments and translated into multiple scapegoatings.
> —ALLAN PRED, "Out of Bounds and Undisciplined"

Over the past several decades Italy has been experiencing what Allan Pred referred to as a "shock of modernity," a crisis of collective identity triggered by economic and political transformation, an insistent sense of insecurity, and hyper-attention to cultural difference. While everyday life has become more complex and volatile, profound situated knowledges are reworked into expressions of anti-immigrant, and particularly racist and anti-Black, anti-Muslim sentiments.[1] Since the 1980s, Italy has transformed from a country of immi-

grant export to a destination for people from Africa, Asia, and central and eastern Europe at a speed and to an extent unparalleled in Europe.[2] Casual levels of racism have come to be taken for granted, and racialized aggression or violence is expressed with frequency. All who are perceived as immigrants or refugees face vulnerability to discrimination, but Black and Arab migrancy holds considerable symbolic valence in anti-immigrant cultural and political discourse. African bodies are (re-)marked as iconic signifiers of illegitimate belonging, represented for instance in media images of packed fishing vessels entering the country clandestinely through southern maritime borders, and in tropes of itinerant street peddlers and prostitutes, suggesting that their very being in an Italian place threatens the moral purity of the nation state. Perceptions of immigrants of color and African Italians as out of place, not human, and disposable are demonstrated in the remarks quoted in the first two epigraphs, made in June 2013, likening Cecile Kyenge, Italy's first Black cabinet minister, to an orangutan and suggesting that she ought to be raped. After assuming the office of minister for integration in April 2013, Kyenge, a Congolese-born Italian citizen and ophthalmologist who had lived in Italy for thirty years, was subjected to a barrage of death threats and hostile and crude racist slurs. The reference to Kyenge's sexuality underscores the intersection between her identification as a woman and a racialized outsider, the (re)production of a racialized gendering that positions her as a permanent outsider on the basis of her racialized gender identity.

Making sense of the social reworkings circumventing this complex "hypermodern" moment and exposing the sedimented, taken-for-granted ideas that suppress multiple perspectives and lived experiences requires the sort of holistic and deeply philosophical approach that Allan Pred pioneered in geography. In his later work, he warned that we were living in an "extended moment of danger" when the place-specific workings of hypermodern global economic restructuring were (re)producing social and spatial inequalities enabled by such imaginative geographies as binarist logics of self and other, him and her, civilized and primitive, here and there, White and Black. These static "boundary-drawing ontological categories" (Pred 1995a, 1068) deployed in political and popular discourse as well as scholarly inquiry prevent us from making sense of multiple and overlapping situated knowledges and deflect attention from the power relations that inform the current moment of repression and forgetting. At stake in Europe is that growing disparities in well-being and ways of seeing and knowing embedded in histories of colonization and authoritarianism, histories suppressed but not at all independent from the present, are being reworked in ways that permanently imprison people categorized as outsiders,

profoundly compromising European democracies. As Pred argued, in practice if not in thinking, boundaries between the past and the present are porous (Pred 1995a, 1995b, 2000).

As he incisively stated in his final commencement speech at the University of California, Berkeley, "The clock is ticking. And the train is rolling on." And to go "full speed ahead," he urged, means robustly critiquing the categories that we may continue to take for granted as we interact and seek to make sense of social and cultural complexity, including diverse and overlapping ways of knowing and interpreting that do not comply with either/or concepts. In twenty-first-century Europe, the reproduction of boundaries between sameness and difference and the scapegoating of people of African descent and Muslims are still salient, carried by buried legacies of colonization. Currently, however, many Africans from places with long historical intertwinings with Europe are living beside people whose racial privileges are taken for granted (see Twine and Gardener 2013). In Italy, where I have been conducting research for twenty-five years, the "extended moment of danger" weighs heavily as residents seek to come to terms with growing social and cultural diversity along with persistent political and economic uncertainty.

In Italian society, especially in the northern parts of the country, the reception of people visibly identified as African, Arab, or Muslim by Italians with recognized heredity has been received with persistent anxiety and hostility. Expressions of fear fueled in part by right-wing political leaders and popular media over the threat that Africans in particular will flood Italy and damage Italian culture or the Italian way of life have dominated political and social discussions and policies for over two decades. As Donald Carter points out, the Western discursive treatment of Blackness suggests a preoccupation with reproduction, that "black reality crosses borders of quantity," meaning "there is always a concern with their being too many" (Carter 2013, 210).

I focus here on what is at risk in Italy, where repressed histories of Italian colonialism and the making of racial capitalism flow like a quiet groundwater stream into the contemporary racialization of newcomers and denial of their legal and cultural citizenship. The advancement of binarist categories of male and female, European and African, sometimes even by the most well-meaning social activists and advocates for immigrant rights working within an idiom of interculturalism, represents a grave danger to the recognition of Africans as participants in European civilization. These binarist categories permeate the way newcomers to Italian society are seen and unseen, and how the privileging of Whiteness and its association with national identity and belonging come to trump common gendered experiences in a patriarchal society.

The danger is especially acute for those who have become visible in recent years, classified as different in ways that endanger their lives. This danger can be identified even in the structure of feminist envisioning of empirical reality, the ethnosociology that infuses some feminist and intercultural organizations, where the language of multiculturalism and tolerance can become the discourse of the dominant, working to shield racism via universalist renderings of sameness via difference. The risk is that as this situation remains unexamined, the past is repeated as Pred warned, and we remain incarcerated in taken-for-granted ideas and practices that fuel fear and hostility. Anti-Blackness and anti-othering compel many to experience the consequences of this ontology in the form of prevailing and unquestioned notions of what it means to be "Italian" as opposed to "African." Many remain trapped in modern binarist categories of gendered and racialized differences, holding to the idea that "black Italians don't exist," something soccer fans have openly asserted when Italian soccer striker of Ghanian origin, Mario Balotelli, is on the field.

I argue that the present moment of danger, when categories and geographical imaginings of self and other, male and female, here and there, which constitute part of the Italian feminist theory infusing many intercultural organizations, may inhibit antiracist coalition building and the capacity to recognize diverse experiences based on social location. My discussion is informed by an early essay in which Pred puts forward a spatialized theory of gender, "In Other Wor(l)ds: Fragmented and Integrated Observations on Gendered Languages, Gendered Spaces and Local Transformation," published in *Antipode* in April 1990. He argues that the meanings of women's utterances and practices are highly contingent on their differential cultural and economic locations in local and broad fields of social and economic relations. I employ the *Antipode* article as a starting point for my discussion of gendered collectivities, racialized national belonging, and multicultural discourses in Italy. Pred's pathbreaking spatialized theorization of power and subject making helps make sense of a highly complex and volatile situation in Italy. His work suggests how we may work against binary classifications in order to articulate new kinds of "both/and" political spatialities. At stake is not only the avoidance of binary categories but also the capacity to develop new forms of transformative politics.

Lived Geographies/Situated Practices

It is through a lived geography—
    through participation in particular *locally situated practices*—
that individuals and groups become racialized
that migrants, refugees, and MINORITIES

    have their racialization again and again reinforced,

regardless of the differences in their biographical background
    or the diversity of their previous social experiences
        and subjective positions.
—PRED, *Even in Sweden*

In Italy, the transformation from a country of emigration to one of immigration has been fraught with social tension and conflict for over two decades. Yet walking through urban neighborhoods in Turin, one would be hard-pressed not to notice the kebab shop and the storefront mosque, the African hairstylist and the Chinese grocer, the Senegalese restaurant and phone calling/Western Union centers filled with people of African, Arab, and Latin American descent. These did not exist in this city twenty-five years ago. In the avenues, piazzas, apartments, and workplaces of Turin, non-Western ways of perceiving, being, and knowing converge and interweave with Italian perceptions, ontologies, and knowledges. The presence of people who speak from multiple, complex historical and cultural locations remains, yet powerful political and cultural technologies are employed to erect symbolic and material borders and diminish recognition of their participation (Merrill 2013a, 2014; Partridge 2012).

Subjectivities are made and remade as people produce places that participate in power relations at multiple scales, historical and present. Gendered and racialized meanings and identities are contested in lived geographies or practices in relation to global capitalist processes. This formation of human subjectivity is frequently taken for granted as participation daily in the (re)production of power relations is effaced by distracting images and ways of speaking, for instance about social and cultural differences. The cultural meanings of daily practices and social contacts are interlinked with economic and political practices at multiple scales and always saturated in (often hidden) power relations.

In Italy, growing privatization and deregulation have gradually eclipsed taken-for-granted ways of life, triggering a topsy-turvy world with high rates of part-time and temporary employment, reduced government services and provisions, high rates of unemployment especially among youth, and extremely

low birthrates. This world of uncertainty and disquiet has for over twenty years nourished a politics of exclusion and scapegoating linked with what Douglas Holmes (2000) refers to as "Integral Europe," the production of a cultural logic that embeds itself in sensibilities committed to traditional cultural forms as a way of negotiating feelings of alienation and fostering solidarity. Women of African descent and women of color more generally are rendered intruders who should bury their own cultural and political knowledge in order to conform to a place where many Italians insist they are, like Kyenge, permanently out of place (Merrill 2013a). Imperial discourses of power and structural inequality nourish taken-for-granted local integralist cultures in contemporary Italy.

Speaking to geographers and feminist theorists, anthropologists, and postcolonial scholars, Pred interrogates the dynamics of practice, power relations, and language/knowledge while exploring feminist theorizations of gendered consciousness. Drawing on the work of Julia Kristeva, he agrees that gendered languages are dynamic and mobile and presses further by suggesting that the words one uses are situated in social, spatial practices signifying at least to an extent the social space of enunciation, including the social location of the speaker. This idea contrasts with a Saussurian concept of arbitrary signs adopted by many social and cultural analysts (Sahlins 1978). The focal point of Pred's analytical approach is the interrogation of how linguistic repertoires are shaped by material, bodily engagement with the world, daily and life paths through which individual and collective biographies are formed. Gendered languages are interwoven with and generated through situated everyday practices in gendered spaces, gendered local as well as national and global power relations, or as Doreen Massey (1994) suggests, power relations at multiple scales that have often been viewed (by some anthropologists and cultural studies scholars in particular) as only afterthoughts or peripheral, secondary processes. Such a critique demands that we ask how women of color in Italy are classified in relation to national discourses and cultural and official policies of belonging and citizenship (see Bartoli 2012; Kyenge 2014) and how Italian feminists make sense of these classifications and the daily experiences rooted in Italian and European colonialism and reproduced in the contemporary moment. How do gender discourses intersect with racial discourses as these are made and experienced in everyday practices? And how do Italian feminists account for these different experiences and relationships with Italian patriarchy? How, if at all, are White Italian women located on the borders of identity in relation to nonwhite women?[3]

Cultures are constructed inside social practices emerging from and contributing to the operation of power relations, and for many in the African dias-

pora generally and Africans in Italy in particular, there is an ongoing struggle against being defined as a "problem" in a world in which one is hypervisible as Black and yet invisible as a full participant in society and culture (Carter 2010). They must struggle against routine degradation, vulnerability, and denial of their personhood. In a world that, as Lewis Gordon (1998) has suggested, asks people of African descent to justify their existence, their perspectives are frequently silenced. As the late cultural analyst and documentary filmmaker Marlin Riggs has asked, "My mouth moves, but you hear your own words. What nature of ventriloquism is this?" (1992, 101–3). This is, as Vivian May suggests in her analysis of the pathbreaking writings of Anna Julia Cooper, a question of "muteness," when multiple oppressive acts are employed to muffle cries for recognition, inclusion, and belonging (May 2007). The fabric of language and culture is permeated with the kinds of lived experiences that privilege and provide power to only some people to name, and use words that are registered in the hegemonic popular lexicon. Those with the power to speak may create narratives and images that become widely diffused, and the ways of seeing and acting they generate are part of taken-for-granted assumptions embedded in and produced through everyday practices.

As Gaytri Spivak (1988) and other postcolonial scholars have observed, we become imprisoned in the languages or ways of speaking about the world that we are taught to advance. In any society, hegemonic evaluations of human value and worth are produced in the languages of academic disciplines such as the sciences, legislation, news, and popular culture. Ruth Wilson Gilmore has argued that those who are dominated build counterlanguages that, except in extraordinary moments of crisis, are structurally secondary to the primary languages. Such counternarratives have authority among some individuals and groups but are seldom represented as part of the wider field of commonsense or taken-for-granted filters through which the wider society makes sense of the world (Gilmore 2002). Those whose words are muted by hegemonic narratives yet who employ alternative or counternarratives are caught in a bind if they wish to have a broad impact on commonsense understanding. They can use the languages generated by those whose words are not broadly heard, or adopt hegemonic languages and try to reformulate or "rework" them (Pred and Watts 1992). Is it possible to do this without further silencing? As bell hooks asks, "Dare I speak to an oppressed and oppressor in the same voice? Dare I speak to you in a language that will move beyond the boundaries of domination—a language that will not bind you, fence you, or hold you?" (1999, 146). Language is an ongoing site of feminist and antiracist struggle.

Writ large and frequently taken for granted in Italian feminist theory influenced by Luce Iragaray's argument that dominant languages are phallocentric is

the idea that female and male languages are distinct, and female language and culture are opposed to dominant male language and culture. As Pred argues,

> Despite all its commendable qualities, despite the range of insights, all too much of the feminist discourse on language . . . reduces the spoken word to two undifferentiated variants, one given voice by men in their own words, and the other expressed by women in an "inauthentic" or "disfluent" manner, as its utterance requires a deference to male norms, as the terms of its usage and the encoding of its meanings are beyond female control. . . . Such an unnuanced distinction, however unintentional, denies heteroglossia to both women and men, and thereby suggests that women's (and men's) language is not multi-faceted; not articulated differently in different surroundings . . . not affected by the movement of individuals from one class (fraction), generation or occupation to another; not characterized by the use of other words in other worlds. (1990, 38)

Drawing from these insights, we need to ask how, by ignoring or minimizing these crucial nuances—the differences between women and the existence of conflicting voices—some mainstream feminism may obscure the places and historically situated materialities of both male and female languages, and most importantly, relations of power—including power relations not only of men over women but of men over men, and women over women, or what is now called an intersectional approach.[4]

Situated analysis is critical to understanding the practice of gender and racialization in relations of power. *Where* one is located culturally and materially restricts or enables one's capacity to be heard as a social and political subject. Invoking Pred's analysis of gendered relations of power, I suggest that we adopt a notion of *situated intersectionalities* as a way of thinking about racial gender relations. Women of African descent cannot walk into a piazza or take public transportation in parts of Italy without the risk of being given what Fanon referred to as "the look," stared at, or harassed. They learn to take for granted that they may not be served in a respectful manner when in a place of business and are likely to have trouble securing housing or work. These and other lived racialized experiences suggest the need for geographical analysis in the study of the intersection of gender and race.

In Italy, where a broad immigrant presence is relatively recent, considerable and persistent anxiety surrounding the inclusion of nonwhites in Italian social geography is demonstrated, for example, in the conflicts surrounding the Italian soccer player Mario Balotelli, a striker for the Italian national team. Since the moment when he was acknowledged as a rising soccer star, Balotelli has frequently been subjected to racial abuse, with fans holding inflated bananas,

hurling racist chants, and carrying signs reading, "A negro cannot be Italian." Even the vice president of the Inter-Milan team, on which Balotelli formerly played, who is also brother of the former prime minister Sylvio Berlusconi, referred to Balotelli as recently as early 2013 as "Negretto di famiglia" (Our little n—er). However, Balotelli is in fact Italian. Abandoned at birth by his Ghanaian parents in Palermo, he was adopted by an Italian family and reared in the wealthy northern town of Brescia. He speaks the regional dialect. A comment made about him by his sister, Cristina, reveals that he is culturally very much an Italian insider. Describing Balotelli's relationship with their Italian mother, his sister remarked, "Mario always needed love and affection. He wouldn't go to sleep without his mother holding his hand" (*Guardian Weekly* 2009). The often very close relationship between mother and son is charged with symbolic and emotional meaning in Italian culture. Yet in this country where the dominant spatial imaginary is being cast as White, as a Black man Balotelli's Italian identity has been perceived as a provocation (Pugliese 2008; Merrill 2013a).[5] Balotelli, whose identity is wholly Italian, is cast as non-Italian because he appears to be linked with Africa, a territory commonly represented in opposition to Europe (Merrill 2014).

It is important to examine these issues of belonging in relation to specific Italian places. Are there places in Italy where people of color are treated with taken-for-granted dignity and respect? There have been grassroots and nongovernmental antiracist and anti-anti-immigrant responses among youth groups, trade unions, and religious, feminist, and other nongovernmental organizations, many sponsored in part by local and regional governments or the European Parliament for the stated purpose of promoting immigrant "integration." Do these places promote diverse perspectives and empower immigrant groups? I suggest that there are three principal immigrant sites in Italy: (1) ethnic associations, (2) diasporic and transnational networks, and (3) intercultural sites. None of these sites is explicitly part of established Italian national and ethnic identity networks and forms of belonging. All are in principle "safe spaces" where people of African descent and others from diverse backgrounds may represent their views and practices without stigma. Diasporic and transnational spaces involve trade, religious, social, familial, and information networks frequently involving multiple geographical locations within and between countries (see Riccio 2001). Intercultural spaces are sites designed to provide information, training, and gathering venues for immigrants and their Italian allies or representatives. In what follows I examine only intercultural sites or centers, although participants in such spaces may also participate in ethnic associations and diasporic networks.

Feminist and Spaces of Interculturalism

My first book, *An Alliance of Women: Immigration and the Politics of Race*, focused on an antiracist intercultural space, Alma Mater, built in Turin in 1992 through an alliance between migrant women and Italian feminists. Alma Mater became a model for intercultural organizations throughout the country and was also widely recognized in Europe for its innovative inclusive organizational structure. Migrant women and Italian feminists together put forward one of the country's first active interethnic centers when Turin's municipal government awarded them use of an abandoned school building located on the urban periphery that had once been a school for educating the children of women factory workers. Alma Mater was generated in the context of the social upheaval surrounding the growing and unexpected presence of migrants especially from North and sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1980s. The concept of interculturalism emerged in response to the need for cross-cultural dialogue and to address a growing anti-immigrant climate by providing public education and avenues for migrant women to generate income while applying the skills they had acquired in their countries of origin. The founders of this organization, an association of migrant women who formed an alliance with local Italian feminists, recognized the need to address the exploitation and containment of migrant women in domestic services, their characterization as prostitutes, and restriction from most forms of gainful employment. These women spoke about the anti-Black and anti-Muslim racism in Italy in a relatively implicit way by focusing on ignorance of other cultures and the need to inform the Italian public about cultural differences. They raised funds from the local and regional governments and eventually from the European Union to create alternative workspaces drawing on migrant skills. Alma Mater was also intended as a place of safety and solidarity among women.

Alma Mater was an expansion of practices that had gestated within Italian feminist and "workerist" traditions and also drew on local culture and politics. In Turin as elsewhere in Italy in the 1970s, Italian feminists had established the Casa delle Donne, spaces of autonomy from the established political parties and government where women could exchange knowledge, educate one another, and raise consciousness in order to create political subjects and establish platforms for enacting feminist political activism. Alma Mater is not a site for political organizing, but it encompasses some elements derived from the Italian feminist theory linked with the Casa delle Donne, such as notions of autonomy, sexual difference, social exchange, and production.

In the Turin context, the Casa delle Donne were profoundly informed by labor activism and trade unionism. Turin is a city heavily influenced by struggles

between capital and labor. Home of the Fiat automobile company, it became a national focus of worker conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s. This political constellation remains sedimented in local culture that until quite recently demonstrated a level of pride in workers not exhibited in other parts of the world (Bagnasco 1990; Lumley 1990; Ciafaloni 2011).

By the mid-1990s, and confronted by objections from some founding members, Alma Mater became increasingly institutionalized and similar to other intercultural centers emergent throughout the country later in the decade. These are centers of *accoglienza*, or welcoming (which must be distinguished from the immigration processing centers also classified as centers of *accoglienza*), that assert as their purpose the promotion of opportunities for "conversations, exchanges, and intercultural dialogues" between Italians and immigrants and among Italians from diverse regional backgrounds. To this end, centers like Alma Mater have frequently organized ethnic dinners and dances; displayed works of art, clothing, and crafts; performed intercultural theater; produced educational videos; provided language instruction; and at some sites promoted microcredit. Perhaps most significantly, Alma Mater created a semiprofessionalized version of cultural mediation, which assisted in educating the Italian pubic about migrant cultures (Maher 1996; Merrill 2006). Cultural mediators (and there has been considerable competition for these positions) are trained to represent a variety of ethnic, religious, national, cultural, and linguistic differences and mediate between representatives of Italian institutions and immigrants. For example, a Moroccan woman trained in a course on cultural mediation might visit hospitals to explain Muslim healing or birthing beliefs and practices to the Italian-trained health workers. She will engage in far more than linguistic translation by comforting people of her country in the hospitals who may feel alone and in need of someone who understands them.[6] As women they may not want their husbands near them because of cultural taboos about male proximity to women in gynecological matters.

In respect to Alma Mater, in some ways even in Turin the model of interculturalism that emerged was based on Italian feminist philosophies of "sexual difference," derived from Milan.[7] Milanese feminism reflected the concerns of middle-class Italian women to a greater extent than in Turin, where much of the feminist leadership was nominally middle class, but this middle-class status was deeply interfused with worker-class values and practices. Nevertheless, the concept of sexual difference was, I believe, a central and taken-for-granted element of Turin feminism. This concept was based on the philosophy that women had to assert their differences from men in order, as Theresa de Lauretis asserts, to critique society and culture and build narratives distinct from the patriarchy-informed languages into which women are born. Women, it was

argued, were born into worlds socially and culturally constructed by languages and philosophies generated through the ideas and experiences of dominant males (De Lauretis 1986, 1989). In contrast with U.S. and British second-wave feminist politics as a means of liberating women from male control over their bodies and unequal access to well-paid work and representation in the public sphere, Italian feminism of sexual difference argued that emancipation and equality may lead only to partial integration within a system created by patriarchy. Hence, Italian feminists developed an approach to social transformation via the creation of alternative meanings and practices within female collectives, for instance, women's organizations like the Casa delle Donne. An idea was that through exchanges between women, mutual identification and *affidamento*, or mentoring between mother and daughter figures, women would be able to produce new political subjectivities. By talking about and sharing biographical stories or narratives, as Adrianna Cavarero (2000) describes it, women could build collective alternatives to male hegemonic languages.

The feminist theory of sexual difference asks women to collectively pose the question, "*Who* am I?" and "*Who* are we?" for the purpose of building a world more closely reflective of the experiences and cultural values garnered by women. These are important questions, informed by European liberal philosophies of individualism and social contract, but they cannot alone generate collective identities that account for differential power relations. A Predian situated intersectionality might pose the translocal questions, "*Where* am I?" and "*Where* are we?" opening pathways for the exploration of gendered locations and how they might be differentiated within both the collective and broader spaces infused with and produced by diverse relations of power such as class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, nationality, age, and ability (Pred 1990, 1995a, 2000).[8]

While Alma Mater was not explicitly modeled on the theory of sexual difference, some of its practices were derived from or influenced by the concepts and emphasis on collective gender identity. This is demonstrated in the way it has come to resemble other intercultural sites in Italy that approach immigration as a problem of how to integrate and arguably discipline and "civilize" people from former European colonies into a new Italian interculturalism, a variety of multiculturalism emphasizing tolerance of cultural differences through practices of cultural exchange. Identity is somewhat reified here in that while treated as multiple, it is also frequently approached as fixed, with the assumption of authentic truths to be uncovered. The cultural translations that may emerge in intercultural centers are, however, never really static, for as Pred argued, the boundary-drawing ontological categories we use are never motionless or entirely at rest.

Otherwheres/worlds

One of the difficulties with the model of interculturalism is that women who participate in Alma Mater, for instance, are speaking from multiple locations and social positions in Turin and beyond, or as Pred suggests, "other wor(l)ds." It is easy to lose sight of the fact that people of African and Arab descent are categorized from "otherwhere" and as essentially different from Italians and are subjected to diffuse efforts to keep them socially and geographically distant from the nucleus of Italian society (Merrill 2013a, 2013b). This orientation is informed in part by taken-for-granted notions derived from colonial and postcolonial histories that people of African descent are out of place in the modern Western world. The past is repeating itself in the present as Blackness in Europe, as Carter suggests, seemingly dominated by the idea that people of African descent are not only outside Europe and the local labor market but somehow external to modernity itself: "the peculiar cultural positioning that has defined people of African descent in the West as permanent outsiders, strangers in a strange land, follows the essential logic of stigma that points to an insoluble difference that justifies permanent exclusion" (Carter 2010, 9–10). This situation creates certain obstacles to the inclusion of women of color in discussions of intergenerational exchanges on an equal footing with women of White Italian origin. A certain paternalism is fostered particularly when women without profound generational rootedness in Italy are relatively powerless in the Italian context, lacking cultural and frequently legal citizenship rights.

African and other noncitizens or people who through bodily appearance are associated with landscapes external to Italy and therefore assumed not to be Italian tend to be treated with considerable reserve, as if they belonged to places outside national borders. For this and other reasons, these women in Italy confront problems that are in some significant ways different from those faced by women identified as Italian for generations. Their differential positioning in Italian society, based on routine racialized national belonging, informs their daily gendered experiences. In some instances familial gender norms informed by specific cultural and religious beliefs reinforce but do not produce distancing encounters in Italian society. There is a broad hierarchy of oppression in Europe that is simultaneously racialized, gendered, and class influenced.

In spite of a relatively well-developed working-class consciousness in much of northern and central Italy, racialized differentiation and perceptions of belonging are not widely considered in most intercultural centers. There is instead a taken-for-granted presumption that all immigrant groups face similar

challenges of displacement and eventual integration into local social geographies. The experiences of people of African and Arab descent who complain of discrimination on the basis of race tend to be interpreted and rationalized as similar to the experiences that predominantly southern Italians faced when they emigrated from diverse villages on the peripheries of major cities in the postwar period. Class norms and gender discrimination are frequently acknowledged, but the persistent reluctance in many of the centers to confront racialized exclusionary practices in Italian society mirrors the wider society (Merrill 2011). This dominant epistemic regime suggesting that racism does not exist in Italy reinforces perhaps unintended yet nevertheless quite lived discriminatory and exclusionary practices (Bartoli 2012).

Allan Pred's critique of the taken-for-granted deployment of binary ontological categories in feminist theory that inadvertently redraw dominant (and patriarchal) boundary-making practices (1990) is useful in making sense of the habit of silencing alternative perspectives interwoven with differential and hierarchical geographies. This practice may be even more complex now than Pred suggested in 1990, in a post–Cold War context in which widespread fear and anger about political and economic uncertainties and distress have been channeled into the scapegoating of immigrants, especially those perceived as furthest from common identities and histories linking Europeans with one another (Pred 2000). As Henk Van Houtum (2013) argues, Europe is trying to gain coherence as well as geopolitical and biopolitical control by reinventing itself as a territorial unity, erecting diffuse borders to keep out the unwanted and racialized "other," and seeking to eradicate ontological multidimensionality.

Liz Bondi (1993) suggests that subjectivity is always fractured and decentered. Yet White European and American identity constructs have been hegemonic for several centuries, expressing both local and global systems of domination (Bondi 1993; Winant 2008; Marable and Agard-Jones 2008; Twine and Gardener 2013). Therefore, *where* one is can strongly influence or even imprison *who* one is within an imagined collectivity. I am referring not to unidimensional identities but to a situated approach that, as Neil Smith and Cindi Katz (1993) have warned, is circumspect about the dangers of appealing to fixity or essential truths while also cognizant of the overwhelming power of broad social and economic processes and cultural patterns. Space is active and responsive to social and economic production, not a dead repository or grid. As a consequence, subject positions in practice are more permeable, multiple, and overlapping than binary, boundary-drawing ontologies suggest. As Pred writes, "what is . . . frozen into position is in actuality melting-merging into something(s)-somerelation(s) else at the same time that something(s)-somerelation(s) else are melting-merging into it" (1995a, 1068).

Immigrants of color in Europe face government surveillance as part of a "fortress Europe" logic and zeitgeist that is defining Europeanness as preferably White (Saldanha 2011; Van Houtum 2013). The current preoccupation with security is infused with a racialized xenophobia from which racial profiling logically flows (Gregory and Pred 2006; Keaton 2013). Not long ago, a well-known African Italian author, Pap Khouma, wrote a letter to the newspaper *La Repubblica* titled "Being a Black Italian: My Life as an Obstacle Course."[9] Khouma described routine incidents of discrimination, including being asked to show his permit of stay in Italy, being mistaken for a street seller by his neighbors, and once while running through Milan when he was late for work, being stopped by police, asked for his documents, and escorted to the local police station as a *stranieri* (foreigner). This is what it can mean to be Italian and Black in Italy today. Immigrants experience the continual threat of deportation. Restrictive immigration and citizenship policies make it extremely difficult for immigrants without grandparents of Italian descent to obtain permanent residency status and Italian citizenship. Many therefore remain in a permanent liminal status, with or without residence documents that must be constantly renewed as part of a precarious process demanding the ability to demonstrate employment in the formal economic sector. Whatever their legal status might be, non-Italians and some non-Europeans are under scrutiny. Those who appear to be African or Arab represent tropes of the border between Europe and the imagined world beyond it, comparable to what Nicholas De Genova, in his discussion of Mexican immigrants in the United States, refers to as "disposable bodies," classified as "illegal" and deportable (2005; see also Lucht 2011; Pratt 2005; Wright 2006).

How might we characterize intercultural spaces in this context? We might consider them as "third spaces," or following Homi Bhabha's (2004) idea of ambiguous positionings, as locally generated spaces representing the intersection of multiple places, histories, and subjects. Or we might conceive of them as marginal spaces of radical openness as in bell hooks's idea of spaces of counterlanguage, resistance, and radical possibility where there is conscious intention to create and sustain alternative realities. Or they might be understood via comparison with transnational feminist political communities of oppositional alliance or resistance to sexist, racist, and imperialist power as in Chandra Mohanty's formulations (Bhabha 2004; hooks 1999; Mohanty, Russo, and Toures 1991).

But none of these concepts quite describes intercultural spaces, which are ambiguous spaces on the border of who is and who isn't "Italian," spaces where differences might be managed and contained as part of a process of *memorializing Italianness*. Yet they also have the potential to contribute to alternative

formations of belonging and citizenship unrestricted by racialized national identity and dichotomous "either/or" perspectives of belonging. As Pred argued, as we move from one situation to another, we acquire a multiplicity of situated experiences and knowledges. Intercultural sites represent continuously shifting and overlapping boundaries, the excluded middle between identifications of sameness and difference or "both/and" spaces from which undisciplined alternatives may be generated (Pred 1995a).

Turin's Alma Mater seems to serve different purposes for immigrants and Italian participants. In this context, immigrant women launched Alma Mater as part of an effort to represent their lived experiences, and *in their own ways* to belong in Italy (Merrill 2006). What sort of belonging were they interested in, and what did belonging mean in this context? As Tahar Lamri, an Algerian Italian writer who lives in Ravenna, has suggested, "Migrants in Italy live in a permanent state of suspension, in a state of contingency and instability" (2002). How do they negotiate or seek to subvert this suspension, and what are their choices, the places available to them to do this in Italy? Alma Mater as an intercultural space was designed to subvert experiences of suspension, to produce grounded spaces of safety and belonging. Is it and other intercultural spaces able to achieve this?

University of Bologna geographer Angela Giardini, who conducted a study of the Centri Interculturali in Emilia-Romagna, has described them as "resource locations . . . situated at the intersection of diverse (Italian) institutions which are designed to integrate and incorporate resident migrants into Italian culture by facilitating their access to services and encourage participation" (Bonora and Giardini 2004, 21). Intercultural centers provide spaces for the Italian state to integrate and regulate immigrants while also producing normalizing discourses of unified national identity. The official aim is that newcomers and their families will integrate into Italian society. There is therefore a danger that if uncritically accepted, the intercultural centers may act as border-making locations in which a somewhat coherent Italian or European identity, including Italian gender identity, is posed against abjected populations from across the borders (Salih 2002). People who are hypervisible may be perceived as in need of remaking and "civilizing" within an Italian and European frame that demands they discard all traces of their past as they are Europeanized.

As Valentina Pagliai (2009) has pointed out, in popular language the new immigrant is contrasted with the "Pure Blooded Italian" (*purosangue*). This term has been employed to refer specifically to a pure blooded Piedmontese, a regional identity for which Turin is the hub, to express the idea of a thoroughbred Italian of local origin. This classification through naming renders Italian regional differences and the uneven relationship between northern and south-

ern Italy monolithic, in a dialectical relationship with Italians as Europeans by contrast with non-European immigrants. While some intercultural centers intend to combat racism and other forms of intolerance, practitioners may also (perhaps unknowingly) reproduce taken-for-granted racialized hierarchies of difference by concealing differences in experiences and locations. Intercultural exchanges run the risk of making "ambiguous and 'disrespectful' instability manageable" as they place differences "into the narrative of the dominant culture—Italian history (north/south) and the European community" (Kowalczyk and Popkewitz 2005, 429).

Many migrants participate in intercultural centers because they provide support in finding jobs, learning Italian, acquiring skills, and establishing social networks. The centers are valuable sites for newcomers when other institutional supports have not been made available. However, when the centers become institutionalized in order to provide services and resources that the Italian state is not dispensing, they are unable to focus their energies on critiquing and opposing social, material inequalities and new expressions of discrimination. Without continual renewal of counterhegemonic politics, they risk becoming instruments for the management of acceptable and unacceptable racialized differences. Unless scrutinized by ongoing critique, a hegemony of presumed European cultural and technological superiority and patriarchy may be reproduced. As Valentina Pagliai (2009) suggests in her discussion of "unmarked racism" in Italy, racial comments are made to seem natural, and even migrants themselves are expected to save face by not speaking up when they are made. In a study by Ruba Salih (2002), a Moroccan woman visited a state-sponsored health-care center for migrant women in Emilia-Romagna looking for help with her fertility and financial problems. The social worker used a taken-for-granted language of difference, telling the woman that she (the social worker) "knew" that Moroccan men "from her tribe" didn't work. Instead of objecting to the characterization and inaccuracy of this assumption, the Moroccan woman, who didn't speak much Italian and wanted very much to be given services in order to communicate with these Italians, was silent in the face of the social worker's assumptions and misrecognition of her experience.

The intercultural centers intend to promote dialogue, communication, and cultural exchange, mirroring in this sense crucial elements in Italian feminism. Italian geographer Paola Bonora refers to the Centri Interculturali as diffuse spaces of "synthesis and hybridity" that act as seats of encounter (*incontro*) and exchange between natives and migrants in a rapidly transforming Italian urban territory. A nongendered intercultural center in Emilia-Romagna, Mondinsieme (World Together), describes its mission as one of "communication, not to give directions to someone, but to create another experience, to

involve people to the depths of each other's lives, emotionally" (http://www.mondinsieme.org/).[10] The Casa delle Donne also stressed the need for dialogue, exchange, and communication among and for women, based on the goal of supplanting male hegemonic knowledge with more egalitarian and less competitive cultural values and practices generated by women's experiences of caring for and nurturing others. The intercultural approach to creating alternative realities through experiential narrative and exchange seems to echo this Italian feminist theory and practice. In intercultural spaces, as in women's centers, separate spaces are created for immigrants where their histories and cultures can be articulated and represented. However, these tend to be apolitical spaces, where there is a risk of reproducing marginality and reifying binaristic discursive practices when the focus is not on building alternatives to dominant discursive and material practices. Alma Mater in Turin and many other intercultural centers are compelled to address immediate survival needs because the Italian government does not adequately aid newcomers or mediate their relationship to Italian society. At the end of the day, the feminist model of cultural dialogue and exchange tends in this context to be a one-way street, with newcomers seeking to secure help and local knowledge in order to survive.

While many intercultural centers promote a humanist, universalist notion that there are no real boundaries between human beings, be they Black, Arab, Eastern European, Hispanic . . . male or female, Italian from Calabria, Liguria or Veneto, these centers may be flattening differences and inadvertently legitimating dominant group power to affirm and manage hierarchies. In Italy, few wish to discuss expressions of racism, and socioeconomic disadvantages are frequently explained as a consequence of cultural inadequacies or anachronistic cultural values. There is a risk that multiculturalism is producing more-subtle forms of racism by retaining belief in the superiority of the dominant national culture (see Castles 2000). Katharyne Mitchell (1993, 2003) has argued that liberal discourses of multiculturalism efface racism in order to gain control over concepts of nation to further capital and state interests. The very idea of "tolerance of cultural difference" advances belief in the superiority of the dominant culture (Pred 2000). As Caren Kaplan (1994) has noted, pluralist relativism subsumes cultural asymmetries and historically specific distinctions in another unitary containment.

Forward Movement

What does this suggest about the place or belonging of African migrants in Italy? How does one belong when one neither was born in Italy nor is White yet has lived in the country for many years or has children who were born there?

Does one feel Italian at all? It is almost impossible not to be in part Italian after learning the language and culture, raising children, and establishing a family in Italy. A Moroccan woman who has lived in Italy for ten years, whose marriage was arranged by her family, and who with her spouse has three children, remarked that people on the streets of northern Italy usually ignore her, don't look at her, that she is not visible to them. But on the other hand, when people look at her, she finds herself irritated, so she feels an internal contradiction. She cooks Moroccan, lives, dresses, and thinks Moroccan, but Italy also grows as part of her. She likes Italian culture. She says she does not feel 100 percent Moroccan anymore. Moroccan friends and family members back home say that she has changed. And when in Morocco visiting, she misses Italy. She's not Italian 100 percent either and says that she can never become 100 percent Italian, but she is no longer Moroccan. She fears that her children will feel inferior because there is so much racism in Italy and people like her are viewed negatively.

It is important to note that African migrants tend to be hesitant to ask "Italians" for much help because of their precarious situation and the pervasive hostility toward their presence. Many have been reluctant to ask the Italian government to accommodate their religious practices and instead comply out of fear. Moving away from the oppositional practices of the feminist, student, and labor movements of an earlier era, the intercultural centers tend not to confront discriminatory labor practices, racialized housing, and other forms of social discrimination. They are at risk of becoming Italian spaces that reflect dominant social norms and regulatory practices.

As Tahar Lamri writes, migrants grope forward, tormented and mute, trying to break their silence in a variety of ways. They use poetry and song as acts of subversion but live life suspended. As Lamri describes his own experience, "Vivo sospeso / senza appartenere a nessuna dimora / ad bivio di un equilibrio" (I live suspended, / without belonging anywhere, / at the junction of an equilibrium). Lamri describes African immigrants as gradually losing sensitivity to the exclusion and gaze of others. But while they soften a bit, the softening is really a wall that they build, that as he puts it, "Sottile diventa anche il muro / che mi difende e mi divide" (I use to defend myself, / but that also divides me [Lamri 2002, 3]).

People of African descent still cannot expect to be listened to in Italian society. Italian languages dominate their world, and men do not escape any more than women. As Pred's intervention suggests, they use languages marked by their diverse social experiences yet must learn to speak in an Italian idiom or will not be heard at all. Tahar Lamri writes of how immigrants living in Italy are aware that they risk losing their identities by becoming Italian: "The immigrant does not ignore or minimize the distance. He knows that going straight to the

middle zone he can lose the taste of his complexity, the shadow of his light. So he chooses to bed down at this distance, that is to try to find those like him, to better construct his own image or portrait (Lamri 2002, 3).[11] Pred's "both/and" inclusive conception of the conjoining of diverse sites and overlapping boundaries may help us shape politics going forward.

NOTES

1. Throughout this essay, I have capitalized "Black" as an indication of diasporic identify formation. "White" is also capitalized as an identity signifier and analytical term.

2. Since 1990, the shift in Italian demographics has been spectacular. There has been a fourteen-fold increase in the foreign resident population, from roughly 330,000 in 1990 to almost 5 million in 2011, representing some 7.5 percent of the population, not including the undocumented (Italian National Statistical Institute, http://www.demo.istat.it/index_e.html; Bonifazi et al. 2009).

3. In relation to northern Europe, Italians have long been seen as not quite White. This classification has persisted, especially for southern Italians who at least until the 1990s were Othered in relation to northern Italian regions. However, as I argue elsewhere, with the growing presence of postcolonial populations of color, this is now shifting and Italians are increasingly unified by language and a sense of European Whiteness (Merrill 2013a).

4. What is so compelling here is that alongside the critical race- and postcolonial-informed feminist theories of intersectionality in Kimberlé Crenshaw, Donna Haraway, bell hooks, Patricia Hill Collins, Chandra Mohanty, and other less commonly recognized but visionary critical race-feminist theorists such as Anna Julia Cooper, Pred was putting forward a *spatialized* theory of gender to make sense of differential positions, multiply inflected and situated relations of power (Crenshaw 2003; Haraway 2003; hooks 1992; Collins 2008; Mohanty, Russo, and Toures 1991; May 2007).

5. Whiteness has a distinctive history in Italy and is a contested term. We may think of Italians as almost White.

6. Cultural mediators often speak several languages in addition to their own.

7. See, for example, Milan Woman's Bookstore Collective 1990; De Lauretis 1990; Bono and Kemp 1991; Braidotti 1992; Diotima 1987; Martucci 2008; Parati and West 2002; Malagreca 2006.

8. Indeed, a global feminist perspective rooted in such foundations would interrupt "national" ideological convictions, allowing women to explore material inequalities at multiple scales.

9. "Io nero italiano e la mia vita ad ostacoli," *La Repubblica*, December 12, 2009.

10. Mondinsieme of Reggio Emilia is today a foundation supported by the local government but directed by an Italian Moroccan man and an Italian Ethiopian woman. This intercultural center has a unique vision of itself as a site to promote integration as well as empowerment. It works to advance antiracism.

11. "Tuttavia, L'immigrato non ignora le distanze e nemmeno li minimizza. Sa che

andando dritto alla meta egli può perdere il sapore della sua complessità, l'ombra della sua luce. E allora sceglie di accamparsi in questa distanza, e cioè prendere I suoi simili come modello per meglio schizzare il proprio ritratto"; author's translation in text.

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CHAPTER 6

Monumental Memory, Moral Superiority, and Contemporary Disconnects

Racisms and Noncitizens in Europe, Then and Now

DAMANI J. PARTRIDGE

> To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it 'the way it really was' (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger. . . . Only the historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins.
>
> —WALTER BENJAMIN, *Illuminations*

> Cultural racism does not merely stereotype ethnicity. It fixes culture. Ours as well as theirs. Asserts permanent difference and closure. Essentializes. Insists on freezing into position. Defines away any form of adaptability. Denies the permeability of borders. Facilitates extreme forms of labor-market discrimination and housing segregation, as well as social and political apartheid. Legitimates social inequality and economic injustice. Erases history. Imagines a homogenous past. Forgets the integration of Finns, Germans, Walloons, Scots, and other European migrants in previous centuries. Condemns integration of the culturally different to the realm of futility. Categorically confines its holders to stasis. "Us Swedes" as well as "them." Once a Swede, always a Swede. Once a Turk, always a Turk. Once an "immigrant," always an "immigrant." Once a "fucking foreigner," always a "fucking foreigner." Even into the next generation. And the generation thereafter. And . . .
>
> —ALLAN PRED, *Even in Sweden*

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This essay reengages a critical component of my recent work on Holocaust memory amid contemporary racisms in light of Allan Pred's Benjamin-inspired interventions on questions of history, danger, and cultural racisms, "even in Sweden." In line with Pred's and Benjamin's insights, it takes specific historically situated articulations of racisms and danger as a mode of understanding contemporary life. My investigation is located in Germany, and even more specifically, in Berlin. Germany is significant to the extent that it (at least symbolically) continues to immediately conjure up images not only of BMWs, Mercedes, Audis, and Porsches, but also of genocide and its memorialization. While Germany continues to be thought of as an exceptional case, putting Pred's articulation of apparent surprise (i.e., "even in Sweden") in reverse, I argue that Germany is emblematic of the break that allows European nation-states and Europe as a whole to insist on moral superiority that requires forgetting the links between genocide, colonialism, racisms, conquest, and contemporary life, as if the danger of European perpetration resides only in the past. Colonialism and conquest are more often than not represented in an ambivalent way (obliquely in terms of a civilizing mission), if remembered at all. The monumentality of the remembering of genocide in Europe, though, takes the place of further reflection, as if the past could be mastered and require no further intervention from new (unanticipated) subjects.

Monumental memorialization associated with American post–World War II liberation begins to reflect an arrogance about memory and increasingly provides European and American nation-states the supposedly moral space to intervene on the grounds of "human rights," "humanitarianism," and "peacekeeping." What Benjamin describes as a "moment of danger" is significant in the sense that there is little space for "Others" to successfully intervene in the complicated rearticulations and reconfigurations of no longer genocidal racialized violence. The past is unavailable to many of us to demonstrate a less extreme but nevertheless systematic form of persistence. Redemption, instead, seems to be the order of the day, which then also reasserts moral superiority because now there is, supposedly, no longer racism, at least not as a mainstream practice.

Framings

My motivation to write this essay originated with an investigation I conducted on citizenship and noncitizens in Berlin schools at the turn of this century. I was struck by the general disconnect between left-leaning, "'68-generation" teachers and their "Turkish" and "Arab" Berlin-based pupils. One tenth-grade math teacher at the Haupt- Realschule (a lower-tier secondary school) that I

was observing told me that he had expected to be working with working-class (implicitly, "White" German) kids, and had hoped to help to transform their socioeconomic circumstances, but in his first year he had been confronted with an entirely "Turkish" class.[1] A history teacher for the same grade and school was dismayed by her students' indifference to her teachings about the Second World War and the Nazis. The secondary school and its students and teachers were situated in a so-called immigrant neighborhood, notable for its beautiful canals, nineteenth-century apartment buildings, hip restaurants, bohemian bookstores, trendy student hangouts, and anarchist graffiti. The milieu was part of an emerging problematic concerning the place of German history in contemporary German life. Ironically, it seemed to me, teachers at the school were more likely to sympathize with a "White" German student who had begun to outwardly identify with skinheads than with the majority of their students who were "Turkish German" or "Arab German."[2]

Over the course of the 1999–2000 school year, the school's tenth-grade science teacher was scheduled to lead a class trip to the former concentration camp Sachsenhausen nearby, and I decided to accompany them. Like the school as a whole, most of his students were children of immigrants, predominantly Turkish and Arab, while a minority were "White" Germans. When I arrived the morning of the trip, I was disappointed to find only two or three students there, all of them "White" Germans. The other students had said that they would come, but they did not show up, so we went on without them. The science teacher thought his students were apathetic, and I went along with his assumption that the absent students had simply taken an opportunity for a vacation from school. On further reflection, though, I wondered to what extent their absence was due to the event itself and the way in which the Holocaust is taught in German schools. To what extent was their absence linked to the failure of the perpetrator discourse to include them, with its emphasis on German guilt?[3] I wondered if the identificatory terms of the memorialization of Nazi genocide were creating new impossibilities of association or horror. I was struck by the way in which the discourse about the Holocaust, perpetration, and guilt, among not only teachers but also Germans more broadly, was fully retrospective, and avoided any connections between the genocide and contemporary circumstances. I observed also that the implicit demand for this affiliation with the guilt of historical perpetration was producing new specters of exclusion.

Nearly a decade later, as part of my investigation of this disconnect, I began to follow a group of Palestinian German and Turkish/Turkish German youths as they confronted national and local demands that they personally invest in German history as part of the process of participating in German democracy.

This project, which began with my work in schools that are predominately populated by Turkish/Turkish German and Arab/Arab German youths, was motivated by the disconnect I observed between "White" German teachers and these pupils who could not relate to the perpetrator discourse of German Holocaust memory, but who could relate to everyday experiences of racism. My interest in the taboo of comparison between racial memory and contemporary racism has led me to examine the relationship of so-called migrant youths to Holocaust memory and to conventional claims that these youths are necessarily anti-Semitic and uninterested in the European history of genocide. I also investigate how the local and national demands that they engage this history meet up against their own experiences of racism and denials of recognition.

Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe

In 2009, I accompanied the group of Palestinian/Palestinian German, and Turkish/Turkish German youths on a trip to the then still recently constructed Berlin Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe (figure 6.1). They were part of a program funded by the federal government and organized by a national antiracism foundation to address "gaps" in "democratic education," particularly among right-wing male and "immigrant" youths. The group I accompanied was scheduled to go to Auschwitz in the fall, and in preparation for that trip the liaison from a major antiracism foundation had organized a series of events over weeks and months in Berlin.

This trip was not the group's first meeting. Previous gatherings had included an exchange of personal histories (including histories of Palestinian refuge in Germany), watching a documentary film about a German family's confrontation with its own SS Nazi legacy, a visit to an unconventional memorial in a middle-class Berlin neighborhood that recounted the daily intensification of anti-Semitism during the Nazi era, and a guided tour of the German Bundestag (the main house of the German parliament today).

On that Sunday afternoon, ten out of sixteen youths showed up. We began with brunch at the foundation, about an hour (by bus and train) away from where the youths lived, then proceeded on a guided tour of the German Reichstag (the national parliament building), and concluded with a guided visit to the memorial. The youth center's director and the youth worker who usually accompanied the youths told me that no one had dropped out of the program, even after several months. This surprised me since the youth worker had also told me that the program had been motivated partly by what she and others perceived as the youths' latent anti-Semitism. The director, who was a social worker, participated in planning the program, but the main organizer was the

FIGURE 6.1. The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe covers an entire city block and, from this perspective, looks onto Berlin's enormous park, the Tiergarten. It is also directly across from the American Embassy and the back windows of the Hotel Adlon, a major five-star hotel. Author's photo.

foundation liaison. The primary youth worker said that the youths in everyday conversation had suggestively asked, "Bist du Jude?" (Are you a Jew?), or forthrightly proclaimed "Du Opfer" (you victim) as insults. She said that this rhetoric, or at least the direct references to Jews, had stopped after the first few weeks of the new program.

On the day of the visit to the memorial, the liaison from the sponsoring foundation was annoyed with the youths for play-fighting in the Reichstag, which they also did at the youth center. The official guide (who worked in the building where the lower house of parliament deliberated) had warned the youths to use language and behave in a way appropriate to the institution. On our way through the building, one of the young men struck a hip-hop pose behind an FDP (liberal party) podium as his friend and I took pictures. When we got to a part of the Reichstag where victorious Soviet soldiers had used charcoal to etch their names into the building,[4] the same young man gave the commemoration a contemporary twist by pretending to shake a can and spray paint his name below the historical Soviet graffiti.

As we left the guide to take the elevator to the glass dome atop the Reichstag,

which famously bears the words *Dem deutschen Volke* ([for] the German folk) at its entrance,[5] she said to the youths, "I'll see you again, when you're parliamentarians." Whether she meant this as an ironic jab or a form of motivation I could not tell, but I recalled her admonition about "appropriate behavior." Was hip-hop bravado unwelcome in this house of democracy, or would the democracy itself have to be transformed by the hip-hop messengers in order to become a more truly democratic institution? In other words, does not the demand for proper (democratic) comportment also exclude? How could the possibility of opening up the democracy be configured in relation to our next stop—the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe?

Between the Reichstag and the memorial, the foundation liaison admonished the youths about their behavior and said they needed to do better. Though he was not harsh, he had told me on the side that he would not go through with the trip to Auschwitz if such behavior continued. After their first meeting with the group, the social workers and the foundation liaison had both wondered if the youths' parents would let them continue with the program if they knew that it was about a history relating to Jews. Although the youths were excited about the prospect of going to Auschwitz, the liaison said that he was going to introduce the Jewish dimensions of the project slowly. In the first meeting, he told the youths only that the project was about history. On the day of the Reichstag visit, as the time approached for going to the memorial, he seemed particularly agitated and nervous about the possibility of an inappropriate incident there.

After a short break, we all walked past the Brandenburg Gate and the new American Embassy en route to the memorial. Our official memorial guide had pictures of the previous site, where the Reichskanzlei (office of the chancellor during the German Reich) had stood before its destruction in the war. The liaison also showed the group a failed proposal for the memorial and asked them to evaluate it. The guide eventually asked them to walk into the memorial and come back after five minutes. In the period before entering, one young man had fallen asleep on a stele. When another talked on his cell phone, the guide joked pedagogically, "If you have questions, it doesn't mean that you have to immediately pick up the phone to call information." (Of course, the youth wasn't calling information, and the guide had found a polite way to point this out.) During the guide's presentation, though three youths talked among themselves, most listened and answered questions; they were much more attentive and respectful than were youths from the eastern German city of Magdeburg whom I had observed on a previous day.

When the Berlin youths came back to the guide after exploring the memorial on their own, our guide led a discussion about the possible meaning of this memorial, one that, as the guide pointed out, had no names or words. We

then proceeded underground to the *Ort der Information* (information center), where a display of names, images, and text narrated a more formal history of internment, deportation, and extermination. On the way down, before the security check, the foundation liaison poked his finger into the back of one young man and told the social worker that he would not take him to Auschwitz. The main youth worker had asked the liaison how he thought things were going, but I did not see what the young man had done. He did not respond immediately to the finger in his back but seemed (emotionally) hurt after the incident. It was not clear to me whether this was a warning, or if instead the liaison meant what he had said. The guide told the youths to explore the exhibit on their own, after which I saw the youth worker gathering the group together for a private discussion. Meanwhile, the foundation liaison spoke with the guide.

After we had returned upstairs and outside, the youth worker, emerging from the conversation with the young people from the center, told the foundation liaison that they had something to tell him. On the corner of the memorial, in response to the youths' mea culpa, the liaison proceeded to say that he would go through with the next meeting, but that if the group's behavior did not improve, he would end everything after that. He wanted each person to sign a contract agreeing to behave appropriately. One of the young people said that the activities had been too much for them for one day. The liaison responded that in Auschwitz there would be even more, and they countered that Auschwitz would be different because they had not been there before.

Things seemed to end on a more positive note. We walked back to the Brandenburg Gate, and all the youths proceeded to the S-Bahn (regional train) to take it back to their neighborhood. I was anxious about the possibility of failure, that the program might end before the youths made it to Auschwitz. In comparison with the previous meeting, I thought that they had been less engaged, and when they tried to participate more, they had been made to feel out of place, particularly in the Reichstag. The experience at the memorial was more of a lecture than a conversation. The youths were there to learn, but there was no space for them to also teach. When asked to interpret the stellae, many said that they saw them as mere abstract concrete blocks, a place to play hide and seek. The guide gave his own interpretation of why people were tempted to play at the memorial, that they were overwhelmed by the horror, and that play put things back into a manageable order, but this reading sparked no epiphanies among the youths. My own sense was that there was still too much distance between the events the blocks were meant to symbolize and the young people who were supposed to be affected by them. The interaction had agitated the liaison, although he did say, on the side, that it was up to the experience itself, including the guides, to engage the youths. While one young woman did

offer an interpretation of her own, most simply gave the guide polite answers to his questions: "It's gray." "We had fun playing tag." They all continued to demonstrate a desire to go to Auschwitz, even if the memorial had failed to reach out and touch or connect with them directly.[6]

The power dynamic that leads to apparent indifference is structured in terms of the lack of social and political space that (if made available or demanded) would explicitly call for and allow the youths to openly connect to this history via their own experiences (see Rothberg 2009). On the other hand, because almost all the victims of the Nazi-administered Holocaust are dead, they cannot participate in—and in the case of the Holocaust memorial are not being asked to participate in—the ways in which the Holocaust is remembered or think about the links to the present. This is, in Benjamin's terms, a moment of danger, in the sense that the German nation-state and Europe participate in producing a kind of historical break that makes these kinds of connections nearly impossible. The danger is that because of a lack of accountability that goes along with the teacher/pupil (top/down, experienced/inexperienced) relationship, racism persists without discussion in new forms. The murdered, of course, also cannot participate (and are not asked to participate) in this exchange.

Memorial Planning and Failed Connections

In speaking at the opening of the Berlin Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe on May 10, 2005, Paul Spiegel, then president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, noted: "The 'Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe' honors the victims of National Socialist tyranny, but it does not directly implicate the perpetrators. On a visit to the memorial, the perpetrators and supporters from that time and their contemporary ideological compatriots do not have to feel as if the memorial is speaking directly to them" (2005). According to him, perpetrators do not necessarily feel implicated by the memorial.

Against Spiegel's claim, one might argue that the decision to put the memorial in the center of the city—next to the site for what is now the American Embassy, Potsdamer Platz (a major commercial, shopping, and entertainment center), and the Brandenburg Gate (the entrance to the traditional city center), and along the road leading to the Reichstagsgebäude (the building that houses the present-day main house of the German legislature)—suggests a permanent confrontation with questions of perpetration. On the other hand, perpetration seems to be less and less a problem for those who claim non-Jewish German heritage but were not active in committing genocide. It is true that the perpetration issue is mildly sustained by national anxieties about renewed complicity between past agents of atrocity and young neo-Nazis who vandalize Jewish

tombstones and attack so-called foreigners. But largely absent from discussions of memorialization or the monument is any reference to everyday racism, in either its institutional or intimate varieties, as part of the historical genocidal (not to mention colonial) logic.[7] Connections are rarely made between genocide and racism today or other histories of atrocity. Part of Spiegel's point seems to be that a confrontation with perpetration is one not only with the specific events of the Nazi Holocaust but also with what it means to be a perpetrator now, and how one might continue to be complicit in acts of racist violence.

More pointedly, contemporary monumentalization of, and distancing from, Holocaust memory is necessary for contemporary modes of normalized racial exclusion. Europeans gain contemporary legitimacy by signifying a historical break from a genocidal logic, despite their building new (asylum) camps (see Agamben 1998). In other words, the technology of the camp has not been banned altogether, only in its particular historical use. I am not arguing that the Nazi camps and contemporary asylum camps or deportation prisons are equivalent, or that asylum camps commit the same kinds of violence as did Nazi-era concentration and extermination camps, or, as Giorgio Agamben suggests (1998, 2005), that refugees in asylum camps are completely excluded from universal rights or political life. Rather, I want to draw attention to the ways in which a supremacist logic persists, not just in Germany, but also in Europe, the United States, and beyond, which differentiates types of citizens and qualifies the universality of rights.[8] To some extent, Germany takes on the culpability for all of Europe, meaning, ultimately, even less reflection elsewhere, inasmuch as others can claim a victim status as those who were occupied by the Nazi power. In writing this essay, I do not imagine Europe (in the political embodiment of the European Union) as the site for a reemergence of a Holocaust. But I do think that setting the Shoah as the standard for what should never happen again contributes to a monumentalization of an antiracist and anti-anti-Semitic logic that solidifies the legitimacy of Europe and European nation-states while still excluding Others in practice (or even excluding while partially incorporating them—what I call "exclusionary incorporation"—see Partridge 2008, 2012). Here I include as "Others" those who already reside within the nation-state and Europe. My main objective in this essay is to point toward a gap that is being produced between Holocaust memorialization and the recognition of contemporary racisms.[9] The discussion of memorialization that I address in what follows is wrapped in guilt, and yet it simultaneously relegates any confrontation with racism cum genocide to a past (see Olick 1998) that is now monumentalized, standardized, and made useful for contemporary purposes without addressing contemporary racisms in their complex European (or American) varieties (see Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Pred 2000; Özyürek 2009; Bunzl 2005,

2007). It allows for the historiographical break that is implied in Benjamin's articulation of a "moment of danger." Beyond German guilt, it lets the rest of Europe off the hook to the extent that physical manifestation of the major memorialization is contained in Germany (as a nationally financed project)—even if there are explicit country-by-country accountings of the numbers of Jews killed during the Shoah (under the memorial at the *Ort der Information*).

Paul Spiegel added another dimension to the process of Holocaust memorialization and its contemporary implications when he argued at the opening of the Berlin Memorial, "The occasionally emotionally taxing conflict [over where, how, and why to build a memorial] has produced many noteworthy contributions to the German-Jewish dialogue about the still burdensome past. Unfortunately, this discussion has been in danger of producing a hierarchy of the victims and the losses suffered. In the face of torture and death, there is no hierarchy. Pain and sorrow over the losses suffered in every affected family are tremendous. Therefore, I emphatically support the proposition by other victim groups to have public sites of remembrance" (2005). How the discussion about the past takes place now is significant for the present and future of antiracist politics. The solution to which Spiegel refers relates to a larger controversy in which Lea Rosh and other advocates for a memorial (which ultimately opened in May 2005) argued that it should specifically honor the Jewish victims of the Holocaust, and against honoring at once all those targeted by the genocidal logic. This discussion, of course, has relevance not just for how the past is remembered but also for contemporary life.

Monumental Memory amid Contemporary Racism

I now want to shift my attention from historical relationships to a contemporary one, that between Berlin's Holocaust Memorial, German Holocaust memory, and contemporary racialized subjects, particularly so-called Turks, Turkish Germans, Arabs, Arab Germans, and Palestinian refugees. I want to explore several key questions: (1) How can the racialized subject, and the analyst, relate to what Viola Georgi (2003) calls a "borrowed memory," that is, the borrowed memory of the implicitly German but also European genocidal perpetration and victimization of genocide? (2) To what extent are the nation-state and the supranation (Europe) being asserted and reasserted in this necessity for remembering via a major memorial? (3) What work does the memorialization of a violent racist history do to serve the contemporary nation and supranation (Europe)? (4) How does the memorial contribute to the rupture between racialist history and contemporary racism? And finally, (5) to what extent does

the memorial work as a form of absolution (and forgetting; see Olick 1998; Edkins 2003), while solidifying national and European consciousness?

In addition to addressing these questions, I want to note that one can read the Holocaust memorial as something akin to what Benedict Anderson (1991) has called "print capitalism." That is, the memorial (and especially the discussion about it as it was being planned and built) works like a novel, allowing people (i.e., national people) to read and argue over the same book in the same language at the same time, to come together as those who can—as opposed to those who cannot—discuss and read and be the national audience.[10] In this way, the memorial and the discussions about it contribute to producing the nation and also Europe via Germany as its head who has come to account for his/her sins with a vision toward the future.[11]

A Third Anniversary of Official Memorialization

In the spring of 2008, prior to more recent visits, I decided to return to Berlin for the third anniversary of the memorial's completion. On the memorial's Web site I had seen that a concert was to be performed within it, and more importantly (it seemed at the time), the most prominent advocate for the memorial project, Lea Rosh, would speak. For many, Lea Rosh was at the center of what had become over the seventeen-year planning and advocacy process a very controversial project.

The project had been contentious due to its large size and its location in the center of the city, because it differentiated between Jewish and other victims, and because the company that had supplied the anti-graffiti agent for the memorial owned a subsidiary that had supplied the lethal gas for the Nazi extermination camps. Furthermore, Rosh had for seventeen years held onto a tooth from a Nazi extermination camp in order to bury it in the memorial, a proposal that was ultimately abandoned because, many argued, it violated the Jewish law that calls for immediate burial of Jewish body parts and outlaws any instrumental use. Rosh had also begun the fund-raising campaign for the memorial by placing a provocative billboard on its eventual site that read: "Den Holocaust hat es nie gegeben" (The Holocaust never happened).[12]

ENTERING THE MEMORIAL ITSELF

As the project's New York–based architect Peter Eisenman has suggested in many statements, the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, while monumental, is not a classic monument. It is a field of gray pillars that appear to both guides and visitors like tombstones.[13] Unlike a cemetery, however, walk-

FIGURE 6.2. This is the audience for an orchestral concert inside the memorial on the occasion of the third anniversary of its completion. At the event, one could hear the musicians but not see them or the conductor collectively. The orchestra musicians watched the conductor on video screens. Author's photo.

ing toward and into the pillars one is enveloped by them, until the surrounding Berlin cityscape disappears from view (figure 6.2). The experience is profound, but to experience this profundity, or any connection to the Shoah in its horrifying depth, one must bring along one's own memories (again, emphasizing a historical break as opposed to continuity—making contemporary experiences of racism distinct from the memory of and the enormity of the past atrocities).

When I returned to the memorial for its anniversary, Catholic youths were reading aloud Elie Wiesel's and others' accounts of the Shoah. The young volunteers were dispersed throughout the field of stelae with yellow scarves tied round their necks like American Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts or East German Young Pioneers. The scarves were close to the color of the stars of David that those whom the Nazi administration identified as Jews were forced to wear during the Third Reich. In the early afternoon, passersby were confronted with these readings or accounts of the numbers thought to have died in the Nazi camps across Europe. One young woman stood at a podium at the edge of the memorial reading into a microphone. Others read deep within the memorial,



FIGURE 6.3 This sign reads: "Foundation of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe," and gives its address. Author's photo.

invisible from the street. One woman wore a Palestinian scarf over her yellow one (recalling a German fashion of the late 1980s to mid-1990s that had come back in style), but she refused to answer my questions about her decision to wear the scarf at this event, saying that the two scarves were unconnected and directing me to speak with the organizer about the readings.

Speeches by Lea Rosh; Wolfgang Thierse, former president of the German Bundestag; and a representative from the Israeli Embassy were followed in the early evening by an orchestral concert, especially composed for the event. The concert, like the readings, took advantage of the space and the acoustics of the monument by using the sounds of horns, voices, strings, and tympani to create a new aura in a space that is ordinarily much more silent, without its own voice or speech to direct or "correct" interpretation.

In its everyday life, when it is not at the center of a special occasion, the memorial makes few direct statements on its own. Although the it covers an entire city block, the announcement that it is the "Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe" is subdued and only appears on the small street that parallels the main one leading to other tourist attractions, including the Reichstag, Potsdamer Platz, and the Brandenburg Gate (figure 6.3).

You might not see the sign at all unless you know where to look. Furthermore, traditional symbols of the Shoah play no role in the aboveground structure. As Eisenman put it, "We did not want to proscribe what they [the visitors] should think; on the contrary, we wanted to make contemplation possible" (2005b).[14] Following this logic, Eisenman was initially against having the *Ort der Information*, which gives an historical account of the European dimensions of the Shoah underground, beneath the field of "2,711 stelae made of high-quality concrete, each measuring 0.95 m in width and 2.38 m in length, hollow, with inclinations of between 0.5° and 2°."[15]

PLANNING THE MEMORIAL FOR THE MURDERED JEWS OF EUROPE

On the planning foundation's Web site, the most frequently asked question has been: "Why is the memorial dedicated solely to the memory of the murdered Jews?" The foundation responds: "The decision to dedicate the memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe was taken by the German Bundestag [lower house of Parliament] in 1999 after a lengthy debate. It makes it clear that the recognition of the singularity of this crime and German historical responsibility are part of the core of the identity of the German nation-state."[16]

This framing of "singularity" and "responsibility" as part of a national "core identity" brings us closer to some of the tensions underlying the disconnect between '68-generation teachers and so-called immigrant students. The terms of the relationship to the memorial and to the history it represents are predefined for those who want to claim belonging or citizenship. This was done in part to combat the danger of Holocaust denial, which is a crime in Germany, but it also closes off other kinds of connections to Holocaust memory, simultaneously producing victims of Nazi genocide and their descendants as non-German noncitizens.

That the memorial's planners thought that the German nation-state should be so crucial to the project's rationale says a great deal about how the monument works in "nation space." It also makes clear that the nation and the state and by extension Europe, and not antiracist politics, are at the center of the process of memorialization. A 2005 discussion between the monument's architect Eisenman and Spiegel Online highlighted these ideas:

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Who is the monument for? Is it for the Jews?
EISENMAN: It's for the German people. I don't think it was ever intended to be for the Jews. It's a wonderful expression of the German people to place something in the middle of their city that reminds them—could remind them—of the past.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: An expression of guilt, you mean?

EISENMAN: No. For me it wasn't about guilt. When looking at Germans, I have never felt a sense that they are guilty. Clearly the anti-Semitism in Germany in the 1930s went overboard, and it was clearly a terrible moment in history. *But how long does one feel guilty? Can we get over that?*

I always thought that this monument was about trying to get over this question of guilt. Whenever I come here, I arrive feeling like an American. But by the time I leave, I feel like a Jew. And why is that? Because Germans go out of their way—because I am a Jew—to make me feel good. And that makes me feel worse. I can't deal with it. Stop making me feel good. If you are anti-Semitic, fine. If you don't like me personally, fine. But deal with me as an individual, not as a Jew. I would hope that this memorial, in its absence of guilt-making, is *part of the process of getting over that guilt.* You cannot live with guilt. If Germany did, then the whole country would have to go to an analyst. I don't know how else to say it.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: The monument is specifically devoted to remembering the Jews who died in the Holocaust. Do you think it's right that the other groups victimized in the Holocaust are excluded from this monument?

EISENMAN: Yes, I do. I changed my mind on that a few months ago. The more I read about World War II history, the more I realized that the worse the war went in Russia, the more Jews were killed by the Nazis. When the Nazis realized they couldn't defeat the Bolshevists, they made sure they got the Jews. Now I think it's fine that the project is just for the Jews. (Eisenman 2005a, my emphasis, original English).

As one sees in Eisenman's comments, the Shoah belongs not only to Germany but to an international community. Germany, as a nation-state, is negotiating its relationship to this transnational memory by funding and ultimately building the memorial after two major international competitions. The German Bundestag, pushed by Lea Rosh, is not building the nation, but it is establishing a moral position in connection to "the idea of Europe" (Pagden 2002), the United States, and the future.

In what follows, I explore further the relationship between guilt and responsibility and the implications of getting over guilt, particularly for those subjects who can feel neither guilty nor responsible.

GUILT REQUIRES ABSOLUTION

> "Thousands of Germans," he [then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder] said, "were prepared to take part in the mass murder of the innocent." Today's European Germany has learned from these crimes, that they could never grow tired of repeating the phrase: "Never Again."
>
> —ROB BROOMBY, BBC News

Within the context of thinking about the break between genocide and contemporary racisms, guilt becomes a central issue. This is expressed most explicitly in terms of the guilt of "Germans" in relation to what "they" did to "the Jews." This formulation is itself a serious problem because of its connection to an ultimate call, even if it is only implicit, for national absolution. When, the German politician wonders, will it be all right to act in the world without guilt, to make foreign policy (and even domestic policy) without atonement as the central rubric of what is acceptable on the world stage, on which some still have low expectations for Germany and suspect hidden German desires for military aggression?[17]

Atonement is a problem because it does not directly consider the fact that racist thinking and policies persist, even if they are not equivalent to genocide. If atonement means getting over guilt, and that guilt is tied to getting over a history of racism, then atonement also potentially means not recognizing contemporary racism because the nation can be and has been forgiven.[18] As Sharon Macdonald found in a study of the contemporary impact of the Nazi Party grounds in Nuremberg, "Even well intentioned attempts to openly face the past can end up telling redemptive stories" (2009, 190).

Furthermore, as many have correctly noted, the generation that was directly involved with the Nazi genocide is dying out. Increasingly, it makes little analytical or political sense to carry over guilt from one generation to the next, particularly when the '68 generation did so much to protest against their parents' complicity with genocide. That guilt is being gotten over can be seen, in part, in Germany's increasing willingness to participate in global military missions, even though its military is legally bound to a defensive posture. Additionally, the formulation of what "the Germans" did to "the Jews" is problematic in the sense that at least some, if not the majority, of those Jewish people who were murdered or had to flee Europe were also German and were only made primarily Jewish by the Nazis and their European sympathizers.

Finally, if atonement is so central to the framework of Nazi genocide and its contemporary recognition, then the fall of the Berlin Wall and German reunification play critical roles in potentially bringing about the ultimate forgiveness

for which the guilt, and the possibility of atonement, have been calling. The trust that Germany has recovered was symbolized in the Allied agreement to, and former chancellor Helmut Kohl's call for, making the two Germanys one, and most recently in a return to global military intervention in countries like Afghanistan, and even before that in Bosnia, where Germany is now on the "right side" of genocide.

Domestically, as I have pointed out elsewhere (2008, 2012), atonement may also allow Germany to end a refugee policy that was initiated, in part, to make up for the sins of genocide by letting people claim refuge in Germany to escape oppression by other governments (and this is part of a broader European process; see Pred 2000, on Sweden). Since the Asylum Compromise of 1993,[19] it has been much more difficult for non-European people to come to Germany (or to the other Schengen Agreement countries surrounding it), claim asylum, and gain a legal status. In other words, the implicit call for atonement as a central rubric of a postracist European future is embedded in an inability to see, and refusal to recognize, contemporary racisms as central to the logic of the nation-state and Europe. Racism is linked to a particular historical moment that mainstream Europe now imagines it has overcome.

RACIALIZED GERMANNESS?

The monumental effort to get beyond racism reveals the persistent reassertion of a racial logic. It is clear in Eisenman's account in his *Der Spiegel* interview (2005a) that he experiences a split between contemporary, "regular" German and global Jewish subjectivity. Even in the present, Jewishness remains an exceptional subject position. This separation is standard in the German context, but the difficulties that it presents are not confronted, even by the monument project's primary organizer, Lea Rosh, who has also publicized her own genealogical relationship to Jewishness. She refers to her Jewish grandfather in some discussions, including one with another attendee at the third anniversary celebration, which I overheard. In that brief conversation, Rosh went on to say that she stands by this genealogical fact, which links her personal history to the event being commemorated (and to her advocacy for the memorial in the first place) yet leaves her standing as an exceptional figure in her biological connection to Jewishness and mainstream recognition as German in national life. The monumentality of Holocaust memory stems partly from the enormity of loss, reinscribing the problematic separation between Germanness and Jewishness.

In this context, Germany, in both mainstream media and the everyday conversations of Germans, produces racialized subjects, while denying its participation in the reinscription of processes of racialization (see also Chin et al. 2009; Fehrenbach 2005). Why else would Eisenman feel so Jewish when

he comes to Germany? On the other hand, Eisenman's discussion and other mainstream accounts like it (with the rare exception of organizations like the one Paul Spiegel represents) miss the opportunity to make connections to other contemporary subjects undergoing processes and experiences of racialization and racism. While Turkish German leaders have attempted to make such links, they are often rebuked, and they certainly are not addressed in the mainstream discussion (see Peck 1994; Yurdakul and Bodemann 2006; Margalit 2009). The monumentalization of the past turns it into something that can only be discussed dangerously.

MONUMENTALITY AND INACTIVITY

Monumentality produces a problematical forgetting. The monumental as forgetting (see also Huyssen 1996) is palpable in the notion that the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe is the first and will be the last monument to tie Holocaust memory to the specificity of German planning and European perpetration. An implicit conclusion follows: "We have paid our dues. We have put the monument in the center of the capital." There is an implied teleological progression in the monument's completion.

When the monument is ultimately built and dedicated, the seventeen-year controversy about its erection ends. On what basis could an active discussion of this magnitude continue? Given that the logics of perpetration are not the same as those of guilt, how can a discussion of the changing nature of perpetration go on, either as a historical or a contemporary problematic, which remembers but is not limited to genocide as its defining feature? How does the nation-state ultimately protect itself from contemporary accusation by building the monument as a historical artifact that primarily serves the contemporary function of memory?

Put differently, the Holocaust memorial does, to some extent, seem to provide an anchor for a German and a European future via its monumentality and centrality. But an active relationship to contemporary antiracist politics is absent nonetheless. There are no events at the memorial that regularly thematize this connection, and no active youth center at the information center underneath the memorial. Racism thus serves as a moment from which one progresses. With the erection of the monument, both the Holocaust and its memory are pushed into the past. "We remember for the culpability of our ancestors, not our own." In this sense, the monument seems to achieve its author Eisenman's goal of "getting over guilt," but at what costs? Is there not some more critically engaged way to address the relationship between the memorialization of Holocaust memory and contemporary racism, without insisting that successive generations need to suffer guilty consciences? Would continuing to

raise the question of perpetration, as Paul Spiegel suggests, make Holocaust memory more active and differently relevant to the present condition?

Anyone who has even casually followed the debate over whether to build a monument, and then where to build it, knows that seventeen years passed between the initial proposal and the actual construction. Former German chancellor Helmut Kohl liked Eisenman's winning design, but some people felt that "the discussion [itself] is the Mahnmal [the memorial]" (Till 2005).

Implicitly, discussion is ongoing, while the erection of the monument represents an endpoint, a finality that seems as if it will last forever, and not, in fact, require new, unanticipated discussions that reach into not only the past but also the future (in Western Europe as opposed to only places such as Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia). Jenny Edkins has added a broader (Western) European dimension to what has traditionally been imagined as a distinctly German problem:[20]

> In the case of the French memorials of this [an earlier] period, there is no reference to the shared responsibility for the mass deportations or the French collaboration with Germany [Wiedmer 1999]. They make concrete a particular reading of events that has little to do with living memory but rather replaces it, as Pierre Nora argues [1996]. As products of an official, state-led commemoration, "rather than encouraging active remembering on the part of the community, these memorials remember for the community" [in Wiedmer 1999, 33]. Unlike the sites that evoke a popular response, like the Cenotaph or the Vietnam Wall, these monuments stand as evidence of a problem solved. We visit, ponder a while, and then turn our backs: "under the illusion that our memorial edifices will always be there to remind us, we take leave of them and return only at our convenience" [in Young 1993, 5]. (Edkins 2003, 130)

One can push these observations further and observe that memory alone, even communal living memory, will not suffice inasmuch as living memory requires a type of witnessing that will be increasingly difficult to obtain as survivors die out. And of course those killed under the Nazi regime can never recount their own experiences of horror; the murdered cannot actively participate in the ongoing discussion (see Edkins 2003). What is needed is a way to stage the contradictions and problematics of a genocidal logic so that they can be accessed not only as a historical problem but also as one that affects the present. It must be connected to the specificity of the Shoah but also understand perpetration as an ongoing problem.

There have been efforts in this direction. In Berlin's Jewish Museum, computer screens display questions about contemporary dislikes, such as a dislike

of Jews among one's friends or family, and provide an instant tally of how other visitors have answered each question. As of 2008, the museum decided to use Turkish German guides to speak to general audiences, and also to predominately Turkish German school classes, about the histories of Jewish presences in Europe. These approaches evince a willingness to link history more directly to the present, and this sets them apart from the normal process of memorialization (see Topkara 2009; Vetter 2008; Deutsche Welle and Qantara.de 2008; Sieveking 2008).

Interestingly, Eisenman himself claims that he resists monuments: "Actually, I'm not that into monuments. Honestly, I don't think much about them. I think more about sports" (2005a). He nonetheless agreed to design this one and sees it as one of his major achievements. It seems important to think through Eisenman's claims both that this is a monument for the German people "devoted to the Jews who died in the Holocaust," and that it is, at least for him, about getting over guilt. While the monument was being built, how did the process of getting over guilt work? If guilt ends, does the meaning of the monument change? How does the German production of Eisenman as "a Jew" really relate to this guilt, and further, to contemporary racism and anti-Semitism (often expressed via a kind of philo-exoticism)? One can take these questions a step further and, returning to Anderson's reading of the novel, ask how the reading of the monument works in translation. Can new audiences be created? Can other Others enter the discussion? How do translations relate to the monument's reading, and the creation of a common community with an implicit common fate? Why was the *Besucherordnung*—the official guide to how one should behave at the monument (figure 6.4)—originally only in German, while the information center, its pamphlets, and the monument tours were in other languages, including English, Hebrew, Russian, and (eventually, though also not originally) Turkish? (On my first visit, I noticed the absence of Turkish and other "immigrant" languages.) Does the monument itself need no translation? Does the politics of translation imply its own gap?

In line with the memorial project's dominant actors, Eisenman did not think about designing the memorial for an audience beyond the "normal" Germans, or in terms of a more complicated relationship to the specificity of Jewish victimization. His vision, which was ultimately selected by the German Bundestag (parliament) limited the scope of the way in which the arguably monumental architecture could move and touch people (see Adelson 2005). (On one hand, it leaves the interpretive field too open; on the other, it closes it off too much.) Even though Eisenman argues that he wants to be understood as an individual and not as only a Jew, when he travels to Germany, his interpretation of the process of memorialization sees Jews as Jews and not as Europeans or German


BESUCHERORDNUNG FÜR DAS STELENFELD
(1) Das Stelenfeld darf grundsätzlich nur zu Fuß und im Schritt-Tempo durchquert werden.
(2) Für Gehbehinderte und Rollstuhlfahrer sind 13 gekennzeichnete Gänge geeignet. Diese Gänge haben ein max. Gefälle von 8 %.
(3) Der Besuch des Stelenfeldes erfolgt auf eigene Gefahr – Warnhinweise:
– Sämtliche Längs- und Querachsen sind lediglich 0,95 m breit.
– Die kreuzenden Wegachsen sind nur in wenigen Teilbereichen einsehbar. Vorsicht ist geboten.
(4) Nicht gestattet ist :
– Lärmen, lautes Rufen, das Benutzen von Musikinstrumenten sowie der Betrieb von Rundfunk- und Tonträgergeräten, soweit über den persönlichen Hörbereich hinausgehend,
– das Lagern im Stelenfeld, auf Stelen zu klettern, von Stele zu Stele zu springen und sich in Badebekleidung auf einer Stele zu sonnen,
– das Mitführen von Hunden,
– das Mitführen von Fahrrädern, Skateboards, Roller-Blades, Rollschuhen,
– Fahr- und Motorräder an den äußeren Stelen abzustellen,
– das Rauchen, der Genuss alkoholischer Getränke und Grillen,
– das Stelenfeld zu verunreinigen.
(5) Anordnungen und Anweisungen des ausgewiesenen Sicherheitspersonals sind zu befolgen.
STIFTUNG DENKMAL FÜR DIE ERMORDETEN JUDEN EUROPAS, STRESEMANNSTR. 90, 10963 BERLIN

FIGURE 6.4 Guide to how to behave at the memorial. Author's photo.

people who are also Jewish. Jews were indeed murdered for being Jewish, but perhaps the memorial should do more to suggest lives in complex negotiation with this identification and even with the contemporary lure of perpetration. Otherwise, one is left with an abstract representation of victimization that does not and cannot reach beyond those who already remember, or at least partially know.

This process of monumental memorialization represents "a moment of danger," as Benjamin would call it, in the sense that it imagines the present as having moved beyond Holocaust-like perpetration. This present has been Europeanized, inasmuch as Europeans, and, in this case, normative Germans, imagine themselves as being in the position not only of those who must account for their culpability for past atrocities, but also of those who can and must teach others how not to fall into this trap: "Never again."

The problem with this form of progressivism is not only that it silences contemporary voices of those who continue to experience racism in Europe, even if not in the mass-murderous form, but also that it refuses the connection between those murdered as a result of the Nazi-inspired Holocaust and those who experience racism now.[21] This is a story of lost connections, not of zero-sum games. Recognizing the horror of the Shoah is not at odds with recogniz-

ing contemporary racisms as scholars such as Leslie Adelson ("touching tales," 2005) and Michael Rothberg ("multidirectional memory," 2009) make clear; however, the contemporary European project and contemporary articulations of European racisms often figure those who experience contemporary forms of racism (see Chin et al. 2009), what some scholars have referred to as "anti-Muslim" racism, for example, as being at odds with the memory of anti-Semitic murder and holocaust. In its official articulations, in its monumental form, Europeanized memory does not do analytical justice to the contemporary possibility for connections.

Oświęcim, October 2009

Let us now rejoin the youth group that we met earlier at the memorial, to travel beyond the sites of recent memorialization to the actual sites of mass murder. After an overnight train trip and two switches the next morning, we arrived at the Polish city that the Nazis named Auschwitz. At one stop Polish commuters had stared at us, a group of fifteen youths (ranging from sixteen to twenty-three years of age), two organizers, a youth worker, two interns, and me, all shelling and eating sunflower seeds, searching for coffee, and talking loudly. We walked from the final train station and eventually arrived at the German-Polish meeting center, built before the end of socialism. It was more like the campus of a small American liberal arts college than the youth hostel I had expected. Our rooms were in several different buildings with a large center at the entrance where we would eat and eventually meet with a Holocaust survivor to hear about her experiences in the camps.

That same day we walked to Auschwitz I, not the center of mass murder but the center of its local organization. Our Polish guide spoke perfect German and said that we could take pictures, even though this was officially forbidden. We followed him with earphones as he spoke into a portable microphone, rattling off numbers and facts, leaving, as I wrote that evening in an anonymous assessment of the day, "no time for emotion."

It was pitch black before we left Auschwitz I. I think what I wanted most at the end of that day was just to be held and comforted, having been exposed not just to numbers but also to rooms full of children's shoes, suitcases bearing family names handwritten in large letters, children's clothes, domestic pots and pans, and a massive collection of human hair. One young woman from our group refused to enter that room, and another immediately burst into tears. While in graduate school I had read about the hair in a *New Yorker* article (see Ryback 1993), but its author had failed to adequately enunciate its impact, and

perhaps to do so is impossible. I was struck by the smell, a human smell of age, decay, and loss. On that day at Auschwitz I, I could not sustain my anthropological role. Critical distance was impossible. I could not observe but only feel.

A number of the young men proceeded directly to a liquor store that they had spotted on our walk there. One of the young Palestinian German men got drunk for the first time. He started, not with beer, but with vodka. The next day one of the trip leaders told me that this was a normal response to Auschwitz. She had observed on many trips that alcohol was often turned to as a coping mechanism. This trip, however, was complicated by the fact that most of the youths' parents forbid alcohol. The next night, as they sat around smoking, drinking, and talking in the main building of the center, the youth worker asked that same young man about his ability to recite the Qur'an, to which he simply responded, "I'm drunk." His facial expression implied less that he was unable to recite than that it would have been disgraceful to do so given his condition.

On the first evening, a woman who regularly led trips to Auschwitz and who worked for a major memorializing institution in Berlin led the discussion by asking everyone to write or draw a picture on small pieces of construction paper in response to the following questions: "What moved you the most?" "What irritated you the most?" "What most annoyed you?" "What made you the happiest?" Everyone, with the exception of this trip leader, participated in the exercise, which allowed us to remain anonymous. The answers were as follows:

The excursion to the concentration camp was very informative. Moved by: child poverty.

Children's shoes; ashamed for the people who, the crimes. . . . That lots of people looked at us strangely. The Children who were murdered.

Three of us received glances because of our [Palestinian] scarves.

The city tour was too short.

I was moved by the perspective of the people in the concentration camp, all of what they had to endure.

I hope that we don't have to walk so much tomorrow.

Thorough tour, informative, the children's clothes.

CHILD. [The foundation liaison told me later that this is what he wrote.] Positive: that everything was explained to us thoroughly; negative: all the walking.

I learned enough for today.

Death by starving.

Hair.
Hair; The exhibit wasn't in the German language. [The youth worker later mentioned being surprised by this fact.]
Harrowing, professional tour.
The cells where prisoners could only stand.
Experiments with children!!!
Black wall [Execution Wall]; children's clothes
Hair.
Emotion without time. [This was my entry. Although I did not discuss it publicly, I did tell one of the young men, a sixteen-year-old, and the group leaders.]
The Standing prison—4–5 persons.

This last person also drew someone with a whip (a guard), a person on all fours with a dog mouth, and someone standing in front of a wall, probably the shooting wall, saying something. On top of the picture was written: "Empathy." On the bottom the person wrote: "That we didn't have a smoking break. When the man [the guide] wanted to go, we had to go."

That evening we discussed what was meant by my (anonymous) phrase: "emotion without time," about the murder of children, and then at length about why other youths were at Auschwitz I with Israeli flags draped around their shoulders. The female organizer said that she disagreed with this "instrumentalization of the Holocaust." The young men were disturbed by the way that the apparently Israeli bodyguards stared at them and their Palestinian scarves. The discussion then moved briefly to Israel and Palestine, until the female organizer ended it.

The next morning we drove in vans to Auschwitz II, the center of mass murder, which had been, to the extent possible, preserved in its original postwar state. We saw the barracks, a train car that transported people to their extermination, and then the remains of the crematoria. The Polish guide pointed to white flecks on the ground and told us that these were the remains of human bones. "Allah, where have you brought me?" asked one of the young "Turkish German" women.

I was left speechless after learning the purpose of a large wheelbarrow in the only exhibit at this camp, alone in a room behind glass. I had assumed that it was to transport clothes, since this was also the building in which the prisoners were made to exchange their clothes for the camp uniforms. When I asked the guide what the barrow was used for, he told me: to transport human ashes.

That evening, we watched *Schindler's List*, at the suggestion of one of the young Palestinian German men. Seeing it after Auschwitz, in Auschwitz, was a

totally different experience, as the foundation liaison also observed. Both of us had always been critical of the film, but seeing it now gave daily life a presence beyond the ends of the preserved death camp. It made the sense of loss even more visible. The film reinhabited the camp, the chambers, the barracks, the lone train wagon, with living souls.

During the screening, the same young woman who had cried in the room of hair, cried again throughout most of the film. "How could people do this to each other? What would I have done for my family members if I were in the same situation?" she asked later.

The experience—not just that of the film but also of being in the camps, listening to the survivor's account the next day, and being in the town—sparked other memories of trauma, of families going hungry in Palestine, of seeking refuge from political repression in Iran, and even of a father who had abandoned his daughter and left a rage in her that she did not know how to deal with other than releasing it on those close to her.

Through this experience, it struck me that what was absent in the contemporary German discussion of racism, expressed in terms of immutable "cultural difference" and the "failure of integration," was humility and love. There may have been and may continue to be a lingering anti-Semitism among some of these young people. One of the Palestinian men, the one who refused to recite the Qur'an while drunk, whose family had lost their home in Israel, said, "The Jews then are different from the Jews now. . . . The Germans then are also different from the Germans now," he added, suggesting that the Germans were no longer Nazis. But such anti-Semitism might best be overcome by constructing a safe space of care, which not only teaches these young people but also learns from them, in conversation with their contemporary experiences.

The foundation liaison worried about the future of these youths whom he had now brought to Auschwitz. At one point, I heard him ask the youth worker what would happen to them after they got too old for the youth center. He said that this trip alone would not be enough. He was referring here not simply to their education but to their future prospects in the nation. At one point, the other organizer asked the youths if they would go back to Palestine if offered the chance. A number quickly raised their hands, indicating that they would immediately go back. "What else could they say?" the foundation liaison asked me rhetorically later, when I talked to him on the phone from back in Ann Arbor. Even if most of them had been born in Germany and thus had German citizenship, Germany was offering them no strong vision of a possible future. I told him about my research in the schools in which the teachers, too, saw no future for their so-called immigrant pupils.

The liaison, whose family had been away for the first few days after he re-

turned to Berlin, told me that he had been feeling depressed, not just about Auschwitz but also about the future of these young people. On that day when he asked the youth worker, "What will happen to the youth," she had answered that they would need to start getting ready to move on, to make way for others at their youth center.

Just before leaving Auschwitz, the foundation liaison asked me to tell the group more about my work. I talked about how impressed I was with how loving and close-knit the group was. Later, however, it occurred to me that this community was ephemeral, a temporary form of community made tighter by a new experience of trauma that would tie them more to one another, but not to the nation-state (or to "the idea of Europe," Pagden 2002) that wanted them also to remember. The foundation liaison briefly worried about his participation in nation building but then quickly added that for these youth that was not the point. The point of the state-funded program was simply to make them less irritating residents within the nation-state, not, the logic follows, to make them more equal members who would be given a larger platform from which to speak, even to their experience in relation, if not in comparison, to this history.

NOTES

1. I have capitalized "White" in this essay because it represents not simply a description but also a political and analytical position.

2. In calling the students "German" in this context, I am less concerned with their official legal status or whether they identify as German—and most do not—but with the fact that they have either been born in or socialized in Germany.

3. In reporting about a Turkish German guide (Ufuk Topkara) at the Jewish Museum in Berlin and his young Turkish German visitors, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* recently gave an account of a visit to the museum by a class from a school where 96 percent of the students had parents "who were not born in Germany": "Only eight students have come. A girl from an Arab family simply did not show up this morning. 'One can absolutely assume that her absence is on purpose,' the teacher Elke Menzel says. 'And sometimes I also assume this.' Menzel was also not sure that Zafer would come today. But now he is sitting next to the other fifth graders on a bench on the ground by the Jewish Museum in Berlin. 'Do I also have to go with the class? I'm not a Jew at all,' Zafer had asked in class a couple of days before. He was required to go" (Vetter 2008). In another recent piece on the Jewish Museum, the Deutsche Welle and Qantara quote Topkara: "The teachers often tell us that the children say to them: 'Why should I go to the Jewish Museum? I have nothing to do with the Holocaust!'" (Deutsche Welle and Qantara.de 2008).

4. This part of the original Reichstag structure had been preserved by the British architect of the modernized reconstruction to commemorate the Soviet victory against the Nazis.

5. The word *Volk* in German is a racialist term.

6. For more on the relationships between Holocaust memorialization, memory, and touch, see Adelson 2005.

7. For the relationship between German genocide and colonialism, see, for example, Steinmetz 2007.

8. "Whiteness" or Europeanness, which are often articulated and administered via national administrations, qualifies citizenship. In the phrase "La déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen," Agamben argues, "It is not clear whether the two terms *homme* and *citoyen* name two autonomous beings or instead form a unitary system in which the first is always already included in the second." He goes on to recall "Burke's *boutade* according to which he preferred his 'rights of an Englishman' to the inalienable rights of man" (1998, 127).

9. In his "Between Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Some Thoughts on the New Europe," Matti Bunzl (2005) is careful to distinguish between contemporary and previous (nineteenth-century) anti-Semitisms. He also wants to demonstrate a break between anti-Semitism and what he calls "Islamophobia." In a response to the piece, Dominic Boyer (2005) points out that the legitimacy of the European Union is, in part, based on the prevention of future holocausts. In the present piece, I am arguing not for an analytical continuity between the genocidal logic of the Nazi era and contemporary racisms (see Pred 2000) but for an analytical and political connection between the politics of Holocaust memorialization and antiracist politics now. This call is driven, in part, by what I have observed from 1995 through the present as a refusal to name racism as such in mainstream politics, unless it mimics its previous forms. This refusal to name the problem is combined with a finger-pointing mentality that blames racialized subjects for their "refusal to integrate." As anyone who follows contemporary European politics knows, this is not a distinctly German problem.

10. As Bruce Mannheim (personal communication) recently pointed out, the German novel has its own important place, and monumental status, in German history. Reading backward from my argument about the monumentality of Holocaust memory, the book becomes something like a portable monument, sustaining a sense of Germanness, even without a state. In the case of the Holocaust memorial, its location within the nation-state and its fixity are both critical to understanding the ways in which the terms of belonging, and ideas of homeland, have now shifted. Buried there are not actual people but rather nationalist and European memories.

11. About the "Stockholm Exhibition of 1897," Pred writes: "The educational exposure of international exhibition visitors to the objective possibilities of new forms of consumption was one with their exposure to representations that glorified domestic industrial achievements, that encouraged national pride, that sought to contribute to the further cultural construction of an 'imagined community,' of a national identity based on shared symbols and sentiments, of a nationally oriented collective memory. At the same time, such exposure was one with an exposure to ideological articulations that lined industrial technology with continuous progress and a belief in an ever-better future, to ideological articulations that silently denied the wide-spread existence of do-

mestic tensions and poverty, and thereby legitimated the present. Thus, the rhetorics of nationalism and progress were articulated with one another as well as with those of consumption" (1995, 40).

The link between "nationalism and progress" is complicated in the case of Germany in the sense that the Holocaust memorial is not connected directly to a crude form of nationalism, but to a supranationalism that supports the idea of a Europeanized moral superiority. 'Because we have confessed and recognized our sins, we are now in a position to move on and teach others.' Unwittingly, perhaps, this teaching becomes a new form of imperial articulation.

12. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2001) reported, "Historian Peter Schöttler initiated the protest and within a few days a number of historians and colleagues in cultural studies have joined him. They are asking for 'an immediate stop to this absurd campaign that gives the impression that the Berlin Memorial is first and foremost oriented against deniers, when, in reality it is supposed to serve the memory of the victims of the Holocaust.'" "The Signatories include Holocaust researchers such as Christopher Browning, Saul Friedländer, and Hans Mommsen, academics including Carlo Ginzburg, Richard J. Evans, and Judith Butler, Gary Smith from the American Academy, Reinhard Rürup from the foundation Topography of the Terror, the sociologist Heinz Bude, and the author Marlene Steeruwit."

13. While Eisenman himself resists interpreting the memorial, on a March 2009 visit and in an earlier conversation with an official Holocaust memorial guide after a presentation of Irit Dekel's ethnographic work on the memorial (see also Dekel 2009), I was struck that the guide referred directly to the memorializing function of the stelae, which, he pointed out, directly reference ancient Greek practices of honoring the dead. It was apparent that he did not want to leave interpretation open to chance with a group of visitors in their twenties from the nearby city of Magdeburg. (One should note that Magdeburg has been the site of dramatic neo-Nazi attacks. When the guide spoke independently with the group's chaperone and asked if some of them were right wing, he said that he was not sure, but that it was possible. When the guide showed a picture from another nearby memorial, of a dining-room table with a fallen chair, and spoke about Gestapo raids of Jewish homes, I noticed two of the young men laughing.)

14. "Wir wolten ihnen [die Besucher] also nicht vorschrieben, was sie denken sollen, sondern ihnen das Nachdenken ermörglichen."

15. Stiftung Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas, accessed May 15, 2008, http://www.stiftung-denkmal.de/dasdenkmal/geschichte/reden/redeeisenman.

16. Ibid. The answer to the frequently asked question continues: "However, the foundation also has the task of acknowledging and preserving the memory of all victims of National Socialism. This also involves building memorials to the Sinti and Roma and to homosexual victims, which the federal government has already decided upon."

17. This concern can be seen, for example, in the debate about the role of the Germany's military in Afghanistan and the recent call for a German air strike that ended up killing a number of Afghanis.

18. While a counter-monument movement (see Young 1993) and even Eisenman

himself try to get beyond the problem of monumentality and call for ongoing reflection, these countermovements have not been successful in producing a national discussion about memory, responsibility, and atonement (see Till 2005).

19. This was a parliamentary agreement that reduced the possibility of asylum in Germany. While it did not eliminate asylum, it made entry by airplane with evidence of foreign government persecution one of the only ways in which one can be recognized as a refugee in Germany.

20. Part of the innovation of this most recent articulation of memorialization itself is that it honors the murdered Jews of Europe, not only of Germany. In the information center, one sees that the largest number of Jews who were murdered was actually Polish. Furthermore, one sees that the concentration and extermination camps were aggregated in Eastern Europe, while memorialization has taken place primarily in Western Europe (as an audio tour of the information center points out). One wonders if there is an implicit point about the "progress" of Western Europe in noting the frequency of its contemporary sites of memorialization.

21. Regarding progressivism, in Allan Pred's take on the Stockholm Exhibition of 1897, one can find a foreshadowing of the links between architecture, national unification, and also Europeanization that was to come in the politics of the "Holocaust Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe" and the linked implicit claims to moral superiority having resulted from the "progress" via the post-Holocaust fight against that kind of racism between then and now. Writing about the Stockholm Exhibition context, Pred notes: "In the dreamworld of the exhibition electric light was the most pervasive testimony to Sweden's industrial and technological progress, was the most insistent indicator of the possibilities of the dawning twentieth century, was the quintessential expression of happiness ahead, of a bright future that all were to believe in. Here, in this magical light, was 'the related [bourgeois] fantasy of a labor-free source of power,' and therefore a world free from social strife. Here was Enlightenment, the application of scientific knowledge in the interest of human progress offered as popular religious spectacle *in the interest of the powerful*" (1995, 65–66).

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PART THREE

The Urban and the Spectacular



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lamps went on in the early evening, you at once had a feeling of sinking, becoming aware, in this gentle gliding, of the ocean depths that heaved opaque and sluggish below the glassy surface of the waters.

The more frequently I return to these memories, the less fortuitous it seems to me how slight a role is played in them by people: I think of an afternoon in Paris to which I owe insights into my life that came in a flash, with the force of an illumination. It was on this very afternoon that my biographical relationships to people, my friendships and comradeships, my passions and love affairs, were revealed to me in their most vivid and hidden intertwinings. I tell myself it had to be in Paris, where the walls and quays, the asphalt surfaces, the collections and the rubbish, the railings and the squares, the arcades and the kiosks, teach a language so singular that our relations to people attain, in the solitude encompassing us in our immersion in that world of things, the depths of a sleep in which the dream image waits to show the people their true faces. I wish to write of this afternoon because it made so apparent what kind of regimen cities keep over imagination, and why the city—where people make the most ruthless demands on one another, where appointments and telephone calls, sessions and visits, flirtations and the struggle for existence grant the individual not a single moment of contemplation—indemnifies itself in memory, and why the veil it has covertly woven out of our lives shows images of people less often than those of the sites of our encounters with others or ourselves. Now, on the afternoon in question I was sitting inside the Café des Deux Magots in Saint-Germain-des-Prés, where I was waiting—I forget for whom. Suddenly, and with compelling force, I was struck by the idea of drawing a diagram of my life, and knew at the same moment exactly how it was to be done. With a very simple question I interrogated my past life, and the answers were inscribed, as if of their own accord, on a sheet of paper that I had with me. A year or two later, when I lost this sheet, I was inconsolable. I have never since been able to restore it as it arose before me then, resembling a series of family trees. Now, however, reconstructing its outline in thought without directly reproducing it, I would instead speak of a labyrinth. I am concerned here not with what is installed in the chamber at its enigmatic center, ego or fate, but all the more with the many entrances leading into the interior. These entrances I call "primal acquaintances"; each of them is a graphic symbol of my acquaintance with a person whom I met not through other people but through neighborhood, family relationships, school comradeship, mistaken identity, companionship on travels, or other such—hardly numerous—situations. So many primal relationships, so many entrances to the maze. But since most of them—at least those that remain in our memory—for their part open up new acquaintances, relations to new people, after a time they branch off these corridors (the male may be drawn to the

Previous page: From Allan's notes on Benjamin, image by Trevor Paglen.

CHAPTER 7

The City and Economic Geography

Then and Now

RICHARD WALKER

The place of the city in the rise of capitalism, both in the past in Europe and America and in the present in Asia and Africa, is one of the great puzzles of economic geography. Oddly, urban geography and economics have mostly gone their own ways over the course of modern scholarship in the social sciences. From time to time, interest in the city as an economic force—rather than as a way of life, monumental space, or cultural center—reappears in the literature. Recent years have seen a dramatic revival of such interest.

Some of the hottest ideas in economic geography and spatial economics over the last twenty years have concerned the role of cities in three domains: globalization, industrial clustering, and innovation (or creativity). These themes have featured repeatedly in the works of the leading economic and urban scholars of our time, including Saskia Sassen, Paul Krugman, Manuel Castells, Michael Storper, Allen Scott, Ken Glaeser, and Richard Florida.

Some significant advances have been made during this period in the systematic analysis of what makes cities tick as powerhouses of economic growth, yet I wish to argue that these themes are not as new as they seem. Indeed, they involve the rediscovery of basic principles of the operation of capitalist space economies and of urban economic geography. The phenomena they highlight go back to the early modern era, ramping up with a vengeance with nineteenth-century industrialization and continuing right through the Fordist and high-tech eras of the twentieth century.

Recent work builds on previous generations of scholars of the capitalist city and its economy, if not always in clearly acknowledged ways. The pioneers of urban economics before midcentury were George Allen (1920), Alfred Weber (1909), Robert Haig (1927), Walter Christaller (1933), Edgar Hoover (1937), and August Lösch (1940). They were succeeded after the Second World War by a new generation of university researchers, including Raymond Vernon (Hoover and Vernon 1959), Walter Isard (1956), Brian Berry (1967; Berry and Horton 1970), and Eric Lampard (Lampard 1955; Perloff, Lampard, and Muth 1960)—not to mention the great independent thinker Jane Jacobs (1969).

Allan Pred should be included among the list of great postwar students of urban economic geography. For the first half of his career, Pred produced an astonishingly rich series of studies that focused on the economy of cities. The key works are *The Spatial Dynamics of Urban Growth in the United States, 1800–1914* (1966), *Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information* (1973), *City-Systems in Advanced Economies* (1977), and *Urban Growth and City-Systems in the United States, 1840–1860* (1980). At the time he was one of the three most-cited geographers in the English language, along with Brian Berry (Pred's doctoral advisor) and David Harvey.[1]

I want to highlight the work of Allan Pred on the three key themes of contemporary urban economic geography: globalization, industrial clustering, and innovation. In each of the three key thematic areas, Pred had something vital to say and did so by means of extensive empirical, historical research. Like all good scholars, he was in dialogue with previous thinkers, such as Lösch, Weber, Hoover, and Vernon. Like many social scientists of his generation, he was a systematic model builder. He was also deeply influenced by the emergence of cliometrics, or the data-driven study of economic history, led by Simon Kuznets and his circle at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Pred believed in mustering good quantitative evidence to back up his theories. But he was never a pure modeler and had a profound respect for the importance of history—and historical trajectories—in how places arrived at their present condition.

In what follows, I take up each of the three topic areas in more detail, laying out what contemporary urbanists are saying about the city in the modern economy, then reviewing what Allan Pred had to say in his relevant works, and highlighting his key contributions that remain pertinent to debates today over cities and globalization, cities and industry, and cities and creativity.

Global Cities and City Systems

Among economists, globalization is usually thought of in generic terms of flows of trade and finance between nations, and certainly such flows have increased dramatically over the last fifty years. But there is much more to the geography of the global economy than that. For one thing, those flows travel along definite networks between places: transportation routes, electronic cables and microwave stations, pipelines, and the rest. And such networks are managed by large firms, whether manufacturing corporations like Samsung, retail companies like Walmart, or intermediary shippers, merchants, and logistics handlers such as Evergreen.

Whatever the means or management, the web of international networks along which goods, money, and information flow is so striking that observ-

ers such as Manuel Castells (1989, 1996) have labeled the new global system as "the network society" and referred to this global geography as a "space of flows." While true, this view of contemporary globalization fails to realize that capitalism has *always* generated a space of flows along the networks of commerce, finance, traders, and information. This was already clear in the nineteenth century, as Allan Pred (1966, 1973) showed in his research on U.S. cities a generation before Castells. It goes back much further with the rise of commerce and commercial cities in Europe, as Pred (1984) showed in a study of merchant family networks in the eighteenth century. Jan DeVries (1984), Fernand Braudel (1982), and other historians have shown the same to be true back through the seventeenth century and beyond.

Another dimension of the contemporary geography of globalization is that its spaces are not dispersed just anywhere; the "end of geography" as predicted by Richard O'Brien (1992) is not upon us. Nor is it a matter of connecting national spaces, as in international trade theory. Instead, it is made up of "nodes and networks," as noted by geographers Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift (1992) and of a mix of specific locales knitted up across the world, or "the local and the global," as discussed by other geographers such as Doreen Massey (1994) and Erik Swyngedouw (1997).[2]

What Pred also saw clearly is that the nodes in the networks are chiefly cities, as researchers such as Ken-Ichi Ohmae (1995) and Allen Scott (1998, 2008) have declared anew for the global economy. In the 1960s and 1970s, a discussion arose among urbanists and urban geographers about "systems of cities" (Berry 1964; Bourne and Simmons 1978). Pred became a leading commentator on the subject through a series of pathbreaking studies of American urban history over a decade and a half (1964, 1965, 1966, 1973, 1977, 1980). While, at that time, the reference space was principally national in scale rather than global, the key idea was clear: cities were the key nodes of economic activity and they related principally to one another. In his extensive research, Pred proved that—contrary to central place theory (Christaller 1933; Lösch 1940; Berry 1967) and theories of imperial cities lording it over hinterlands (Innis 1933; Cronon 1991; Brechin 1999)—cities do most of their business with other cities, *not* with the surrounding countryside. Moreover, Pred showed this to be true from the outset of commercial and industrial urbanization in the United States—pushing the origins of U.S. urban integration back a century earlier than previously recognized (1980, 117).

Along with the (re)discovery of globalization in the 1980s came the (re)discovery of a world of cities (Friedmann and Wolff 1982; Castells 1989). Indeed, the recent explosive growth of cities from China to Africa means that the global city system is more robust than ever (Scott 1998, 2008). A misleading aspect of

the new focus on global cities, however, has been an exaggerated focus on the Big Three: New York, London, and Tokyo (Sassen [1991] 2001; see also King 1990). While other cities are sometimes mentioned in the same breath as the Big Three, such as Los Angeles, São Paulo, and Beijing, the notion has persisted that the only cities that really count are the supersized ones. Worse is the belief that this is a new phenomenon generated by globalization. Neither is true, as Allan Pred well knew.

In fact, capitalist cities have always come in many sizes, from the largest metropolitan areas to the smallest towns, all of which are linked together. Indeed, this is whole point of speaking of *systems of cities*, as Pred did. City systems are hierarchical, with a small group at the top and steadily widening numbers at every scale below, as has been known for a long time (Zipf 1941; Madden 1956; Berry 1961). Indeed, an essential task for urban theory has been to explain urban hierarchy, going back to Christaller's (1933) central place theory and Lösch's (1940) market threshold variant on central places. But in no way should the existence of city hierarchies be read as saying there are only a handful of "global cities" that matter.

Pred went further than those before him in an effort to account for rank-size inequality, combining Löschian thresholds with Keynesian multiplier analysis and Gunnar Myrdal's circular and cumulative causation (as will be detailed in the next section). His model was laid out early on (Pred 1966) and remained much the same over all the works considered here (cf. Pred 1973, 1977, 1980). In short, he argued that early starters have "initial advantage" over late bloomers, big cities have persistent advantages over smaller places, and the advantages of the largest cities tend to increase over time. A generation later, Allen Scott has made the same case for global city regions, large metropolitan areas, and initial advantage—but on the basis of external economies rather than Keynes and Myrdal (cf. Scott 1998, 2000, 2005, 2008).

Although most of his work was on the nineteenth century, in *City-Systems in Advanced Economies* (1977) Pred looked at how large, multilocational corporations build interurban networks and concentrate their headquarters and support services in the top-most metropolitan areas. Corporate hierarchies were a popular way of explaining uneven development in the 1970s, but Pred's approach was more sophisticated than others because of its sense of the cross-cutting effects of interurban networks (contrast Hymer 1972; Massey 1984). Sassen ([1991] 2001) expanded the simple corporate hierarchy model to include the clustering of financial and business services in her global cities but again missed the system quality of global urbanization.[3]

Writing in the final decades of high Fordism, Pred was struck by the long-

term stability of the urban hierarchy (e.g., 1977, 33–37)—though he was aware that some cities that thrived in the past has been eclipsed by a changing industrial order. By contrast, later economic geographers paid more attention to upheavals in the urban-industrial hierarchy due to major industrial transitions and the expansion of capitalism in Asia (e.g., Scott 1988a, 2008; Storper and Walker 1989).

Another favored idea of the last twenty years has been that of production networks, or commodity chains, that span the earth from continent to continent. Recognition of such long-distance production systems, whether in electronics assembly or retail sourcing, has been one of the most fruitful areas of research in economic geography (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Fields 2004; Coe, Dicken, and Hess 2008). Nevertheless, as Scott (1998, 2008) has insisted, few of these supply networks reach into rural areas; most of them link up centers of production in cities and industrial districts within cities. Cities are the prime locus of industrial and commercial activity, as they have been since the early days of capitalism, and the complexity of modern production chains has not changed that (Pred 1980, 167).

Industrial Clustering and Urban Agglomeration

A tremendous leap forward occurred in economic geography in the 1980s as the implications of the decline of high Fordism set in, forcing scholars to come to grips with a radically reorganized space economy (Amin 1994). The first glimpses of this came with the discovery of horrific deindustrialization in Britain and the United States circa 1980 (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Massey 1984). This upheaval demanded a rejection of optimization theories of industrial localization in the manner of Weber (1909) and Isard (1956) and of simple decentralization theories based on wage differences (Borts 1960) or product cycles (Vernon 1966). Something more dramatic was up, and it meant rethinking the basics of industrial dynamics and their relation to places (Massey 1984), particularly the opening up of what Scott called "New Industrial Spaces" (1988b) and Michael Storper and I (1989) called "geographical industrialization."

This kind of pursuit led in three main directions. One was appreciating that the Japanese revolution in mass production was wiping out (and replacing) large swathes of heavy industry in North America and Europe (Kenney and Florida 1993; Sayer and Walker 1992). Another took up the question of the high-tech (electronics) revolution that had spawned the world's new leading industry and was spreading into almost every other domain of the economy and daily life (Morgan and Sayer 1988; Scott 1993; Saxenian 1994). A third was

a newfound appreciation of the productive power of spatial clustering of bevies of smaller firms in industrial districts (Becattini 1978; Storper and Scott 1988; Storper and Christopherson 1987).

At first the greatest play was given to the idea promulgated by Michael Piore and Charles Sabel (1984), based on their study of central Italy, that the key post-Fordist shift was to a system called "flexible specialization." But the most fruitful development was the rethinking of the whole process of spatial concentration, not simply as a replacement for Fordism but as a major force in the history of industrialization from the beginning (Marshall and Marshall 1881; Allen 1920; Sabel and Zeitlin 1985; Scranton 1997). Industrial clustering has been prominent not only in craft industries like jewelry and clock making, but recurred in steel and autos, petrochemicals, and food processing; came back with a vengeance in electronics and software; and even showed up in Japanese just-in-time production (Kenney and Florida 1993) and in spades with the industrial revolution in China of our time (Krugman 1995).

The analysis of spatial clustering brought back the other, relatively neglected side of Weber's classical location theory: agglomeration. The combination of neoclassical equilibrium analysis in economics, central place theory in geography, and the widespread decentralization of large Fordist factories in practice had led most economic geographers to neglect the topic of spatial clustering in the postwar era. By the 1970s, the study of industrial location had become obsessed with corporate decision theory and spatial organization (Dicken 1971; Hayter and Watts 1983; cf. Walker 1989). Meanwhile, most urbanists of the 1960s and 1970s, including urban geographers, had forgotten entirely about industry in the city. They shifted their sights to such themes as consumption and housing, politics and land development, and racial segregation and spatial inequality in cities (e.g., Harvey 1973; Castells 1977).

But not Allan Pred, who put out a series of studies of the economics of metropolitan growth from the mid-1960s through the 1970s. His project from the outset was "the formulation of a geographic location theory originat[ing] with the consideration of urbanization and industrialization . . . as interacting spatial processes" (1966 5, 12ff.; cf. Pred 1964, 1965).[4] The starting point for Pred's approach was Weber's notion of agglomeration economies, which he took for granted (Weber 1909; Hoover 1948; Isard 1956). In brief, firms are drawn into the city because of the lower costs of shared infrastructure (ports, railway terminals, electricity, and buildings); aggregate costs of transport of goods are reduced by proximity of urban industries, whether it is between firms or to transshipment points; and employers benefit from sharing a large pool of labor, and one that is already disciplined and skilled in the industrial arts.

To the basic ground of agglomeration theory, Pred added that firms benefit

from the size of the urban market, or "threshold effects," of assembling enough buyers of specialized products (whether intermediate or final) and that these benefits are the greatest in the largest cities. As he noted, with the growing complexity of material inputs and the growing demand for a greater variety of (skilled) labor, the cost and threshold advantages of cities over dispersed locations were enhanced by advances in industrialization (1966, 44, 79). To this argument about rising productivity, he added that cities provide more and cheaper sources of bank capital (1966, 80).

Pred also applied the Keynesian idea of multiplier effects, or the circulation of money through the urban system. Such multipliers involved both capital investment and worker spending on consumer goods (Pred 1966, 30–32, 42–43; 1973, 191–93; 1980, 125–31). Key aspects of this feedback system were capital investment in transport and communications infrastructure to keep goods and information flowing toward the major centers; the proliferation of newspapers, advertisements, and other means of disseminating business information; and the building up of real estate and construction of the city itself (Pred 1980, 128; cf. Brechin 1999). In his discussion of multipliers, Pred rejected the basic/nonbasic industries approach popular at the time, realizing that markets and feedback loops could be both local and distant (1966, 30).

Finally, Pred employed the idea of circular and cumulative causation, which had been developed by Gunnar Myrdal (1957) to explain international inequalities. In this, labor and capital flow out of less developed regions into more advanced regions, helping the latter grow and stifling the former. Myrdal's approach, and similar work by Albert Hirschman (1958), went against the neoclassical orthodoxy that growth ought to spread outward from developed centers to underdeveloped peripheries (e.g., Borts and Stein 1964). Pred's innovation was to apply these ideas explicitly to metropolitan growth and city systems, as a way of explaining both urban concentration of economic activity and the relative stability of urban hierarchies once established (1966, 15, 26; 1973; 1980, 131–41).

Such agglomeration economies are still the foundation stones of any theory of urban concentration. But the literature on industrial districts since Pred's time has gone further in the analysis of the collective logic of spatial concentration. Of fundamental importance are external economies of many interacting firms, or increasing returns to scale for the whole district (Young 1928; Lampard 1955). Another key insight is the power of economies of scope, or the correct scale of capital equipment and production relative to market size (Panzar and Willig 1981). The analysis of such effects has been taken to a high level of formal modeling by economic geographers such as Scott (1988b, 1993) and Storper (2013) and by geographical economists such as Krugman (1995;

Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999). Nonetheless, Allan Pred understood very well the payoff to specialization among many firms, the process of vertical disintegration, and external economies as not just additive but multiplicative (e.g., Pred 1966, 14, 41, 61).

The elaboration of the theory of industrial clustering was the most significant advance in economic and urban geography of the 1980s and 1990s. Many layers of nuance were added to the basic model along the way. One is the importance of shared social relations or the implicit and explicit ways of doing things that characterize tightly knit industrial districts, which allow for efficient, unstructured interaction, mutual aid, and cooperation (Saxenian 1994; Storper 1997; Cooke and Morgan 1998). These social interactions feed into the dynamism of industrial districts brought about by concentration of expertise, collective problem solving, and learning by doing, and therein lies the strong impulse for innovation in clusters such as Silicon Valley electronics or Parisian fashion (Florida 1995; Cooke 2002; Gertler 2003; Scott 2005).

The worm had truly turned from the midcentury model of innovation carried out in corporate laboratories (Schumpeter 1942). It was accompanied by a mad rush by cities, states, and countries to build research parks to try to capture the Silicon Valley magic—most of which failed because they never grasped the key ideas of economies of specialization (the need for many complementary firms), innovation as a collective problem solving (not just science coming out of university labs), or historical trajectories (the deep history of most industrial districts, including Silicon Valley) (Saxenian 1985; Massey, Quintas, and Wield 1992).

Nevertheless, what was regarded by industrial geographers as a great breakthrough into the realms of innovation had been a central concern of Allan Pred much earlier. Indeed, Pred saw cities as the principal loci of innovation, for much the same reasons as in industrial districts: the power of spatial concentration. Moreover, for Pred, as a student of the nineteenth century, industrial geography and urbanization were the same thing seen from different angles—the lesson that postwar economic geography forgot but which was rediscovered by urban economic geographers such as Scott (1988a, 1993), Storper (1997, 2013), and myself (Storper and Walker 1989).

Information and Innovation in Cities

Today we hear a great deal about the knowledge economy, the digital economy, the cognitive economy, and other variations on the post-Fordist theme that there has been a historic transition from the era of the mass production of goods to one of the production (and consumption) of intangibles, whether in

the form of software, entertainments, or designs. This has led to studies of "cultural economic geography" (Sheppard and Barnes 2003), the "cultural economy of cities" (Scott 2000), and, most famously, the "creative class" as the pivot of urban revival (Florida 2002, 2005).

This view of things is not entirely new, however. The pioneering study of knowledge in economic growth was by Fritz Machlup (1962), while Daniel Bell (1973) declared the coming of the "post-industrial society" a decade later. The cybernetic revolution was in the air in the 1960s, long before the age of the Internet, and it had an enormous influence on thinking about information, systems, feedback, and much more. Allan Pred was a keen student of the era and took it all in. Then he went looking for the role of information in American history and the growth of cities, particularly in the sequential studies, *Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information: The United States System of Cities, 1790–1840* (1973) and *Urban Growth and City-Systems in the United States, 1840–1860* (1980).

What Pred discovered was that the urban-industrial revolution of the nineteenth century was not simply a matter of the production and exchange of goods but was necessarily accompanied by—and propelled by—the circulation of information (Pred 1973, 1980). Information was essential to the conduct of all trade and production; indeed, it was the nervous system of all enterprise, the brains of modern business. So the capitalists of the antebellum United States did not just set up factories and warehouses; they established newspapers by the thousands, set up a national post and package delivery network, and strung a million miles of telegraph lines (cf. Henkin 1998, 2006). They had to communicate, and what they were talking about was prices, orders, and payments, not to mention market prospects and competitors, and this information flowed from city to city around the country. Talk about the space of flows!

In Pred's model of city systems, the networks and flows between cities are not simply about trade and movement of goods but are fundamentally about information, such as demand, investment, and business conditions (1973, 1980).[5] He also knew that long before modern electronics revolutionized communications via the telephone, computers, and the Internet, earlier networks of merchant contacts, postal routes, newspapers, and, later, telegraph lines had produced a time-space compression as radical as anything in our lifetimes (cf. Marx 1964; Kern 1983). If, as Alfred Marshall has said, "the secrets of industry are in the air" in industrial districts, Pred went further (and he had read his Marshall) in saying that the secrets of business were singing along the wires, spreading a wealth of economic knowledge from city to city in nineteenth-century America (Pred 1973, chaps. 2, 3, 5; 1980, 145–65). The circulation of information is, moreover, sharply biased, not just toward cities in general, but

toward the biggest commercial and industrial centers; such bias is important, for example, in explaining the rise of New York to supremacy among U.S. cities in the early 1800s (Pred 1973, 16–19).[6]

Information alone is not enough, of course; the question is to what use is it put? Trade and marketing are one purpose, management another (Hoover and Vernon 1959; Beniger 1986), banking yet another (Hamelink 1983). But information is the raw material of knowledge, and it is knowledge that is the crucial input to everything else in the system of production and circulation of goods and services. Moreover, the generation of new knowledge is critical to the process of economic innovation that is at the heart of modern capitalist growth. Pred was centrally concerned with the role of innovation in urban growth dynamics, whether single metropolitan areas or systems of cities (1966, 1973, 1977, 1980). He was steeped in the postwar revival of the economics of technological change brought about by the work of Joseph Schumpeter (1939, 1942), Robert Solow (1957), Nathan Rosenberg (1963), and Gary Becker (1964).

Pred realized that a key driver of uneven development was the process of innovation and that large cities were the biggest centers of innovation (e.g. 1966, chap. 4). This was quite the opposite of the conventional theory of "innovation diffusion" popular at the time (e.g., Hagerstrand 1953; Berry 1972; cf. Pred 1973, 228ff). A quite striking discovery of Pred's was that even when new information and innovations appeared in peripheral areas or towns down the urban hierarchy, they tended to filter up to the biggest metropolitan areas, reinforcing their advantages in the race for growth and solidifying the urban hierarchy (Pred 1973, 236, 264). In other words, cities do not always generate the newest and best ideas, but they do almost always capture them eventually. Cities not only enhance creativity, they are the chief sources of demand for new technology (Pred 1973, 90).

These ideas speak directly to recent debates over innovation in cities, especially under the rubric of "creativity." Richard Florida (2002, 2005) says that urban growth flows from the activities of the "creative class," mostly professional, technical, and cultural workers. But this formulation is one-sided.[7] Skilled and talented people move to cities because that is where the jobs and the economic action are to be found. As Pred notes, "Urban industries and their multiplier effects created the employment opportunities that successively attracted . . . migrants to infant metropolises, and eventually led to additional manufacturing growth" (1966, 39). Of course, the influx of workers helps drive the next round of growth, which attracts more people, and so on, but this is a mutually reinforcing spiral based fundamentally on the actions of industry: the clustering of firms, continued capital investment, and external economies of spatial concentration (Scott 2008; Storper 2013).

A central idea of the urban economists of Pred's early years was face-to-face communication (Hoover and Vernon 1959). Urban innovation derives from the way information flows along "the web of interpersonal communication" that flourishes in cities and especially large metropolitan centers (Pred 1966, 127–31). As Pred puts it, "The multiplication of interactions among the growing number of individuals engaged in the manufacturing and tertiary sectors enhances the possibilities of technological improvements and inventions . . . , enlarges the likelihood of the adoption of more efficient managerial and financial institutions, increases the speed with which locally originating ideas are disseminated, and eases the diffusion of skills and knowledge brought in by migrants from other areas" (1966, 28). Recent literature about innovation and creativity in cities goes further than Pred in its analysis of the richness of social relations, problem solving, and learning-by-doing within industrial districts (Saxenian 1994; Storper 1997; Cooke 2002). But not surprisingly, the central idea of face-to-face communications has been revived by economic geographers (Storper and Venables 2004; Storper 2013).

In recent years, the evolving social division of labor and advances in digital technology—not to mention the cultural turn in social sciences—has led economic geographers to pay closer attention to matters of culture, mental labor, and creativity in the dynamics of urban growth (e.g., Lee and Wills 1997; Scott 2000, 2005, 2008; Currid 2007). Allan Pred's later work tracked such changes and has much to offer on the cultural economy of the city, but I leave consideration of that to other contributors to this volume.

Conclusion

In sum, Allan Pred had a great deal to say in his early work, from 1965 to 1980, about three of the most important dimensions of the modern space economy: the leading role of large cities in capitalist development, the inexorable spatial clustering of industry and management, and the dynamics of information and innovation in the modern economy. Crucially, Pred helped overturn previously dominant ideas about cities and hinterlands, networks and hierarchies of cities, urban industrialization and clustering, and flows of information among cities and people within cities. His theoretical exercises and empirical research are still valuable models of rigor and sources of insight for urban and economic geographers today.

While some of Pred's ideas have been superseded by more elaborate studies of external economies, industrial districts, and learning regions, among other things, his conclusions are sometimes still more pertinent than those of later writers. First, city systems and hierarchies are older, more extensive and more

entrenched than the recent fashion for "global cities" and "spatial fixes" would lead one to believe. Second, urban growth is about not just industrial districts but the dynamics of urban agglomerations as a whole, and it rests not just on external economies but on spatial inequality in labor and capital flows. Third, the biased flow of information is crucial to big cities' dominance, and creativity is only one element of the forces at work spurring innovation in cities. Most of all, Pred showed that cities have been at the heart of the geography of capitalist growth for the last two hundred years, and in that regard there is less new under the sun than our contemporaries may think.

NOTES

1. Personally, I learned a great deal from Pred as a young professor at Berkeley, and it enabled me to contribute to the New Industrial Geography of the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., Storper and Walker 1989; Sayer and Walker 1992). I should also mention another colleague, James Vance (e.g., Vance 1970), whom Pred (1966) pays tribute to as well.

2. Allan Pred was well aware of this interweaving of scales, and he began calling his undergraduate course "The Local and the Global" twenty-five years ago.

3. Oddly, Allen Scott's efforts to widen the domain of urban activities to all "cultural-cognitive" functions (2000, 2008) forgets completely the force of finance and management (business services) in the buildup of the biggest cities.

4. What is striking in reading the introduction to Pred (1966) is how he stood at the threshold of systematic urban economics, with remarkably little to go on in the literature up until then.

5. At the time Pred was writing, there was a flurry of interest in matters of communication and networks, following from World War II and the birth of computing (cf. Meier 1962; Olsson 1965).

6. Cf. Zook 2005 on similar biases of the global use of the Internet.

7. Florida's ideas grew directly out of the advances in research of the 1990s, which lost their subtlety in being distilled into the punch bowl of policy pronouncements that he likes to stir. Florida's theory is a kind of spatial reworking of Becker's (1964) "human capital" theory, but while the rising capacity of labor is a key facet of technological advance, it must be put into the full (spatial) context of capital, companies, and cities, not to mention the characteristics of the technologies themselves.

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CHAPTER 8

Situated Spectacle

Cross-Sectional Soil Hermeneutics of the Shanghai 2010 World Expo

SHILOH KRUPAR

> All human geographies are historically specific,
> and their construction
> through earthbound activities and the transformation of nature,
> is one with the making of histories,
> with the interplay of human agencies and structures
> through time.
> —ALLEN PRED, *Making Histories and Constructing Human Geographies*

> What would our lives be like if we took earthworms seriously, took the ground under our feet rather than the skies high above our heads, as the place to look, as well, eventually, as the place to be? It is as though we have been pointed in the wrong direction.
> —ADAM PHILLIPS, *Darwin's Worms*

The Shanghai 2010 World Expo was undoubtedly one of the greatest shows on earth—often hailed as the largest and most expensive mass event in human history to date (Sun et al. 2013). From May through October 2010, over 73 million visitors attended the expo in Shanghai, where nearly two hundred countries and fifty corporations gathered to display national and global technologies and progressive histories in over 260 pavilions (Balis 2010; Barboza 2010). The cost was colossal: estimates range from $44 to $95 billion. With meticulous planning and urban transformation on a massive scale, the civic support infrastructure of the expo included extensive road repair, renovation and expansion of the city rail system, security installations, the organization and training of 1.7 million volunteers, and the clearing of 5.28 square kilometers of land around the Huangpu River within the city (Branigan 2010; Mullich 2010).[1] To make way for the expo site, thousands of families were relocated, and well over two hundred factories—some of which were the biggest or oldest in China—were

demolished and reestablished at further remove from the city. Such sacrifices were deemed necessary in order to host a global event that would serve as a platform for internal communications and international accreditation. Expo coordinators not only boasted superlatives about the event but also conjoined Shanghai's renaissance to the revival of the contemporary world expo format. Accordingly, China had reclaimed the expo from irrelevancy to host the biggest one yet, fulfilling Shanghai's destiny as a global city by restoring the expo to the level of nineteenth-century world's fairs (Cunningham and Wasserstrom 2010). The event also projected a new postcolonial horizon within the genealogy of world spectacle. The Shanghai 2010 World Expo marked the first time that a developing country has hosted one of these events, and it was the first expo to focus exclusively on sustainable development and the "problem" of the city. The expo theme "Better City, Better Life" evokes an imperative to improve life on the planet by creating environmentally friendly cities, through urban economic prosperity, innovations in science and technology in the city, improved interactions between rural and urban areas, and personal reflections on urban community.[2]

Following the staging of this expo, *what is the legacy of a temporary "mega-event" focused on sustainable urban development? What is the nature of a planetary-scale spectacle dedicated to sustainability?* Despite a mixed record of environmental governance, China has been moving toward sustainable development since the 1990s (Yin and Wang 2000, 171). The Shanghai 2010 World Expo, along with Beijing's "green" Olympics, contributed to China's experiments in "postcarbon" transition, wherein the state shifts from socialist industrial polluter to environmental regulator and scientific modernizer (Zhou 2010).[3] The successful planning and administration of these large-scale events depended on the anticipation and integration of waste and potential disasters in health and security, through environmental impact assessments, sustainable planning approaches, environmental actions performed on the expo grounds or throughout the city, and integrated disease control and security systems. The expo, in particular, was also an opportunity to showcase the environmental performance of the state to visiting nations and citizens alike, and to entertain and train visitors in the pursuit of environmentally friendly habitats and energy-efficient and healthy habits.[4] For China, an expo dedicated to urban environmental issues in the context of climate change could strategically serve as an instrument of soft power (through trade, diplomacy, culture) and as an "attractor"—a research "hot spot"—to position China as a producer of knowledge within global development policy debates (Mol 2010; United Nations et al. 2011; Sze 2015; Blanchard and Lu 2012; T. Hall 2010; Hunter 2009; M. Li 2008; Nordin 2012a).

Critiques of such mega-events have largely focused on their devastating impacts on host cities, brought into sharp relief by contrasting their celebratory rhetoric and environmentally friendly themes. The contradictions between the material wreckage and waste generated by a mass event and its claims to "be green" repeatedly lead to disavowal of the event as a form of *greenwashing*. In the case of the Shanghai expo, the discourse of sustainability and the plethora of environmental technologies can be seen to eclipse the destruction wrought by the expo's installation and capitalist imperatives. This interpretation, however, risks entrenching a split between the material and the discursive dimensions of the expo: it does not address the actual workings of the expo, its environmental aftermath, and embodied affective aspects in relation to the city. Moreover, accounts that are intent on revealing the operations of greenwashing do not help us come to terms with the ways in which mega-events like the Shanghai expo—or the Chinese state more generally—are internalizing some of their own material environmental consequences and contradictions within the mass exhibition (Hayes and Horne 2011, 754). The Shanghai 2010 World Expo presents an opportunity to investigate postindustrial urban redevelopment and the state's orientation toward sustainability, postcarbon transition, and reduced government waste in response to the industrial heritage of contamination of the Chinese socialist project.

This essay, therefore, aims to address two interrelated aspects of the expo that are missing from critical accounts: the governing function of the mega-event, which is not strictly tied to capitalist imperatives and relies on the expo's transformation of nature and new technological grounds; and, more generally, the political materialism of spectacle, that is, the way spectacle is integral to the social, material operations of the state. I approach the Shanghai 2010 World Expo as an exemplary case of spectacle defined as a *governing arrangement*: the expo involves spatial and temporal disembedding from the socialist-industrial past for the purposes of creating an urban redevelopment zone of so-called sustainable futures, social manageability, and self-regulating citizens. The critique seeks to re-embed the expo and contemplate its material organization, utilizing geographer Allan Pred's insights on denaturalized consumption and situated spectacle and philosopher-activist Michel Foucault's work on biopolitics and governmentality. Rather than the presentation of spectacle we've come to expect—as soft power, simulacra, capitalist logics, greenwashing, and so forth—the essay considers the expo to involve the *political organization of matter* and *sedimentation of power relations*, whereby the literal grounds of the expo are shown to be a dynamic arrangement of surface and subsurface relations that internalize contradictions of the state and mega-event in order to maintain governance. The overall discussion seeks to contribute empirical and

theoretical comprehension of the extended moment of danger signaled by "sustainable spectacle"—most evident in the popular figure of the self-sustaining eco-city in China (C. Hall 2012). The political materialism of such spectacle represents—*is*—a durable obstruction to living differently and can entail long-term, difficult-to-detect ("nonevent") dysgenic effects. The following section introduces *soil hermeneutics* as a method to excavate the sedimented power relations of spectacle and thereby contest the toxic effects of this organization of life.

Spectacle In Situ and Soil Hermeneutics

Allan Pred's work is an indispensable theoretical resource for any investigation of spectacle. Pred developed an analytic approach that might be called a spatial-material ontology or, in his words, "historical geographies of the present." At the very heart of this effort is an insistence on the "situatedness" of all social and material conditions of culture. With the dynamic performative quality of manifesto writing, he explains:

> The construction of human geographies,
> the social production of space and place,
> the locationally bound intervention of humans into nature,
> the place-specific and on-the-ground nature of everyday life,
> have long been taken for granted, long relegated to the secondary, long
> unexamined in the discourse of social theory, long made irrelevant by
> compositional approaches to social analysis, by approaches that group
> people and human phenomena according to abstract or logical criteria
> of alikeness, by approaches that focus on conceptually constructed
> observables and ignore material actualities.
> In doing so, compositional approaches
> de-located social action,
> de-place the execution of activities,
> detach life
> from the constraining and enabling contexts in which it flows.
> (Pred 1990, 5)

In response, Pred sought to ground knowledge in the social actions of everyday life and institutions of culture, particularly in the lived and embodied material practices of people. He understands "geography" to be an ontological condition: "Everybody has a body, nobody can escape from their body, and consequently all human activity—every form of individual and collective practice—is a situated practice and thereby geographical."[5] This claim mobilizes

an understanding of knowledge as inevitably situated in and of the world as a social, spatial practice. "What people do or do not know, the discourses they have or have not been exposed to, the taken-for-granteds that inform their actions, can in absolutely no way be separated from the on-the-ground, embodied and situated practices in which they have participated—or have been excluded from" (Pred 2006). Pred insisted on the inseparability of power and knowledge and, thus, the situated, conditional, and material possibilities for the production and reproduction of life.

For Pred, power relations are embedded in concrete actions and spaces: "Power relations, while abstract and intangible, are always somehow associated with the concrete conduct of social life in place, always in some way involved with 'the capacity to organize and control people, materials, and territories'" (Pred 2006). "Situatedness" means that all knowledge and social life are invested with power—arranged and lived via power relations that take place in and through "space" or geography. Pred further developed this social-material understanding of space—and the embeddedness of power relations—in a now-classic investigation of the "denaturalized" nature of consumption (Pred 1998). He begins this piece by raising the question: "How is it possible that material nature has become divorced from culture and society . . . that acts of consumption have become so denaturalized (except where proximity to nature is marketed by real estate developers and in the tourism and resort industries where the experience of nature—as physical setting—is explicitly commodified)?" (Pred 1998, 153–54). He responds by methodologically constructing a historical geography of the separation of nature from everyday life. His analysis traces the way such "disembedding" of social life and consumption became taken-for-granted by appearing to be a self-evident "natural" organization of space and society. By doing so, he wryly denaturalizes commodity fetishism writ large as the material social organization of life attendant to capitalism and modernity. The separation of nature and society—what Guy Debord (1994) and others have called "spectacle"—is revealed to be an inherited, deeply *sedimented* social condition of the present.

Pred's striking use of the adjective "sedimented" to characterize the *material* workings of power and knowledge runs contrary to any notion of space or ground as static, inert, dead, fixed, or undialectical. He pursued how power manifests—is dynamically arranged and represented—in and through space. Moreover, he integrated poststructuralist insights to move beyond worn-out critiques of ideology based on the "false image" (or simulacra as replacing the real) and their persistent binaries of real/fake and material/discursive. Instead, Pred viewed all representations as social, material facts that produce certain realities; representation is less a thing than a practice and, as such, is never

neutral or innocent of power relations. Rather than "debunk" representation to reveal truth beneath the image or surface, Pred reoriented critique toward the *organization of visibility and invisibility*: "I regard the invisible geographies of power relations and meaning/discourse as every bit as 'real' as the visible geographies of the built landscape and actual human activity."[6] Such an understanding enabled Pred to consider the governing function of representations and the arrangement of visibility/invisibility in the context of modern institutions and capitalist development. In his research on international exhibitions and expo, for example, Pred observed how cultural forms have appeared in specific situations to serve particular social, economic, and political interests. Specifically, he sought to unpack how "spectacular spaces" had become routinized exhibitionary venues of modernity with pedagogical lessons for citizenship (Pred 1995). Implementing a governmentality approach to culture, he showed how spectacle was integral to the situated practices of the changing economy and to institutions and state operations: how certain pedagogies are developed and used by the state, the social conditions that give representations their power, and the consequences of power functioning through different spaces and fields of visibility.[7]

This essay takes Pred's emphasis on the sedimented, *dynamic* aspects of power and the material organization of state spectacle in a more literal direction. Similar to the way Pred sought to explain how consumption is denaturalized by disrupting current arrangements of knowledge and matter, this essay demonstrates how the rearranging and securing of soil "subsurface" of the Shanghai 2010 World Expo site worked to renaturalize a central city area and give ground to expo experiments in sustainability and (collective and individual) docility under technical eco-social management systems. In response to Pred's earlier warning against compositional approaches to social analysis that ignore material actualities and the embeddedness of all life, I endeavor to chart out a *material inquiry of spectacle* in terms of social composition and governing arrangements—of soil, affect, and technical control alike. Power relations are material relations—literal arrangements of matter, people, and things—and, as such, spectacle can be seen as a composition of surface and subsurface, and, by extension, visible and invisible, *for the purposes of governing*. The approach still applies the Predian premise that spectacular divisions—the disembedding and denaturalizing of everyday life arranged by spectacle—can be explained through materialist analysis. However, to examine the Shanghai expo's biophysical arrangement of geographies of power—the sedimentation of spectacle and its material effects—it is necessary to further develop the *biopolitical* aspects of Pred's cultural-geographical analysis. To do so, I draw further on Michel Foucault to excavate the political materiality of the expo. The material

legacy of the expo involves a governing arrangement of subsurface and surface that affects how life is organized and lived. As such, *spectacle is more embedded than impression management or soft power*; it is a *political-material governing apparatus* that structures possibilities for life. The expo takes place in situ, as per the framework of historical materialism, by actively producing the political materialism of the state.

Governing here references Michel Foucault's notion of governmentality: "arts of governing" and the regimes of practices through which populations are constituted and regularized. Modern governmentality is concerned with the "conduct of conduct" for a population of subjects and the establishment of a regime of truth to which the population adheres. Within the complicated genealogy of Foucault's work, he came to link governmentality with "biopolitics," in order to take into account how life became more of the focus of governing. According to Foucault, biopolitics refers to the ensemble of institutions, procedures, analyses, calculations, tactics, and reflections that allow the exercise of an intricate form of power that has as its target the population. "Biopolitics is the series of governmental strategies centered on this new concept called life" (Darier 1999, 28).[8] Biopolitics foregrounds the historical rise of biological life as an object of state calculation and strategy—in other words, the securing and standardization of a population. This theoretical conception is founded on the historical process by which juridical power and law were incorporated into administrative states to function primarily as regulation, rather than rigid prohibition (Rutherford 1999, 41; Hewitt 1983, 69; Foucault 1990, 144). It is a power enabled by a whole complex of knowledges and enacted through apparatuses of security and a series of technical and cultural means.

Foucault's recontextualizing of his own studies of biopolitics and the natural sciences within the framework of governmentality opened the door to an ecological reading in which "life" enters history as an explicit strategy—as a state preoccupation, an object of scientific knowledge, and a normalizing principle of conduct. In so doing, "biopolitics is probably the closest Foucault ever came to addressing the environmental issue from the perspective of how the mechanisms of biological life themselves became an object of 'reason of state' calculations and strategy" (Darier 1999, 28). Environmental management, for example, can be regarded in these biopolitical terms, in that it originates in and operates on the relations between populations, resources, and the environment (Rutherford 1999, 45). More generally, "we might say that 'power' is nothing other than the organization of 'capacity' itself, whether in the sphere of the economic or the political, and therefore represents . . . the mobilization, concentration, and deployment of living energies" (Medovoi 2010, 141–42). Biopolitics in effect saturates ordinary material existence with power; it arranges, concen-

trates, and mobilizes life according to particular rationales, logics, and efficiencies (Coole and Frost 2010, 32–33). Power operates through political ecologies that *are* biophysical arrangements of governing.

The Shanghai 2010 World Expo, then, is a biopolitical project in that life is organized through the administration of the environment and population—the regulations, procedures, and calculations that proliferate and diffuse state power, that target the population and environment as principle objects of knowledge (Medovoi 2010, 141–42). The planning and hosting of the expo moved earth and people; the event involved the removal of an entire industrial sector from the inner city, remediation of the land, relocation of local populations, and other material reorganizations of life. The production of soil standards for the expo's subsurface—an early model for national efforts to establish soil regulations and cleanup responsibility—allowed for the imposition of surface control systems, such as civility, crowd management, and environmental feedback loops.[9]

The remainder of the essay will dig further into the production of the expo subsurface and surface relations, including banal but highly instrumental bureaucratic auditing, gridlike territorial oversight, systems control of deracinated crowds, the creation of docile environmental consumer-subjects through interactive technologies, and so forth. To do so, the account performs a *soil hermeneutics* of the expo, in a tongue-and-cheek reference to the "worm's eye view" mentioned in the second opening quotation of this essay. Just as analysis of the soil of the land where the expo took place determined the entirety of its use and the soil standards for all exhibition sites, soil hermeneutics attends to the expo's material organization of subsurface and surface and its extension as the future terrain of "brownfield" redevelopment, wherein contaminated land is remediated and reused by regulating and containing waste through surface-subsurface relations. This allows for sanitation of the surface and legitimates the transferring of people around the territory with little to no participation (e.g., eminent domain and displacement). The form of future habitation is predetermined by the designation of an end use for the site, which is then biophysically organized by the cleanup *regardless of the state's industrial-socialist history of contamination*. In the case of the expo, soil hermeneutics shows how this establishment of the subsurface according to the spatially contained end use of "exhibition" enabled the surface to develop as an urban laboratory of sustainability experiments and eco-city-like systems controls. Essentially, soil hermeneutics of the expo re-embeds spectacle to consider the materiality of the state and how the biophysical divisions of surface and subsurface are a governing arrangement. It attempts to excavate countertruths to the world expo by showing how spectacle arranges matter in such a way that toxic foundations and effects are hidden

from view, annulling linkages between the former missions of the site and everyday lives, health, and ecologies. Spectacle is a strategic ontology that embeds end uses and produces a new nature or grounds for bureaucratic oversight, financial instruments, eco-city experiments, and cultural productions of docility, thereby inoculating responsibility for past injustices, ongoing harm, or any material remains (unless incorporated as inputs to China's nascent waste-remediation industry).

Soil hermeneutics marks a significant shift in the way that spectacle is methodologically delineated. A primary motivation of criticism is to "expose the truth," which is a central tenet of many approaches to spectacle. Yet this orientation is inadequate to the task of addressing the conditions of everyday toxicity, land-use shifts, and banal forms of bureaucracy attendant to the biopolitical operations of the Shanghai expo, especially the event's purported contribution to the life and health of the population. In contrast to a limited visual understanding of spectacle as repressive of reality, with matter as a medium of a deceptive image, soil hermeneutics strives for an institutionally embedded, relational, material-focused analysis of spectacle as an arrangement of truth and relations with biophysical nature, and as constitutive of the population and subjects and, therefore, relevant to investigations of aesthetics, affect, political matter, and biophysical effects. It follows that the expo site is not "spectacle" in terms of its "greenwashing" false imagery or due to the illusory nature of representations and displays as detached from "true reality." Rather, the expo spectacle—and the social relations of visibility and invisibility it installs—involves the biophysical composition of surface and subsurface, anchored to remediation standards and the vertical geopolitics (human/waste binarism) of the site's pre-event cleanup and management. Instead of naturalizing dispossession as the earth writ over by capitalist imperatives, soil hermeneutics of the expo exhumes the way in which the site was displaced in place—the way that spectacle arranged for the instrumental separation of surface from subsurface to undergird the event's organization of population management, collective experience, and social-ecological order.

The following section puts soil hermeneutics to work in a condensed analysis of the political materialism of the expo. The critique takes a vertical orientation and "naturalist" stance by presenting a cross-sectional display of the relationship between the expo's subsurface and surface—what might be considered the *edaphological geopolitics* of the Shanghai expo. Edaphology, one of the main fields of soil science, concerns the influence of soils on living things, particularly plants, but also extends to the way soil impacts human use of land and, vice versa, how human land use impacts soil. Here, I adapt this empirical scientific investigation to the discovery of *sedimented*—grounded *and* dy-

namic—power relations. Alluding to a cross-sectional view of the soil column, the display begins with the subsurface and works upward, through base and superstructure, scientific truth and ideology, edaphology and social inquiry, in a subtle but irreverent send-up of a depth ontology. The analysis is geopolitical *and* resolutely materialist "all the way down." The edaphological geopolitics of the expo entails the organization of waste as the material grounds of the expo as well as the terrain of new risk-based soil assessments and regulatory bodies, brownfield real estate instruments, and land-use futures. The account examines the symbolic repurification of the site's unstable soil in relationship to the mass event's toxic foundations of displacement, eminent domain, inequality, and destruction. The cross-sectional display then opens the expo site to considerations of atmospheric and crowd systems controls, civility, and social management. The dialectics of expo subsurface and surface generates dehistoricized crowds, deracinated memory, and sanitized heritage sites. The surface exploration briefly focuses on several participatory eco-feedback mechanisms found in Chinese state-sponsored or -affiliated theme pavilions that inserted citizens and their bodies into the circulation and surveillance of the expo as feedback loops. The overall account demonstrates how the organization of "sustainable spectacle" internalizes contradictions of the state by relegating industrial socialist contamination to "outside" the system and obstructs other governing arrangements. The following section puts *soil hermeneutics* to work as a method that excavates the sedimented power relations of spectacle and the toxic effects of this organization of life.

Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Shanghai 2010 World Expo

SUBSURFACE

Following China's successful bid to host the World Expo 2010 in Shanghai, preparations for the event began, including soil remediation of the Expo Park sites. As a major industrial city of the last century, Shanghai's soil in numerous areas of the city was contaminated with industrial pollutants (Liu 2012). Many industries had been located downtown and/or around the Huangpu River in now-central areas, and had been closed or relocated elsewhere to make room for the development of the local economy. The expo site itself was located in an old manufacturing district along the river, where hundreds of factories, including some of China's oldest, had stood. Preparations for the world expo revealed the extent of soil contamination—largely toxic heavy metals and volatile organic compounds (or POPs—persistent organic pollutants; Stanway and Niu 2013).[10] Although considerable attention had been given to air pollution and water pollution, world expo preparations marked the first time that the

remediation of contaminated soil officially came to public attention as a government priority.[11] Because of the expo, Shanghai was one of the first cities in China to attack the problem of soil quality: the Shanghai Environmental Protection Bureau admitted there were varying degrees of contamination due to past industrial development and stressed that any land found with contaminated soil could not be sold or redeveloped until the soil had been cleaned (World Bank 2011). In 2005, the Shanghai Academy of Environmental Sciences established a soil pollution remediation center—the Shanghai Center for Soil Remediation—to clean the contaminated expo grounds. Because no national standards on contaminated site soil existed at that time, Shanghai's Academy of Environmental Sciences drafted assessment standards for the environmental quality of the expo site's soil, before construction of the buildings began. These world expo soil standards were submitted to the Ministry of Environmental Protection and officially published as the nation's first remediation standards, titled "Standard of Soil Quality Assessment for Exhibition Sites" (HJ 350–2007; Department of Science, Technology, and Standards 2007).[12] The document outlines land-use types: one where the soil is directly exposed to the human body and may be a potential threat to human health, and a second category that includes everything else, such as stadiums, green land, commercial land, public municipal land, and so on. It then sets forth evaluation criteria and soil quality assessment indicators for exhibition sites, namely the allowable levels of contaminants and soil environmental quality targets. Basically, preparing the expo grounds generated a new problem: soil quality, attended by new soil centers, new standards where previously there had been none, and new environmental/soil assessments and techniques for addressing and removing contamination.[13]

Cleanup of the expo site impacted the soil column in significant ways, through the mass removal of contaminated soil in areas that required fast remediation, and through the country's first application of solidifying technologies for contaminated sites with a slower redevelopment time scale (Best 2011). Prior to the construction of expo buildings, the City of Shanghai excavated and displaced contaminated soil, transporting it to the city's Old Port, where it was supposedly segregated and contained.[14] Clean soil was then backfilled. This remediation method—often referred to as the "dig and dump" strategy—simply redistributed the contaminated soil elsewhere, because the development of the site was so urgent. The strategy is the most common response to China's rapid urban redevelopment, even though the country has a limited number of waste-disposal sites and as yet still lacks the specialized facilities capable of treating polluted soil (Su 2012).[15] For expo buildings that were not built as rapidly, the city adopted a new remediation technology that applied a curing

agent to contaminated soil, to produce a chemical reaction that fixed pollutants in place; the chemical "fixing" generated a dense solid material to block the release and migration of contaminants. This advanced solidification-stabilization and "biopile" technology was used in the 24,000-square-meter section of the expo's Urban Best Practices Area E, which contained around 5,400 square meters of contaminated soil at a depth of two-to-four meters. Here, the creation of a subsurface layer of solidified contaminants—effectively the country's first domestic large-scale application of this remediation technology—prepared the grounds for the Urban Best Practices Pavilion, an innovative clearinghouse of city-oriented urban best practices from around the world that made its first expo debut in Shanghai (Li and Cai 2011).

After cleanup and assessment of the remaining soil's quality, the expo land area was deemed ready for construction. Considered to be the first large-scale soil remediation project in China, the expo soil standards and cleanup effort are often used as a model by other local environmental protection bureaus and referenced as the basis for national soil assessment standards for exhibitions and green spaces and, more generally, for postindustrial redevelopment guidelines (Liu 2012).[16] Although the expo site preparations heavily involved the government at national and local levels, making it difficult to replicate elsewhere, officials and scholars contend that the expo standards and remediation demonstrate that China can develop feasible methods of soil quality control, including effective regulatory bodies (Caldwell and Wang 2011). They point to the prodigiousness of the soil center in Shanghai, which, since 2005, has completed well over twenty major projects being built on contaminated soil and remediated more than four hundred thousand cubic meters of contaminated soil and twenty thousand tons of underground water.[17] The center is currently focusing on comprehensive remediation for the Shanghai Disneyland project in Pudong and an area of the Baoshan district, where one thousand factories will be shut down and relocated to make room for residential compounds (Liu 2012). Projections indicate that soil and underground water remediation will become a major area of new environmental industry growth in the 2016–20 period.[18]

Moreover, the Shanghai 2010 World Expo incubated brownfield redevelopment strategies in China. The term "brownfield" is used in postindustrial countries to describe land contaminated by one or more hazardous substances but that has potential to be reused once it is cleaned up to certain standards (World Bank 2011).[19] For China, the regulation of and market for brownfield redevelopment is only just emerging to respond to the complex shifts in land use and, inevitably, the dynamic "waste in motion" that such land-use changes bring.[20] As hundreds of polluting enterprises are relocated away from city cen-

ters, a large number of industrial brownfield sites are being "recycled" for contemporary urban use—to address the need for floor space in China's rapidly expanding cities and to alleviate the pressure on arable lands (although this is debatable, in that industries are often relocated to rural areas with fewer environmental regulations). The extent of contamination in the soil is not known; such sites may have soil pollution depths up to ten meters, as recently projected by a World Bank report on brownfields in China (World Bank 2011). Urban land reuse, such as the conversion of a chemical plant into a residential complex, intensifies pollution incidents and exposures and has raised awareness and concerns about environmental health hazards. Although national standards and protocols for brownfield redevelopment are only now emerging in China, the Shanghai World Expo cleanup and inner-city land-use change—from industrial/manufacturing to exhibition, recreation, and leisure facilities—established the efficacy of two conversion practices: the state shift from polluter to brownfield supplier and risk-based end use over static land-use categories.

Regarding the shifting role of the state, it is necessary to review land governance in China. Soil comes under regulation when land use changes; however, there is a regulatory effort under way in China to require that enterprises detect soil contamination before moving or changing land use and, if contamination is found, repair the soil. Responsibility for contamination and for the cost of cleanup is a contentious issue that remains unresolved. But an important aspect of brownfields in China is that the biggest polluter companies were mostly state owned. This often means that the government, by default, conducts cleanups, until financial incentives are put in place to encourage companies to pursue brownfield remediation and cleanup projects. Furthermore, land in China is publicly owned. Central and local governments take control of the land market—including heavily contaminated areas—and set up land-use planning; developers cannot possess land permanently but can use it for a fixed number of years. Known as the Chinese urban land reserve system, the operation includes three stages: land purchase, requisition, and regain; land consolidation and reserve; and supplying land to the market (Zhang and Jia 2000; Zhou, Kang, and Tian 2003; Cao and Guan 2007, 129). Preparing the Shanghai World Expo site merged brownfield redevelopment with this land reserve system: land was assembled from dispersed land users and managed as one site, clearing away the obstacle of inconsistent property rights and eventually bringing the brownfield into the land market, such as the commercial and hospitality sectors now under development in part of the former Expo Park. Effectively, the state can appropriate and consolidate polluted lands to then package and supply brownfields for different end uses, following remediation. On this point, the grounds of the Shanghai 2010 World Expo entrenched a clear relationship between land-use

planning (deciding the type of land use) and brownfield management (specifying remediation standards and assessments). Cleanup standards and threshold limits of contaminants were established and implemented according to the end use of the site: a high-profile exhibition area. Or, put differently, remediation of the site was conducted according to the nature of the land reuse and decided upon by the corresponding requirements of contaminated soil risk assessment. The remediation of the expo site opened up land-use categorization to risk-based determinations about end use. This is crucial to brownfield redevelopment, in that end uses are defined according to allowable levels of remaining contamination, "safe" levels of exposure, and graduated soil standards according to subsurface depth (i.e., below a certain depth, allowable levels of pollution expand or are without limit). Such standards then guide the entire cleanup process; that is, the cleanup ensures that contamination remains in place, only at levels permitted in accordance with the designated end use.

The material arrangement of the expo site end use provided grounds for the symbolic cleansing of the city's historical industrial roots and the relocation of people based on the land-use shift. This massive brownfield redevelopment project carried out simultaneous recognition of risk inherent in the soil's instability yet refusal of the ongoing material history of industrialization in the soil, water, and people's bodies (i.e., toxic effects); the land was clean—"safe enough"—for use as an exhibition site. The cleanup externalized industrial waste to the subsurface and to other sites, dumping dirty soil in the city's old port area, which ironically serves as a landfill of industrial history. In essence, this process enlisted the industrial paradigm of nature for a postindustrial end use, wherein by-products and waste, as the "externalities" of growth, were cast off to the environment as dumping ground. Yet in the case of the world expo site preparations, the cycle came full circle so that waste dually served as the new input of a nascent brownfield bureaucracy (and industry) *and* as the nature—political matter—of a new "spectacular" governing relationship. Contaminated soil was removed or fixed below the surface in order to "renaturalize" the site and in doing so, facilitate future inhabitation and land speculation. Countering the state's historic role in polluting the environment, remediation cultivated the state's legitimacy as an efficient energy manager, regulator, and scientific modernizer by naturalizing the tensions of modernity and world-city formation as objective environmental problems. By "disembedding" the site from its material industrial history, the state readministered industrial wasteland as expo parkland.[21] The large areas of contiguous industrial remains along the Huangpu riverbanks supplied resources for the making of industrial relics, which have become popular settings for the burgeoning creative industry in Shanghai, for example, the conversion of an art-deco-era slaughterhouse into a

design hub, the expo's adaptive reuse of the Nanshi Power Plant as an exhibition hall, and the preservation of two shipping cranes to serve as sculptural flourishes in an area of the expo waterfront that had formerly hosted the Shanghai No. 3 Iron and Steel Plant and Jiangnan shipyard (renowned as China's first factory—a combination of arsenal/firearm manufacturing and shipbuilding; *Shanghai Daily* 2011; Bergère 2009; Sze 2015). Such sanitized industrial remains and the attraction of a few heritage objects of industry deracinate memories of the city's industrial and turbulent colonial past, clearing the ground for more state interventions in environmental cleanup and green space creation.[22] In this light, urban revitalization and soil sanitation generate seismic shifts in collective memory, enabling the creation of dehistoricized crowds of people that can be transferred around, displaced and re-placed.

The subsurface of the expo, then, consolidated a not-so-benign legacy: the toxic foundations of displacement, inequality, eminent domain, and destruction of settled populations, characteristic of many mega-events (Human Rights in China 2010; Moore 2010; *Telegraph* 2010; Sze 2015).[23] Particularly due to its national-level priority, expo planning disrupted legal and social norms in order to ensure a beautiful redeveloped and efficient event space. Substantial parts of the city experienced massive construction projects and mass evictions, the implementation of highly restrictive regulatory and legal instruments to ensure public compliance, and the use of vast amounts of public money for the securitization and corporatization of space. The expo created restrictions on certain forms of movement, public and commercial expression, and other cultural/artistic projects. Such mega-events "temporally engineer a crisis of deliberative structures: the immutability of deadlines, the stakes of reputations, the primacy of delivery, and the scale of the watching audience engender a systemic violence to existing or potential participatory . . . structures, from planning processes to established civic freedoms" (Hayes and Horne 2011, 761). The expo's symbolic repurification of the site's unstable soil, however, has made it difficult to see and contest the biophysical characteristics of this crisis—the way the physical remediation of the expo site anchored the surface's future, the end use of exhibitionary purpose—to allowable contaminant specifications and the depths of waste containment. The expo demonstrates that brownfield concessions and liquidation go hand in hand, strategically denying the industrial heritage that is contamination, annexing counterhistories, disposing of inconvenient remains, and bolstering long-term emergency state powers. The political materialism of such spectacle produces undesirable characteristics for future generations (i.e., potentially dysgenic effects at the level of toxins, bodies, etc.) and forestalls ethical consideration of the way in which the past persists in conditioning the complex social-ecological relations at present.

SURFACE

The brownfield redevelopment and remediation of the expo site supported experimentations of surface control, namely, techno-efficient administrative systems and social manageability. The Shanghai 2010 World Expo was the largest expo in history, and its organization and operations were a feat of planetary-scale proportions, given the duration and daily numbers in attendance. Stability and social order were maintained through a number of mechanisms aimed toward the technical management of life. These included crowd control and health risk-management systems, civility campaigns, interactive technologies that rehearsed citizenship as a duty of managing anticipated futures, and urban-systems feedback loops that trained expo visitors to monitor their energy use. Not only was the vision and planning of the event a demonstration of state competence, but the actual administration of the expo site and its many pavilions and programs installed apparently neutral technical state oversight and circuits of virtuous citizenship (e.g., health, risk, pleasure, enterprise, docility). From the perspective of the expo surface, Chinese state power is not merely repressive but rather actively seeks to mobilize subjects—to turn objects of governance into active subjects. "The legitimacy of the Chinese party-state relies on much more than the negative power of censorship and control; rather than see the PRC as a police state, it is better to understand China as a mobilization state that both encourages and feeds off of the positive productive power of popular feelings and mass action" (Callahan 2010, 25).

Long before the expo's opening day, prospective expo visitors in China and Shanghai residents in particular were taught how to modify their behavior and bodies for the event (Nordin 2012b, 114). Similar to the Beijing Olympics, education in civility was a major focus of expo preparations. A state-led campaign aimed at inspiring Chinese citizens to "raise their awareness of civility, develop a collective sense of representing the host nation and/or host city, remold their social manners and habits" (Law 2010, 169). A series of public-service announcements on television gave specific directions about how to behave in public and how to conduct oneself in personal interactions at the expo site. These exercises in civility training often featured the expo mascot Haibao, a blue cartoon creation based on the Chinese character *ren* (which means human or person), with large round eyes and huge feet. In spite of criticism directed at Haibao for its similarity to the U.S. character Gumby and for resembling the bodily abject (e.g., phlegm/spit wad, condom), its cuteness was instrumental to the "soft power" of behavioral screening prior to the event (Nordin 2012a, 600; Han 2010). Haibao and other cartoon delivery systems enacted and corrected

unacceptable public activities and mannerisms: don't sleep on public benches; don't use public drinking fountains for anything other than drinking; don't publicly spit except directly into bins. Such directives were framed as a matter of national pride and in accordance with global standards. Books on expo etiquette circulated that informed readers how to properly greet, walk, shake hands, queue in expo lines, and care for personal hygiene (Nordin 2012b, 114). These manuals also included information on the social customs of other countries with recommendations about how to adjust oneself and manage encounters with others during China's hosting of the cosmopolitan convergence. As a "last resort," reminders of good habits and signs prohibiting improper behavior were installed throughout the expo site, particularly in the queue areas outside the pavilions. Additionally, thousands of local volunteer helpers were trained in English to engage with visitors and facilitate proper impression management (Law 2010, 172).

Just as expo preparations attempted to foster persons who would advance their own health, education, and etiquette, the site's surface hosted a variety of simulations in crowd control, channeling lines, infrastructures designed to facilitate waiting, and health/disease and security controls both inside and beyond the expo site (S. Greenhalgh 2009; Holmes 2008). Prior to the actual event, expo organizers engaged experts on crowd management, and digital systems of crowd modeling were used to anticipate pedestrian traffic flows; large-scale simulations mobilized model generic expo visitors in order to rehearse responses to potential crowd behaviors, and to test the degree of chaos, uncertainty, and disaster any proposed control system was engineered to sustain (Zhou et al. 2009).[24] In spite of the complexity of the scale of analysis, the expo, as a container—an enclosed site or unit of place separate from the ordinary city—and as a distinct unit of time, was conducive to such modeling efforts (Liang 2011). The Expo Park effectively became an outdoor site for experimenting with crowd behavior, providing all necessary city services within the enclosed space, and dealing with density (Houdart 2012, 131). The Shanghai context required that the administration of the expo clearly master the density of Chinese masses and administer a well-ordered, enclosed outdoor site—essentially a miniature city with well-disciplined inhabitants and highly managed atmosphere, lines, and encounters. The design and implementation of mass control systems made it possible for millions of people to gather with few incidents—"to map flows of crowds and respond to their needs, but also to connect the space of the expo with the space of the city of Shanghai, to foresee the transformation of expo axes into public ones, to bring people in and people out, to regulate the flow of things that go in (lighters, liquids in plastic bottles, small plastic benches bought in tourist places, etc.) and those that go out (Expo

passport stamps, souvenirs, empty plastic bottles for recycling, etc.)" (Houdart 2012, 130). A flexible expo operations control center was established to monitor the event in terms of people, traffic, and energy. The center was equipped with technical systems that centralized all available data and communication avenues for responsive actions, such as a TV circuit, communications network (telephone, paging, etc.), remote-control infrastructure (electric power, public lighting, etc.), information technology, traffic control, loudspeakers, alarm systems (for fire, disasters, etc.), automatic data links (streamed from parking lots, visitor gates, service gates, etc.), video projection devices for displaying public messages, and other devices aimed at measuring the in-goings and out-goings generated by the event (Houdart 2012, 131).

Essentially, the Shanghai 2010 World Expo demonstrated that Chinese crowds could be disciplined via a well-designed site and comprehensive, consolidated social-technical management systems. The expo campus was designed to facilitate orderly waiting in line, with an atmosphere conducive to waiting (Houdart 2012, 133). An assemblage of devices provided shade, cooled down lines with water vapor, ventilated waiting areas, and effectively kept people in good shape under stressful conditions due to heat or extended passing of time. "17,000 extra benches, 3,000 sunshades, and 190 temporary drink trolleys were installed in the expo garden to beat the heat" (Houdart 2012, 133). Moreover, an endless array of barriers flexibly broke up potential crowd gatherings, channeling bodies into lines that wound around pavilions. Signs at the entrances to queues displayed the estimated waiting time until entry, discouraging the amassing of bodies beyond the queue gates. Line composition was also controlled by security personnel, who were swiftly dispatched to respond to crowding anywhere from inside the expo at designated bathroom areas to transportation areas and taxi pickup spots outside the expo site gates. The combination of atmospheric, technical, and security devices disbanded disorderly crowds with incredible versatility and enabled expo controls to quickly track any crowd improvisations of concern and coordinate integrated and effective responses. Such crowd-control mechanisms were particularly crucial for reducing the risk of public-health emergencies during the world's largest mass gathering (Sun et al. 2013; He et al. 2012), such as heat illness, general injuries, communicable diseases, food-borne illness, and mass casualty events. The importance of disaster risk reduction and effective management of the mass gathering was given top priority: the expo site accommodated an average of 400,000 visitors per day, with 700,000 on most peak days and over 1 million people as a record high for *daily* attendance (Sun et al. 2013). Health concerns, in particular, were amplified by the number of overseas visitors (approximately 3–5 percent) and the large numbers (an estimated 50 percent) of visitors from

outside Shanghai. For the successful and safe hosting of the expo, therefore, the Shanghai Municipal Center for Disease Control and Prevention established a special unit on public-health security to develop emergency preparedness plans and dynamic risk assessments of the event and to coordinate public-health and medical services within and beyond the Expo Park (Sun et al. 2013). Health monitoring and security points around the expo coordinated information across the city via an extensive health surveillance network and technical systems.

Within the expo's pavilions, visitors engaged with public interactives and displays that granted access to or simulated the expo's technical ("sustainable") systems or made the new nature of technological experiences available (Balsamo 2012). The Shanghai 2010 World Expo contributed to an ongoing shift in international exhibitions from the display of commodities and technology as the means of national identity and promotion to the construction of experiential narratives, often without overtly national references (Harvey 1996; Qin 2011). Such interactivity was intended to transform static admiring viewers into the active subjects of stories that appeal to universal themes. Moreover, mega-events like the expo can be considered on the basis of "their capacity to act as powerful agents of technology transfer and technical norm diffusion, with a wide mimetic potential in both geographic and public policy sector terms allied to a demonstration effect designed to encourage positive, individual lifestyle changes amongst civic populations" (Hayes and Horne 2011, 750).

In the state-themed Citizen's Initiative Pavilion, photographs of expo preparations and activities could be submitted to a designated Web site and then circulated on the screens in the pavilion during the event. Visitors could also send "blessings for Expo 2010" or greetings to family members and friends to be screened in the pavilion and surrounded by physical cards written by visitors on site. In yet another display, expo participants wrote good wishes on colorful paper that was then folded into paper airplanes, thrown toward a synthetic tree, and, in the process, detected and digitally rendered on a large screen for other viewers. The combination of physical and digital means and real-time screening of visitor commentary made this pavilion function as a state-administered multimedia guestbook and recording device. Here, "citizen's initiative" meant participating in state-scripted feedback loops that operated similarly to Facebook. The State Grid Pavilion—sponsored by the China State Grid Corporation, the nation's largest power distributor—offered a more embodied experience of state energy controls. Inside, expo-goers entered a science-fiction-like "Magic Cube," where they were suspended on a transparent platform and surrounded by a 720-degree LED screen with digital sense-surround of superhuman scale.[25] Here, a video showcased the transformation

of natural energy into human use and induced a dizzying sensation of cube rotation: giant energy vectors traversed the globe, a riveting engagement with Chinese energy imperialism and insertion of bodies into the "sovereign power" of a planetary energy grid.

Additional exhibits served the biopolitical function of producing citizens exposed to—and capable of engaging with—advanced technologies and imminent futures. Directly related to the expo's theme of sustainability, the expo coordinated an affective economy of anticipation, as the basis of citizenship of and for the future. Circulated by pavilion display strategies and intensified among visitors, anticipation affectively rooted the possibility—indeed, the responsibility—of knowing about certain futures and a dual sense of the uncertainty and the inevitability of the future (Adams, Murphy, and Clarke 2009, 249). The Pavilion of Urban Planet incited anticipation of global environmental and economic crises. Dramatic scenery of destruction, pollution, and energy depletion confronted visitors with the simulated and actual detritus of a ruined world, tempered with the possibility of active interventions and solutions to keep people happy and inspire healthy ecological living. For example, pavilion goers strolled by sprawling illuminated scrolls of landfills and urban rubbish piles, punctuated with waste-drum displays of encased consumer castoffs. Ticking clocks, swinging pendula, and hourglasses containing the last drop of oil or water or precious minerals marked the countdown to scenarios of planetary demise (Nordin 2012b, 112). Such display techniques substantiated the idea that limits had been reached or were imminent and demanded regulatory collective and individual responses. Portal holes directed attention toward a provocative series of rhetorical questions that encouraged viewers to speculate on futures that may or may not arrive—futures that are always uncertain yet necessarily requiring decisive and creative actions: What will we do when the world runs out of oil? If there's no gas tomorrow, what will become of our city? What will we do if we run out of drinking water? (Adams, Murphy, and Clarke 2009, 249). The pavilion tour ended in a solutions chamber, where miniature displays of green technologies (solar-powered car on a stick!), ecological living techniques (bring your own chopsticks when eating out), eco-city models (Treasure Island, California; Masdar City, UAE), and "bionic" parametric blobs symbolizing sustainability spiraled down around an enormous, inflated sphere, rendered as the planet earth via a cohort of projectors. The playful and serious elements together suggested that zones of danger permeated the present—in part, as the result of advanced forecasts and anticipation—but that planetary survival could be managed through creative technical solutions and modified behaviors (Braun 2014).

While the expo inevitably interpellated people as consumers of the mapped international state system on display, the main theme pavilions placed tre-

mendous emphasis on city models and model thinking (Hoffman 2011). The Urban Best Practices Area even accommodated in the same place, under the same roof, a panoply of different city models and SD negotiations of city risks, solutions, and best practices, submitted by municipal governments.[26] Such diagrams, in their variety, worked together to give form to the city as an autonomous, irreducible domain that is both naturally self-governing yet requires constant intervention—"an open-ended provocation to government" (Osborne and Rose 1999, 758–59). The collective display tied city governing to the continuous activity of generating truths about the city and revealed, as a subtext of sustainability discourse, the assumption that we can know the city through scientific, technical monitoring (Osborne and Rose 1999, 739). In yet another portion of the large state-run exhibition hall, the Urbanian Pavilion persuasively exhibited the idea that there are units of urban living and systems of thinking that operate across the planet in different configurations. In case studies and "small stories" of the urban lives of six families (first introduced in wax-figurine tableaux) representing cities ranging from Phoenix to Zhengzhou, Rotterdam to São Paulo, visitors learned to cross-examine different urban lifestyles and contexts using the rubric of "family, work, contact, education, and health" (Wu 2010, 44–45). In a subsequent section of Urbanian, expo-goers explored an approach to urban sustainability of excess proportions, an enormous and ironic city model of overstock items, a surreal funhouse of unbranded, characterless, mass-produced everyday objects: skyscrapers of piled plastic bins, buildings made of filing cabinet stacks, the dense built forms of stacked doors, even the corrugated tin of slum typology. A multimedia interactive in the Citizen's Initiative Pavilion made this exercise a more individualized performative undertaking. Eager participants arranged large model building blocks and urban landscape typologies to make an SD image of their personalized built environment appear on the back wall. A sign exhorted people to "become a designer of the future city" as an adventure in self-advancement and urban planning education.[27]

The Pavilion of City Being, by contrast, used metaphors of metabolism, circulation, biological life cycles, and recycling. Part of it was evocatively presented as a sewage system, interspersed with electronic marquees and billboard messages about urban-systems thinking. Per the general tendency toward systems approaches in contemporary science, the urban theory embedded in the City Being installations directed visitors in a cybernetic style of thought—the city was a system that could be imagined and efficiently controlled through the continuous modulation of risk, feedback, and equilibrium, that is, the city as a feedback loop (Osborne and Rose 1999, 749). Sustainability initiatives employed at the expo attempted to put such thinking into practice by installing

self-regulating mechanisms, smart buildings, telematics/informatics, and computerized models of power, water, traffic flow, and so on. The gargantuan Theme Pavilion, for example, featured the largest single-rooftop solar-energy system in the world, asserting China's world dominance in photovoltaic production (Sze 2015, 145).[28] Covering an area of thirty thousand square meters, the system could reportedly generate 2.8 million kilowatt-hours per year. Simultaneously, the design of a large eco-wall of plants on the five-thousand-square-meter eastern and western walls of the pavilion reduced building energy consumption and sustained itself (temporarily) via a recycled water drip-irrigation system. Moreover, striking moments of "ecofeedback" real-time monitoring of the event embedded expo visitors in site management and sustainability initiatives. For example, the State Grid Pavilion, along with its displays about smart grid technology, housed the high-tech transformer substation that exclusively supplied power to the whole expo site and all the pavilions. Visitors were invited to examine this "backstage" control room, witness techno-efficient energy management, and watch the "live" computerized monitoring of power supply across the expo site. Viewers consumed a live feed of data rendered as graphs and charts that showed where power was being used the most within the expo grounds. Visitors became participatory energy managers and, potentially, more self-aware and self-regulating individual energy users. Similarly, in a corner of the Pavilion of City Being, a monitor screened a live feed of the number of bodies currently circulating in different pavilions, giving an "insider" infomatic audit of crowd behavior. Such ecofeedback participation reached new levels at various waste receptacles that incited users to monitor their inputs and outputs of consumption. The environmentally friendly public toilets, in particular, hailed users as potentially self-regulating individual feedback loops. Stall signs advocated paperless human waste removal (or at least treeless toilet paper aids) and expressed gratitude for your participation in the expo's high-tech sanitation system and on-site gray-water recycling. These experiences represented an effort to mobilize enlightened and efficient practices of everyday life, for the purpose of refining citizens and expanding the purview of urban-systems thinking to the practice of the self as a kind of rational circuit or self-sustaining eco-city. Overall, the expo was an education in sustainability as technical monitoring and modulation, and citizenship as effective and affective responses to countless surface controls.

Residual Comments

The preceding cross-sectional analysis of the Shanghai 2010 World Expo used a theoretical framework inspired by Pred and Foucault to excavate countertruths

of the world expo. The methodological approach sought to re-embed the expo within broader political-material governing relations and examine biophysical and social arrangements. The "Subsurface" section showed how waste is constitutive of nature and the basis of state land-use redevelopment, known as brownfields. For the expo, an exemplary brownfield, the Chinese state materially arranged the "end use" and allowable levels of contamination, thereby producing the grounds for soil regulations and bureaucracy, a remediation industry, new financial instruments, and so forth. Moreover, the narrative drew attention to the material and symbolic cleansing of the site's soil for expo preparations, implanted with the toxic foundations of eminent domain, destruction, and mass displacement of residents. The "Surface" tour further extended the material-relational analysis of spectacle as a governing arrangement to the constitution of rational crowds and anticipating citizens, thereby extending the relevance of the approach to investigations of affect and aesthetics, citizenship and systems control. Commentary on expo pavilions drew attention to sustainability initiatives and displays that emphasized social-ecological management, inoculating blame or responsibility for past injustices, environmental harm, material remains, or any potentially toxic effects of the expo.

To return to the questions that began this expo analysis, the legacy of this mega-event operates on multiple levels, which I will delineate here in terms of sustainable urban development and the Chinese state, followed by more general implications gleaned from "sustainable spectacle" as a governing apparatus. First, the Shanghai expo is but one experiment—on a mass scale—of China's ongoing "postcarbon" transition—it was a discrete bounded area where sustainability expertise and technologies could be developed and applied. In this respect, the expo was similar to China's numerous eco-city projects, which have come to occupy a central place in the Chinese developmental state's agenda. As a city-scale laboratory of sorts, the expo attempted to integrate some of the social and ecological contradictions of modern capitalist growth, as evidenced by China's widening income gap and environmental crisis. Integrating infrastructure and architecture, ecology, and technology, the expo exhibited the temporalizing and territorializing logic of these eco-city projects: the anticipating of disaster and carving out of divisible ecological and economic security zones, to support circular metabolisms and all other manner of disembedded systems thinking. Another legacy of the expo, therefore, is a local material one—a governing arrangement of subsurface and surface that allowed for such an "eco-city territory" to take place and persist. The establishment of the subsurface according to the spatially contained end use of "exhibition"—anchored to remediation standards and the vertical geopolitics of a waste/nature and waste/human binarism—enabled the surface to develop as an urban labora-

tory of sustainability experiments and eco-city-like systems controls. While the site is largely an uninhabited de/construction zone, with remnant clusters of disposable paradigms, defunct models, and other "eco-chutzpah" of the city of the future, it affected and continues to affect how life is organized and lived in Shanghai (Mirviss 2012). The edaphological geopolitics of the expo spectacle is also germane to national and international levels: the Chinese state is currently coming to terms with the results of the nation's first comprehensive soil survey (recently completed in 2013), which essentially maps the brownfield nature of the entire country (Stanway and Niu 2013). Reportedly, a critically large portion of the country's urban and especially agricultural land is contaminated (Environmental Administrative Management Information 2014). How the state will adapt and arrange for continued governing relations will likely center around the organization of waste and soil contamination across variegated land use, from exhibitions to agriculture. However, there is no access yet to the raw data or the ways the survey was conducted, due to the more traditional geopolitical concerns of state security and the global reputation of several Chinese industries.[29]

The sustainability and governance practices of the Shanghai 2010 World Expo also direct attention to more-general negative legacies. First, the expo raises concern about the lack of processual equity with respect to sustainable development; participatory forms of decision making were not at work. Entertaining and technical aspects of sustainability were privileged over democratic or redistributive ones (C. Hall 2012; Gotham 2005). The lesson we might draw from various green mega-events, such the Beijing green Olympics or the Shanghai expo, is that "sustainable development is conceptualized as 'best practice,' 'best available technology,' 'green growth' and so on; it is not a question of environmental citizenship as democratic deliberation" (Hayes and Horne 2011, 759). Moreover, the physical geography of spectacle "naturalizes" dispossession and docility through the political organization of matter and bodies and via the inducement to perform within control systems. Second, the expo suggests that spectacle is an organization of life with harmful effects: ephemeral mega-events can lead to long-term, durable, and "uneventful" material outputs, such as (ongoing) toxicity. The expo demonstrates that brownfield concessions and liquidation go hand in hand, strategically denying the industrial heritage that is contamination, annexing counterhistories, disposing of inconvenient remains, and bolstering long-term emergency state powers. The political materialism of such spectacle produces undesirable characteristics for future generations (i.e., potentially dysgenic effects at the level of toxins, bodies, etc.) and forestalls ethical consideration of the way in which the past persists in conditioning the complex social-ecological relations at present. Third, the Shanghai expo

provides a window to the extended moment of danger signaled by "sustainable spectacle," most evident in the international practice of decontextualized eco-city models (Joss and Molella 2013; Joss et al. 2013; Qiang 2009; Yigitcanlar 2009). Such efforts to produce a kind of "transcendent urbanism," to overcome local environmental limits, resource constraints, and the consequences of global climate change through internalized metabolic flows and control, disavow spatial, ecological, and sociopolitical complexity (Hodson and Marvin 2010). While efforts to integrate and relocalize food, energy, water, and other resources is laudable, the systems thinking of eco-city models fails to register the contestations and conflicts between "best practices" and place-specific contexts and can even legitimate increasingly militarized forms of ecological and economic security to become enclaves of the privileged. As such, the legacy of disembedded urban-systems thinking is the technical organization of life (and, in the case of China, a centrally planned future) for the survival of sustainable growth and capitalist accumulation in a future that is already considered to be ecologically devastated. The depoliticizing arrangement of such "sustainable spectacle" represents—*is*—a durable obstruction to living differently.

What is to be done? What responses might we imagine and put into action? This essay has aimed for an intervention in theory production by exploring the *nature* of a planetary-scale expo dedicated to sustainability. It has attempted to "ground" understandings of spectacle in a vertical analysis of subsurface/surface, to show the political materialism of spectacle and the way such "political matter" structures possibilities for life. Instead of mobilizing a depth ontology that would reveal the truth beneath the spectacle, the methodology has enacted a material inquiry into spectacle as a governing arrangement of subsurface and surface, one that is difficult to contest due to both biophysical and aesthetic aspects. Particular futures are embedded in the soil composition and end use of remediated land, with invisible material agencies at work that are difficult to detect; toxic foundations and effects are hidden from view, annulling linkages of the site's material history to everyday lives, health, and ecologies. The arrangement of what is visible and invisible also dramatically influences politics, essentially channeling which ecologies, communities, or entities can enter politics. In the case of the expo, this was intensified by technical controls as well as interactive anticipatory modes that materially circulated throughout the site, setting the conditions of possibility for action in the present and producing futures that are lived and felt as inevitable (Adams, Murphy, and Clarke 2009).

To de-ontologize the political limitations of the present, the analysis has drawn Predian insights on situated knowledge and spectacle into conjunction with Foucaldian work on biopolitics. In a remarkable constellation of world-

historical-to-intimate everyday-life levels of analysis, Pred explicates the dynamic material governing arrangements of spectacle:

> The construction and operation of . . . these spectacular spaces was—or is—
> entangled in (would-be) hegemonic discourses, in discourses which were—or
> are—meant
> to maintain, restructure or consolidate domination
> by means of popular consent rather than coercion,
> to legitimate or extend existing power relations,
> to ensure or produce a new relative stability
> within the political and economic domains of concrete everyday life.
> At each of these spectacular spaces (would-be) hegemonic
> representations were made which served
> to further buttress the position of those who govern, rule and control
> at a number of social sites simultaneously,
> to reinforce or newly inculcate a particular way of seeing,
> to make some particular things visible
> and other particular things invisible—
> thereby rearticulating the social and cultural landscape,
> to, in short,
> "rearticulate the complex relations among the state,
> The economy and culture."
> (Pred 1995, 19–20, citing Grossberg, *We Gotta Get Out of This Place*, 247)

Pred dramatizes the geographical, earthbound character of power, in the process redirecting social theory to the grounded nature of spectacle and inevitably situated operations of critique. When this methodology is further advanced into biopolitical domains, one can develop an analytic approach that excavates the material interplay of governing strategies and representational practices across bodies—administrative bodies, bodies of land, and human bodies—traversing seemingly disparate terrains (i.e., surface and subsurface) and even disciplinary divisions of the humanities, social sciences, and physical sciences. This essay has sought to delineate the human-environment-institutional power relations organized by the expo. It has framed its investigation of these complex political-material relations using partially tongue-and-cheek references to a "worm's eye view" and soil column display. I have used "soil hermeneutics" to excavate the political materiality of spectacle and, thereby, potentially inaugurate an ironic naturalist tradition of spectacle or mega-event study. Countering the plethora of Shanghai expo guidebooks now constituting another waste pile of the event, strategic natural histories of the expo and its effects might serve

as "antidote field guides" that encourage alternative versions of sustainability and modes of living that feature new lexicons and landscapes of sustainable growth (Gibson-Graham 2011). An ironic naturalist approach to expos and, more generally, spectacle might provide the missing political matter of previous critiques focused on ideological greenwashing and embolden theory to be an activity that works for reparative justice and more creative material-social compositions of life on the planet, rather than settles on a pedagogy of exposure or denaturalization (Sedgwick 2003, 123–51; Krupar 2013, 279).

NOTES

1. This essay is based on fieldwork that the author conducted in Shanghai in 2010. The Huangpu River flows through the city of Shanghai. The historic western bank of the river is called "Puxi" and features remnants of colonial architecture and waterfront known as the Bund. The eastern bank is called "Pudong," where massive development over the past few decades has resulted in an immense outbranch of special economic zones and an internationally recognized skyline. The expo campus was intended to bring both sides of the river together and further integrate the city in/around a new inner-city development zone (in contrast to previous expos that have been built on the outskirts of cities).

2. The Chinese-language version of the expo theme is slightly different and demonstrates the attention to the nuances of language on the part of expo coordinators. In a literal translation of the Chinese version, the theme reads, "Cities, make life better." This can be interpreted as a declaration that cities make life better *or* potentially as a call for cities to improve the lives of their residents. See Nordin 2012a.

3. This focus has had a tremendous impact on cities in China, involving the modernization of urban planning/performance of urban systems; the greening of economic networks of Chinese cities; a training base of environmental protection concepts and technologies; the ecological modernization of the Chinese system of urban governance; improved greening of market-based development; further government transparency; and the creation of green spaces and "healthy" environments for urban residents.

4. The Shanghai 2010 World Expo is the most recent iteration of modernity as an exhibitionary project, in the tradition of world's fairs. See, for example: P. Greenhalgh 2011; P. Greenhalgh 1988; Harvey 1996; Heller 1999; Jackson 2008; Pred 1995; Roche 2000; Rydell 1984; Rydell 1993; Bennett's formulation of the "exhibitionary complex" 1995, 59–88; Benjamin 1999; Buck-Morss 1995; Crary 2000; Mitchell 1991; Prior 2002. For an experimental application of this theoretical framework to the Chinese context, see Krupar 2007.

5. See Allan Pred's faculty page, Department of Geography, University of California Berkeley, accessed October 7, 2013, http://geog.berkeley.edu/PeopleHistory/faculty/AllanPred_InMemoriam.html.

6. Ibid.

7. For a useful introduction to the study of spectacle and an outline of a govern-

mentality approach, see Krupar and Al 2012; Krupar, forthcoming. For cultural studies of spectacle that apply insights from both Guy Debord and Michel Foucault, refer to Bennett 1995; Crary 2000; Pred 1995.

8. Additional discussion of biopolitics and Chinese governmentality studies can be found in Jeffreys and Sigley 2009. My turn to Foucault's work to theorize spectacle draws on the research of several key scholars in the field of Chinese urban studies and Chinese governance, particularly relating to Chinese green urbanisms, urban models, and new urban-environmental governing relationships. See Hoffman 2009, 2011; Boland and Zhu 2012; Ong 2011; Hubbert 2010. For investigations of China's biopolitical investments in biomedicine and the population problem, see, for example, S. Greenhalgh 2009; Salter and Waldby 2012. For biopolitics more generally, refer to Foucault 2008, 51–73; Foucault 1990, 135–45; Lemke 2011.

9. My interest is in the technologies of crowd management and social-ecological feedback loops that integrate the mass of bodies in/at the expo—not the formation of individual subjectivities and the complexities of "participation." For excellent work in this latter area, refer to Boland and Zhu 2012; Hoffman 2011.

10. In spite of government efforts to increase transparency in China, the results of the survey had not yet been released at the time of my writing this essay. The survey reportedly reveals extensive contamination across the country, particularly in agricultural areas.

11. According to Huang Shenfa, deputy director of the Shanghai Academy of Environmental Sciences (the research institution under the Shanghai Environmental Protection Bureau, which carries out most of the soil remediation in the city), as cited in Yin 2012.

12. The State Environmental Protection Agency announced an Environmental Quality Assessment Standard for the soil at the Expo Site on June 5, 2007.

13. A national-scale survey of soil in China was also initiated; see Stanway and Niu 2013.

14. Unfortunately, at the time of writing this essay, I have not yet been able to learn what technologies were/are employed to maintain the soil as separate and safely contained.

15. Most of the contaminated soil is incinerated in cement kilns, a process that produces highly poisonous waste gases such as dioxin; such kilns are usually not equipped to process the exhaust gas.

16. An earlier event that might be said to inaugurate the remediation industry in China was a poisoning incident in Beijing on April 28, 2004. A group of construction workers passed out at the same time while working on a new Songjiazhuang subway station in Beijing. The site had previously housed a 1970s-era pesticide plant. Though the factory had moved years earlier, large quantities of residual poisonous gases remained trapped underground. These gases were released when drilling operations reached five meters, poisoning a group of workers. The contaminated soil was later evacuated, transported, and incinerated.

17. Again, remediation methods in China mostly involve excavation and relocation.

18. According to Zhao Hualin, director of the Department of Total Pollutants Control of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (cited in Yin 2012).

19. Note that "cleanup" does not mean land is returned to an originary pure/pristine state; brownfields demonstrate the impossibility of that understanding of land.

20. "Waste in motion" is an adaption of the "waste in transit" concept developed by Jeremy Till with respect to architecture (2009, 67–75). I employ the idea to refer to the shifting definitions—and presence—of acceptable levels of waste/contamination, depending on the soil quality standards applied to different land uses.

21. Shanghai is the birthplace of industry in China; the city also underwent massive industrial expansion since the People's Republic of China was established in 1949. Metallurgical, chemical, petroleum, electrical, and machinery industries in Shanghai experienced rapid growth reaching industrial scales, with residential districts to support these large-scale industrial areas. As a result, there has been a vast amount of industrial remains. For an overview of Shanghai's industrial heritage, see Yu 2012.

22. Ackbar Abbas (2000) discusses the disappearing of history through the spectacular visibility of heritage projects. This applies to the leveling of Shanghai's unique industrial past via the expo's selective curating of industrial heritage. Shanghai's "reappearance" as a cosmopolitan hub of culture also facilitates this erasure. Abbas refers to a strategic vision of Shanghai's future and fantasies of cultural renaissance—what I have explored as a *collective memory of the future* as Old Shanghai (Krupar 2009)—that serve as a tool of urban renewal/removal, revisionist history, and culture industry resource.

23. Stories of forced resettlement and coercion circulated in the international news. Reportedly, six protestors, whose homes had been destroyed to make way for the expo site, were sent to labor camps. Other displaced neighborhood residents were invited to appear on the expo program, such as the theatrical performance "Homeland, Impression Shangsteel."

24. My efforts here draw on a 2012 article by Sophie Houdart, titled "A City without Citizens," wherein she outlines an insightful research agenda on the expo as crowd-control system. Rather than characterize the expo as a "city without citizens," however, I attempt to show how citizenship is moving toward a model of technical control, affective capabilities, and individualized self-regulation. I suggest some of the embodied effects on subjectivity, generated by expo systems controls, interactives, and campaigns. For more information on expo simulations, see Zhou, Kang, and Tian 2003; Sun et al. 2013; He et al. 2012.

25. The chief designer of this pavilion was Zhao Xiaojun, who was in charge of the designs for six venues at the Beijing Olympics, including the "Water Cube."

26. This is the claim of expo organizers; see the official expo guidebook: Wu 2010.

27. The popularity of this activity at different venues in Shanghai (e.g., the Shanghai Urban Planning Exhibition Hall) demonstrates a more "neoliberal" turn in the Chinese state's approach to population: an increasing emphasis on self-governing, self-enterprising, quality Chinese subjects. For a discussion of this in the context of the regime's larger bionationalist/biopolitical project of transforming China into a prosperous modern power, refer to S. Greenhalgh 2009, esp. 216.

28. The building served as the "umbrella" structure for the majority of the state-run pavilions, including the Sunshine Pavilion, the Pavilion of City Being, the Urbanian Pavilion, the Pavilion of Urban Planet, and the Citizen's Initiative Pavilion.

29. China might reframe this situation as "toxic debt" from serving as the world's growth machine and factory. In April 2014, a summary report of the main findings of the soil pollution survey was posted on the Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People's Republic of China website; see Environmental Administrative Management Information 2014.

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PART FOUR

Historical Geographies of the Present



Previous page: Angelus Novus, image by Trevor Paglen.

CHAPTER 9

Insurgent Spaces

Power, Place, and Spectacle in Nigeria

MICHAEL J. WATTS

> The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that did not exist before, precisely *in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to present this new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed language*.
> —KARL MARX, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*, emphasis added

> Articulating the past historically does not mean recognizing it "the way it really was." It means appropriating a memory as it flashes up in a moment of danger. Historical materialism wishes to hold fast the image of the past which unexpectedly appears to the historical subject in a moment of danger. The danger threatens both the content of the tradition and those who inherit it.
> —WALTER BENJAMIN, *Illuminations*

> The hypermodern present . . . is an extended moment of danger.
> —PRED, *Even in Sweden*

One of Allan Pred's favorite books—one he pressed upon all his close friends—is the great novel by Tasmanian writer Richard Flanagan titled *Gould's Book of Fish*. Richard Flanagan's remarkable, phantasmagorical novel is, on its face, a story about a convicted nineteenth-century forger who is imprisoned on Sarah Island, a terrifying penal colony in Tasmania where he is compelled to paint local fishes for a camp surgeon gripped by a sort of Linnaean madness to finally "order nature," to complete "man's mastery of his dominion." The island is the last resort among last resorts, a dead end for re-offending convicts who find themselves confronting the dreadful harshness of Van Dieman's Land. Gould is found guilty of a murder he did not commit and is awaiting execution in a

"fish cell" that floods, with the tide, twice daily. The syphilitic Commandant, a megalomaniac whose lunacy extends to re-creating Enlightenment achievements on Sarah Island, drags the convict community to the point of dissolution and implosion. But the world of the penal colony—a disciplinary space par excellence—is a topsy-turvy world of arbitrary rule, crazy inversions, and subterfuge. As one critic put it, former convicts turn into constables, escapees into bushrangers who return to avenge their brutal treatment, and alliances are abruptly disbanded at the first hint of preferment.

This says much—and yet also almost nothing—about a book that is a deep mediation of colonialism, nature, racism, love, loss, and just about everything else. It is magical, comic, grotesque, squalid, labyrinthine, terrifying, and apocalyptic: it is Pynchon, Swift, Melville, Borges, and Dante all at once. *Gould's Book of Fish* is a window into many things, including what it means to be poor and disenfranchised ("If shit ever becomes valuable, the poor will be born without arseholes"; Flanagan 2001, 134) and the instabilities and arbitrariness of colonial and penitential hierarchies. The book is, as Gould says at one point, "a natural history of the dead" (63).

Allan Pred fell in love with *Gould's Book of Fish*, and it is not hard to see why. There is much in Flanagan's approach to his art that resonates deeply with Pred's views of what a critical geography could and should be: a deep immersion in the quotidian details of history, an attentiveness to the deep grammar of places and how they are shaped by historical contingency, the ever-present structures of power and domination, the deadweight of collective amnesia and forgetting ("the unspeakable," as he put it), and of course racial and other stereotypes that constitute part of the taken-for-granted. Perhaps most important of all, there is in *Gould's Book of Fish* something that Pred took from Walter Benjamin (I have not the slightest idea whether Flanagan is familiar with Benjamin's work) that might be called the Benjaminian conception of history: namely, a conception of history in keeping with the idea that "the state of emergency" is the rule, not the exception, the notion that knowledge (and practice) emerges in moments of shock rather like lightning flashes, that the snapshot (the "micrological procedure") can disclose new structural formations of the subject, that an individual biography can give a sense of the infinity of mediated complex relations that collectively constitute the fiber of a life.

I want to relate these issues to another that was central to Pred's work, namely, the making and contesting of regions and places. In my case, the vehicle for this place making and (violent) struggle is contemporary Nigeria, and the genesis of two insurgencies in markedly different regions (the Muslim north and the Christian southeast), each of which, through different discourses, practices, and power structures, expressed in contrasting registers something similar to

what James Holston (2009) in describing Brazilian urban politics calls "insurgent citizenship."

In Pred's work, the intersections of power, culture, and history—a concern with historically situated processes, and with multiple axes of oppression, domination, exploitation as he would have it—began with his turn from the examination of the American urban and industrial world to Sweden, and to modernity (and inevitably the modern city) as a way of life and a mode of experience. Pred's perseverance and his eye for historical sources yielded unexpected fruits in his new Swedish project, and indeed for the first time his love affair with Sweden pushed him toward a scholarly engagement with the country that was to persist for almost thirty years. What turned out to be foundational for all his subsequent work on Sweden was an astonishing set of archives, including historical ethnographies of various aspects of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Swedish urban and rural life. It was this treasure trove of neglected church and state papers on nineteenth- and twentieth-century life that undergirded the extraordinary empirical richness of his writing. What followed was an exhilarating series of projects designed to unearth the making of place, everyday life, and popular identities in the transit to what he called "Swedish modern."

He began with rural enclosures and peasant life in the nineteenth century, in *Place, Practice and Structure: Social and Spatial Transformation in Southern Sweden, 1750–1850* (1985) and moved quickly to the world of Stockholm's working classes at the fin de siècle in *Lost Words and Lost Worlds: Modernity and the Language of Everyday Life in Late Nineteenth-Century Stockholm* (1990). The first book was certainly indebted to Anthony Giddens's work on structuration but also to Torsten Hagerstrand's time geography. Pred mined important sources on the Swedish "agrarian question" and shed new light on enclosures. In a rather different register from both peasant studies (the likes of Henry Bernstein [2010] and those who were associated with the *Journal of Peasant Studies*) and the English social historians (Edward Thompson [1991] and Judith Neeson [1993], for example), Pred laid emphasis on the dialectics of structure and agency around place, what he termed place as a historically contingent process. It built on a conceptualization of place as a constantly becoming human product as well as a set of features visible on the landscape. As he put it, "place is seen as a process whereby the reproduction of social and cultural forms, the formation of biographies, and the transformation of nature ceaselessly become one another at the same time that time-space specific activities and power relations continuously become one another" (1985, 279).

Pred's vision subsequently grew even bolder, taking on that apotheosis of modernity, the World's Fair, in *Recognizing European Modernities: A Montage of the Present* (1995). The book contains two overlapping narratives: one is in

effect a periodization of European modernity in terms of its specific form of the commodity economy. The second is constituted by three moments seen as "spectacular spaces" (this move represented a mixing of Guy Debord [1967] and the work of Timothy Mitchell [1991]): the two Stockholm Exhibitions of 1897 and 1930, and the Globe, a contemporary Stockholm multipurpose arena. Pred attempts to read across spectacularized sites of consumption as locally specific yet changing discourses and practices of power and cultural politics.[1]

In my contribution to this volume, I want to pursue some of these Predian themes and to locate power, culture, spectacle, and history in a part of the world that Allan knew little of, namely, West Africa, but around a topic that he was deeply concerned with especially in his later work, namely, violence, identity, and authority. At stake is the way in which two violent insurgencies emerged in two different regions of multiethnic Nigeria—regions with markedly contrasting cultural histories and political economy—but each forged within the spectacularized forms of accumulation, development, and violence associated with Nigeria's vast oil wealth. These two insurgencies launched against the Nigerian state—one draped in the language and discursive sentiments of caliphal restoration and "true Islam" and the other in terms of ethno-nationalist "resource control" and the politics of recognition (Fraser 2000)—seem to be exemplary cases of what one might call the Pred oeuvre. Each is inexplicable outside the deeper history of places and regions as historically sedimented and contingent; each is shaped by world historical process (global Islam, slavery, the history of mass commodities, the making of the Black Atlantic) inseparable from the powers of empire and colonization; and each emerged from the time- and place-specific vortex of forces unleashed by the discovery and commercialization of oil in the postcolonial period that simultaneously produced spectacularized forms of *wealth* (the infusion of billions of petrodollars, some of which funded the building of an entirely new Brazilia-like capitol in the middle of the country), *politics* (a run of flamboyant military and civilian leaders, kleptocrats, and larger-than-life political patrons known as "godfathers" in the local lexicon), and violent *contestation* (car bombs launched in the modern capital city by Internet-savvy militants with more than passing resemblances to Osama bin Laden and Subcommandante Marcos).

The family resemblances (and divergences) among two regional insurgencies in Nigeria speaks to the genesis of moments of danger and to the writings of Pred's intellectual hero, Walter Benjamin. The moment of danger might be inventoried in this way: a permanent state of emergency that has dogged a postindependence Nigeria struggling with the national project of building a multiethnic and multireligious federation; the moments of shock triggered by the onset of oil-fueled modernity; and not least, violent spaces of enclosure,

incarceration, and dispossession, always experienced in culturally and historically specific ways, that have attended the remaking and reimagining of Nigeria as an instance of what Dan Slater (2011) has called the ordering of power in an "authoritarian Leviathan." Nigeria is a fragile and conflicted expression of what one might call a "violent democracy" (Araias and Goldstein 2010). Together, these insurgencies represent a state of emergency that throws into question the very existence of an entity called Nigeria, a terrifying echo of the breakup of the country instigated by the terrible Biafran war of the 1960s. Each, in quite different ways, calls up deep historical memories that, to invoke Karl Marx, whom I quote at the opening of this essay, "anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to present this new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed language" ([1852] 1937).

Two massive car-bomb attacks, ten months apart, were launched in a spectacular assault against the diplomatic heart of Nigeria's high-modernist capital, Abuja. On October 1, 2010, amid the golden jubilee celebrations marking the fiftieth Independence Day anniversary, three car bombs were detonated, two outside the justice ministry and a third near Eagle Square, where President Goodluck Jonathan sat with hundreds of Nigerian and foreign dignitaries. Twelve people were killed and many more seriously injured. The State Security Service (SSS) claimed it had, just days before the attacks, foiled other plans to detonate at least six car bombs on September 29 in the Three Arms Zone in central Abuja, which houses the presidential palace, parliament, the supreme court, and also the SSS headquarters. Shortly afterward, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), an armed nonstate group fighting for what it calls "resource control," issued an electronic statement apparently penned by their shadowy, eloquent, and media-savvy public relations person, Jomo Gbomo:

> The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) deeply regrets the avoidable loss of lives during our bomb attack in Abuja on Friday October 1, 2010. Our hearts go to the families of those killed who we know were sympathetic to our cause. The irresponsible attitude of the government security forces is to blame for the loss of lives. They were given 5 days prior notice [and] the security forces were also warned one full hour to the first bomb blast ahead of the general alert sent to the media and told to steer the public from all parked cars which was not done.[2]

In an earlier e-mail to the Nigerian security agencies and to the foreign diplomatic community, MEND warned of the prospect of attacks and dis-

ruption because, as it put it, "for 50 years, the people of the Niger delta have had their land and resources stolen from them." In spite of this admission, President Goodluck Jonathan, himself an indigene of the Niger delta, immediately absolved MEND of responsibility for the attacks. Yet within two days Henry Okah, a purported operative and arms supplier for MEND, was arrested in South Africa, as were his brother and four others accused of masterminding the attacks.[3]

Ten months later, on August 26, 2011, an armed neo-Salafist Islamist group, Boko Haram, which had first appeared a decade earlier in the northeast of Nigeria, initially near Yobe based in the Kanuri heartland of Maiduguri, bombed central Abuja.[4] Gaining visibility in 2003 (though its origins seem to date back to Islamic study groups in the mid-1990s) under the leadership of Muhammad Yusuf, Boko Haram had by 2011 engaged in direct military confrontations with security forces in the region of the old Bornu empire in the northeast of the country but rapidly expanded into ten of the northern states (Amnesty International 2012; Human Rights Watch 2012). Its tactics and operations escalated to include attacks on religious and political leaders, churches, schools and universities, beer halls, and banks, culminating in an astounding jail break that released eight hundred of its incarcerated followers in Bauchi in 2010. The massive car bomb that was detonated in the United Nations compound in Abuja killed twenty-three persons and seriously injured more than one hundred. The attack took place at about 11:00 a.m. local time in the diplomatic zone in the center of the city close to the U.S. embassy. Housing twenty-six humanitarian and development agencies, the building is the UN's main office in Nigeria. Within ten days two videos—their political aesthetics almost indistinguishable from the early al-Qaeda videos—were released to the media; they included twenty-five minutes of speeches by the alleged UN bomber, who is seen holding an AK-47 automatic rifle. A man claiming to be a spokesman for the sect told local news services that the alleged bomber was Muhammad Abul Barra, a twenty-seven-year-old married man from the northeastern city of Maiduguri. In the videos a young man speaks in measured tones wearing a striped shirt, a turban, and what appears to be a suicide vest. At other moments in the videos, the UN is referred to as a "forum of all the global evil" and praises are offered to Osama Bin Laden, the al-Qaeda leader killed by U.S. special forces in Pakistan two months prior. Earlier in August, the commander of the U.S. Africa Command, General Carter Ham, announced that U.S. intelligence agencies had reason to believe that Boko Haram had contacts with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and ties to al-Shabaab in Somalia. These twin assaults confirmed what most Nigerians already knew: that the country confronted two homegrown insurgencies.[5]



FIGURE 9.1. Conflict events and fatalities: Boko Haram and MEND, 2005–2011. Illustration by Darin Jensen, data from Country Report: Nigeria, April 2013: p. 1 and p. 4, ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset), http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ACLED-Country-Report_Nigeria_April-2013.pdf.

Each of these insurgencies (figure 9.1) appears as both an echo of the recent past (see Watts 1997; Okonta 2005) and an expression of much deeper historical resonances. In one case in the Niger delta region in the southeast, a small so-called ethnic minority, the Ogoni people, and their political wing, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), challenged in the early 1990s what their charismatic leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa, called the slick alliance of oil and military rule. This story—of an oil-fields ethnic minority mobilized by the devastating ecological footprint of the oil industry and by its marginalization from the purported benefits of Nigeria's petro-wealth—ended with the infamous hanging, by military tribunal, of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders in November 1995 and with a scorched-earth militarization of the entire region at the hands of Sani Abacha's brutal military government. In the other case, the echo originated further back in time during a brief civilian interregnum in the early 1980s in the Muslim north of the country. An unorthodox populist Kano-based Islamic movement locally known as Maitatsine, led by a charismatic preacher called Alhaji Marwa and composed of a ragtag group of lumpen urban poor and *almajirai* (Qur'anic students), challenged the very notion of what constituted Muslim orthodoxy (see Lubeck 1985). Maitatsine

launched an assault not simply on a morally bankrupt secular state and its political class but on a corrupted ulama (Islamic clergy) including orthodox Muslim organizations such the Sufi brotherhoods deemed to have departed from the true path. It all ended catastrophically with aerial bombardment by the Nigerian armed forces, the killing of Marwa and almost five thousand of his recruits, and the imprisonment of large numbers of his followers (Lubeck 1985).

Almost two decades on, the political landscape appears to be the same, only worse. Fifteen years into the Fourth Republic—the military handed over power in 1999—the Nigerian state confronts two armed rebellions, one on the oilfields and the other in the Muslim heartlands of the north, each suggestive of a wholly different scale and order of social dissent. Both, if not products of the war on terror, have been shaped and framed by it. These two intersecting histories—one framed by the events of September 11 and their aftermath and the other by the deeper history of the contentious politics of the postcolonial Nigerian petro-state— constitute a great forcing house for the two insurgencies now confronting the Nigerian political class.

At the same time, each insurgency was bequeathed by earlier crises and by deeper histories of power and regional traditions of contestation. As Murray Last (2007, 2012) has brilliantly shown, the Muslim *umma* in northern Nigeria has never been without religious dissidence. Indeed, Islam provides both the language of discontent and the logic for political resistance as a moral necessity.[6] The paradigmatic case of dissent in northern Nigeria is the jihad of the Sheikh Uthman dan Fodio (April 1804–December 1808), which led to the establishment of the Sokoto caliphate, a confederation of emirates that stretched from Burkina Faso to Cameroon and from Sahel in the north to the tropical forest lands of the south. Yet this most successful of all of northern Nigeria's religious protest movements in turn produced its own oppositional movements during the nineteenth century against the Sokoto caliphate, which itself subsequently resisted British colonial rule. The use of force to repress or eradicate Islamic protest rarely succeeded and typically dispersed dissidents who sought to reconstitute themselves and seek revenge. The Niger delta too has a long history of contention not associated with Islamic state formation and jihad but in opposition to the global forces of empire and crashing waves of mercantile accumulation—the slave trade, palm oil commerce, and the shift from informal empire to colonial rule—each integral to the making of the Black Atlantic and the British Empire. Historical figures such as King Jaja, Nana Olomu—both of whom resisted colonial incursions in the late nineteenth century—and in the postindependence era Isaac Boro, who led the famous twelve-day rebellion of Ijaw insurgents intent on establishing a Niger delta republic in 1966, continue to have great saliency in the ongoing struggles for self-determination across the

region (see Nwajiaku 2012). These differing repertoires of protest—each associated with quite different forms of ethnic, religious, and political identities—were invoked and put to work around quite different world systemic forces (global jihad, a global oil and gas industry, the war on terror, and neoliberal capitalism and its reform agendas) in the postcolonial era.

Regional Insurgency, National Leviathan

> When a regime survives a crisis but fails to eliminate . . . the underlying factors that precipitated it, that regime should be considered less stable than one in which similar crises are fully resolved. . . . All authoritarian regimes have states, but they do not all have state power.
>
> —DANIEL SLATER AND SOFIA FENNER, "State Power and Staying Power"

In late 2005, MEND exploded out of the creeks of the western Niger delta, promising to close down the oil industry. Within a matter of days, close to one-third of national output was shut in; global oil markets were roiled. The situation rapidly deteriorated as MEND launched ever more audacious and well-organized attacks on oil infrastructure and government security forces. According to a report released in late 2008—prepared by a forty-three-person government commission and titled The Report of the Technical Committee of the Niger Delta—in the first nine months of 2008 the Nigerian government lost a staggering $23.7 billion in oil revenues due to militant attacks and sabotage. By May 2009, oil production had fallen by over a million barrels per day from the average national output five years earlier. On May 13, 2009, federal troops launched a full-scale counterinsurgency against what the government saw as violent organized criminals who had crippled the oil and gas industry. The militants in return responded with ferocious reprisal attacks, gutting Chevron's Okan manifold, which controls 80 percent of the company's shipments of oil. Over a two-month period, from mid-May to mid-July, twelve attacks were launched against Nigeria's $120 billion oil infrastructure; 124 of Nigeria's 300 operating oil fields were shut by mid-July 2009. Then, late in the night of July 12, 2009, fifteen MEND gunboats launched a devastating assault on Atlas Cove, a major oil facility in Lagos, the economic heart of the country, three hundred miles from the Niger delta oilfields. MEND is typically seen as an Ijaw struggle (Nwajiaku 2012) but operates as something of a franchise among fragmented and heterogeneous militant groups of quite varied ethnic composition, and as a consequence the attacks attributable to MEND remain a source of debate.[7] What can be said is this: at least three hundred individuals were abducted between 2006 and 2009, there were over three hundred armed assaults between 2007 and 2010, and according to the Nigerian National Petroleum Company over

thirteen thousand pipeline vandalizations occurred between 2006 and 2011. Since 2006 conflict deaths, by some estimates, run to fifteen hundred per year; perhaps as many as one hundred thousand people have been internally displaced.[8] Since amnesty in 2009 and the onset of the demobilization program, armed conflict has declined markedly in large part due to the infusion of vast quantities of money.[9] Since 2012 there has been a resumption of attacks and the threat of militants returning to the creeks.

In the semiarid, drought-prone Muslim north, rising inequality and poor governance, conditions generative also in the earlier Maitatsine uprising, have nurtured an Islamist insurrectionary movement, labeled Boko Haram, which is the Hausa-language nickname for the group officially known in Arabic as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (the People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad). The Hausa nickname Boko Haram translates loosely as "Western education is forbidden" and is derived from one of the chief tenets of the teachings of Muhammad Yusuf, the group's early leader who was killed by the military under suspicious circumstances in 2009. While the composition of the group certainly encompasses Hausa and Fulani across the north, it emerged initially among Kanuri speakers in the northeast, an ethnic group linked to the old Bornu empire and the contemporary violent economies of the Chad basin (Roitman 2004) subsuming parts of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Assassinations carried out by motorcycle riders target representatives of the state whom they believe have cheated or failed them: politicians, officials, rival religious scholars, and especially representatives of the dreaded police and security forces who routinely engaged in extrajudicial killings according to international human rights groups. Paul Lubeck's (2010) brilliant analysis shows how Boko Haram's carefully executed jail breaks and calls for the full implementation of shari'a law throughout Nigeria arise from a profound regional crisis: the demographic time bomb ticking within the region, a horrifying social and economic recession (the northeast region in particular has the highest rates of illiteracy and poverty in the nation), and the implosion of the industrial sector including the all-important textile sector, once the region's largest industrial employer. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), since July 2009 Boko Haram has killed over fifteen hundred people in 164 attacks (HRW 2012) over a three-year period (including the deaths due to the military, the figure exceeds four thousand). On Friday, January 20, 2012, following afternoon prayers, at least twenty coordinated bomb attacks on policy and security installations were launched in Kano city; close to two hundred persons were reported dead, and the city—the commercial and political epicenter of the north—was placed under curfew. Northern Nigeria, in short, had descended into a full-fledged state of emergency.

FIGURE 9.2. Nigeria: State-level income per capita disparities, 2013. Map by Darin Jensen.

What accounts for these particular historical and regional transects (figure 9.2) and their deeply contentious and violent nature? In one sense they represent both a historical reversal and a sort of paradox: a previously marginal and political disenfranchised Niger delta is inserted into the center of Nigerian politics at the same time that economic and social conditions in the north—historically the seat of postcolonial political power—have declined precipitously. Both MEND and Boko Haram blossomed when the military withdrew from political life as a purportedly democratic Nigeria took shape. Armed struggle in the Niger delta, moreover, arises when the region is *less* economically and politically marginal than it has ever been, awash in oil monies as a result of the enhanced revenues allocated to the region by the federal center after 1999 and by elevated global oil prices. Equally contradictory, a Muslim insurgency flowers in the wake of the adoption of shari'a law across the north, at a moment when Islam's presence in the social and political life of the Hausa-Fulani communities is arguably greater than ever. Of course, the global context has changed too from the 1980s and 1990s: the profusion of armed actors in Nigeria has, as its political oxygen, the events of September 11, the war on terror, and the hegemony of what I have called military neoliberalism (RETORT 2005).

Insurgencies of this sort obviously are political phenomena; they are armed movements by nonstate actors, often described as guerilla movements. The insurgents have sought to contest state power and frequently establish their own territories and forms of rule (Clapham 1997, 1). Insurgent combat has its own formal properties: small, mobile irregular forces; campaigns of targeted assassination, sabotage, kidnapping, and strategic mobility; cross-class social composition of youth combatants; operations within, and among, the territory and agents of the ruling state power; and not least their reliance, whatever their ideological orientation, in differing degrees on local populations, more or less coercively, for material support (Weinstein 2007, 29). Formal similarities in the compositional, strategic, and spatial attributes of rebel actions should not obfuscate the fact that insurgencies can and do differ radically in their political and ideological orientation. Christopher Clapham's typology (1997), for example, classifies African insurgent movements ideologically and historically: liberationist (anticolonial), separatist (secessionist or autonomist in orientation), reformist (radical reform of the state), and warlord (directed toward leadership change within the status quo).[10]

Neither Boko Haram nor MEND fits comfortably within this typological grid, however. Each has attributes of separatist, reformist, and warlord insurgencies. Each is also rooted in region-specific cultural traditions of warfare. In the north, the existence of the precolonial Sokoto caliphate and a deep history of state construction, jihad, religious conversion, and empire building—what Mike McGovern calls "principle" (2012, 54)—provided the ordering logics of warfare. In the south, martial societies operating through localized, unstable, and smaller-scale, decentralized polities offered the prospect of upward mobility though "pillage," as McGovern calls it, built around age and social-class tensions within gerontocratic systems. But the irreducible fact of the insurgencies is their political constitution and hence the determinant force of the political order out of which they were born, and within which they were locally forged and shaped (see Pred 1985). It was, of course, precisely this sort of cultural and situated thinking that David Kilcullen (2011) deployed in his now famous treatise on counterinsurgency and which came to radically shape General Petraeus's thinking about global counterinsurgency (COIN) in Iraq and Afghanistan.[11]

This tale of two insurgencies arises from the intersection of profoundly place-specific (in this case regional) crises of authority and structures of power, on the one hand, and the politics of dispossession and the refiguring of space and identities—complex forms of fragmentation and parcelization of sovereignty—on the other. These two force fields are rooted in, and arise from, what Dan Slater (2011) calls the ordering of power in authoritarian Leviathans and

the creation of political pacts or settlements arising from deep crises of contentious politics. Slater's key claim is that the sorts of coalitions and elite collective action congruent with durable authoritarian regimes will only arise if contentious class politics, prior to the consolidation of the authoritarian Leviathan as such, are seen by powerful economic and political classes as endemic and unmanageable—that is to say, their class property, privileges, and positions are threatened by urban insurrection, radical redistributive demands, and communal tensions (2011, 55). Elites support state centralization as a reactive, and reactionary, bulwark against popular mobilization from below, and in turn this facilitates state building especially in the first instance through the state's coercive apparatuses, but more generally through building institutions and networks that provide the foundations for durability. Violence and state making are dialectically related, integral to the creation of what Slater calls "protection pacts"—class and elite coalitions (state officials, economic elites, middle classes, and communal elites) unified by "shared support for heightened state power and tightened authoritarian controls" (2011, 5). The Southeast Asian cases are, of course, framed by the Japanese invasion (and subsequent defeat), by the Cold War, and by powerful leftist (and often Communist-inspired) popular movements. Out of this conjuncture and forms of contentious politics emerged the ordering of power, patterns of extraction and organization capable of drawing together coercive, remunerative, and symbolic power into a phalanx of authoritarian political institutions constructed around class protection. State capacity, military cohesion, and party strength are held together—that is to say politically ordered—by forms of extraction (flows of resources particularly around direct taxation), institutions, and historical experiences and memories that convince powerful social forces that "they have more to fear from each other than the state" (Slater 2011, 117).

Oil in Nigeria is fundamental to undercutting the logic of a protection pact. Oil is not a simple "resource curse" (see Collier 2005) but rather provides a means for state centralization through a statutory monopoly over oil and gas resources and a vehicle to distribute rents to core constituencies in a highly contested, multiethnic federalist structure. Oil revenues (and not direct taxes) provide the basis of what Slater calls a "provisioning pact" (patronage through nontax revenues). Oil is inserted into an existing late colonial–early postcolonial political order that shapes, and is shaped by, the political economy of the oil complex (Watts 2011). A political order emerges that is shaped by the conditions antecedent to both the discovery of oil in 1958 and to the establishment of the authoritarian Leviathan itself in the 1970s.

Here oil plays a contradictory role. Its capture by the Nigerian state had a strong centralizing effect, but the political mechanisms by which the revenues

were to be distributed (by fair means or foul) in a federal system wracked by ethnically based claims had the effect of decentering and fragmenting the polity. On the one hand, oil funded a strong military and a raft of new federal institutions; on the other, it drove a vast multiplication of states and local governments (from four states in 1967 to thirty-six currently, and from roughly fifty local government councils to almost eight hundred now) and the creation of a vast state-salaried class, all of which emboldened subnational forms of identification. Oil was a national resource controlled by the state, deployed in the service of building an oil nation and a state territory, but at the same time oil as geography, as landed property, and as oil rent generated a raft of other more-local territorial identities (oil-bearing chiefdoms, oil minorities, and so on) as communities of various stripes struggled for their cut of the action. Oil, in short, provided a unique coloration to the provisioning pact, holding Nigeria together and yet pulling it apart. From these contradictory dynamics—both of which operated in a way that fragmented and enclosed space and propelled a logic of dispossession—the two insurgencies emerged.

The Politics of Dispossession

The 1970s oil boom converted Nigeria overnight into a petro-state, and in so doing oil revenues underwrote the provisioning system of authoritarian rule. Oil has seeped deeply and indelibly into the political economy of Nigeria, and into the national psyche and social imaginary (it is no accident the five-hundred-naira note has an oil rig emblazoned on it). In 2010 over 87 percent of government revenues, 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings, 96 percent of export revenues, and close to one-third of gross domestic product (GDP) are accounted for by just one commodity: oil. With oil prices close to one hundred dollars a barrel in 2014, oil rents—what economists call unearned income—will provide the Nigerian exchequer with at least eighty billion dollars or more annually.

Two logics underwrote the provisioning pact, each of which entailed a politics of dispossession and ressentiment (McGovern 2012).[12] The first was the capture of oil rents by the state though a series of laws and statutory monopolies (the 1969 Petroleum Law being the foundation stone). In effect the conversion of oil into a national resource conferred dual legacies: first, it became the basis of differential claims making. That is, citizens could, by virtue of its national character, plausibly claim their share of this national cake as a citizenship right. Second, state appropriation of oil flew in the face of robust traditions of customary rule and land rights. The principle of indigeneity and the authorization of so-called customary forms of rule (such as chieftainship and emirate

authority) in effect institutionalized a parallel system of governance associated with chieftaincy in the south and caliphal rule in the north. Community forms of authority were further prolonged, and indeed deepened, as indigeneity as a category was enshrined in the Nigerian constitution.[13] In a multiethnic polity, indigenes looked to customary institutions as a source of legitimacy and authority and nowhere more so than around questions of access to and control over land. Oil nationalization trampled on local property systems and land rights and complicated the already tense relations between first settlers (indigenes) and newcomers (that is to say, the historical complexities of waves of settlement and in-migration, all typically surrounded by considerable juridical and legal ambiguity).[14]

For the Nigeria delta and its sixty ethnolinguistic groups, the raft of oil laws inevitably was construed locally as expropriation and dispossession—the loss of "our oil." These claims were inevitably expressed in ethnic terms ("our land," "our oil") and marked the emergence of so-called oil minorities (a postcolonial invention) not only as a political category but as an entity with strong territorial claims. The fact that oil companies, as cosignatories to joint ventures with the state, were in turn compelled to pay rent—always vague and indeterminate—to oil-bearing communities (which typically meant undisclosed cash payments to chiefs, councils of elders, and ruling big houses) converted an already contested arena of land rights into a charnel house of violent struggles over "who owns the oil" and on what basis (lineage, clan, ethnicity, first settlers). The resentments of corrupt chiefs and elders, oil spills and lack of corporate accountability, the massive ecological footprint of the industry, ineffective local government, and community squabbles over territorial boundaries often adjudicated by remote and corrupt commissions all ran deep. In the north, where oil was not located, less ethnically heterogeneous Muslim populations stood in a more attenuated relation to oil expropriation. Here oil politics turned primarily on the basis for northern communities—states, local governments, Muslim *umma*—getting their share of the national cake. Resentments turned on the extent to which the delta was perceived to be capturing disproportionate shares of oil wealth, but also in terms of the consequences of oil monies on the operations of the state itself and of a Muslim community that had lost its moral compass. All of which points to the second logic of the provisioning pact.

The history of the political and institutional mechanisms by which revenues were allocated within a federal system—both vertically (from federal center to state and local government) and horizontally (the metrics by which the value of the allocations were to be determined)—contains much of what postindependence Nigeria has been about: how the provisioning pact works and what are its driving forces. Suffice to say that the sources of public revenue in Nigeria are

proceeds from the sale of crude oil, taxes, levies, fines, tolls, and penalties, and they accrue in general to the Federation Account. The Federation Account excludes so-called derivation payments by which a percentage (currently 13 percent) of revenues from resources flows directly to its state of origin (enhanced derivation necessarily benefits the oil-producing states). The balance of the total federally collected revenues is paid into the Federation Account, which is currently roughly 60 percent of the total, down from over 90 percent in 1970. Oil revenues are the main source of public revenue, accounting for about 80 percent to 85 percent of the total receipts. In the period 2001–11, oil revenues averaged 27 percent of GDP, while tax revenues averaged 6.4 percent. The proportion of revenues allocated to differing tiers of government is 52.68, 26.72, and 20.60 percent for federal, state, and local government respectively. Local governments and states rely overwhelmingly (over 70 percent for local governments, over 50 percent for the states) for their revenues on the Federation Account—that is to say, the dependence on centralized oil revenues has been at the expense of other forms of internal revenue generation. These figures confirm, of course, the centralizing effect of capturing oil rents, but the details, hammered out in a raft of deeply contentious revenue commissions over half a century, are the subject of intense contestation and continuing controversy.

The broad contours of the revenue allocation process—fiscal federalism so-called—are clear. First, the federal center captured a disproportionately large share of the revenues; the states and local governments have depended heavily on statutory allocations. Since the 1960s the principles of allocation in effect demolished the principle of derivation, reducing it from 50 percent to roughly 1 percent between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s. Fiscal centralization reflected a calculus by which monies for developmental purposes were redirected away from the centers of oil production to non-oil ethnic majority states. The federal center became a hunting ground for contracts and rents of various kinds. Second, derivation politics (and the loss or disappearance of revenues cascading within the federal allocation system) inevitably became an axis of contention between the delta and the federal center and laid the basis for what became in the 1990s the delta's clamor for "resource control." Since Obasanjo's return to power in 1999, the federal center has tried to balance the growing agitation, and growing militancy, over derivation from within the delta against the array of political forces rooted in the hegemony of powerful northern and southern political interests. Abuja drew a line in the sand in its refusal to meet the delta's demands of 25 percent derivation or more during the 2005 national conference and in the struggle over offshore oil resources (a supreme court decision affirmed federal control over oil resources in 2002). But the debates over a just derivation magnitude and the geography of the revenue-sharing process

continues unabated. Third, the lethal combination of failed development and violent democracy has unleashed a raft of new decentralizations or what one might call localizations: first, the decentralization of corruption (associated with, in the case of the delta, the vast increase in revenue flows related to the increase of derivation to 13 percent) particularly to the lower tiers of government; second, the democratization of the means of violence (or the extent to which the state monopoly on the violent means of destruction has been undercut by the widespread deployment of arms locally by militia and other militant groups) (Human Rights Watch 2007); and third, the rise (in part associated with changing revenue allocation) of enormous power and wealth at the level of the state governors and politicians ("godfathers" in local parlance) who become not only counterweights to the federal center but machine politicians in their own right (Human Rights Watch 2005).

These two regional experiences of the operations of Nigeria's violent democracy and turbulent fiscal federalism exhibit family resemblances but also sharp divergences in their kinship (in Pred's terms the dialectics of place making were at work). In the Niger delta, geographical proximity to the oil resource, an all-too-intimate connection with transnational oil companies, and not least the devastating ecological footprint of the oil complex, conjured up a politics of resentment over fiscal allocation principles but also a demand for community rights, the need for accountability among local governments, and how redress might be sought for the violations perpetrated by the security forces (United Nations Development Programme 2006). The failure of local government, the often arrogant operations of transnational capital, the failures of security forces, and the failures of customary rule (the chiefs pocketing so-called community rents) all came to populate one large universe of abjection draped in the overarching language of dispossession. Accumulation by dispossession as David Harvey (2003) calls it, generates a state-focused discourse directed to the illegitimate extra-economic coercion by the state, and to the complicity of oil companies that increasingly, in light of the absence of anything like functional local government, came to be construed by host communities across the delta as an arm of the state. Often cross-class in character (chiefs, elites, graduates, and unemployed youth all adopted the rhetoric of resource control), the militant expressions of dispossession politics assume a variety of idioms (identity, citizenship, personhood, religiosity, belonging) and are channeled into a variety of more or less organized forms of resistance (Lieven 2013). In many instances, the struggles over land, property, and territory in and around the oil concessions and the footprint of the vast oil and gas industry had the effect of fragmented space and producing what Henri Lefebvre (2005) calls multiple and overlapping spaces (chiefly and village territories, clan lands, local

government areas, bunkering territories, ethnic claims, and especially tensions over the history of land occupation). These resentments were often directed toward a violent assertion of autochthony, which is the often exclusionary attachments and belongings of individuals and groups to particular places and identities, sometimes directed at strangers or nonindigenes, sometimes against state predators (Geschiere 2009).

In the north, where the forces of neoliberal dispossession were concurrent with the adoption of shari'a law in the twelve northern states, resentments grew because of dwindling state resources, a precipitous decline in human security, and the crumbling of both the old emirate system and local government. Insurgent Islam, not surprisingly, was directed against the failures of secularism, Western development, and the fortunes of the *yan boko* (the Western educated). Dispossession was expressed through the loss of material and ideological legitimacy: the moral and political failings of the state, the loss and decay of customary values and forms of authority, a sort of ideological expropriation by organized Islam, and not least the decay of the state apparatuses and the perceived diminution of Muslim power within the federation (northern powers were seemingly usurped both in the wake of the death of President Yar'Adua and by the success of Niger delta militancy in capturing a larger slice of the oil cake). The economic collapse of the north, coupled with the rerouting of petrodollars, produced a collapse of all the human security indices. As Lubeck (2010) has shown, across the shari'a states' human development profile, malnutrition is almost twice the national average in the shari'a states; the human poverty index is 45.88 compared to 27.8 in the non-shari'a states; female literacy in the north is 17 percent compared to 69 percent in the south; the percentage of married women using contraception is 3.4 percent in the shari'a states compared to 14 percent nationally; and not least total fertility rates in the north are over seven per woman making for a massive youth bulge (the comparable figure in the Niger delta is 4.7). Overall the picture is one of vertiginous economic descent and declining per capita income coupled with radically diminished health and education standards. It all added up to a profound crisis of legitimacy for the institutions of secular national development and for northern political classes confronting growing hostility among millions of *talakawa* (commoners). As in the delta there was a spatial and territorial dimension too: mosque complexes and utopian communities created in the impoverished and ramshackle northeastern cities; Boko Haram's regional linkages to wider geographies of the Sahel, the Chad Basin, and the old Bornu empire; and of course the spatialized networks within which the Qu'ranic students circulated.

This parceling of sovereignty in both north and south points to how the operations of the oil economy produced not one but multiple and simultane-

ous crises of authority within both modern *and* customary structures of power. Nicholas Argenti (2007), discussing Cameroon, talks of the "double marginalization" of youth as traditional and national authorities failed. Nigeria offers up a radical version of this marginalization in which multiple crises of authority among customary, religious, and formal state institutions coexisted. These crises of legitimacy encompassed both public and civic institutions. First, the federal state had failed to deliver development and was synonymous with graft and limited capabilities ("carry go" as the local vernacular has it), but this was no less the case with the institutions with which most Nigerians had some modicum of direct contact (namely, local governments, elections, and the judiciary, all of which were limited at best and bankrupt at worst, and public services such as schooling, water provision, and power). Second, the institutions of customary rule—whether the relics of the old emirate system in the north or the chieftaincy systems in the south—were no longer authoritative and effective systems of authority either; most youth felt excluded from these gerontocratic orders. Niger delta chiefs were not unusually violently ejected from office by rebellious youth angry at their pocketing of monies paid to them by oil companies for purported community development. Gerontocratic institutions have in effect been aggressively contested and in some cases subverted over the last two to three decades. Third, the security forces—especially the police and the army—whose purpose was to provide protection and impose law and order, have become objects of utter contempt and illegitimacy, not only for their corruption (the endless roadblocks and taxes levied on vulnerable travelers, for example), but also because of the extent to which so much of the urban and rural violence in both regions was triggered by excessive police actions. The postcolonial history of violence in the north and the south is littered with the wreckage of state repression, extrajudicial killings, and undisciplined security forces. And finally, even religious authority and institutions—most obviously in the north concerning the so-called true Islam—have been subject to debate and questions as the boundaries between religious practice and state power have been eroded.

The illegitimacy, indeed the ethical and moral bankruptcy, of these multiple and overlapping networks of customary, religious, and modern governance produced a vast space of alienation and exclusion, a lifeworld in which the armies of impoverished youth—the so-called youth crisis—were neither citizens nor subjects, a social landscape in which the politics of resentment could fester (Richards 2011; Gore and Pratten 2003; Argenti 2007).[15] Contempt is the ruling ideology. Floating populations—the lumpen proletariat, Qu'ranic students, and land-poor peasants in the north, the unemployed youth in the delta detached from the old gerontocratic order, each unable to fulfill the norms of

personal advancement through marriage, patronage, and work—occupied a social moratorium (Vigh 2006; Peters 2012). Youth occupied a social space of massively constricted possibility, a world in which economic recession and the dreadful logic of provisioning and self-interest reduced millions to the level of unfulfilled citizenship (a precariat), what Murray Last (2007) has properly called material, social, and political insecurity.

But these conditions, one might argue, are endemic across the continent—the recognition of a continental youth crisis is a case in point—and insurgencies remain an exception rather than the rule. Organized militancy and the rise of nonstate armed groups did not appear fully formed from within the rich loam of despotism, exclusion, and truncated aspirations; insurgency is a social achievement as McGovern (2012, 205) calls it, and this is where the organization of the war machine (Hoffman 2011)—the making of forms of solidarity, modes of organization, ideological formation, and the like—comes into play. Here, to return to a motif in Pred's work, namely biography, individual biographies are shaped by and expressive of the infinity of place-specific mediated complex relations, which come to constitute collectively the fibers of a life. Salfist leaders like Muhammad Yusuf and the militant commanders like Henry Okah or Tompolo, both of whom emerged from the ruins of oil-based development in Nigeria, can disclose much about the wider force field and historical sedimentations and practices that so concerned Pred in his own scholarship.

States of Emergency: Boko Haram and MEND Compared

> Violence is the occasion to invent.
> —DANIEL HOFFMAN, *The War Machines*

Boko Haram and MEND—and the states of emergency they helped create—are not the product of single causes, any more than their goals and missions are singular and uniform. If each is in some way expressive of a structural crisis of youth deeply embedded in what I earlier called the multiple crises of legitimacy and authority, then one might claim plausibly that there is a powerful thread linking youth militancy to a political order that, as Hoffman says, "denies them recognized forms of authority" (2011, 67). But this crisis has many forms and many discourses: a crisis of identity, of rights, of social exclusion, of masculinity, of the spirit, of employment, and so on. The significance of this is threefold. First, the two insurgencies must be located on a wider social field of conflict. In the delta, MEND is one of a raft of conflicts on the oilfields in both rural and urban settings engendered by disputes of oil property; struggles over corrupt chieftainship; violence among and between youth groups and security forces

over access to oil company contracts and rents; interethnic battles over electoral wards, local government boundaries, and territorial authority (including oil-bearing lands); violent exchanges over bunkering territories by competing militias; vigilante groups offering protection services; and the deployment of young men by politicians for electoral thuggery. In the same way, Boko Haram must be located on a larger Islamist canvas of Muslim vigilante groups (*hisbah*), conflicts between Christian and Muslim communities, the incessant violent episodes with state security forces, conflicts between Muslim organizations over legitimate religious practice, and so on. There is often a traffic in youth across and between these sites of conflict, which speaks to a second question. MEND, for example, is not simply an expression of Ijaw militancy any more than Boko Haram is of Muslim "fundamentalism." I do not mean to imply that these insurgencies are panethnic—there is a sense in which this has an element of truth—but rather that in the same way that youth may move between differing sorts of conflicts (their polymorphousness to return to Mbembe) so too are the boundaries between the core concerns of youth—citizenship, masculinity, religious identity, authority—quite porous. As Hoffman points out, the overlap between nationalist sentiment, economic exclusion, religious ideology, and gender in Sierra Leone are such that existentially "these forces are interchangeable . . . the dividing line between them effectively erased" (2011, 13). If these spheres are not readily separable in practice, it is because the life of youth is deeply multivalent, embedded in multiple and contradictory forces shaping contemporary global capitalism and the postcolonial condition.

And finally each insurgency has a unique historical trajectory; it is historically sedimented as Pred would have said. One links youth and Islam dating back to the nineteenth-century jihad of Usthman Dan Fodio; to the turn-of-the-century establishment of colonial native administrations, which opened up opportunities for *yan boko* (Western-educated youth); and to the formation of the first political parties in the 1950s (Last 2005). More recently the rise of a transnational Islamism and global jihad and armed groups such as al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Shabaab in sub-Saharan Africa has provided a new historical frame and a source of inspiration for groups like Boko Haram. In the delta, the earlier struggles of the Ogoni people, the heroics of Ijaw rebel Isaac Boro in the 1960s, the earlier proto-nationalism of the ethnic minorities in the 1920s and 1930s, and earlier still the anticolonial struggles of King Jaja and Governor Nana in the 1890s are all fully part of the ideological frame of MEND's militants. In the north Islam, empire, and conversion worked together in a martial tradition; in the delta decentralized polities were associated with lineage-based commercial competition (the so-called big houses) and the war houses and war canoes by which individual mobility and intergroup superior-

ity could be maintained within gerontocratic systems. The war on terror plays a role here, too, but not through global terror networks—the delta struggle certainly has recruited diasporic global support, but there is no evidence of links to international terrorist groups. Here the war on terror is wrapped up with the global geostrategic significance of oil and Nigeria's role in supplying high quality fuels for the European and U.S. markets. The omnipresent threats to oil supply—eliciting pressures from both the government and the oil companies—became a critical ingredient in the drive to throw a security blanket over the region, exacerbating the open sore of suspicion and violence between communities and the joint military task forces operating across the delta. What, then, were the driving forces and wider force fields that shaped the twin insurgencies?

BOKO HARAM AND THE POLITICS OF TAKFIR

Boko Haram was born in the aftermath of 9/11 and inevitably has been shaped by discursive shifts with the global Muslim world and the concept of global jihad.[16] The group's origins seem to be traceable to an Islamist study group in the mid-1990s. When its founder, Abubakar Lawan, left to pursue further studies at the University of Medina, a committee of sheikhs appointed Muhammad Yusuf as the new leader. In 2003, Yusuf ousted the sheikhs—charging them with corruption and failure to preach "pure Islam" and founded a movement known as the Yobe Taliban rooted in a largely rural, impoverished Kanuri region of Yobe State, approximately seventy kilometers from the state capital Danmaturu. Modeled on al-Qaeda and the Taliban and self-consciously imitating their dress and affect, followers believed that the adoption of shari'a in the twelve northern states since 2000 was partial and incomplete. After conflicts between members of the movement and local villagers escalated, the Yobe State Council compelled the sect to move, and it decamped to a remote location near the border with Niger; the new base was named "Afghanistan," and the group adopted the moniker "Taliban" of Yobe. Between 2002 and 2009, Boko Haram, as the group was popularly referred to, clashed with local villagers and police and dispersed to various locations across the northeast, making Maiduguri a new hub. More critically, Boko Haram was drawn into state politics and was in fact deployed to disrupt elections in 2003. Some Boko Haram leaders maintained close and high-level political connections, which, however, fell apart after 2007 when their expectations were not met by the local political class. The thirty-two-year-old Yusuf established a religious complex with a mosque and an Islamic boarding school in Maiduguri, along with a prayer group that he called "people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and jihad," but he ran afoul of local authorities as relations between Boko Haram and the Bornu State political elites fell apart.

On June 11, 2009, an encounter with the police turned violent—the conflict was triggered by the seemingly trivial issue of a local helmet law that Boko Haram flouted during a funeral procession to bury some of its members who had died in a car accident. Perceived by the police as an open defiance of authority, the incident led to a conflagration in which seventeen persons were hospitalized. Anger at what were perceived to be heavy-handed police tactics subsequently sparked an armed uprising in the northern state of Bauchi and spread quickly into the states of Borno, Yobe, and Kano. The violence began on July 26, when Boko Haram members attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi police station in Bauchi. Over the next four days, in Maiduguri, Lamisulu, and Gamboru, members attacked the state police headquarters, a primary school, a maximum-security prison, the national Directorate of Employment, the Makera police station, the Police Mobile College barracks, and several churches; the violence left fifty civilians, twenty-two suspected militants, two police officers, and one prison officer dead. On the same day, the group attacked several targets in nearby Yobe, and further afield in Kano, members attacked the Wudil police station. All of this suggested a far larger network of insurgent recruits and leaders. On July 30, 2009, in a violent confrontation in Maiduguri, security forces captured and killed Boko Haram's leader, in what human rights groups have deemed an extrajudicial killing. Yusuf's execution was videotaped by soldiers and later broadcast on television. In total, nearly eight hundred people were killed in the uprising.

The death of Yusuf at the hands of security forces marked a turning point for Boko Haram. Driven underground—many of its leaders reportedly fled to other parts of Nigeria, as well as neighboring countries and the greater Chad basin—the group adopted a new and more radical leadership in Imam Abubakar Shekau, considered a spiritual leader and operational commander; in Kabiru Sokoto, the alleged mastermind of the Christmas 2011 attacks; and in Sheikh Abu Muhammad. For many members of the sect, the unjust circumstances surrounding the death of Yusuf served to amplify preexisting animosities toward a secular state seen to have abandoned Islam and the protection of Muslims. By 2010, Boko Haram reemerged determined to seek vengeance against the Nigerian state, and Boko Haram militants carried out violent operations against government targets in the north including an astounding assault on a Maiduguri prison and a bombing in the city of Jos that killed more than eighty people. In June 2011, Boko Haram militants bombed the police headquarters in Abuja and, finally, carried out the suicide attack against the Abuja UN headquarters two months later.

To grasp Boko Haram's dynamics—particularly its goal to restore "true Islam" and to wage war against unbelievers—requires an understanding not simply of the spiritual and economic insecurity of its recruits but of the frag-

mentation of and contestation within segments of organized Sunni Islam in the north associated with various revitalization movements seeking reform (*tajdid*).[17] Lubeck (2010) has laid this out brilliantly in his account of how the authoritarian Leviathan and its developmental failures were read through the cultural lens of *tajdid* in order to fully implement shari'a as a means for Muslim self-realization. The dominant Sufi brotherhoods associated with the ruling emirate classes came into conflict with a conservative modernizing movement emerging in the 1960s led by Abubakar Gumi (himself supported by radical Muslim populists critical of the ascriptive and reactionary system of the Sufi Brotherhood and old emirate social structure). Gumi's formation was linked to his exposure to Saudi patronage and to Salafist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood; he adopted the doctrines of Sayyid Qutb and the willingness to condemn Muslims as *takfir* (unbelievers) for adopting un-Islamic practices (*bidah*). In founding a mass-based organization in 1978—Yan Izala—to provide a modern interpretation of shari'a, he represented not just a reformist movement within northern Islam but an all-out assault on Sufism. The movement drew sustenance during the economic recession of the 1980s because the call for shari'a law invoked a sense of economic and political justice for the poor and a type of open egalitarianism, as Lubeck says, that appealed to youth. But at this point the reformist movement fractured and fragmented largely along the lines of military tactics and what was required in terms of force to restore "true Islam." Splits within Yan Izala, and the rise of new Shi'ite groups drawing inspiration from the Iranian revolution, coupled with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the encompassing war on terror, provided the ground on which a charismatic leader could emerge recruiting impoverished youth and Qu'ranic students locally and within a transnational space—the Chad Basin—wracked by poverty, conflict, and violent accumulation, but also capable of gaining adherents in high political places within state bureaucracies.

Boko Haram's critique of the state and its apparatuses—during the 2011 elections it assassinated clerics and politicians and destroyed schools and police stations—was inseparable from the violence of the army and the police, confirming for the insurgents the utter decay of the state. There is evidence to suggest that well-placed politicians supported the group, that the recruits went underground across the border into neighboring states to avoid state repression, and that Boko Haram has acquired ideological and material support from Islamic terrorist organizations in Algeria, Somalia, and elsewhere.[18] At the same time, the organization appears to have fractured, reflecting sectarian differences over killing civilians and military strategy but also the difficulty of maintaining organization and coherence among a heterogeneous pan-ethnic and transnational body of recruits.[19] Whether Boko Haram represents a mani-

festation of a global jihadi movement at this point is hard to say; many of its grievances concern local issues such as police brutality and the reconstruction of mosques and the release of prisoners. But there is no question that the ideology of religious renewal provided a powerful social adhesive from which charismatic leaders like Yusuf could build a utopian community. In the context of the new phase of the war on terror being conducted across the African Sahel—the recent progress by Islamists in northern Mali and the retributive attacks on the Armenas gas plant in southern Algeria (*Financial Times* 2013)—Boko Haram's reach must now be understood in continental and global terms.

MEND AND THE POLITICS OF THE CREEKS

MEND emerged in the western delta in the creeks south of Warri, a major petrocity of the region.[20] The political agenda of MEND was not clear in the weeks of late December 2005 except that it self-identified as a "guerilla movement" whose "decisions, like its fighters, are fluid." In fact, in a press release by e-mail, PR man Jomo Gbomo claimed that MEND was apolitical and its fighters "were not communists . . . or revolutionaries. [They] are just very bitter men" (Bergen Risk Solutions 2007). But in spite of a welter of e-mail denials—calling an Oporoza-based Ijaw militant group the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC) a tribal assembly, claiming to have co-opted other militant groups in the eastern delta, rejecting any connection with oil bunkering (theft), and claiming that it was not an Ijaw militia group—there was in fact a clear political platform. In a signed statement by field commander Tamuno Godswill in early February, MEND's demands were clearly outlined: the release of three key Ijaw prisoners, the immediate and unconditional demilitarization of the Niger delta, and the immediate payment of $1.5 billion compensation from Shell approved by the Nigerian National Assembly covering four decades of environmental degradation. In an interview with Karl Maier on February 21, 2006, Jomo made it clear that MEND had "no intention of breaking up Nigeria" but also had no intention of dealing directly with a government that "knows nothing about rights or justice." Resource control meant that the states would "directly manage" oil. Other communiqués reiterated that these demands were not pecuniary, asserting, "We shall receive no money from any quarters" (Vanguard, February 4, 2006).

The emergence of MEND in 2005 represents a moment in a longer arc of political mobilization that reached a watershed moment with the 1998 Kaiama declaration, which founded the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC)—an Ijaw youth group that grew out of their frustrations with more conservative Ijaw elders and their organizations (most especially the Ijaw National Congress) and the

growing state militarization of the region since 1990. The declaration carried more than a faint echo of Boro's Twelve-Day Revolution, launched in 1965, in which he reminded his followers, "Remember too your petroleum which is being pumped out daily from your veins and then fight for your freedom" (Boro 1982, 117). Kaiama marked a massive cross-delta (and cross-ethnic) mobilization through mobile parliaments and youth organizing and an explicit strategy to diversify tactics associated with the struggle. The question of militancy was always an object of debate within IYC—and indeed it preceded IYC since the so-called first Egbesu war, in which Bayelsa State youth took on security forces, occurred in the late Abacha years. A second Egbesu war emerged in 1999 from the deliberate attempts of the state to suppress the political project expressed at Kaiama. Militants in turn, as they had in the first war, occupied flow stations and provided protection for oil companies, the proceeds of which were invested in arms. But IYC also helped spawn its own offspring—the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) of which Asari Dokubo was one, and arguably the most important—and drew into its ranks all manner of disaffected youth groups in such places at Okrika, Eleme, and Nembe in a shifting set of alliances in which the borders between criminality, Mafia-like vigilante groups, and politically organized insurgents was difficult to discern. These militants were not in any obvious sense—as some have argued for Sierra Leone—a predominantly urban lumpen class raised on a diet of drugs, rap, and alienation, without intellectuals and without ideology. As survey data show (Watts 2011), many were youth of rural and small-town backgrounds who were the casualties of exclusions from the chieftainship and lineage systems of the Ijaw as much as local government and the labor market; many of them had been hounded and bombed by the military task forces for their trouble.

MEND's genesis reflected a complex regional geography. The emergence of the group shifted the struggle dramatically to the western delta—the so-called Warri axis. Here a similar set of grievances and struggles were playing out wrapped up with the complex ethnic politics of Warri city, the failures of the companies to provide meaningful benefits to host communities, and the militancy of women most famously against Chevron in Ugborodo in 2003. As Ukoha Ukiwo (2007) has shown, Ijaw marginalization stemmed from a long history of struggle over trade during the nineteenth century in which Itsekeri peoples emerged as a comprador class to the European trading houses (thereby cutting off the Ijaw). The western Ijaw built a reputation as being "truculent" and "pirates" and actively resisted colonial rule until the 1920s, when they were located into a new western Ijaw division cut out of the Warri division. By the 1940s the Gbaramantu clan—which is central to MEND's political dynamics and one of

sixty clans in the Ijaw diaspora across the delta—was involved directly in claims over land (with the Itsekeri), and by the 1970s, in the wake of the establishment of oil operations by Chevron and Shell in the mid-1960s, violent conflicts had occurred over the oil-bearing lands near Ugborodo. It was from this axis that MEND dramatically emerged in late 2005. MEND had grown from an earlier history of militant youth groups—the Egbesu Boys of Africa, the Meinbutu Boys, Feibagha Ogbo, Dolphin Obo, Torudigha Ogbo—in the Warri region dating back to the early 1990s and before (Courson 2009). These Ijaw fighters were war hardened during the interethnic violence of the Warri crisis in the late 1990s, but in contrast to the east, Ijaw militants were not co-opted by a state government. Conversely, in the eastern region around Port Harcourt, militant groups were co-opted by powerful regional politicians and often deployed for electoral violence. Here the militants were funded, armed, and shaped by political godfathers anxious to both dampen the youthful energy of the IYC and to redirect it to political ends during the election cycle. When these groups began to fall out with the political class and fought among themselves often over payment—this was the core of the violent battles between Dokubo and Ateke Tom's Niger Delta Vigilante in 2003–4—insurgent sentiments were channeled into criminal enterprises like oil theft. As a consequence, the horizons of militant groups taking resource control were in practice often local and pecuniary. Groups became fragmented and splintered—new commanders and militias sprouted—without any identifiable transdelta leadership or political direction, and with none of the coherence and military might of MEND in the west.

The challenge for MEND and the western Ijaw was whether it could provide a delta-wide centralized leadership—among a welter of militant groups fractured by clan, lineage, and ethnicity—constructed around an ideology of resource control. In the eastern delta, many of the militant groups were co-opted by state governments and armed as political thugs during the 2003 elections, a process that backfired as differing factions fought the government and other groups over questions of compensation and oil bunkering (theft) territories. Solidarity and leadership were provided by charismatic leaders like Chief Government Ekpemupolo, alias Tompolo, but equally important was the role of indigenous religious practices, not the dominant Pentecostalism but the local spirit world and the Egbesu cult. Egbesu (in a manner strikingly similar to the complex meanings of the word "jihad" for northern Muslims) invoked an indigenous sense of warriorhood but also of truth and moral purity in a disordered world (Golden 2012). Since the 1980s, Egbesu (the powerful Ijaw god of war and justice) and its cosmological order were revived in the political mobilization of the Ijaw. In the period leading up to the counterinsurgency launched in May 2009, meetings among commanders across the delta under Tompolo's direction sug-

gested something like a unified, if volatile, command. But as with Boko Haram, the sectarian tendencies—in this case the splintering off of so-called commanders like Farah and John Togo and Boyloaf, many of whom had no discernible political project—represented an enormous challenge for Tompolo or anyone to exercise authority over the welter of fragmented groups, many of which claimed to act under the sign of MEND or use it as a sort of political franchise.

In part fragmentation reflected different local responses to the serial failures of the state—military transgressions by the military task forces, failures to negotiate meaningfully—but also to the complex internal divisions within an Ijaw community crosscut by lineages, clans, chieftaincy, and ethnic and territorial disputes. The lure of oil played a decisive role here as a constellation of groups struggled for access to oil rents. Contentious oil politics were further compounded by the role of the oil companies, which dispensed vast cash payments to chiefs, youth groups, and vigilantes in an attempt to secure the flow of oil, a practice that often backfired as militants and youth fought among themselves and with the gerontocratic order (WAC 2003; Watts 2005, 2011). The logic of struggles over oil in its various forms—as landed property, revenues, cash payments, compensation, rents—had the effect not just of splintering territory and identities but also of dispersing political energies.

States of Terror, Spaces of Violence

> Each . . . space was a crucible in which the new crystallized out of the ongoing.
>
> —ALLAN PRED, *Recognizing European Modernities*

The outcome of Nigeria's engagement with oil wealth is a state of neither war nor peace, but of a system in which conflict—in effect violent economies—are self-reproducing and durable, but typically by necessity "states of emergency that act as cover for various forms of profiteering" (McGovern 2012, 197). Of course, these states of emergency are not simply discursive or constructed by states and venal political classes. The have real-world referents and signal stark patterns of class exclusion and alienation. Both MEND and Boko Haram seem to echo Frantz Fanon's prescient remarks on the lumpen classes, "the most spontaneous and radically revolutionary forces," and their oppositional stance toward a national bourgeoisie that he believed had come to resemble a "tribal dictatorship" (1967, 147). There is surely something of "the damned," as he calls these classes. In my Nigerian story it is the radical precarity among Nigerian youth, what Mike Davis (2004, 28) calls the actively unemployed, "largely

dispossessed of fungible labor power" and "with little access to the culture of collective labor," that seem to drive these Fanonian revolutionary forces. As Michael Denning (2010, 81) says, the "wageless life, not wage labor," is the starting point of the free market. This is as true of the precarious industrial classes who are the products of the urban and rural "slum worlds" in Spain, Greece, and the UK as it is in Nigeria (Richards 1996; Davis 2004). The politics of these classes—constituted in similar and different ways in the Niger delta and the northern states—share a common interest in recognition: they want inclusion, dignity, equality, justice. They diverge, of course, in their inclusivity and their politics, to return to Nancy Fraser, of redistribution and representation.

With this understanding in mind, and to return to my earlier reference to the work of Holston (2009) on inequality and exclusion in contemporary urban Brazil, Brazil adopted, in Holston's account, inegalitarian citizenship with inclusive membership, which he examines principally through the politics of law and land. He shows how the majority of Brazilians have been historically excluded from legal use of land, forcing most them to live illegally and making illegality the predominant condition of settlement. Holston claims that Brazil's inclusively inegalitarian citizenship is being challenged by "insurgencies" that he explores through long-term research on land struggle in the São Paulo peripheries, in the communities of Jardim das Camélias and Lar Nacional. Over three decades, residents of the urban peripheries converted their conflicted struggle over home construction and property into claims about legal rights as citizens rather than into privileges within a neo-patrimonial system of dependency. In many respects the socially exclusive political settlement as it has developed during civilian rule in Nigeria resembles much of what Holston describes. Both MEND and Boko Haram, however, pursue what Holston calls insurgent citizenship quite literally through insurgency, that is, through forms of nonstate armed struggle. In a way that Holston does not explore—but is not inconsistent with the Brazilian case—I have emphasized the forms of fragmentation and parcelization of space and national identity associated with an oil-lubricated federalism and the splintering of power that it represents. Of course what constitutes citizenship for MEND looks very different for Boko Haram. Precarious politics typically turns on recognition and the demand for membership in a political community. For MEND this translates into constitutional demands for reforming access to oil. For Boko Haram the political community is grounded and overdetermined by the Muslim *umma* interpreted in a literalist fashion, and here citizenship—if one names it in this way—seems constricted and exclusionary. In recent months Boko Haram's horrific violence has reached a point where claims over corruption, state decay, and political illegitimacy

have produced terrifying violent and human rights violations. At this point (in 2015) citizenship is surely not commensurate with Boko Haram's tactics and worldview.

Nevertheless, the twin insurgencies in Nigeria exhibit remarkable structural similarities, not least in the complex dialectics of consolidation and fragmentation among armed youth both fighting for a sense of purity in a political and moral order gone terribly wrong. The energies unleashed in the name of Islam or Egbesu—and in the name of ethnicity and class—among a generation of marginalized youth are astonishing. The reservoir of anger is now very deep, having been filled by the waters of resentment over many decades. That the resentments can and have been channeled into all manner of claims, aspirations, and practices (complex mixtures of greed and grievance), the borders among which are labile and porous, should surprise nobody. Both insurgencies in their transnational, national, and subnational expressions point to a parcelized or fragmented sovereignty that has become a hallmark of the Nigerian provisioning pact.

None of this would have surprised Allan Pred. These twin states of emergency—these moments of danger—arose from the place-specific crucibles of power, culture, and history; each crystallized out of the past and out of the ongoing. They became insurgencies that were both the product of spectacularized oil wealth and expressions of spectacularized forms of modern violent politics. Pred knew all too well that—to quote Brecht—"the Old strode in disguised as the New, but it brought the New with it in its triumphal procession and presented it as the Old" (Brecht [1938] 1976, 26). Out of the modern—in this case the militant politics of a true Islam and of authentic resource control—came the relentless search for alternatives, some of which invoked the past to rebuild a new future. What this Brechtian assessment might mean for Nigeria remains an open question. It depends in large measure on how the Nigerian authoritarian Leviathan can accommodate the enormous challenges to its violent economy and democracy that the twin insurgencies represent. But with the expanded presence of Islamists in the West African Sahel—in Mali most dramatically—with connections to Boko Haram, and the unsettling resurgence of conflicts in the delta creeks as insurgent citizenships raise their heads once more in the wake of a largely failed government amnesty program, the future appears dark and foreboding (Lipschitz, Lubeck, and Watts 2007). None of this would have surprised Allan Pred since he understood moments of danger better than most.

NOTES

I am grateful for comments and suggestions by Lisa Hoffman and Heather Merrill. Also, Gill Hart provided me with many reflections on Allan Pred's work and especially his deep and abiding affection for *Gould's Book of Fish*.

1. In some respects *Recognizing European Modernities* emerged from some collective work that Allan and I produced together—*Reworking Modernity* (1992). Our book was provoked both by David Harvey's critique of postmodernism and also by a desire to explore the relations between capitalism "on speed" (what we called "fast capitalism") and the notion of different formations of the modern (what we glossed as a reworking of modernity).

2. This message was sent electronically to a number of media outlets. It is available in its entirety on the Sahara Reports Web site (see Gbomo 2010).

3. Okah, who is in a South African jail, was convicted and found guilty of terrorist attacks in 2013. As part of an affidavit, Okah claims that he was in close contact with the president's handlers over the 2009–10 period and was visited in South Africa by the president's closest advisors in regard to security and political matters. In the wake of the October bombings, Okah claims he was contacted and pressured to retract the claims that MEND was responsible for the Abuja attacks and that in fact the presidency was responsible for the October 1 bombings as part of a political strategy to limit northern ambitions (*Daily Sun* 2012). He was found guilty by the South African court on January 21, 2013.

4. Salafism has a deep history within Islam. In its modern iteration, Salafi refers to a follower of a modern Sunni movement known as Salafiyyah, related to, and sometimes including, Wahabbism, and sometimes the two terms are seen as synonymous. Salafism has become associated with literalist, restorative Islam and with the controversial idea that violent jihad against civilians is a legitimate expression of Islam.

5. The language of insurgency is for some a question. Kathryn Nwajiaku (2012) inexplicably uses scare quotes when she describes the Niger delta "insurgency" and like Paul Collier seems to believe that it is either organized crime or at least does not warrant the term. For Boko Haram the term insurgency is widely deployed by the press, the military, and policy intellectuals.

6. Dissent in Islamic communities depends on what is considered *bid'a*, innovation. Individual Muslims and the Muslim community, or *jama'a*, as a whole should reenact the lifestyle of the Prophet and his companions: they should replicate the practices of the earliest Muslims in ritual and in day-to-day day life documented in the Holy Qur'an, and the sunna (from both what the Prophet said [hadith] and what he did [*sira*]). As Last (2012) says, literal details of the sunna, however, are not all agreed upon, and interpretations vary. Some traditions are regarded as unsound and the shari'a itself has four distinct schools of law. Even within the consensus of most interpretations of the hadith and sunna, there is still considerable space for discursive interpretation and idiosyncratic exegesis.

7. By 2005 there was a dizzying, often bewildering array of militants, militias, and so-called cults: the Niger Delta Militant Force Squad (NDMFS), the Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF), the Grand Alliance, the Niger Delta Coastal Guerillas (NDCG), the South-South Liberation Movement (SSLM), the Movement for the Sovereign State of the Niger Delta (MSSND), the Meinbutus, the November 1895 Movement, the ELIMOTU Movement, the Arogbo Freedom Fighters, the Iduwini Volunteer Force (IVF), the Niger Delta People's Salvation Front (NDPSF), the Coalition for Militant Action (COMA), the Greenlanders, Deebam, Bush Boys, KKK, Black Braziers, Icelanders and a raft of other so-called cults. Over fifty operating military camps were dotted around the creeks.

8. The government announced an amnesty on June 24, 2009. Over twenty-six thousand militants and their commanders signed on, all of whom were included in a demobilization, disarmament, and rehabilitation program (DDR) that has now officially ended. Arms collected (from August 6 to October 4, 2009) include 3,124 weapons, eighteen gunboats, 3,693 magazines, and 297,056 rounds of ammunition. All arms collected were destroyed in Enugu on May 25, 2011. It is widely felt that the disarmament represented a small proportion of the arms circulating in the delta. The peace that ensued is fragile, complicated by failings in the DDR program itself and by the periodic reemergence of attacks since February 2012.

9. Dedicated federal agencies (the Niger Delta Development Commission, the Ministry of the Niger Delta, the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, and of course the allocations of the amnesty program) collectively account for a staggering inflow of monies. The six core oil states have annual budgets of $11.2 billion for 2012; NNDChad a budget of $1.6 billion in 2010, and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (2009–12) and Ministry of the Niger Delta account for $1.6 billion and $1.55 billion respectively; the amnesty program (2009–11) ran to $819 million and another $447 million in 2012; and all of this excludes the estimated community development and security spending of the transnational oil companies (perhaps another $500 million).

10. William Reno's (2011) new book adopts a similar classification: anticolonial, majority rule, reform, warlord (which he sees as rooted in particular sorts of authoritarian regimes and resulting from an "expansion of political competition" within these regimes [11]), and parochial (self-defense forces). Reno emphasizes that insurgencies in contemporary Africa are new insofar as they have no clear ideology, are fragmented, factionalized, fluid, and defensive.

11. Kilcullen's *Accidental Guerilla* (2011) became a canonical text within the U.S. military in rethinking the history of counterinsurgency (Malaysia, Algeria, Vietnam) with regard to understanding what he calls "conflict ethnography. . . . To borrow a literary term, there is no substitute for a 'close reading' of the [local] environment" (2011, 45).

12. Resentment provided an "overarching idiom for people's discussions of what happens to them especially their disappointments but also their hopes for the future" (McGovern 2012, 93). The reference point for dispossession is, of course, the work instigated by David Harvey's account of primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession (2003).

13. At independence the dual legacy of colonial rule continued through the coexistence of so-called customary forms of rule and civic and political rights for all Nigerians. The bonus of independence was that certain citizens were deemed to be "indigenes" of particular states and municipalities, while other were settlers or strangers; the state had to designate who was who and the benefits to be conferred on indigenes. Some Nigerian communities use the distinction between indigenes and nonindigenes as a way of demarcating the boundaries between people who are eligible to hold chieftaincy titles and participate in traditional institutions of governance including, importantly, control over land. The consequences of maintaining customary rule linked to indigeneity is that the law enshrines cultural (and in this case ethnic) identity as the basis for political community

14. For similar arguments in Sierra Leone, see Richards 1996 and Peters 2012.

15. Youth is an important category and key to the politics of intergenerational and national political conflicts. Charles Gore and David Pratten note that youth is a complex, fluid, and permeable category, enabling "covert and secret forms of organization . . . salient to . . . everyday life . . . these modes of collective youth action are generated at the intersection and interfacing of top-down modes of governance and bottom up response to disorder" (2003, 240). Located within the vertical politics of patrimonialism, the category of youth has crystallized into what they call an "extended social category" in terms of its duration; it refers to a set of economic and social circumstances offering little prospect of future advancement. See Last 2005.

16. This section is drawn from the pathbreaking work by Lubeck (1985, 2010) on the changing face of Islam in northern Nigeria, and by Forest (2012), Meehan and Spier (2011), Militant Leadership Monitor (2012), Tanchum (2012), Isa (2010), Amnesty International (2012), Human Rights Watch (2012), and Cook (2011) on the Boko Haram.

17. As one of Boko Haram's leaders put it: "We do not believe in any system of government. . . . We are fighting against democracy, capitalism[,] socialism and the rest. . . . The Nigerian government is illegal . . . because it is not protecting Islam" (Human Rights Watch 2012, 4).

18. And on November 30, 2011, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security released a headline-grabbing report, *Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland*, which claimed of increasing collaboration between the group and al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Shabaab. In turn, this has produced pressure for the United States to designate Boko Haram as an international terrorist organization, which would have profound implications for both the Nigerian government in its dealing with the group and with respect to U.S. military activity in the region.

19. The suggestion is that Boko Haram has split into three factions: one that remains moderate and welcomes an end to the violence; another that wants a peace agreement; and a third that refuses to negotiate and wants to implement strict shari'a law across Nigeria. On July 19, 2011, a group calling itself the Yusufiyya Islamic Movement (YIM) distributed leaflets widely in Maiduguri denouncing other Boko Haram factions as "evil."

The authors of the leaflet, asserting the legacy of founder Muhammad Yusuf, distanced themselves from attacks on civilians and on houses of worship. The split in Boko Haram appears to be so serious that one representative of its moderate faction was killed after negotiating with former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo.

20. This section draws from Watts 2007, 2011; Nwajiaku 2012; Ikelegbe 2006; Ukiwo 2007; Courson 2009; Obi and Rustaad 2011.

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CHAPTER 10

Even in Plurinational Bolivia

Indigeneity, Development, and Racism since Morales

NANCY POSTERO

In his pioneering work on racism, *Even in Sweden*, Allan Pred argues that economic, political, and social crises during the 1990s led many Swedes to experience a "dislodging of practice-enmeshed taken-for-granted meanings" (2000, 187). As Swedes' sense of self and nation was destabilized by global economic restructuring and the accompanying presence of non-European and Muslim immigrants, they "repeatedly found everyday settings, situations, and discourses suddenly somewhat unfamiliar or unrecognizable" (187). This "disease" prompted cultural reworkings that relied in part on people "reinventing their own past histories and geographies, or accepting a new (would-be) hegemonic version thereof" (187). In the Swedish case, this social reconstruction of collective memory allowed Swedes to articulate a virulent form of racism against migrants, while at the same time regarding racism as typical of "somewhere else," thus denying their own part in newly reconfigured racisms.

Pred was studying symbolic discontent with rapid changes in global capitalism at the height of the neoliberal period. What has changed in the long twilight of neoliberalism? In Latin America, the rise of a progressive Left has enabled both a radical reworking of state development projects—sometimes referred to as a "post-neoliberal" moment—and a corresponding reconfiguration of the language of race as indigenous values are incorporated.[1] Returning to Allan Pred's ideas about the "'trialectical' tension between meanings, situated practices, and power relations" (Pred 1992a, 107) at this moment allows me to consider how race and racisms are being reworked as capitalism undergoes yet another transition in the contemporary era. Pred focused on cultural politics, demonstrating that when historically and geographically specific forms of capitalism intersect with already-existing localized patterns of everyday life, they inevitably elicit cultural responses or negotiations, including racism (1992a, 1992b, 2000). Drawing attention to these "cultural articulations" was central to his efforts to illuminate the forms of capitalism at play in the world and the everyday struggles surrounding them, which he pointed out were always "at once political and cultural" (Pred 1992a, 107).

In this essay, I use these insights to examine the case of contemporary Bolivia, where indigenous president Evo Morales has been leading what he calls a "democratic cultural revolution" to overcome neoliberalism and "decolonize" society. I examine Bolivia's historically and geographically contingent form of "post-neoliberal" capitalism and contestations to it, attending to how these contestations are simultaneously contestations over race. Responding to the experiences of poor and indigenous Bolivians under two decades of neoliberal government, Morales and his MAS (Movement toward Socialism) party have advanced an ambitious anti-neoliberal agenda, nationalizing the oil and gas sector and implementing redistribution and social service schemes. But the keystone of this "revolution" is a profound revaluation of indigenous and peasant peoples and their customs. In the new constitution passed in 2009, a central goal of the new plurinational state is to end the centuries of racism against the country's indigenous people, who make up a large majority of the population.

While these reforms have produced enormous advances for Bolivia's poor and indigenous peoples, a Predian analysis of the ways in which they have been experienced and resisted demonstrates that they have also created a new "moment of danger" (Pred 2000, 8). On one hand, the government's combined focus on reversing neoliberalism and revaluing indigeneity sparked a strong and often racist countermovement from the white-mestizo agribusiness elite sectors of the eastern lowlands, who pushed for regional autonomy and independence from the central state. On the other, despite government rhetoric, the country continues to be deeply enmeshed in an extractivist capitalist development model that adversely affects indigenous communities. The vociferous resistance from indigenous people to these projects characterizes the Morales government as racist and colonial. In this essay, I show how indigenous peoples' bodies and territories continue to be the site of political and economic violence as Bolivia struggles to negotiate between the often-conflicting requirements of global capitalism and social and economic justice. *Even in* plurinational Bolivia, a country known across the world as a model for indigenous liberation, racist colonial discourses are reproduced in the process.

My analysis of the Bolivian case draws inspiration from Pred's research on racism in Sweden as well as his work with Michael Watts, which demonstrated the complex ways in which both spatial meanings and cultural identities are produced as capitalism is reworked in particular moments and places (Watts 1992, 17–18). Pred and Watts argue that "nonlocal processes driving capital mobility are always experienced, constituted, and mediated locally" (1992, 6) through "context-dependent, geographically and historically contingent forms of contestation that develop in response to the inner contradictions of the capital-labor relation" (xiii). It is precisely this articulation that I examine in

this essay. As Bolivia reworks its relation to global capitalism in this "post-neoliberal moment," Pred's theoretical legacy helps us see how historically and geographically embedded notions of race act as the "cultural materials" that local actors use to make sense of these changes. As Pred would have predicted, in the process, notions of race are both reworked and reinforced.

New Answers to the Indian Question

Race is a central line of fracture in Bolivia, where somewhere between 60 and 70 percent of people identify as indigenous. There is an enormous diversity among this self-identifying group marked by big differences between highland and lowland communities, urban and rural peoples, and so on. Yet in every era, the dominant class has grappled with "the Indian Question"—trying to determine the proper role of indigenous people in society and the economy (Postero and Zamosc 2004; Zavaleta Mercado 1986). In some eras, this question was explicitly tied to race, while in others, it was described in terms of ethnicity or subsumed into the category of class. Following Peter Wade (1997), I use the terms "race" and "racism" to describe relations between Bolivia's native peoples and the whites and mestizos who dominated them for centuries. While scientists now agree that there is no basis for describing human difference in terms of race, in Bolivia there has been and continues to be overt racism against indigenous peoples. Thus describing these relations as "racialized" draws attention to the ways in which creating and enforcing categories of difference can act as a form of domination. In Bolivia, racialized difference was created historically in part through long-term extractivist patterns of development that tore native peoples from their lands, exploited their labor, and denied them full membership in the polity (Galeano 1973; Larson 2004; Platt 1982). Racism in the form of discourses about the inferiority, savagery, and childishness of Indians justified this violence, but racism was also produced in the practices and power relations that resulted. Peruvian sociologist and political theorist Aníbal Quijano explains that specific colonial structures of power produced specific social discriminations—"intersubjective constructions" that were later codified as "objective" "racial" or "ethnic" categories. These forms of domination, which Quijano calls the "coloniality of power," were accompanied by modes of knowing and produced new social identities, like the social category of "race" (Quijano 2007, 168–70). Thus, in Bolivia, as the white/mestizo elite exercised power over indigenous peoples and territories and claimed the right to exploit their resources, they enacted the situated practices of domination that I am referring to as racism.

Beginning in the colonial era, indigenous lands and labor were exploited

by European conquerors, the Crown, and the Catholic Church. Indians were forced to pay tribute taxes and to work in near-slavery conditions on colonizers' haciendas and in silver mines, the profits of which fueled Europe's industrial revolution (Galeano 1973). In the lowlands, native peoples were forced into servitude during the rubber boom. In this early period, difference was explicitly racialized, as the *casta* system based on blood purity determined status. After independence from Spain, creole elites continued this exploitation in different forms, arguing that indigenous collective land holding was an obstacle to the modern nation-state. The resulting "disentailment acts" pushed indigenous people off their lands and into new forms of exploitative labor relations with rich landowners. A small cadre of mestizo families controlled the mining sector, also fueled by indigenous labor (Rivera Cusicanqui 1987; Larson 2004; Zavaleta 1986). Dissatisfaction with these patron-peon patterns was a fundamental impetus of the 1952 revolution. Peasant uprisings and land takeovers pushed the new government to put an end to the system of large landowning, called *latifundio*, and to implement wide-ranging agrarian reforms to give the indigenous peasant farming class access to land. Thus, after the revolution, the solution to the Indian Question was to incorporate indigenous people into the state as small-scale producers for the national market. Situated practices of racism were reconstituted with the political economy of peasant agriculture, producing new categories of difference: Indians became campesinos, or peasant farmers. In this period, the category of Indian was folded into the discourse of class, yet racism did not disappear. If the category of campesino was intended to resolve the Indian Question by drawing attention away from race or ethnicity, in practice, rural indigenous peasants continued to feel the effects of racism. The reforms after the revolution were intended to reverse some of the worst of these abuses, but they made only slight inroads into the structured poverty that had resulted from the colonial land grabs. During the years of dictatorship that followed, these structures were further exacerbated, as elites expanded their cattle, logging, and agribusiness empires, taking over indigenous lands throughout the lowlands.

Over the years, Andean intellectuals began rethinking this race/class politics, and in the 1980s the Aymara-based Katarista movement pushed a more nuanced revolutionary vision, characterizing oppression of indigenous people as the result of both their ethnicity and their class (Hurtado 1986; Reinaga 1970). They began to struggle not only for economic justice but also to push for the recognition and defense of their history, values, and language. Lamenting the paternalism of the society as well as the humiliating poverty in which they lived, they called for indigenous peasants to organize as a people (*pueblo*) whose most important resource is its culture. While not explicitly referring

to race, the Kataristas spoke of oppression, racism, human rights, and the liberation of the Indian peoples (see Hurtado 1986). The multiculturalism of the neoliberal era was the next stage in this long negotiation about the relation between Bolivia's native peoples and its political economy. Responding in part to marches and increasingly public demands by indigenous peoples who were inspired by the new discourses of identity politics as well as the long historical memory of resistance, in the 1990s the government implemented a new scheme of neoliberal multicultural citizenship, which included expanded political participation, intercultural education, and collective territorial titling. In this era, difference was overtly recognized and tamed. The category of "indigenous people" became the term of choice for lowland peoples, and "originary peoples" (*pueblos originarios*) for highland peoples. For neoliberal politicians, the answer to the Indian Question was to transform unruly Indians into disciplined political participants and responsible managers of their own territories and communities (Postero 2007b). Indeed, a new form of capitalist accumulation and its associated political practices, in Predian terms, enacted new identities: Indians were now indigenous citizens. Yet, as I describe later, despite this seeming advance in the recognition of oppressed peoples, the neoliberal period of privatization and structural adjustment did little to change their economic situation. A World Bank study showed that by 2004, 52 percent of Bolivia's indigenous peoples still lived in extreme poverty (World Bank 2005).

The Morales victory in 2005 represented a historic chance to rewrite the national narrative and to provide new answers to the persistent Indian question. Thus, while the Morales administration was concerned with restructuring the economy, developing a new national development model, and rolling back two decades of neoliberalism, it was also engaged in a critical battle over the meaning of indigeneity. From the beginning of his administration, Morales took on the role of representing indigenous people in this historic reconfiguration. The day before he was officially inaugurated at the Congressional Palace, he held an "indigenous" inauguration ceremony at the country's most important archaeological complex, Tiwanaku. There, Aymara priests blessed him and declared him the highest *mallku*, or leader, of the Aymara people. Morales invoked the notion of *pachakuti*, or the reversal of time and space, and promised a new millennium for indigenous people (Postero 2007a). Through this powerful symbolism, Morales made clear that his administration was fundamentally committed to changing the position of indigenous people in Bolivia. He has continued this role throughout his time as president, invoking indigenous history and customs as the backbone of the new Bolivia and as the source of the new decolonized society.

Since their victory passing the new constitution, Morales and the MAS have

begun to implement the decolonization agenda. This has taken many forms, from legal measures like the passage of the new antiracism statute in 2010, which makes any discrimination based on ethnicity, language, or dress illegal, to political reforms like integrating government ministries with people from all sorts of backgrounds. Most important has been the formulation of a revolutionary new constitution, which declares Bolivia to be a plurinational state. This was the result of a two-year-long Constituent Assembly, in which popularly elected delegates, many of them indigenous, rewrote the constitution. These reforms have been extremely important to the lives of everyday people, as they improve the situated practices of racism that Bolivia's indigenous people have endured for centuries. Yet indigeneity is not a neutral good that the government merely endorses or encourages. Rather, the state is one actor in a contested process putting forth a particular vision of indigeneity to justify its agenda. As I describe later, the MAS agenda has produced enormous pushback from both white/mestizo elites and lowland indigenous groups. Andrew Canessa (2006) argues that Morales has developed a "new language of national political identity," a discursive representation of indigeneity as the solution to domestic and global problems. I agree with his conclusion that indigeneity has become "the foundation of a new nationalism" (Canessa 2012, 17–18). Thus it is imperative to consider the way that the state's agenda both reconfigures and reinscribes the meanings of indigeneity to justify state power.

One controversial state program demonstrates how the state uses the symbolic and aesthetic dimensions of indigeneity. In 2011, the Vice-Ministry of Decolonization held a collective marriage ceremony, bringing together over three hundred couples to be married by Andean religious experts. The wedding, billed as "a collective wedding of our identity," was intended to foment pride in Andean indigenous customs and practices, eschewing the legacy of Western colonial institutions like the Catholic Church. The wedding couples were encouraged to wear "traditional" clothing, as part of "recuperating" indigenous customs. President Morales acted as the *padrino*, or godfather, of the couples, offering them congratulations for "decolonizing themselves" and posing for pictures with each group. Critics objected to the fact that the ceremonies created a homogenized vision of indigeneity that ignored the wide variety of local customs and practices. Others, including many participants, felt the wedding was a political "show" by a government seeking votes from indigenous constituents. In fact, it was a show, a spectacle intended to resignify cultural markers in which "fact and fiction," past and present, are conflated (Pred 2004, xi). In my analysis of the symbols used in this potent political ritual, I conclude that the state merely reiterated traditional "erosion-resistant sediments" of difference (Pred 2004, xi). By mimicking the aesthetics of the Catholic Church

and the Inca Empire, this spectacle in fact performed a masculinist colonial state, interpellating the wedding participants as *descolonizados permitidos*, or authorized decolonized subjects. By forging a generic state version of Andean indigeneity, which combined traditional images of indigenous peoples with new, supposedly revolutionary, meanings, the state silenced ongoing disagreements about what indigeneity means in the contemporary moment (Postero, n.d.).

Through such spectacles, Morales and the MAS have worked at the discursive and policy levels to formulate their own revolutionary answer to the Indian Question. That is, by performing and embodying the plurinational subject, they link indigeneity (as they define and enact it) and the state. One could argue that this is a form of racism in itself, as this homogenization obscures critical material and epistemological differences between different indigenous peoples. Perhaps more important, however, is the fact that, in the process, the MAS justifies its agenda and its national development model and transforms the language and practices of an indigenous past into a vehicle for producing a new state-centered economy. I now turn to an examination of this development model, which Morales claims is a radical challenge to neoliberalism.

Challenges to Colonial Neoliberalism

During the neoliberal era of the 1980s and 1990s, the traditional white-mestizo political class instituted orthodox restructuring, including privatizing state-owned enterprises, cutting back on social spending, and opening the country to foreign capital (Postero 2007b, 190–93). Laying off thousands of (mostly Andean) miners at the state mining corporation, the state privatized most publicly owned enterprises and cut public sector employment (Arze and Kruse 2004, 27). Bolivia's farm economy was also devastated by the commercial liberalization, as farmers and herders were unable to compete with cheaper supplies from abroad. As the poor shouldered these burdens, incomes for the local economic and political elites tied to transnational capital rose (Portes and Hoffman 2003, 65). The result was an increasing sense among most Bolivians that the elite and foreign capital had commandeered control of the national economy.

As elsewhere, neoliberal reforms in Bolivia were not limited to the economic sphere. Instead, these economic policies were part of a larger set of changes, pairing economic reforms with a discourse of "market democracy" linking free trade and democracy promotion. This resulted in policies such as decentralization, the devolution of state power to cities/regions, on the one hand, and the empowerment of civil society, on the other. The Bolivian Law of Popular

Participation (1994) was a prime example of such neoliberal governance. Under this form of "neoliberal multiculturalism," indigenous and social movements were encouraged to participate in development and budget decisions at the municipal level. While this scheme did recognize indigenous people as legitimate actors, the overarching racism in the country and the continuing control of political parties by the white/mestizo elite made it difficult for indigenous people and their representatives to gain meaningful access to the political process (Postero 2007b).

But the neoliberal reforms had unexpected consequences. Indigenous and poor people began to articulate their long-held demands for inclusion, dignity, and territory in terms of citizenship rights, which they exercised both on the streets and at the ballot box. A wave of social unrest culminated in the October 2003 "gas war," in which a broad spectrum of urban indigenous people, labor, and students rejected plans to allow a transnational corporation to export natural gas. Condemning a pattern of foreign and elite profit from the resources and labor of poor Bolivians, and particularly from the natural resources they deemed national patrimony, they forced the resignation of the president and called for the nationalization of gas. Indigenous and peasant activists also began to use the neoliberal political structures to contest local elections, forming a new political party, the MAS in 2002. The MAS party grew quickly, eventually bringing its leader, Evo Morales, to the presidency in 2005. In his 2005 campaign for presidency, Morales promised to nationalize gas resources, restore Bolivia's sovereignty (long eroded by its dependence on U.S. and foreign aid), and institute national development based on indigenous values and social justice for the poor. This campaign brought together highland Andean peoples, lowland indigenous groups, labor and the traditional Left, and many progressive mestizos.

Yet Morales's election was bitterly opposed in the eastern lowlands, where the white-mestizo agribusiness elite was threatened not only by the MAS's challenges to neoliberal economic policies but also by its racial politics. In the lowland capital of Santa Cruz, where the elite have traditionally differentiated themselves from the Andean capital by emphasizing their European roots and their lowland mestizo or *camba* identity, the call to decolonize Bolivia and embrace indigenous rights was not a welcome one.[2] This radical change in political power thus reconfigured the fields of force at play in Bolivia, ushering in a period of transition and social upheaval (García Linera 2010). With a charismatic leader and a growing indigenous coalition, the MAS-controlled state had new grounds to transform the economy and impetus to take command of the lowland region's considerable resource wealth. Bolivia's main export is natural gas, and a large majority of gas fields lie in the eastern lowlands. The

newly marginalized *cambas* defended their traditional privileges, advocating for regional political autonomy and control over income from resources in the region. During the Constituent Assembly, the right-wing opposition did everything possible to oppose this transition, from boycotts of the process to a massive campaign of hunger strikes across the lowlands (Fabricant and Postero 2013). This "political" movement was also characterized as a cultural struggle, as *cambas* opposed their customs, values, and histories to those of highland indigenous peoples, often expressing these differences through violent acts of racism.

For instance, Morales appointed an indigenous woman, Silvia Lazarte, as president of the Constituent Assembly. Lazarte, who had only a few years of schooling, had worked as a domestic and a labor activist. But during the assembly process, she suffered many terrible insults at the hands of the opposition, including being called a "llama"—the iconic herding animal of the Andes. During this tense period, racial incidents increased across the country. In Santa Cruz, the autonomy movement led by the civic committees was accompanied by a thinly disguised racial campaign. Civic leaders argued that Andean migrants were invading their city, taking land and economic opportunities from local people (Fabricant 2009; Gustafson 2006). Elites openly asked how Morales, an uneducated Indian, could be the president. A Santa Cruz youth group carried out numerous attacks against Andean migrants to the city, and city officials banned street venders, "protecting" the city from the dangers of unhygienic Indian bodies (Fabricant 2009). Perhaps the most shocking incident of this overt racism came during the last conflicted days of the assembly in Sucre, when opponents captured a group of Andean MAS supporters. Hurling racist insults at them, the attackers forced them to strip to the waist, kneel down in the plaza, and kiss the flag. Humiliated, with tears in their eyes, the victims bowed in shame and fear (see Schavelzon 2012). This incident, which was captured on video, horrified the country and demonstrated how close to the surface colonial relations of domination and subjugation remain. Here we see race at the center of that trialectical tension Pred described: indigeneity, long linked to practices of domination, took on new meanings in the context of the power struggles between the MAS and the lowland elite sector. On the one hand, indigenous activism and ideas were held up by the Morales government and the social movements it represented as the solution to centuries of colonial oppression. On the other, the old faces of racism continued to be potent tools of contestation. Pred and Watts have pointed out that such periods of reconstruction are structural attributes of capitalism, which regularly undergoes transitions. The result, they argue, is invariably contestation, in which local actors defend their specific interests and identities through remappings of space

and forms of difference (Watts 1992, 11, 17). Let us see how this played out in Bolivia.

The Racial Politics of Morales's Democratic and Cultural Revolution

Once in power, Morales and his MAS government set about implementing their agenda of transforming society through reforms linking economics, politics, and race. The National Development Plan, issued in the first few months after Morales took office, describes this linkage.[3] The plan describes the goal of national development as "remov[ing], from its roots, the profound social inequality and inhuman exclusion which oppress the majority of the Bolivian population, particularly those of indigenous origin" (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, hereafter PND, 2006, 1). This inequality, the plan makes clear, is the product of colonial appropriations of indigenous lands and labor; the capitalist "primary export model" of silver and tin mining that benefited a small nucleus of oligarchs; and, most importantly in the contemporary era, neoliberalism. The neoliberal model, says the plan, exacerbated the concentration of wealth by giving access to means of production and jobs to the rich white/mestizo sector and subjecting the development of the country to the interests of multilateral organizations and transnational corporations (PND 2006, 3). It failed because it was "the product of a system of ethnic, cultural, and political domination, impregnated with racism" (PND 2006, 12).

The plan proposes an alternative model of development, called *vivir bien* (to live well). Derived from the *cosmovisión* (worldview) of indigenous peoples, *vivir bien* refers to communitarian forms of *convivencia*, or living together. It implies intercultural respect and symmetries of power: "One cannot live well if others live badly" (PND 2006, 10). The plan argues that this collective notion of well-being is very different from Western notions of individual well-being, which can be obtained at the expense of others or the environment. It also differs from Western notions in that it goes beyond the material and economic to include values such as emotions, recognition, difference, social prestige, and dignity (PND 2006, 10). The plan insists that implementation of this alternative form of development would require the state to intervene as "promoter and protagonist of national development" (PND 2006, 4).

As the plan makes clear, and as I have described, all of Bolivia's previous development models were always deeply imbricated in and supported by the structures of racism: indigenous lands and labor were appropriated to benefit the white/mestizo classes. To reverse this pattern, the plan argues, would require restructuring the state itself, which like all other parts of society was considered a colonial vestige. This was the goal of the 2006 Constituent Assembly,

in which popularly elected delegates rewrote the constitution. The assembly was a deeply contested political process marked by opposition boycotts, racialized street violence, political bargaining, and virulent disagreements about the form and obligations of the state.[4] The resulting constitution is a remarkable document, born from the dreams and demands of indigenous and peasant social movements but modified by politicians negotiating a tense political climate.[5] It literally rewrites the geography and history of the country, inserting indigenous peoples and their rights into the state and society, where they had previously been invisible. Yet this recount to include the "part without a part," to use Jacques Rancière's (1999) terms, was not intended to be merely a modified form of multicultural recognition. Instead, indigenous delegates to the assembly began a profound debate about national development, arguing that Bolivia's development should be based on indigenous values and implemented through a radically different form of decision making. Here we see the libratory potential that periods of transition can enable. As Pred has suggested, such moments produce struggles "over what is construed as common sense, over which categories are allowed to make sense, . . . over which names and meanings are taken as legitimate" (Pred 1992a, 111–12).

At the Constituent Assembly, the main proponent of these challenges was the Pacto Unidad (Unity Pact), a federation of indigenous and peasant social movements that had long pushed for a new Constituent Assembly and then promoted a draft text throughout the process (Tapia 2010; Postero 2015). Their bottom-up vision focused on three axes. First, they sought sovereignty as nations, proposing "indigenous autonomy" as a form of communal self-government. Second, where the liberal nation-state imagined a unified homogenous Bolivian people, the Pacto argued that the underlying *pueblo* is plural and diverse. A unified plurinational state should recognize that plurality by establishing juridical pluralism and allow differing forms of government to coexist with the central state. Finally, the state should be based on shared decision making. The most important arena for this is natural resource exploitation, where the Pacto demanded binding prior consultations before any development projects affecting local communities are undertaken. The Pacto thus envisioned sovereign and plural people participating directly and sharing power in their own government (Pacto de Unidad 2006).

Much of the Pacto's agenda is visible in the final text of the constitution, but many of its most revolutionary ideas were blocked. Not surprisingly, the right-wing opposition opposed them, but the MAS, which did not want to give up so much power, also rejected them. Instead, Morales and his most trusted cohort pushed through a much more traditionally liberal vision of the state,

which gave the central state exclusive power over natural resources and subordinated most decision making to the central state. The text was further watered down in negotiations with the Right after the assembly ended. The result is a constitution with many contradictions but with enormous revolutionary potential. On the one hand, it declares Bolivia to be plurinational and values and recognizes "indigenous peasant originary peoples" (CPE 2009, Art.3). It makes decolonizing Bolivian society a central goal of the state and holds up *vivir bien* (living well) as the basis of the state's economic and welfare policies. It guarantees indigenous self-determination and self-government. Yet in the sections that detail the powers of the state and the different entities of government, it is clear that indigenous government is subordinated to the central state in a "constitutional hierarchy" (Tapia 2010, 167). Indigenous autonomy is greatly diminished from the Pacto's vision, and there is no mention of coadministration or co–decision making (Garcés 2011). Instead, indigenous nations are given a tiny number of legislative seats. Most notably, while the Bolivian people have the exclusive right to natural resources, this right must be exercised under the administration of the central state, and while affected communities must be consulted prior to any development, their desires are not binding (see Beaulieu 2008). Thus the reformed state institutionalized by the MAS incorporates indigeneity, but not to the degree hoped for by indigenous activists. Instead of the decolonizing "revolution" promised by Morales, many critics argue that the new plurinational state looks more like reformed multiculturalism, which recognizes indigenous values but domesticates them under a liberal state structure (see Tapia 2010; Regalsky 2010).

Extractivist Capitalism: Racist Betrayal or Point of Departure?

The contradictions visible in the constitutional process and in the resulting document reflect the enormous tensions the MAS government faced as it attempted to restructure the relation between its national development model and its indigenous peoples. For many of the indigenous and peasant social actors who pushed Morales and his government into power, decolonization means orienting state economic and political policy around indigenous *cosmovisións* and recognizing communal practices and values. Morales emerged from this social-movement milieu as president of the coca growers' union and promised to "lead by obeying," to use the terms of the Zapatistas' Marcos. The government's adoption of the sustainable development concept of *vivir bien* is one sign of this obedience. A second is Morales's international stance toward climate change: Morales has become a prominent figure in the international

climate-change discussion, arguing that capitalism is the enemy of Mother Earth and only reliance on indigenous values and economic practices, such as *vivir bien*, can resolve the global crisis (Postero 2013b; but see Fabricant 2013).

Yet, while internationally Morales describes a coherent set of "indigenous" values, at home that homogenous vision often breaks down. The revolutionary indigenous vision put forth by the Pacto at the Constituent Assembly, it turns out, is not the only vision of development held by Morales's indigenous constituents. In fact, indigenous people have widely divergent relations with resource extraction, reflecting the history and geography of national development (see McNeish 2013). The first centuries of exploitative silver and tin mining took place in the highlands, but since the early 1900s, development has largely focused on hydrocarbons (oil and gas) and agribusiness in the lowlands. So for a large majority of indigenous people—those living in the urban areas, in the coca-growing regions, or in highland areas not threatened by resource exploitation—the agenda of the October 2003 gas war remains their priority. For these citizens, decolonization means transforming the structure of the economy so that more people benefit from it, improving levels of poverty among Bolivia's indigenous populations. As Nicole Fabricant (2013) points out, for urban indigenous residents living in precarious situations, access to jobs in industrializing sectors and to water is critical to their survival. For the minority indigenous people in the lowlands, on the other hand, hydrocarbon exploitation, dams, and roads represent a huge threat to their livelihoods, as we shall see.[6]

Thus, despite the language in its National Development Plan about colonial neoliberalism or Morales's declarations in international forums about the evils of capitalism, Bolivia has continued long-standing extractivist development, based on mineral and hydrocarbon exploitation. It earns a huge proportion of its income from global sales of natural gas and minerals. Scholars note that this legacy from the past makes Bolivia "path dependent"—changing its economy will involve a complete transformation of its infrastructure as well as its policies (Kaup 2010). For now, the Morales government is trying to split the difference between sustainability and redistribution, carrying out what Eduardo Gudynas (2010) calls "progressive extractivism"—continuing to engage global capitalism through the extraction and export of raw materials but distributing a larger portion of the profits to the population. In 2006, Morales "nationalized" the natural gas sector, Bolivia's largest export sector. Reversing the terms of contracts with the transnational corporations that carry out the majority of gas exploitation so that the state now receives the lion's share of profit instead of the companies, Morales transformed Bolivia's economy. The rents from natural gas are now distributed to municipal and regional governments, to indigenous

organizations, and to public universities (Postero 2013a). The government then embarked on a campaign to expand health services, restoring some of the huge cuts made under the neoliberal regimes. Most importantly, the MAS is carrying out widespread cash transfers to Bolivia's poorest and neediest sectors, such as seniors, schoolchildren, and nursing mothers. While these measures have not changed the structure of poverty, they have begun to end extreme poverty and are enormously popular (Stefanoni 2013). Morales has also addressed inequality of land tenure through an agrarian reform, titling some 100 million acres to 900,000 poor (mostly indigenous) peasant farming families (Farthing and Kohl, forthcoming; García Linera 2012b).

Yet even at the same time Morales pleads with international audiences to stop relying on capitalism and to adopt indigenous ways of living together, his government has in fact expanded the extractivist focus, building new roads, extending concessions for new iron-ore mines, planning new hydroelectric dams, and most importantly, beginning exploitation of lithium recently discovered in the fragile salt flats in Uyuni (Bebbington 2009; Postero 2013b). This policy has increasingly put the government at odds with indigenous communities whose lands are threatened by the projects. I discuss one specific example later, but in all these cases, we see the ongoing tension between responding to the "indigenous" vision of sustainable development and protection of Mother Earth and the need to build an economy that can provide improved welfare for all Bolivians, including its indigenous people.

Vice President Alvaro García Linera has defended the government's choice to continue along the extractivist trajectory.

> Extractivism is not destiny but it can be a point of departure for overcoming it. . . . For us as a country, it is the only technical means at our disposal to distribute the material riches generated thanks to it. If [we do not continue this extraction], how will we ever surmount extractivism? By stopping production, closing the tin mines, the gas wells, reversing the satisfaction of the basic material means of existence, as our critics suggest? Isn't it possible to use these resources that come from the primary export activity controlled by the state to generate profits that permit the satisfaction of minimum conditions of life for Bolivians, and to guarantee the intercultural and scientific education that generates a critical intellectual mass capable of assuming and conducting the emergent processes of industrialization and economy of knowledge? (García Linera 2012a, 3–4, my translation)

Here we see the paradox clearly articulated. In some sense, this statement reflects the widespread perception that "there is no alternative" to engaging in global capitalism. J. K. Gibson-Graham (2006) describes the overwhelm-

ing discursive, affective, and material obstacles to thinking outside or beyond capitalism to what she calls "post-capitalist politics." Suggesting that Bolivia is not yet ready for socialism, García Linera proposes a model of what he terms "Andean Amazonian capitalism," which calls for recognition of and state investment in the varying forms of production present in Bolivia, including private and state-owned industries, small producers and family enterprises, and traditional communitarian systems (García Linera quoted in Farthing 2009). This is not simply a defeatist position recognizing the inevitability of capitalism. Instead, we can also see in this proposal precisely what Gibson-Graham calls for: an "ethical decision-making" process to determine what sorts of production are best, what sorts of needs and labor exist, and how the surplus should be allocated.

But as García Linera's quotation makes clear, this is not a completely free choice. Instead, the government's decision making is deeply constrained by what Pred has called "the particular conjuncture of general, wider-scale economic, political, and cultural processes in which those practices are ensnarled" (2000, 24). García Linera concedes this point, suggesting that no one country can escape from global capitalism. The only true solution is worldwide communism. In the meantime, the best Bolivia can do is alter its position in the international division of labor, as it begins to conceive a potential new mode of communitarian production (García Linera 2012b, 33). But because the state continues to be "ensnarled" in capitalist extractivism, state decisions have had enormous negative effects on some indigenous communities, as we will see in the following section. Regardless of the justifications advanced by García Linera and the MAS, their choices also reinforce the racism on which extractive capitalism continues to be structured. Just as Bolivia cannot extract itself from the capitalist system, its current resource extraction has not been disembedded from historical geographical patterns of racialized exploitation that I described earlier. Those indigenous peoples who managed to retain their lands continue to be vulnerable to corporate and state abuse precisely because they lack political power. If in previous eras, lowland indigenous groups were subject to the domination of the hereditary power of landowners, now they are facing the equally rapacious power of the MAS state, which intends to exercise sovereign control of their lands (García Linera 2012b).

Indeed, as Pred and Watts made so clear in their case studies, particular forms of capital accumulation map and remap spatial meanings onto territories. In the case Pred studied in California, global integration brought South Korean corporations and local union gas-refinery workers into new social and economic relations, supposedly bridging the global with the local (Pred 1992b, 155–91). Yet, despite their resistance, workers were ultimately forcibly integrated

into the new form of production. Thus Pred and Watts emphasize the "historical production of difference within a unified system" of constantly evolving capitalist relations (Pred and Watts 1992, 197). In such moments of capitalist reconstruction, they insist, transitions occur "from within, but within limits, set by the logic of capital itself" (Watts 1992, 8). In the Bolivian case, I am arguing, the logic of capital continues to rely on the vulnerabilities of lowland indigenous people, whose lands continue to hold exploitable natural resources.

The contradictions between extractivism and "indigenous" values are linked to a second related set of tensions in this restructuring of the relations between indigenous people and development. As discussed earlier, the Pacto's vision of the new Bolivia involved a radical change in the ways decisions would be made at both the local and the national levels. While Morales and the MAS officially trumpet the notion that they are the servants of the social movements who elected them (see most recently García Linera 2012b, 3–4), in practice they have instead implemented a strong centralized state model of governing. As described previously, the constitution and follow-up legislation lay out jurisdictions of the central state in relation to other levels of government, such as the municipalities, regions, departments (states), and indigenous autonomies. The central state maintains exclusive power over most natural-resources decisions, as well as those relating to national security, taxes, and justice. This structure is the result of a clear ideological position: Morales and García Linera have stated many times their belief that, for the moment, the state is the best instrument by which to make the transformations necessary to decolonize Bolivian society (see García Linera quoted in Farthing and Kohl 2010). In García Linera's words: "The purpose of consolidating the state with economic, cultural, and political strength is to provide a protective shield for the social movements, and international armor for the growth of the social struggles. Yes, reinforce the state, but not in the sense of the old state capitalism, which was a way to privatize public resources. It's a subordinated state that has to be strengthened, one always controlled and permeated by the demands, activities, and insurgency of the social movements" (2007). Since the state is now the "main investor and collector of economic surplus" due to the restructuring of the hydrocarbon sector, the state is now the main engine of the economic investment and social transformation (García Linera 2010, 43). Morales often uses executive power, making decrees and using discretionary funding to support the programs and projects he chooses (García Linera 2010, 41). But this power also elicits criticism, as many consider the administration top heavy and closed. Morales is often accused of *caudillismo*, a form of corrupt populism, or even authoritarianism. In recent years, the president received enormous criticism when he disregarded constitutional requirements and massive popular opposition to push through a

controversial highway project on lowland indigenous lands, as I describe later. Yet he and the vice president continue to defend the state's actions, characterizing opponents as counterrevolutionaries aligned with either reactionary oligarchs or devious transnational corporations selling "environmentalism to the poor" (García Linera 2012b, 28). Such tensions demonstrate the difficulty the Morales government has faced in balancing the tensions in its development project described here, but what interests me in the remainder of this essay is the way these tensions are played out in the idioms of racialized difference. Indeed, they provoke us to ask (though perhaps not answer) whether this version of extractivism is a step on the path toward a decolonized Bolivia or part of a continuous history of nationalist resource extraction based on exploitation of native peoples now made palatable for a larger majority by its new "indigenous" face. It is to that topic I now turn.

Sacrificing Indigenous Territories

In 2011, Morales announced that his government would build a highway linking the tropics of Cochabamba through the Amazonian forest to the Brazilian border. The highway, to be funded by a Brazilian development bank, would open a path through Bolivia's hinterlands to the exterior, thus expanding opportunities for trade, especially to the region's new super economic power, Brazil. The problem was that this road was to cross the Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park, known by its Spanish acronym, TIPNIS. Although the new constitution requires the government to carry out a prior consultation with affected communities, the government had not done so, and when pressed, refused to do so. "Like it or not," the president said, "we are going to deliver this project" (*La Jornada* 2011). Local communities worried that the road would cause damage to the fragile environment, and that coca growers, who had already invaded one section of the park, would use the road to expand their cultivation. The TIPNIS became a cause célèbre, as environmentalists and student groups across the country defended the park and the indigenous communities who lived there. Residents of some of the affected indigenous communities, along with the national indigenous organization, CIDOB, mounted a massive march from the lowlands up the Andes to the capital in protest. Such marches are traditional ways for CIDOB to push its agenda—this was the eighth such march. Because they are peaceful and require enormous sacrifice on the part of the marchers, who walk over eight hundred kilometers through tropical heat and Andean cold, they have met with a fair amount of success in the past. This time, the government was intransigent. Then, in September, military police attacked the marchers with batons and tear gas in the small town of Chaparina,

causing many injuries among the marchers. When the marchers finally arrived in La Paz, they were met with a warm and massive welcome. Facing widespread public disapproval, Morales finally backed down, declaring the park intangible, or untouchable.

That reversal was only temporary, however. The MAS-controlled congress authorized a new consultation process, which began in late 2011. It was met with enormous contestation. Not only did many consider it "too little, too late" and refuse to take part, but many of those who did participate were members of government-created parallel indigenous organizations. During the summer of 2012, CIDOB mounted another march, but this time the march fizzled. Many of the regional indigenous organizations making up CIDOB refused to support the march, some because they had been co-opted by the government, and some because they thought it a bad strategy. When the march reached La Paz, government security forces attacked it with tear gas and water cannons. But this time, the repression produced little public response. Finally, the leaders returned to their home communities to carry on the struggle at the local level. Then, the government orchestrated the takeover of CIDOB, the national indigenous organization established in the early 1990s. In August 2012, a parallel, government-friendly group that does not oppose the highway forced its way into CIDOB's Santa Cruz headquarters, backed by the police. CIDOB's originally elected leaders held a vigil in front of the church in the main plaza for several weeks and then finally faded away, defeated by the state's clientelist tactics. Many noted the irony that CIDOB had been able to withstand thirty years of struggle with white/mestizo politicians, only to be undone by an indigenous president.

The TIPNIS consultation officially concluded in December 2012 with a favorable vote for the road. However, Bolivia's human rights ombudsman, Rolando Villena, issued a harsh critique of the consultation process, which he characterized as "authoritarian, colonialist, and unilateral." "In addition to failing to comply with international requirements for a consulta previa [consultation process](before financing and construction commitments), to be carried out in good faith and in accordance with indigenous customs and governing structures, . . . the process did not achieve the agreement of all parties, as required by the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (TCP), as a condition of its constitutionality" (cited in Achtenberg 2012).

The TIPNIS conflict once again brought the relation between indigeneity and development into the public arena, but with a different and ironic twist. This time, it was an *indigenous* president who raised the "Indian Question," suggesting that the TIPNIS indigenous communities were acting as obstacles to national development. Arguing that the road would bring the benefits of

modernity, like health care and education, to the TIPNIS communities, as well as access to markets for their products, he flatly discounted their desires to protect their territories. Not all communities were opposed to the development of the road, as they did want better access to markets. Yet many were deeply opposed to the government's top-down process. When these communities refused to back down, government ministers accused CIDOB of taking money from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or being puppets for external nongovernmental organizations (NGOS) (Achtenberg 2011a, 2011b). Here we see the government reprising classic racist tropes of earlier governments, claiming indigenous people were childlike or too easily manipulated to be full citizens. Like the early modernizing states, the MAS government argued that the best solution for the Indian Question was for these unruly Indians to submit to the larger good of national development. Yet it is not only the government that is returning to discourses about indigeneity to defend its position. Lowland indigenous people I spoke with during the march felt the government's actions represented a horrifying reappearance of colonialism and a terrible betrayal of Morales's claims to defend indigenous peoples. Critics characterized the government's actions as "internal colonialism" and decried its cynical efforts to demean the movement (see Contreras Baspineiro 2012). Across the country, indigenous people and intellectuals questioned Morales's commitment to indigenous autonomy and even his identity as indigenous. Rafael Quispe, a prominent Aymara leader, suggested that in its dealings with the TIPNIS protesters, "the government has revealed its true identity. The indigenous mask has fallen off, and its neoliberal face is revealed" (cited in Orellana Candia 2011).

But it was the seemingly racist and violent aspect of the administration's dealing with the TIPNIS case that really shocked people. The Defensor del Pueblo's 2011 report determined that the military attack at Chaparina violated human rights in numerous ways, including racist epithets that the police used in the attack and violent acts against the women and children on the march (Defensor del Pueblo 2011). If there was any question about colonial politics resurfacing, Morales made things crystal clear when he suggested to his supporters, the coca growers, that they should go out and seduce local indigenous women in the TIPNIS to garner their support for the road (Erbol 2011). A congresswoman from the left-center Movimiento Sin Miedo (MSM) party, Marcela Revollo, summed up the feelings of repugnance that Morales's comment had produced across the country: "Oh, the cost of hurting and humiliating the body of these women, the indigenous of TIPNIS. . . . That is an act that is profoundly patriarchal, sexist, and colonial. That is how the Spanish colony entered the American territories, raping and damaging to conquer the territory" (Erbol 2011).

Revollo's comment makes an important point: once again, indigenous people are paying the costs for capitalist development. The TIPNIS provides an eerie repetition of previous epochs of state sacrifice of indigenous peoples' territories in the name of progress, as the geographies of exploitation continue regardless of who leads the state. While the MAS state faces the complex tensions I have described and must represent a spectrum of indigenous and nonindigenous constituents, in the end its entanglement with global capitalism appears to enable, if not justify, a renewed sacrifice of indigenous communities along with a renewed racist discourse.

The Wounded Indian Body

If in his efforts to push through a highway to support international commerce, Morales used classic racist tropes of the Indian, the right-wing opposition's reaction to the TIPNIS struggle was little better. First, it is important to note that by the time of the TIPNIS proposal, the civic committees in the eastern lowlands had lost most of their real power. During the Constituent Assembly in 2006 and 2007, they were able to mount a strong opposition platform and nearly brought the assembly's process to a standstill. At home, they were able to convoke huge public demonstrations in the streets pushing for departmental autonomy and increased shares of revenues from the hydrocarbon industries. At that apex, the Santa Cruz committee held a public meeting attended by a million flag-waving protestors. The civic committees were backed by the agribusiness sector, which feared that Morales's anti-neoliberal rhetoric meant the end of their successful export business.[7] But after a violent takeover of public buildings in what was called a "prefectural coup" in 2008 and then a bloody massacre of MAS supporters in the northeastern department of Pando the same year, the political fortunes of the lowland elites began to diminish. Their demands for autonomy lost further force after the passage of the new constitution, which instituted a form of departmental autonomy. Although lowland leaders complain that the new political structure does not give them enough local power (for instance, departments do not have authority to raise taxes), the substance of their demands was met. Two further blows decimated their strength as political actors. First, Morales negotiated a deal with agribusiness leaders, encouraging them to continue production without fear of nationalization or export bans. In essence, he realized how important the business sector was for food sovereignty as well as national income. This deal left the civic committees without their financial backers, so their protests now appear as toothless bluffing. Then, government agents uncovered a conspiracy to assassinate President Morales and traced the funding back to several prominent lowland, or *camba*, leaders. This tainted the entire civic committee with the possibility of terrorism.

In this weakened state, the civic committee has been forced to push its agenda by different means. Over the last few years, *camba* leaders have presented themselves as the victims of an authoritarian government set on destroying them through illegal and immoral acts. Nicole Fabricant and I have examined how *camba* activists have begun to frame their cause in human-rights terms, arguing that their political leaders are persecuted and exiled. They emphasize their victimhood by using social protests of the kind most often used by those with few political options, for instance, hunger strikes and posters of "disappeared" leaders (Fabricant and Postero 2013). While these acts garner them little sympathy from the highlands or at the national level, they have acted, as such forms of political protest often do, to foment solidarity among their followers.

The TIPNIS situation offered them a way to expand this strategy. When the 2012 TIPNIS march ended in defeat and CIDOB was taken over, CIDOB's leaders returned to Santa Cruz to the open arms of the civic committee. The TIPNIS/CIDOB encampment in the main plaza with its placards decrying government abuse echoed the *camba*'s messages of political persecution across the plaza. The civic committee held press conferences defending the TIPNIS protesters, drawing similarities between the highland migrants to Santa Cruz, who have colonized the rural zones, and the highland coca growers, who were ready to invade the TIPNIS. Many in Bolivia argue that the *camba* elites are cynically using the indigenous people to advance their own interests. While it is clear that the *civicos* are trying to breathe new life into their badly damaged movement with this alliance with the TIPNIS activists, what I draw attention to here is the way they are using a particular representation of indigenous people to do so. Like the MAS government, the opposition is using racial politics as a site of political pressure. And like the government, the Right is rewriting history and geography to create a new identity and a new place in Bolivian society. Ironically, it uses an old trope of powerless and wounded Indians to write itself into a new role: the protector of Indians.

This strategy was obvious at an August 2012 political rally in Santa Cruz staged by the civic committee. At the height of the assembly, *camba* leaders introduced a young indigenous leader from the rebellious communities in the TIPNIS. Reminding the audience of the violent attacks on indigenous marchers and all the sacrifices they had made during the 2011 march, the young leader called upon the *camba* public to join their struggle for justice and human rights. The crowd, many wearing "Defend TIPNIS" T-shirts, roared their approval. Using symbols evoking indigeneity and democracy, the civic leaders created a "representational field" where two bodies—the indigenous people (symbolically wounded by the highway crossing their community and physically wounded in the Chaparina attack) and the mestizo *cambas* (symbolically

wounded by being marginalized and persecuted by the nation-state)—are linked and condensed into a single struggle against a state that violates human rights. By doing so, this alliance legitimates the struggles of the *camba* elites because it associates them with the sacrifice and wounded bodies of the indigenous marchers (Fabricant and Postero 2014; Jones 2009).

Yet this surprising strategic political alliance also revealed the highly racialized power relations on which it was erected. At this rally and across the city that summer, Fabricant and I heard *cambas* supporting the TIPNIS protestors using sadly familiar paternalistic and colonial tropes. At the CIDOB vigil in the plaza, passersby gazed at posters of women and children marching in the cold mud of the Andes. They often expressed their admiration for these sacrifices necessary to protect their traditional way of life in the forest. "Sadly," one woman said, "when they enter civilization, that is when their degradation begins." Another said, "We have to defend them, they are ours. . . . If we let them, they [the *cocaleros*] will overcome them." Here we see how the sacrificed bodies of the TIPNIS indigenous people open the space so that the *camba* elite can play the role of benefactor and protector of the indigenous, who are evoked as childlike and backward. Using a human-rights framework, they re-represent themselves as allies in victimhood. This is truly ironic, given how the lowland elite have historically exploited indigenous labor in the haciendas and sugarcane plantations, often using violence to discipline the workers. But this truth is obscured by their newfound kinship with the "good Indians" who—like the *cambas*—are victims sacrificed to the MAS agenda.

Here, once again, we see how the enduring colonial and racist image of the Indian emerges as a tool for contesting larger political and economic battles. Yet these tropes produce new positions for those who use them in this period of transition. The *camba* elite, shaken from its position of privilege by the reordering undertaken by the MAS government, responded to the unfamiliar world by a phantasmagorical rewriting of history and re-remembering of the geographies of oppression. Like the Swedes whom Allen Pred (2000) described during the "hypermodern moment" of the late 1990s in Europe, the Bolivian right wing in this "plurinational" period project a reality in which others (the MAS state) are the racists and they are the upholders of law and democracy. Yet, as in Sweden, this "would-be" re-representation is belied by the situated practices of racism that escape the rhetoric.

Conclusion: The Open Question of Race

This essay explores the ways in which the remarkable transformations in Bolivia since Morales's election have shattered traditional structures of political power, restructured economic models, and challenged cultural constructs. In

the "process of change," as the MAS calls its agenda, everyday notions of belonging have been upended, as new geographies of power produce new subjects and meanings. With a new indigenous president and a new constitution enacting new valuations of indigeneity, the fields of force have radically changed. Yet old imaginaries and meanings of indigenous people haunt this period of change. This reality has forced Bolivians to confront multiple "disjunctures" of "behavior and meaning" similar to those that Allan Pred has described in his critical analysis of racisms in Sweden (2000, 20). As the decolonization process shakes up the old order of things, actors on all sides of the Indian Question have attempted to rewrite the narrative, using bits and pieces of the past, combined with new discourses of indigenous and human rights to suit their present agendas. As Pred and Watts have pointed out, "tradition" and "custom" often provide the symbolic raw material with which actors rework and refashion the meanings of capitalist transformations (Watts 1992, 15). These rewritings show the contingent nature of culture and especially of cultural identity, which can take on conflicting valences even for the same actors. On the one hand, we see Morales and his Vice-Ministry of Decolonization using folkloric notions of Andean customs and practices to create a generic but highly valued notion of indigeneity—a (would-be) hegemonic version of indigeneity that supports the MAS state's policies. On the other, Morales uses demeaning racist notions of the Indian as the obstacle to national progress when necessary to push his government's vision of national development, reverting to those "erosion-resistant" stereotypes that Pred has argued remain entangled with relations of domination and exploitation (2004, xi). The Right's reconstruction of the past is equally jarring, as *camba* leaders rewrite the geographies of exploitation and violence to refashion themselves as the benevolent protectors of the poor, sacrificed lowland Indians. Such responses arise in what Contreras refers to as the "fractured tectonics" of resistance to both the "colonial modern logos" and the neoliberal order, those spaces between the taken-for-granted past and the hoped-for emancipatory future (Contreras Natera 2013).

Working at the height of the neoliberal period in Europe, Allan Pred drew our attention to the ways racism emerged in the extended "moment of danger" when the meanings of hypermodern everyday life were repeatedly reconstituted and de-constituted, especially in conjunction with the restructurings of national capitalisms (2000, 8). The Bolivian case I have described here expands this insightful analysis to the current "post-neoliberal" period, where formerly subaltern actors are instituting a very different set of restructurings. In this long-awaited revolution, historical continuity appears just as salient as disjuncture. In plurinational Bolivia, so far, colonial relations of race can be reconfigured as indigenous people take power, but they have not disappeared—even though erasing them is the central goal of the state. While it is clear that the

MAS reforms are, in fact, making slow but significant improvements to Bolivian society, I suggest that the TIPNIS controversy demonstrates a troubling continuity: from the colonial period to the current moment, the extractivist development model continues to be structured around exploitation of indigenous bodies and lands. It is precisely in this moment of supposed "restructuring" that the situated practices of racism in place since colonial times reemerge in both traditional and new forms. Adapting Pred's analysis to this new era allows us to pry open the uncomfortable question of race in contemporary Bolivia. Yet, as Pred would have predicted, this question remains open, the site of continued disagreement and reworking.

NOTES

1. "Post-neoliberal" is a term used to describe the challenges to neoliberalism currently under way in Latin America, particularly in those countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, commonly termed the "Pink Tide." Most authors argue that this is a horizon rather than a reality and note the enduring neoliberal features even in these supposedly anti-neoliberal efforts. For a comparative review of this concept, see Goodale and Postero 2013; Escobar 2010.

2. *Camba* is a Guarani word used to describe a dark-skinned person tied by debt-peonage to a hacienda or plantation. The term has been appropriated and resignified by urban elites to refer to all people (including Europeans and mestizos) from Santa Cruz and other lowland regions (Fabricant 2009).

3. While much of the plan was never implemented, it gives us a clear idea of the ideology and discourses driving the MAS vision. This section draws from a longer analysis of the NDP in Postero 2013a.

4. The constitution was approved in a national referendum in November 2009. For analyses of the Constituent Assembly process, see Postero 2010; Schavelzon 2012.

5. This section draws from a longer analysis of the constitution and the Constituent Assembly in Postero, 2015.

6. Salvador Schavelzon (2012) develops this idea of majority and minority in his excellent analysis of the Constituent Assembly.

7. In fact, in 2008 the government temporarily banned the export of sunflower oil, after prices inside the country spiked (Schuttel et al. 2011).

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CHAPTER 11

Moving Targets and Violent Geographies

DEREK GREGORY

Modern war has always been a moving target. The trajectory from total war in Europe and beyond in 1914–18 through what James Gibson ([1986] 2000) calls America's "technowar" in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s to what I have called "the everywhere war" (D. Gregory 2011b) in the early twenty-first century reveals an extraordinary series of transformations in the nature and very meaning of war. And yet for all these convulsions, there is also an enduring sameness about modern war. Even as we are assured that later modern war has succeeded in limiting combatant and civilian casualties through its new modes of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), new weapons systems, and new modes of accountability, and even as new systems of medical evacuation and advances in military medicine have enabled the injured to survive wounds that in the past would surely have killed them, military violence continues to be registered on the frail, fleshy human body.

The intimate dialectic between the political technology of war and the human body was recognized by Walter Benjamin—one of Allan Pred's most vital sources of political and intellectual inspiration—in 1936. The storm clouds were already gathering over Europe, but Benjamin noted that a process set in train during the First World War had not halted:

> Wasn't it noticeable at the end of the war that men who returned from the battlefield had grown silent—not richer, but poorer in communicable experience? What ten years later was poured out in the flood of war books was anything but experience that can be shared orally. And there was nothing remarkable about that. For never has experience been more thoroughly belied than strategic experience was belied by tactical warfare, economic experience by inflation, bodily experience by mechanical warfare, moral experience by those in power. A generation that had gone to school on horse-drawn streetcars now stood under the open sky in a landscape where nothing remained unchanged but the clouds, and beneath these clouds, in a field of force of destructive torrents and explosions, was the tiny, fragile human body. (W. Benjamin [1936] 2002, 143–44)

As we approach the centenary of the First World War—once known as the Great War, "the war to end all wars," until Lt. Col. Charles Repington commit-

ted the shocking ordinal sequence to print in 1920—I explore the same dialectic at work in our troubled present. My focus is on the seemingly strange conjunction of supposedly "unmanned" aircraft being used to kill individual human beings: on a nonhuman or, more accurately, a more-than-human assemblage activated with the express intention to kill the only too human.[1] My argument is presented in two parts. First, I retrace the trajectory with which I began in order to establish a provisional genealogy of the drone—or, more technically, the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), unmanned aircraft system (UAS), or remotely piloted aircraft (RPA)—and inscribe its development within a concerted attempt to achieve "victory through air power."[2] The phrase is Alexander de Seversky's, a veteran of the First World War and a fervent advocate of military aviation in the Second, who in 1942 foresaw a future in which bombing would be conducted over such vast distances that intermediate bases—like the U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) bomber stations in Britain—would be unnecessary: "The entire logic of aerial warfare makes it certain that ultimately war in the skies will be conducted from the home grounds, with everything in between turned into a no-man's land" (De Seversky 1942, 138–39; see also Meilinger 1995).[3] Today's remote operations do take place (literally and violently so, as Pred would surely have reminded us) from the "home grounds," or what the United States now prefers to call "the homeland," against targets thousands of miles away. They are not carried out by the "inter-hemispheric super-bombers" of Seversky's dreams, however, but by far smaller, slower, and strictly limited-capability Predators and Reapers. Even so, the expansive prospect conjured up by Seversky requires me to address not only genealogy but also geography, so in the second part I set out the ways in which drones have redrawn the increasingly indistinct contours of later modern war.

Genealogies of the Drone

Drones have multiple applications for "dirty, dangerous, or difficult" work, many of them civil rather than military, but it is their use as vectors of military violence that concerns me here.[4] The United States uses them in networked attacks, sometimes as "eyes in the sky" for conventional strike aircraft or ground troops, but much of the contemporary debate revolves around their direct role in targeted (or "extrajudicial") killing. Yet targeted killing from the air has a longer history than most commentators think. According to Chateaubriand, during the French invasion of Russia in 1812 the military governor of Moscow devised a secret plan in which a rotor-wing-powered hydrogen balloon "was to float above the French army, pick out the Emperor among his thousands, and fall on his head in a shower of fire and steel" (Chateaubriand 1848). Quite how

the balloonists were to identify Napoleon "among his thousands" at Borodino was never clear—positive identification continues to be a problem for today's remote operators—but in any case the wings of the airship ruptured in a trial run, and Count Rostopchin was forced to abandon the project.[5]

It was an arresting and, as it happens, an arrested beginning: assassination was not on the minds of the first artificers of remote aerial operations, who envisaged destruction on a far greater scale. Many, perhaps most, flight innovations were the stuff of fiction before being turned into fact. In 1909, no doubt inspired by H. G. Wells's *The War in the Air*, which had been published the previous year, Walter Booth's short science-fiction film *The Airship Destroyer* showed an airship attack on Britain. The film fed off and into the invasion scare of the prewar years. After counterattacks by aircraft had failed, Booth showed the airship finally destroyed by a ground-to-air "torpedo" controlled by wireless. The film had limited success until it was re-released at the height of the Zeppelin raids on Britain, but in 1910 British engineer Raymond Phillips spectacularly combined and reversed Booth's two plot devices. He used a twenty-foot model Zeppelin to demonstrate a wirelessly controlled "aerial torpedo" before an entranced audience at the London Hippodrome. The *New York Times* reported, "He claims to be able, sitting at a transmitter in London, to send a dirigible balloon through the air at any height and almost any distance. He can load his balloon with dynamite bombs, he claims, and without leaving his office can send it over a city and wipe the city out" (1910). He told his audience, "I don't want to brag, but I feel sure that if England purchases my aerial torpedo she will make short work of the enemy's fleets and cities in any future war. Why, I can sit in an armchair in London and drop bombs in Manchester or Paris or Berlin" (*New York Times* 1910).

Given the first city on his list, it is scarcely surprising that there should have been questions about navigation. Asked how he would know that his airship was over "the town [he] purpose[d] to destroy," Phillips replied that he might work with a large-scale map or a "telephotographic lens which, being en rapport with a reflector placed before the operator, would show him the country over which the airship flew." Offering his invention to the British government, he predicted, "It will do away altogether with existing methods of warfare" (*New York Times* 1910).[6]

One of Phillips's rivals in the audience spotted a weakness in the system. "I believe that it would be possible for another operator to interfere with Mr Raymond Phillips' control," speculated Harry Grindell Matthews, using what one newspaper called "hostile electric currents," and he predicted that he could, "by manipulating an instrument of [his] own, compel it [the airship] to turn round and return to the place from which it was sent."[7] The two men agreed to



FIGURE 11.1.
Illustration of airships titled "Torpedoes of the Air: Bomb-Droppers Directed by Wireless," *Illustrated London News*, September 6, 1913.

a duel between their devices, and although I have been unable to find any record of the outcome, Phillips was evidently undeterred. In September 1913 the *Illustrated London News* devoted a whole page to "torpedoes of the air"—what it called "bomb-droppers directed by wireless"—and its drawing (figure 11.1) was based on materials provided by Phillips (*Illustrated London News* 1913).

A year later both sides in the First World War were using aircraft. Orville Wright had always believed that the most immediate market for the new flying machines would be the military, but even though there had been several commercially sponsored bombing competitions before the war, he maintained that the primary function of military aircraft would be "scouting," not "bomb-dropping" (*New York Times* 1917).[8] They were first used for direct observation and aerial photography, but later and larger aircraft bombed targets on the battlefield and also towns and cities in Britain, France, and Germany, while Zeppelins carried out a series of bombing raids against the British mainland. Despite Phillips's offer, however, the military showed little interest in such seemingly outlandish ideas as a remote-controlled aerial torpedo. The exception was the "Aerial Target" project led by Archibald Low at the Royal Flying Corps' Experimental Works at Feltham and then at Brooklands. Low had been

working on an electronic range finder for the artillery, but the new project put his remote skills to work in a radically different direction.[9] The code name was a deliberate deception because the plan was to develop a pilotless aircraft as a flying bomb rather than a target drone, which would be guided by wireless from an accompanying manned aircraft to attack Zeppelins and ground targets. Six prototypes were constructed in 1916–17, but their degrees of success varied from zero to minimal, and none of them saw combat.[10]

Long-range strategic bombing came into its own during the Second World War, particularly by RAF Bomber Command and the U.S. Army Air Force against targets in Germany, Italy, and occupied Europe and in Japan. The Allies experimented with long-distance navigation systems like Gee, which used radio pulses transmitted from ground stations in Britain to guide the aircraft, and Oboe, which used radar pulses transmitted back to the ground stations to track the aircraft and locate the bomb release point. The use of ground stations was a significant advance, but these supported remote navigation, not remote control systems. There were also attempts to use onboard imagery from ground-scanning H2S and higher frequency H2X radar to fix the target, but in most instances these were insufficiently accurate to convert area bombing into precision bombing. Air strikes were planned and executed within a photocartographic imaginary whose high-resolution, high-altitude photography and specially constructed target maps turned cities into opaque abstractions that had both affective and analytical force in making bombing possible (D. Gregory 2011a; Fedman and Karacas 2012).

It was not until the dog days of the war that the USAAF toyed with unmanned systems. Its ill-fated Project Aphrodite planned to use war-weary Flying Fortresses and Liberators, both heavy bombers but now stripped of ancillary equipment and packed with high explosives, which—once the U.S. Navy's Special Attack Unit came onboard—were to be guided onto their targets from an escort aircraft using television cameras mounted in their noses and remote ("robot") control. Like Low's Aerial Target, these too were flying bombs—the project was developed in July 1944 to attack the hardened launching sites for the V-1 rockets that had started to rain down on Britain that summer—and, as Benjamin and Phillips had recognized, there is an important difference between torpedoes and flying bombs that can be used only once and drones that can be used over and over again. But the focal importance of Aphrodite lies in its reliance on a real-time visual feed to guide the aircraft's remote-control system. Although only fifteen, unsuccessful missions were flown against the launch sites and an expanded target list that included submarine pens and other targets inside Germany before the project was abandoned in January 1945—Lt. Gen. Jimmy Doolittle complained that it had been put together "with

baling wire, chicken guts and ignorance"; Gen. Henry Arnold remained enthusiastic and asked for further research into remote-controlled, television-assisted aircraft (Crane 1993, 78–85; Boyne 2010; HW 2012).[11] He was convinced these new devices would "fly over enemy territory and look through the leaves of trees and see whether they're moving their equipment." "I see a manless air force," Arnold told his chief scientific advisor, and on VJ-Day he predicted that "the next war may be fought by airplanes with no men in them at all" (Sherry 1987, 187). At a press conference three days later, he pressed home the claim: "One year ago we were guiding bombs by television, controlled by a man in a plane fifteen miles away. I think the time is coming when we won't have any men in a bomber" (Shalett 1945; Sherry 1987, 15).

It is not hindsight to see this determination to enlist new technologies of vision in the service of what Sherry sees as a "dehumanized" mode of military violence as a precursor to today's remote operations. But the way forward was far from clear; remote operations require more than visual feeds, and it was twenty years before another vital series of way stations opened up. During its air wars over North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the American military continued to rely on conventional-strike aircraft. During the Rolling Thunder campaign from 1965 to 1968, fighter-bombers attacked specified targets in North Vietnam, for example, while long-range B-52 bombers from Guam and later Thailand conducted pulverizing Arc Light missions over target boxes in the South (a new kind of area bombing ridiculed by one critic as "bombing forests"). The B-52 crews saw nothing of what was happening on the ground beneath them; bombing became a deadly form of applied geometry in which the aircrew "sitting in their air-conditioned compartments more than five miles above the jungle" saw it merely as "a familiar technical exercise." They "knew virtually nothing about their targets," the *New York Times* reported, "and showed no curiosity." "We're so far away," one of them explained, that "it's a highly impersonal war for us" (Treaster 1972). This presents a sharp contrast to remote operations over Afghanistan and Pakistan, as we will see, but in concert with these conventional air strikes, the military also developed three elements that prefigured the technical infrastructure in which remote operations would subsequently be embedded. These were a system of close-in, real-time aerial reconnaissance from slow, propeller-driven aircraft, whose core principles approximated today's "pattern of life" analysis but without the formal algorithms or advanced network analysis; television-guided reconnaissance drones launched from Hercules transport aircraft, which at first produced only still images but which later transmitted real-time video feeds; and a remote networked sensor-shooter system ("the electronic battlefield") that used seismic and sonar sensors, relay aircraft, and an early visual display terminal

to dispatch bombers to interdict movement along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.[12] The three elements remained separate, but they would eventually be brought together in an integrated hunter-killer system.

The challenge was to develop these elements so that ISR and lethal strikes could be executed from the same remote platform. The prospect was demonstrated with stunning clarity in 1983, when the Israel Defense Forces showed American general P. X. Kelley a videotape of his secret tour of the bombed U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in October that same year. A small drone circling out of sight had captured imagery of the visit with the general's head displayed in the crosshairs (Chamayou 2013, 44). The Marines were more interested in image capture than targeted killing, however, and over the next decade several joint ventures between Israeli Aircraft Industries and U.S. aerospace companies provided a stream of small battlefield reconnaissance drones for the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Navy. The U.S. Air Force remained absolutely committed to conventional aircraft, and no attempt was made to arm these remote platforms by the other services. That project emerged on an altogether different track. In 1977, Abraham Karem, a former Israeli Air Force engineering officer who had also worked for Israeli Aircraft Industries on its drone program, immigrated to Los Angeles, and by 1981 his fledgling company had successfully tested a prototype radio-controlled drone called the Albatross. It turned out to be a prophetic name. Karem's work attracted the attention of the Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), but the U.S. Army and Navy were so dismayed at the difficulty of fitting sophisticated sensor systems into the aircraft that they withdrew from the project.[13] Karem set about developing a bigger, heavier, and in many ways less advanced version for a putative export market, the GNAT-750, but this was a desperate commercial strategy that failed to save his company. In 1990 Hughes Aircraft bought Leading Systems Inc. and then sold it to General Atomics, which retained Karem and his development team. Five years later the project finally achieved commercial success when the CIA purchased its first two GNAT-750s to monitor events over what was fast becoming the former Yugoslavia (*Economist* 2012; Whittle 2013).

CIA Director James Woolsey recalled those early test flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina with something approaching wonder: "I could sit in my office, call up a classified channel and in an early version of e-mail type messages to a guy in Albania [the location of the Ground Control Station] asking him to zoom in on things" (Finn 2011).[14] Even so, the utility of those early transmissions was limited, and even as the GNAT-750 was deployed, its design was being developed into a new platform, the RQ-1 Predator, which incorporated three major modifications. The original intention had been to provide still imagery and text interpretation, but this was replaced by real-time motion video in

color (by day) and infrared (by night). A more serious limitation was range; the GNAT-750 could operate only 150 miles from the ground-control station because it relied on a C-band line-of-sight data link. The CIA experimented with using relay aircraft to expedite data transmission—the same solution that had been used for the "electronic battlefield" along the Ho Chi Minh Trail—but the breakthrough came with the use of the Ku-band satellite system, which dramatically increased the operational range. The upgrade had been tested in the United States and was retrofitted to Predators in Europe in August 1995. Although data was then rapidly transmitted across the Atlantic, the key intelligence nodes were still in Europe, like the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) at Vicenza in Italy, and the drones were still controlled from ground stations within the region, at first from Gjader in Albania and later from Tazar in Hungary. In fact, the crews were remarkably detached from the wider mission, and their communications with actors and agencies outside the ground stations were highly constrained. The vulnerability of these "austere" sites, close to the theater of operations, together with the experimental status of the project, limited access to secure networks, communications, and databases (Cullen 2011). A third, no less revolutionary innovation was the installation of an onboard global positioning system (GPS); early target imagery had to be geo-located using a PowerScene software program, but the introduction of satellite-linked GPS made a considerable difference to the speed and accuracy of targeting (Kozaryn 1996).[15]

Four of the aircraft were flown by the U.S. military for the CIA, but the U.S. Army had become the lead service for Predator operations, and in response the U.S. Air Force activated its own UAV unit, the Eleventh Reconnaissance Squadron, at Indian Springs Auxiliary Field (since renamed Creech Air Force Base) near Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada in July 1995. These interservice rivalries were significant—Thomas Ehrhard notes that the Predator's capabilities lay "between the Army's battlefield range and the Air Force's preferred altitude and speed comfort zone" (Ehrhard 2010, 255; see also Ehrhard 2000)—and the trick would eventually be to link the two in integrated air-ground operations. But the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia was originally restricted to an air campaign, and while the CIA and the USAF supplied real-time imagery from their drones, the air strikes against Serbian targets were carried out by conventional strike aircraft. It was a similar story when NATO acted against Serbia's assault on Kosovo in 1999. Both army and air force drones were used to provide imagery for air strikes, and there were determined attempts to use the real-time video feeds to "compress the kill-chain": to contract the time between target identification and target execution by relaying imagery to a small group of analysts in the United States and from the CAOC to forward air controllers in the theater of operations

so that they could choreograph the strikes. But the delay in image transmission was still long enough for Serbian tanks and troops to move before the fighter-bombers arrived. This prompted the air force to equip its Predators with laser designators so that they could "paint" the targets for the strike aircraft, but the conflict ended before they could be used (Newman 2002; Boyne 2009).

Still, hunter and killer were now integrated, but they remained separate platforms. In February 2001 at Nellis Air Force Base, the air force successfully test-fired a Hellfire-C laser-guided missile from a Predator, but it was the CIA that became the lead agency in what its director George Tenet called "an interagency effort to fully develop the capabilities of the armed Predator" (reclassified as the MQ-1). This aircraft had its first operational deployment in October 2001 in Afghanistan.[16] The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan relied on barrages of sea-launched cruise missiles and intensive high-altitude bombing, and Predators continued to provide ISR and post-strike damage assessment, supplying real-time video feeds to U.S. Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida, to the CIA in Langley, Virginia, and to the Pentagon.[17] As the war ground on, eventually in parallel with the U.S.-led war in Iraq, the main function of the MQ-1 (and later its faster and deadlier offshoot, the MQ-9 Reaper, which came into service in September 2007) became the provision of close air support to ground forces, often in cooperation with conventional strike aircraft. This was not the preserve of the CIA, so the air force assumed responsibility and ratcheted up its combat air patrols from these platforms.[18] Its pilots and sensor operators continued to be seconded to the CIA, however, and on their return in 2002–3, they successfully argued that the primary execution of remote missions should be consolidated at Nellis and Indian Springs, which would expand and enhance crews' access to secure intelligence and analysis capabilities (Cullen 2011). This marked the beginning of "remote split" operations; the aircraft would continue to be stationed in or close to the theater of operations, and there would still have to be a forward deployed "launch and recovery" crew, but all other mission tasks could be handled from the continental United States using fiber-optic cable and a Ku-band satellite link.

The network thus became more elaborate and the targeting cycle more detailed. Video was fed to specialist image analysts through the Distributed Common Ground System in the United States and to senior commanders and military lawyers at the Combined Air and Space Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, who oversaw each strike, while the targeting process was refined to include more advanced software programs for collateral damage estimation and weapons selection (D. Gregory 2011c, 2013d).

But the CIA did not leave the field; it had its own interest in hunter-killer missions. The agency had a murky record of clandestine assassination in

Central America and Southeast Asia. Its paramilitary role had been most visible in the Phoenix Program during the Vietnam War, and the question that preoccupied the White House, Langley, and the Pentagon was whether a different "bird" could emerge from the ashes.[19] The answer was to take another leaf from Israel's playbook. The IDF had openly resumed targeted killings in the occupied Palestinian territories since the start of the second intifada in September 2000, and many of the assassinations had been carried out by attack helicopters and F-16 aircraft.[20] In early 2001, the U.S. State Department had vigorously condemned the program, but in the wake of 9/11 all bets were off. Was it now possible to conduct a new type of clandestine warfare using drones?

At first, the CIA continued to make the running, and the first CIA-directed targeted killing took place outside the war zone and over a year later, in Yemen in November 2002. The target was Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, one of what were then just seven "High Value Targets" who had been identified by the CIA's Counterterrorism Center. Harethi was described as "a senior al Qaeda operative" suspected of being involved in the bombing of the USS *Cole* in the Gulf of Aden in October 2000. Five other men traveling with him were killed in the strike, which was carried out in concert with President Saleh and his own intelligence agency by a Predator armed with two Hellfire missiles flying from Djibouti (just three hundred miles across the Gulf) under the operational control of the CIA's Special Activities Division. As Lt. Gen. Michael DeLong explained, the U.S. Air Force carried out the attack. At the time, DeLong was deputy commander at U.S. Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa:

> Tenet calls and said, "We got the target." . . . I called General Franks [commander of CENTCOM]. Franks said, "Hey, if Tenet said it's good, it's good." I said, "Okay . . . I'm going down to the UAV room." . . . We had our lawyer there. Everything was done right. I mean, there was no hot dog. . . . The rules of war, the rules of combat that we had already set up, the rules of engagement ahead of time. Went by them. Okay, it's a good target. . . .
>
> I'm sitting back . . . looking at the wall, and I'm talking to George Tenet. And he goes, "You got to make the call?" These Predators had been lent to him, but the weapons on board were ours. So I said, "Okay, we'll make the call. Shoot them." (DeLong 2006)[21]

This was, as Seymour Hersh observed, a manhunt (2002).[22]

It was a slow start. It was more than eighteen months later before the focus of the CIA's drone program switched to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan, which remained the main hunting ground for the next decade.[23] The United States regarded the borderlands as an extension of

the battle space in Afghanistan, and the number of High Value Targets slowly increased along with the number of strikes. The coincidence of the battle spaces was eventually marked by the designation "AfPak," a cavalier term proposed by U.S. Special Representative Richard Holbrooke in 2008, but the CIA's priorities had already been signaled by the creation of a Pakistan-Afghanistan Department within its Counterterrorism Center.[24] After the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, President Bush expanded the target list beyond al-Qaeda to the Taliban and other "nexus" targets and increased the tempo of attacks; by the end of 2008 there had been forty-six drone strikes in Pakistan. Even so, the CIA did not have a monopoly on targeted killing. The Pentagon had developed its own "Joint Prioritized Effects List" for time-sensitive "aerial strikes against enemy leadership targets" as part of its counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan (Garrett 2008, 12–17). But ever since that first drone strike in Yemen, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had been determined to edge out the CIA—as Jeremy Scahill puts it, he had "no interest in being the support team"—and he decided to promote a revitalized and expanded Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) as the leading edge of U.S. counterterrorism too (Scahill 2013, 54–60).[25] JSOC became notorious for its "night raids" by ground forces, but it also included an air force component, and Dana Priest and William Arkin have claimed that the CIA's targeted killing campaign "paled in comparison to the size of the drone war being waged abroad by the U.S. military, mainly through JSOC and mostly in Afghanistan" (Priest 2011, 202–20). The plan was to develop a still more clandestine form of what Steve Niva calls "a modular form of war that could be delinked from the conventional military battlespace and extended across new cartographies" (2013, 196).[26]

My narrative has been highly selective, but it does show that the history of drones cannot be separated from the wider matrix of military and paramilitary violence in which they have been embedded. The history of bombing is a crucial part of the story because it describes the emergence of a political technology of long-distance and stand-off killing that followed no single line of descent. In the course of its development, a series of technologies—each with its own affordances and dispositions—was assembled that eventually joined "hunter" and "killer" in a networked assemblage and sometimes in the same aerial platform. As that union occurred, and as an integral part of the formation of an intrinsically political armature for these new technologies, the lines between military and intelligence agencies became blurred, and new complicities between different states emerged in the shadows of these already shadowy wars. Even as so-called strategic bombing continued to take its toll on terrified populations, however, these new technologies also made it possible to contract the radius of violence—though not necessarily of terror: those "living under drones" in the FATA and elsewhere report a pervasive sense of

fear induced by the persistent presence of Predators and Reapers in the skies overhead (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic 2012)—through the new capacity to put "warheads on foreheads" (Mulrine 2008).[27] In one tremendously powerful sense, the target remained unchanged throughout all these transformations: it was still the human body. But the eyes of the new hunter-killers are now directed at particular bodies (not areas or boxes), so, as I must now show, embedded in these remote operations is a series of distinctive geographies.

Geographies

There are four compound geographies through which drone operations are executed. The first set might be bundled together as "homeland security" since they are all located within the continental United States. The U.S. Air Force describes its remote operations as "projecting power without vulnerability"; the suite of four aircraft that constitute a combat air patrol involves 192 personnel, and most of them (133) are located outside the combat zone and beyond immediate danger (figure 11.2).[28] This is risk-transfer war with a vengeance, where virtually all the risks are transferred to populations overseas (M. Shaw 2005).[29]



FIGURE 11.2. U.S. Air Force infographic, "CAP Requirements: Single 24/7/365 MQ-1/9." United States Air Force / public domain.

Those who live in the attack zones often criticize drone strikes as cowardly, but the fact that those flying these online missions do not put their own lives on the line has also sparked a series of domestic debates about military ethics and codes of honor. These have traditionally invoked a reciprocity of risk that gave war what Clausewitz saw as its presumptive moral force: to kill with honor, the soldier must be prepared to die. Now the remote warrior is still the vector of violence but no longer its potential victim (Chamayou 2013, 139–50; see D. Gregory 2013c).[30]

Indeed, some critics have ridiculed the drone crews as "cubicle warriors" who merely "commute" to war (Royakkers and Van Est 2010). Their remotely piloted aircraft can remain in the air for at least eighteen hours—some have recorded flights of more than forty hours—and this requires them to work in shifts of ten to twelve hours and to alternate between home and work. Many of them report considerable difficulty in this interdigitation. As in previous wars, crews of conventional aircraft are forward deployed at varying distances from the conflict, and when they return to their bases at the end of a mission, they remain within a military space that enables them to maintain focus and "psychic integrity." The same is true for forward-deployed launch and recovery crews, but it is much harder for crews of Predators and Reapers in the United States, who, as one of them put it, "commute to work in rush-hour traffic, slip into a seat in front of a bank of computers, fly a warplane to shoot missiles at an enemy thousands of miles away, and then pick up the kids from school or a gallon of milk at the grocery store on [their] way home for dinner." He described it as living "a schizophrenic existence between two worlds"; the sign at the entrance to Creech Air Force Base announced, "You are now entering CENTCOM AOR [Area of Operations]," but "it could just as easily have read 'You are now entering C. S. Lewis's *Narnia*' for all that my two worlds intersected" (Martin and Sasser 2010, 44–45).[31] "The weirdest thing for me," one pilot admitted, is "getting up in the morning, driving my kids to school and killing people" (Blackhurst 2012).[32] Another confirms "the peculiar new disconnect of fighting a telewar" from "a padded seat in American suburbia" and commuting home "always alone with what he has done" (Bumiller 2012; see also Hurwitz 2013).[33]

In George Brant's play *Grounded* (2013), a pilot describes her shock at the switching: "We'll be working in shifts, tapping each other out and taking the controls. A never-ending mission. Home will be training too. Getting used to the routine. Driving to war like it's shift work. Like I'm punching the clock. Used to transition home once a year. Now it'll be once a day. Different. Definitely different."

She finds it increasingly difficult to maintain the separation—to decom-

press—and gradually and ever more insistently one space keeps superimposing itself over the other; the fixed, precise sensor of the Gorgon Stare yields to a blurred vision in which the pilot finds it increasingly difficult to know where (or who) she is. The two worlds begin to become one: the desert on the night drive home from Creech starts to look like the grayed-out desert landscape in Afghanistan, and the face of a little girl on the screen, the daughter of a High Value Target, turns into the face of her own child (Brant 2013).[34]

Brant's play is all the more powerful because public attention has been, I think, no less artfully orchestrated so that it does not make that connection. When critics of CIA-directed drone strikes in Pakistan and elsewhere demand to know about their legal basis, about the rules and procedures that are followed, the government diverts the public gaze from Waziristan to Washington. Madiha Tahir (2012) has noted how what she calls the Obama administration's "theatrical performance of faux secrecy" over its drone war in the FATA—a teasing dance in which the veil of official secrecy is deliberately let slip once, twice, three times—functions to draw its audience's entranced eye toward the American body politic and away from the Pakistani bodies on the ground. It has been a hideously effective sideshow, in which Obama and an army of barkers and hucksters—unnamed spokesmen "speaking on condition of anonymity" because they are "not authorized to speak on the record," and front-of-house spielers like Harold Koh and John Brennan—induce not only a faux secrecy but its obverse, a faux intimacy in which public debate is focused on transparency and accountability as the only "games" worth playing.[35] Yet when you ask people who live under the drones what they want, Tahir continues, "They do not say 'transparency and accountability.' They say they want the killing to stop. They want to stop dying. They want to stop going to funerals—and being bombed even as they mourn. Transparency and accountability, for them, are abstract problems that have little to do with the concrete fact of regular, systematic death" (2012).[36]

The second set of geographies turns on the strange connection that makes these "remote split" operations possible. Killing at an ever-increasing distance is a leitmotif in the history of war, and American aviator Charles Lindbergh saw it as the very diagnostic of modern war, where "one kills at a distance, and in doing so does not realize that he is killing." Far from imagining "writhing, mangled bodies" on the ground below, he wrote in 1944, it was like "viewing it on a motion-picture screen in a theater on the other side of the world" (Lindbergh quoted in Sherry 1987, 209–10). Many commentators have argued that Lindbergh's metaphor has been realized—and radicalized—in today's drone wars. Certainly killing is now conducted over an even greater distance and is not only projected onto but also executed *through* a screen. Several crit-

ics insist that distance increases indifference, though there is a longer warrant for this than many of them realize. In his *Lettre sur les Aveugles* (1749), Denis Diderot asks: "Do we ourselves not cease to feel compassion when distance or the smallness of the object produces the same effect on us as lack of sight does on the blind?" His question resonates through the much later history of bombing; one RAF Bomber Command veteran of World War II surely spoke for countless others when he admitted, "Those sparkling lights on the velvet background, they weren't people to me, just the target. It's the distance and the blindness which enabled you to do these things" (Harold Nash in Taylor and Davidson 2004, 447; see also D. Gregory 2013d). The difference today is that the video feeds from the drones have removed the blindness, but critics insist that the sense of detachment is not only retained but in fact heightened by the screen itself, which they say reduces military violence to a video game and inculcates a "Playstation mentality" among its perpetrators (Alston 2010; Cole, Dobbing, and Hailwood 2010; see also Grossman 1995).

But matters are considerably more complicated. Today's video games are profoundly immersive, and the high-resolution full-motion video feeds from the drones allow crews to claim time and time again that they are not thousands of miles from the war zone but just eighteen inches away: the distance from eye to screen. The sense of optical proximity is palpable and pervasive. Crews are often required to track someone for weeks, even months: "We see them playing with their dogs or doing their laundry. We know their patterns like our neighbors' patterns. We even go to their funerals" (Abé 2012). In consequence, the same officer suggested that "war somehow becomes personal," while another insisted that he and his colleagues "understand that the lives we see in the screens are as real as our own" ("We Are Predator" 2013). Journalist Mark Bowden (2013) echoes these sentiments. "Drone pilots become familiar with their victims," he writes, watching them "in the ordinary rhythms of their lives—with their wives and friends, with their children." What he calls "the dazzling clarity of the drone's optics" means that "war by remote control turns out to be intimate."

This "rush to the intimate" has become increasingly focal to many military operations, and here—as elsewhere (D. Gregory 2008)—it is violently invasive and thoroughly conditional. Those conditions are revealing. Most obviously, crews can see without being seen, and Grégoire Chamayou has argued that "the fact that the killer and his victim are not inscribed in 'reciprocal perceptual fields' facilitates the administration of violence" (2013, 167) because it ruptures what psychologist Stanley Milgram in his experiments reported in *Obedience to Authority* has called "the experienced unity of the act" (Milgram 1974, 39). The physical separation between an act and its consequences is clearly radicalized

in remote split operations, but it is also dispersed across the network as senior officers, military lawyers, image analysts, and ground commanders all scrutinize the video feeds from the Predators and the Reapers. This distributes "the personal" in such a way that for most crews it also becomes more *im*personal.[37] The technology is "mesmerizing," reporter Mark Benjamin concedes, but "it also makes the process of killing another human being eerily impersonal" (M. Benjamin 2008). This happens because the video feeds display what Harun Farocki calls "operative images" that "do not represent an object but are *part of an operation*" (2004, my emphasis). The "impersonality" of the operation is not a function of the technology alone: what matters is, precisely, its incorporation *into* a process—a standard operating procedure—and a chain of command that is both techno-scientific and quasi-juridical. The conjunction is crucial. Eyal Weizman notes that the software programs used for collateral damage estimation, for example, activate a calculative instrumentality that works not only to operationalize but also to justify what is to be done: in short, "violence legislates" (2012, 12).[38] Killing is conducted under the sign of military Reason, which invests the process with a seriousness of purpose that is expressly designed to minimize emotional response. This is compounded by an intrinsically visual economy that invests the operation with a peculiarly truncated meaning. As Nasser Hussain (2013) observes, sound shapes images, and in this case "the lack of synchronic sound renders it a ghostly world in which the figures seem unalive, even before they are killed. The gaze hovers above in silence. The detachment that critics of drone operations worry about comes partially from the silence of the footage." It takes crews from six to twelve months to absorb the technical mediations that sustain remote split operations, so that "you put yourself more and more in the position that this is more and more real life and that you are actually there," as one sensor operator told Omer Fast, but over the same period, he continued, "you become emotionally distant" (Fast 2012, 100). And here, in a different interview, is the same officer who earlier spoke of war becoming more "personal": "I would couch it not in terms of an emotional connection but a . . . seriousness. I have watched this individual, and regardless of how many children he has, no matter how close his wife is . . . I am tasked to strike this individual. The seriousness of it is that I am going to do this and it will affect his family" (Wood 2013). This form of invasive, irruptive intimacy—a "voyeuristic intimacy," Matthew Power (2013) calls it—militates against any identity with those whose lives are under surveillance. They remain obdurately other, as one female pilot made plain when she said "she didn't want to be like the women in Afghanistan she watched—submissive and covered from head to toe" (Abé 2012). But this sense of difference is the product of more than cultural estrangement; it also flows from a techno-cultural hermeneutics

of suspicion. When drone crews are called upon to provide close air support to ground troops, their sensory geography expands because they become immersed not only in video feeds but also in a stream of radio communications and online messaging with ground commanders via MIRC. In this way they establish what Col. Kent McDonald of the USAF School of Aerospace Medicine describes as a "virtual relationship" with troops on the ground that is impossible for those others who necessarily—and sometimes accidentally—remain purely optical signatures (Bumiller 2011).[39] It is, within obvious limits, a reciprocal relationship from which others are completely excluded. As another officer explained, "Those employing the system are very involved at a personal level in combat. You hear the AK-47 going off, the intensity of the voice on the radio calling for help. You're looking at him, 18 inches away from him, trying everything in your capability to get that person out of trouble" (McCloskey 2009).[40] And after a successful strike troops message or sometimes e-mail the drone crews: "They would want to just say, 'Hey, thanks, man'" (Bumiller 2011). "Intimacy" is thus cultivated within a culturally divided field—a different sort of remote split—in which crews are interpellated to identify so closely with their comrades-in-arms that they are predisposed to interpret every other action, which is to say every Other action, as hostile or sinister, sometimes with disastrous consequences for the innocent.[41] My point is not that military investigations of civilian casualties often cite "human error rather than machine malfunction"—which is true enough and carries its own diminished sense of moral agency—because the terrain of miscalculation is not mapped by the traverse from one to the other; it is also produced by the operative function of a techno-cultural system whose dispositions facilitate such outcomes.[42] "Of course persons use technological instruments," Judith Butler reminds us, "but instruments surely also use persons (position them, endow them with perspectives, establish the trajectory of their actions); they frame and form anyone who enters into the visual or audible field, and, accordingly, those who do not" (2010, xi; Holmqvist 2013; see also Suchman, forthcoming).

In contrast to close air support, when crews work from the Joint Prioritized Effects List—or in the case of CIA-directed air strikes from the "disposition matrix" approved by the Counterterrorism Center (Kleidman 2012; Miller 2012; see also Cobain 2013)—the presumption of innocence has already been removed. Matt Martin's description of the normative change in targeting is revealing. "I doubted whether B-17 or B-29 pilots and bombardiers of World War II agonized over dropping tons of bombs over Dresden or Berlin," he claimed about the killing of a target known as "Rocket Man" in Sadr City, "as much as I did over taking out one measly perp in a car." The crew deliberated because they "had to be cautious with a shot in this neighborhood to avoid killing a bunch

of people who didn't necessarily deserve to be killed" (Martin and Sasser 2010, 50–53).[43] But the casual appeal to the vernacular of law enforcement—"We finally got the perp!"—is by no means exceptional and is embedded in the administrative apparatus that authorizes targeted killing and also in the more general juridification of the kill chain. Military lawyers insist on maintaining what they term a "visual chain of custody" throughout "the prosecution of the target"; they are Defense attorneys, not defense attorneys, and these formularies evidently weigh the scales against those who are caught in the militarized field of view.[44]

These considerations intersect with a third set of geographies that circle around targeted killing, which, it must be remembered, is not the only function carried out by drones. Neither is it exclusively executed by them, as Russian dissidents in London and Iranian scientists in Tehran have discovered to their cost. But many commentators have argued that the involvement of drones in targeted killing threatens to transform the locus and meaning of war itself. The "battlefield" denotes both a physical space and a normative space. Its physical deconstruction has been accelerating since at least the First World War, when bombing redrew the contours of killing so dramatically that Giulio Douhet could confidently declare that in the future, "the battlefield will be limited only by the boundaries of the nations at war, and all of their citizens will become combatants, since all of them will be exposed to the aerial offensives of the enemy. There will be no distinction any longer between soldiers and civilians" (Douhet [1921] 1988, 10; see also Hippler 2013).[45] Drones have now dissolved even those physical limits. One of the central foreign policy questions that confronted the Bush administration, and since pursued with undiminished ferocity by its successor, was fighting "war in countries we're not at war with," and drones have routinely and repeatedly transgressed the borders of belligerent states in pursuit of their transnational hunter-killer missions: most notably in the course of the "covert" war in Pakistan (Ryan 2011).[46] But in stark contrast to Douhet's grim prognostications about remapping the normative space of war—which have been dismally confirmed by every strategic bombing campaign from the First World War on (Tanaka and Young 2010)—drones are supposed to have reinforced the principle of distinction. Their protagonists claim that their persistent presence and heightened capacity for surveillance guarantee an unprecedented compliance with the requirement under international humanitarian law to discriminate between combatants and civilians (Lewis and Crawford 2013; see also Beard 2009).[47] The debate is necessarily both a substantive one—over numbers killed and wounded—and a semantic one over the boundaries between combatant and civilian in irregular warfare.[48] But it is underwritten by a normative problematic, even a "nomos" in something like

the sense of a spatial ordering proposed by Carl Schmitt, because at the heart of the American response to 9/11 lies what Frédéric Mégret sees as "a deliberate attempt to manipulate what constitutes the battlefield *and to transcend it in ways that liberate rather than constrain violence*" (2012, 148; my emphasis). This amounts to a concerted project to transform one of the central registers of the imaginary of war into the *individuation* of killing (Issacharoff and Pildes 2013a; 2013b). Practically and rhetorically, individuation sanitizes the battlefield: publics are no longer confronted by images of the widespread destruction caused by the area bombing of cities or the carpet bombing of villages in the rainforest. "This isn't Dresden," I've been told time and time again, as though that is the appropriate standard against which to judge the contemporary conduct of war. These strikes against individuals are punctuation points in what Jeremy Scahill calls "dirty wars" that "liberate violence" by threatening to turn the whole world into a battlefield (2013, 173).

In conventional wars combatants are authorized to kill on the basis of what Paul Kahn calls their corporate identity: "The combatant is not individually responsible for his actions because those acts are no more his than ours. . . . Warfare is a conflict between corporate subjects, inaccessible to ordinary ideas of individual responsibility, whether of soldier or commander. The moral accounting for war [is] the suffering of the nation itself—not a subsequent legal response to individual actors" (2013, 214). The enemy can be killed no matter what she or he is doing (apart from surrendering). There is no legal difference between killing a general or killing his driver, between firing a missile at a battery that is locking onto your aircraft or dropping a bomb on a barracks at night. "The enemy is always faceless," Kahn explains, "because we do not care about his personal history any more than we care about his hopes for the future" (2013, 215). Combatants are thus vulnerable to violence not only because they are its vectors but also because they are enrolled in the apparatus that authorizes it: they are killed not as individuals but as the corporate bearers of a contingent (because temporary) enmity. But now, insofar as military force is directed against specific individuals on the basis of determinate acts that they have committed or, by preemptive extension, are likely to commit, this inaugurates a different political subjectivity through which, as we have seen, the enemy is transformed into the criminal. "The criminal is always an individual," Kahn notes; "the enemy is not" (2013, 216).

This situation has at least four implications for the geography of military violence. First, individuation transforms the very contours of intelligence, so much so that Peter Scheer (2013) suggests that "the logic of warfare and intelligence have flipped, each becoming the mirror image of the other." As targets have contracted to individuals, so intelligence gathering has swollen to incor-

porate data-mining and interception on a global scale. It is naturally difficult to connect the dots in much detail, but the global intrusions of the National Security Agency in particular have been extensively documented by journalist Glenn Greenwald using classified information from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. "Boundless Informant," one of the agency's Global Access Operations, is evidently a high-level cover set for a host of interconnected systems that together map an increasingly vital dimension of the everywhere war. Pakistan emerges as a major focus of covert surveillance, where a High Value Target of particular interest has been Hassan Ghul, al-Qaeda's chief of military operations. A series of intercepts provided NSA's Counter-Terrorism Mission Aligned Cell (CT-MAC) with a "vector" for the compounds used by Ghul as he moved about the FATA—in effect, a set of safe houses—and eventually an e-mail from his wife was intercepted that contained sufficient information to fix the real-time coordinates for a drone strike near Mir Ali in North Waziristan that killed him and two companions on October 1, 2012 (Greenwald and MacAskill 2013; Miller, Tate, and Gellman 2013). In this case, and no doubt many others, the space of the individual-as-target is an instantiation of what Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge call "code/space," a space produced and activated by software, whose spatiality is "simultaneously local and global, grounded in certain locations but accessible from anywhere across the network" (2012, 17).[49]

Second, individuation requires an adjudicative apparatus to positively identify, detect, and prosecute the individual-as-target, and this has reinforced the operational juridification of military violence. "That is, to the extent that someone can be targeted for the use of military force (capture, detention, killing) only because of the precise, specific acts in which he or she as an individual participated, military force now begins to look more and more like an implicit 'adjudication' of individual responsibility" (Issacharoff and Pildes 2014). The traditional distinction between military and police operations, one ordering "the outside" and the other ordering "the inside," has already been destabilized through the catchall invocation of the "security forces," but this has now been rendered even more permeable by what Chamayou calls a "state doctrine of non-conventional violence" that combines elements of military and police operations without fully corresponding to either: "hybrid operations, monstrous offspring [*enfants terribles*] of the police and the military, of war and peace" (2013, 51).[50] These new vectors of state violence traverse the borders in both directions, inward and outward, and in Kahn's horrified eyes represent "statecraft as the administration of death." Neither warfare nor law enforcement, he concludes, "this new form of violence is best thought of as the high-tech form of a regime of disappearance" (2013, 226).

Third, individuation refers to the *technical production* of an individual as an

artifact of targeting separated from the exploded fleshiness that flickers briefly on the Predator's video screen. She or he is someone who is apprehended as a screen image, a network trace, and a sensor signature, and the individual-as-target that results is doubly artificial, at once constructed and constricted. High Value Targets are named and made the object of "personality strikes"—although in Afghanistan many of them have been nexus targets with only proximate associations to senior Taliban or al-Qaeda fighters—but most targeted killings are "signature strikes" against anonymous ("faceless") subjects (Heller 2013). They are brought within the militarized field of vision through the rhythmanalysis and network analysis of a suspicious "pattern of life," a sort of weaponized time-geography, whose grammar of execution has been dissected by Joseph Pugliese with forensic skill:

> The military term "pattern of life" is inscribed with two intertwined systems of scientific conceptuality: algorithmic and biological. The human subject detected by drones' surveillance cameras is, in the first scientific schema, transmuted algorithmically into a patterned sequence of numerals: the digital code of ones and zeros. Converted into digital data coded as a "pattern of life," the targeted human subject is reduced to an anonymous simulacrum that flickers across the screen and that can effectively be liquidated into a "pattern of death" with the swivel of a joystick. Viewed through the scientific gaze of clinical biology, "pattern of life" connects the drone's scanning technologies to the discourse of an instrumentalist science, its constitutive gaze of objectifying detachment and its production of exterminatory violence. Patterns of life are what are discovered and analyzed in the petri dish of the laboratory. (Pugliese 2013, 193–94; see also Bell 2012a, 2012b)

Killing is made the culmination of a natural history of destruction, and the targets are rendered as "individuals" in a calculative rather than corporeal register. Any others who are incidentally killed in the course of a strike almost always remain unidentified by those responsible for their deaths, "collateral damage" whose anonymity confirms on them no individuality but only a collective ascription (T. Gregory 2012). And by fastening on a single killing—through a "surgical strike"—all the other people affected by it are removed from view. Any death causes ripple effects far beyond the immediate victim, but to those who plan and execute a targeted killing, the only effects that concern them are the degradation of the terrorist or insurgent network in which the target is supposed to be implicated. Yet these strikes also, again incidentally but not accidentally, cause immense damage to the social fabric of which she or he was a part—the extended family, the local community, and beyond—and the sense of loss continues to haunt countless (and uncounted) others.[51] Amnesty

International documented a strike near the village of Ghundi Kala in North Waziristan on October 24, 2012, for example, and included an annotated photograph showing the position of Mamana Bibi's family who were working in the fields with her when she was killed.[52] Nobody has explained why the grandmother was targeted, but her son, comforting her grieving grandchildren who were traumatized by what they saw on that bright afternoon, explained: "She was the string that held our family together. Since her death the string has been broken and life has not been the same. We feel alone and we feel lost" (Amnesty International 2013, 18–23).[53] More generally we need to ask, with Madiha Tahir, what does it do to someone to live among the rubble, to have to negotiate a sense of loss that is both deeply personal and irredeemably social? The same question has haunted the history of bombing for a hundred years, of course, but its gravity is not diminished by substituting Predators and Reapers for Lancaster bombers and Flying Fortresses (Tahir 2013).

Fourth, individuation impels the war to go wherever the individual-as-target goes. This is dynamic targeting with a vengeance. The logic of the manhunt is one of pursuit and evasion, Chamayou argues, of predator and prey, in which one advances and the other flees (Chamayou 2013, chap. 6; 2012; 2011). In Afghanistan-Pakistan this has become a *danse macabre* in which insurgents cross the border into Afghanistan at the start of the fighting season in the spring and retreat to their sanctuaries in Pakistan at the end of the summer. But the space of military and paramilitary violence is no longer circumscribed by any battlefield or discontinuous war zone: the locus of targeted killing is defined by the fugitive presence of the enemy-prey. These are not alternatives, of course, and U.S. counterinsurgency and counterterrorism work together. Its "kinetic" (deadly force) operations deploy drones in firefights with insurgents in Afghanistan and in targeted killing in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. But there is an important distinction between the two. As Kahn explains, lethal force can legally be used against enemies because of their status: this is the logic of war sanctioned by international humanitarian law (sometimes called the law of armed conflict). But lethal force can only be used against a suspected criminal after a "showing of dangerousness": this is the logic of law enforcement governed by international human rights law. The American legal rationale for its targeted killing program blurs the two. The Obama administration insists that international humanitarian law is the operative legal armature for the use of lethal force in its counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns, but it has also invoked what its legal officers have called an "elongated" concept of imminence to extend the temporal envelope within which targeted individuals are deemed to pose a threat to the United

States: its justification then becomes one of self-defense.[54] This is also an argument about the spatial envelope of targeted killing, because the emergence of transnational armed conflict between states and nonstate actors as a dominant modality of later modern war relocates killing on uncharted legal terrain in which the target is contracted to the individual human body even as the field of military violence expands to encompass the globe. Chamayou describes this as a dialectic between specification and globalization. "The zone of armed conflict, fragmented into micro-scale kill-boxes, reduces itself in the ideal-typical case to the single body of the enemy prey: the body as the field of battle," while "because we can target our quarry with precision, the military and the CIA say in effect, we can strike them wherever we see fit, even outside a war zone" (2013, 86). It is the prospect of a global hunting ground produced through and punctuated by "mobile zones of exception" that so deeply disturbs most critics (Pugliese 2011, 944).

These considerations feed directly into a fourth set of geographies that map what Ian Shaw calls a "Predator Empire" in which, according to Fred Kaplan, the world becomes "a free-fire zone" (I. Shaw 2013; F. Kaplan 2013). The signs are not difficult to see. By March 2011 the U.S. Air Force's Predators and Reapers had flown one million combat hours, and by October 2013 those hours had already doubled. In January 2012 the Pentagon committed to increasing its armed drones by 30 percent, as part of a "leaner and more agile" military capability, and mandated the air force to mount sixty-five regular combat air patrols by 2014 with a capacity to "surge" to eighty-five. Remote split operations have already expanded from Creech Air Force Base to several other air bases in the continental United States, and the United States has deployed drones in conflicts and "overseas contingency operations" in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen.

But some cautions are in order. Shaw's "Predator Empire" convenes "the strategies, practices and technologies arranged around the deployment of drones for targeted killings," but this is to contract the functional space of their use in assassinations (2013, 5). And yet it also extends their reach: "Everywhere and nowhere, drones have become sovereign tools of life and death" administered through what Shaw calls "an expanding geography of drone bases" (2013, 14). His gazetteer is derived from Nick Turse (2011), whose "secret empire of drone bases" lists more than sixty sites. Yet more than half of them are *within* the continental United States and far from what he calls the "foreign jewels in the crown" (some of which look very much like paste to me). Perhaps this does not matter very much; the purpose of remote operations is precisely to project power from "the homeland." But we are still a long way from Seversky's

nightmare vision of "inter-hemispheric super-bombers" with which I began. These hunter-killer platforms have a comparatively short range—770 miles for a Predator and 1,150 miles for a Reaper—so they have to be based close to the theater of operations, hence those forward-deployed launch and recovery crews. The Pentagon is involved in various experiments designed to increase operational flexibility, which include launching drones from aircraft carriers or collapsing drone bases into a cargo container so that they can be deployed rapidly and launched within four hours of their arrival (Reed 2013a).[55] But in their present and near-future forms these are not weapons of global reach (the United States already has terrifying capabilities for that and is developing others like Prompt Global Strike, which is intended to deliver a conventional missile attack anywhere in the world within one hour).[56] These platforms are also remarkably limited in the theaters in which they can be used. They are slow—the cruising speed of a Predator is around 84 mph, a Reaper 230 mph—and far from agile, so they are vulnerable to air attack, and they fly at altitudes that bring them within the range of antiaircraft defenses, so they cannot operate in "A2AD" (anti-access/area denial) battle spaces.[57] In September 2013, Gen. Mike Hostage, commander of USAF Air Combat Command, described them as "useless in a contested environment," and even allowing for the collision between contrasting visions of air power, these limitations surely make it difficult to see Predators—even as placeholders—as the advancing edge of American Empire (Reed 2013b).[58] This is not to dispute the palpable reality of American imperialism, whose military map is made up of more than a thousand bases around the world. Neither is it to deny its unprecedented attempt to establish a triple-canopy system of global surveillance that includes unarmed drones like the Global Hawk (McCoy 2012).[59] But its military power, and its capacity for unrivaled military violence, is vested in far more than its Predators and Reapers.

This does not mean that we can turn a blind eye to their development and deployment. Many other states already have or are actively developing a military drone capability; most of these platforms are unarmed, but since they can be used in networked warfare to direct conventional strike aircraft, the distinction is not as reassuring as it might seem (O'Gorman and Abbott 2013).[60] And as drone technology becomes less expensive, the prospect of nonstate actors using drones to launch attacks becomes ever more likely (Dunn 2013).[61] But Kaplan's "free-fire zone," with its reinscription of one of the most wretched devices of the Vietnam war, seems overdrawn too. What I have described as "the everywhere war" is also a *somewhere* war, and when the United States uses armed drones to take its war outside the zones of declared hostilities, it

is always to some of the most vulnerable and defenseless populations on earth whose own governments often turn out to have been complicit in exposing them to death (D. Gregory 2011b).

Mat(t)erialities

This has been a report from a rapidly changing field. There is an ever expanding suite of peaceful uses for unarmed drones, and even those that I have described here are, like other modern military systems, embedded in a series of nominally civilian technologies that most of us take for granted (see Turse 2008). In fact, it is precisely the ways in which armed drones—their technologies, visualities, and dispositions—have become part of everyday life that needs the closest scrutiny. Artists have led the way in interrogating these developments and, in particular, the visualities that attend them (Van Veeren 2013; see also Delmont 2013; Harger 2013). James Bridle (2012) puts it well: "We all live under the shadow of the drone, although most of us are lucky enough not to live under its direct fire. But the attitude they represent—of technology used for obscuration and violence; of the obfuscation of morality and culpability; of the illusion of omniscience and omnipotence; of the lesser value of other people's lives; of, frankly, endless war—should concern us all" (see also D. Gregory 2013f). It is here, too, that the "remote split" that characterizes these operations is at its most insidious. In the United States, public debate has fastened on the summary power of the president to authorize the assassination of American citizens and the threat to domestic privacy posed by surveillance drones; even those who probe the legal-administrative apparatus through which the Obama administration conducts its targeted killings focus attention on Washington, while those who investigate the practice of remote operations concentrate on air bases in the continental United States. These are all important issues, but we should be no less concerned at the ways in which drones have turned other lifeworlds into deathworlds. I understand why Roger Stahl (2013) complains that the media fascination with the lives of drone pilots artfully domesticates war, reinscribing the logic of the national security state and inviting the reader-viewer to move easily "from the kitchen to the cockpit." But the interdigit(al)ization of war and peace has a still wider geography. Here is photojournalist Noor Behram (2012), who has spent years bravely documenting the effects of drone strikes on his native North Waziristan: "This was like any other day in Waziristan. Coming out of the house, witnessing a drone in the sky, getting along with our lives until it targets you. That day it was in the morning and I was at home playing with my children. I spotted the drone and started filming it with my camera and then I followed it."

This needs an even wider-angle lens. As I have shown, it is a serious mistake to abstract drones from the history of bombing (indeed, the Pakistan Air Force also carries out air strikes in the FATA) or from the present grim reality of ground war. Drones have undoubtedly made a difference in the conduct of later modern war, and we desperately need to attend to what Elspeth van Veeren (2013) calls "the sensible politics of drone warfare"—by "sensible" she means, I think, acutely and insistently material—but neither their genealogy nor their geography can be severed from the matrix of military and paramilitary violence of which they are but a part. And that matrix should remain the primary target of critical analysis and political action.

NOTES

I am extremely grateful to Trevor Barnes, Craig Jones, and Michael Smith for their comments on a draft of this essay.

1. Cf. Shaw and Akhter 2012. Walter Benjamin did not quite anticipate this conjunction, but in the third version of "The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technical Reproducibility," he used "the remote-controlled aircraft which needs no crew"—this was also written in 1936—to juxtapose its technology of experimental, endless repeatable procedures that made the minimum possible use of human beings with a much older political technology that was its dialectical opposite: human sacrifice. Grégoire Chamayou develops the comparison in relation to drone warfare in his *Théorie du drone* (2013, 121–29); I have commented on his argument in "Sacrifice, Suicide and Drones" (2013e).

2. There are good reasons to prefer the technical terms I've listed here, but "drone" has become so entrenched in contemporary debates that I will revert to the popular usage.

3. The book was turned into a rabidly racist film by Walt Disney, advocating the wholesale destruction of Japan from the skies. The film, unlike the print version, had little public success when it was released in June 1943, but Disney was undeterred and Bugs Bunny was enlisted as an enthusiastic reader of the book in Disney's *Falling Hare* later that year. The history of bombing, remote or otherwise, is a profoundly racialized one, and its intersections with popular culture have played an important role in its public acceptance.

4. My focus is on drones operated by the U.S. Air Force, sometimes as part of Joint Special Operations Command, and on those directed by the Central Intelligence Agency. These are primarily medium-altitude long endurance (MALE) platforms like the Predator and the Reaper. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps operate drones too, but these are typically much smaller and unarmed. Their main function is to provide real-time intelligence for close combat and attack by ground troops, and their speed, range, and altitude are correspondingly much lower than the Predator or the Reaper. They include the hand-launched Raven and the trailer-launched Shadow. In 2010 the

army deployed a developmental version of its Gray Eagle to Afghanistan—an upgraded Predator—and its full operational deployment started in 2012.

5. There are several versions of the story, which I discuss in "A Shower of Balls" (2012b).

6. Phillips insisted that his invention would be far cheaper than an artillery bombardment: "Every time a big naval gun is fired £300 is spent. But for £300 I can make, equip and dispatch to any distance three wireless-controlled airships carrying huge quantities of explosives." And unlike any shell or naval torpedo, which once used was "usually gone beyond recovery," Phillips could "bring back [his] aerial torpedoes as soon as they have done their work, load them with a fresh cargo of bombs, and send them out again." Similar (though not unassailable) economic arguments have been made for the use of drones today.

7. The same fear haunts today's remote operations. Unencrypted video feeds from Predators have been intercepted by insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, and control signals to the aircraft are also vulnerable to GPS spoofing (see Paganini 2013).

8. On prewar bombing competitions, see D. Gregory 2012a. When the United States finally entered the war, Wright conceded that bombing the Krupp Gun Works in Essen—"only about 150 miles from the present lines of battle"—made sound strategic sense, but he also insisted that bombing over greater distances was still impracticable. "I have never considered bomb dropping as the most important function of the airplane, and I have no reason to change this opinion now that we have entered the war" (*New York Times* 1917).

9. On one reading, it was not so very different. Insisting that "there's nothing categorically new about the drone phenomenon," Tom McCarthy points precisely to the use of aircraft to range artillery on the western front: "In World War I aerial observers used wireless to range remote ordnance onto remote targets. With drones, of course, the observer/ranger doesn't even need to be above the battlefield, but that's just an extension of distance, an expansion of scale" (McCarthy quoted in Fast 2012, 47). Although McCarthy concatenates several issues in this passage, his point is a sharp one. He argues that war, then as now, was "networked, threaded with technologies and given over to geometries and spaces that exceed us" (McCarthy quoted in Fast 2012, 47); I discuss these themes in relation to McCarthy's novel *C* and the First World War in D. Gregory, 2015, "Gabriel's Map."

10. In March 1914, Low had successfully demonstrated an early version of television, and the *Times* reported that "if all goes well with this invention, we shall soon be able, it seems, to see people at a distance"—a capability that, over fifty years later, would be integral to the USAF's experiments with reconnaissance drones over North Vietnam. As the *Times* continued, it was an open question "whether Dr Low will be regarded as a benefactor, or the opposite." But Low never linked his two projects (see Hare 2011; Warne 2012).

11. For a full discussion, see Schultz 2007, 193–249. In another parallel with today's operations, the radio remote-control system could not handle takeoffs, so volunteer crew took the aircraft up two thousand feet, where they handed control to operators

in the "mother ship" before parachuting to safety. The final report on the project concluded that the system "should be used as a tactical rather than a strategic weapon," with a launching base "well forward" and guided from a ground-control station. Without a "mother ship" to guide the aircraft, the short-lived Operation Willie Orphan experimented with radar stations, radio beacons, and ground controllers.

12. This was still area bombing. As the officer responsible for the system explained, "We are not bombing a precise point on the ground with a point target bomb—we can't determine each truck's location that accurately with ground sensors, which are listening—not viewing—devices. Since we never actually 'see' the trucks as point targets, we use area-type ordnance [including napalm and cluster bombs] to cover the zone we know the trucks to be in." For a detailed discussion of these elements and their subsequent integration, see D. Gregory 2013d, 41–69.

13. DARPA had other irons in the fire. In the 1970s it had commissioned two prototype drones, Praere and Calere, based on the work of John Stuart Foster that promised to combine reconnaissance and strike capabilities. A series of weapon systems was spun off from this early work; one set led to the development of so-called smart bombs and missiles like the JDAM, but Fred Kaplan argues that "something close to Foster's vision finally materialized in the mid-1990s" with the Predator (2013).

14. For the role of the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology in the development of the Predator, see Strickland 2013.

15. One of the first two GNAT-750s crashed on approach in California during CIA trials. Of the four Predators that were initially deployed to Bosnia, described as "an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration," at least one was shot down (some reports claim two) because the drones were not equipped with the radar required to see through dense cloud cover, which forced them to fly at low altitudes, where they became easy targets for Serbian ground fire; another was made to crash when it lost power over Bosnia (drones continue to be vulnerable to cloud and bad weather; Risen and Vartabadian 1995; Ernst 1996; Hansen 1997; Dixon 2000).

16. These were not the first Predators over Afghanistan. In September 2000 they were deployed from a base in Uzbekistan in a joint mission directed by the CIA to boost the search for Osama bin Laden.

17. For the consequences of the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan during the invasion of 2001 and the occupation that followed, the work of Marc Herold is indispensable: http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold. For operational details, see Ripley 2011.

18. It takes four UAVs to maintain a single Combat Air Patrol CAP, which requires the platform to be on station twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, so-called persistent presence. In 2004 the U.S. Air Force's Predators and Reapers supported just five CAPs; by 2006 this had grown to eleven, by 2008 to thirty-three, by 2010 to forty-eight, and by the end of 2012 to sixty (all figures include Afghanistan and Iraq). These raw numbers do not capture the increase in real-time ISR, because over the same period the capacity of the onboard sensors increased dramatically, particularly with the introduction of wide-area airborne surveillance. Hence the danger of "swimming in sensors, drowning in data."

19. For a critical history, see Valentine 1990; for a revisionist account, see Moyar 1997. President Gerald Ford banned "political assassinations" in 1976, and President Jimmy Carter extended the ban to all assassinations and to U.S. contractors and proxies.

20. Drones were used to provide ISR for many, perhaps most of these attacks, and by August 2006 Israel Aircraft Industries were working on using them to "close the sensor-to-shooter chain," but the first documented case of an armed drone carrying out a targeted killing was on the first day of Operation Cast Lead, December 27, 2008, near Gaza City (see Blumenfeld 2006; B'Tselem, n.d.).

21. Everything may have been "done right," but in this particular case—for all the apparent concern about authorization—killing was made commonplace, even casual. When asked, "What does it feel like when you know you're going down there to kill somebody?" DeLong replied: "It's no different than going to the store to buy some eggs; it's just something you got to do" (DeLong 2006).

22. The same language was used by Bush and Rumsfeld to characterize the central operations of the "global war on terror" (see also Mazzetti 2013b, 85–87; Scahill 2013, 75–80). Mark Mazzetti (2013b)reports that when Saleh granted permission, "he seemed proud that Yemen would be the first place outside of Afghanistan that the CIA was preparing to use the Predator."

23. The first strike in the FATA took place in South Waziristan on June 18, 2004, with the full support of President Musharaff's government, when Nek Muhammad, a Taliban commander knowingly misrepresented by the United States as an "al Qaeda facilitator," was killed along with four of his companions. In fact, he had been marked by Pakistan and its Inter-Services Intelligence Agency as an enemy of the state, and his death was the price the CIA agreed to pay Islamabad for its tacit consent to "covert" drone strikes in the FATA (Mazzeti 2013a; 2013b, 103–9).

24. By 2011 the CIA had created an equivalent department for Yemen and Somalia (Miller and Tate 2011).

25. Rumsfeld was staunchly supported by Vice President Dick Cheney. The lines between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism have become as blurred as those between the U.S. military and the CIA; for a discussion see Bell and Evans 2010; the transition from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency that they identified has arguably been reversed since then.

26. "More clandestine" because the CIA operates under Title 50 of the U.S. Code, whereas JSOC (like the rest of the U.S. military) operates under Title 10, and no congressional notification of its actions is required. For an aggressive defense of JSOC's legal warrant and of Title 50 by the former senior legal adviser for Special Operations Command, see Wall 2011.

27. Unlike the bombing grounds of the Second World War, there are no air-raid warnings, no antiaircraft defenses, and no air-raid shelters in the FATA.

28. There are forward-deployed launch and recovery crews who handle takeoff and landing, still through a C-band line-of-sight link, before handing off the missions to U.S.-based crews via a Ku-band satellite link to a ground station at Ramstein Air Base in Germany and a fiber-optic cable across the Atlantic to the United States; given the

technical problems that continue to dog what Jordan Crandall has described as "the wayward drone," there are also large maintenance crews in theater to service the aircraft. For a rare account of the life of crews on a four-month rotation at one of these forward operating bases (Kandahar), see Blackhurst 2012. Some combat missions have also been flown by crews based in Afghanistan and Iraq.

29. Martin Shaw makes no mention of drones and emphasizes risk-transfer war as a general characterization of later modern war. In fact, advanced militaries have always sought to engage in asymmetric warfare—this is not confined to their struggles with rag-tag, nonstate actors—in the sense that they clearly prefer to overwhelm their opponents through technological superiority.

30. Grégoire Chamayou is extremely effective at exposing the masculinist virtues (and virilities) written into these codes; for more on the "un-manning" of UAVs, see Manjikian 2014.

31. In a still more surreal (and astonishingly imperial) gesture of compartmentalization, when Robert Kaplan visited Creech he was told, "Inside that trailer [a shipping container serving as the Ground Control Station] is Iraq; inside the other, Afghanistan" (2006, 81).

32. Notice that it is not the killing that is so strange—which is, after all, what these officers are trained to do—but rather its almost visceral proximity to everyday life.

33. For a detailed analysis of the conditions of work for drone crews, see Asaro 2013.

34. Like Omer Fast's *5,000 Feet Is the Best*, the fictional status of the work should not blind us to its obvious "grounding" in a careful reading of interviews with and reports of real drone crews.

35. Koh served as the State Department's legal adviser; Brennan made most of his statements as deputy national security advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism before becoming director of the CIA in March 2013.

36. There is in any case another objection to the siren calls for "transparency and accountability." Fleur Johns insists that these notions toy with fantasy because it is exceptionally doubtful whether international law has ever been able to provide the sort of vigorous scrutiny the critics demand of it. "The latest technology for automated killing is, it seems, to be matched by an equally obscure, remotely operated technology of control programmed to render transparent a power perpetually located elsewhere" (Johns 2013, 6).

37. The network also distributes responsibility: "The responsibility for the shot could be spread among a number of people in the chain: pilot, sensor, [Joint Terminal Attack Controller], ground commander. That meant no single one of us could be held to blame" (Martin and Sasser 2010, 212).

38. "It is the very act of calculation—the very fact that calculation took place—that justifies their action" (Weizman 2012, 12). Reciprocally, international law works to establish what Madiha Tahir calls "the proper order of violence" (2012).

39. Regarding "accidentally" remaining optical signatures, I am thinking of the "friendly fire" incident—the first of its kind involving a drone—in which video from a Predator circling over a firefight near Sangin in Helmand province in Afghanistan in

April 2011 captured a U.S. Marine and a Navy corpsman whose infrared signatures were mistakenly interpreted as hostile; both men were killed by a Hellfire missile (MacAskill 2011; Laster and Iannota 2012).

40. Dave Grossman suggests that a sense of accountability to comrades-in-arms is a powerful means of overcoming resistance to killing (1995, 90, 149–50).

41. I describe one such incident in Uruzgan province in Afghanistan in February 2010, in which twenty-three civilians were killed and more than a dozen wounded, in "Lines of Descent" (D. Gregory 2013d), and I provide a more extended analysis of this and other attacks in "Angry Eyes" (D. Gregory, forthcoming). The subsequent investigation faulted the Predator crew involved for inaccurate reporting.

42. Cf. Packer and Reeves 2013, 324. Neta Crawford (2013) emphasizes the importance of widening the focus from individual to collective moral responsibility.

43. Martin also describes the target list as a "BOLO" sheet (Martin and Sasser 2010, 82), using the standard U.S. police abbreviation for "Be on the Look-Out" for a person wanted in connection with a crime. Another senior pilot "likened the job to what he's seen of cop movies and stakeouts" (McGinn 2013).

44. These modalities preclude what Joseph Pugliese describes as a "general system of exchange" between the hunter-killer apparatus "and its anonymous and unsuspecting victims, who have neither a right of reply nor recourse to judicial procedure" (2013, 209).

45. That this was a Euro-American anxiety bears emphasis. In 1932, the British high commissioner in Iraq was still insisting that "the term 'civilian population' has a very different meaning in Iraq from what it has in Europe" so that European sensibilities about civilian casualties there were literally misplaced: "The whole of its male population are potential fighters," he explained, "as the tribes are heavily armed" (Satia 2006, 23). The same grotesque rationale was still in action seventy years later during the wars in the shadows of 9/11.

46. "The remote-control nature of unmanned missions enables politicians to wage war while claiming we're not at war" (Hastings 2012).

47. There is a tortuous genealogy to the legal protections afforded to civilians during military conflicts (Kinsella 2011; Crawford 2013).

48. Regarding the debate over numbers killed and wounded, in Afghanistan there are no separate figures for casualties caused directly by drone strikes, but since drones are also used to provide the "eyes" for attacks carried out by conventional strike aircraft or helicopters, any count would be difficult to interpret. There are no satisfactory figures for the supposedly clandestine strikes carried out by drones in Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia either, but the most reliable estimates have been provided by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/blog/category/projects/drones.

49. Kitchin and Dodge (2012) do not discuss these military instantiations that convert the lifeworlds conjured up by their subtitle into so many deathworlds, but their astute discussion of software and what they call "everyware" invites a forensic dissection

of a twenty-first-century "everyware war" that is about far more than the cyberwar that has attracted so much concern.

50. Cf. Bell, Bachmann, and Holmqvist 2014.

51. These network effects are a standard trope in later modern bombing. When the IDF in Gaza or the U.S. military in Iraq claim that they "only" bombed a power station and deliberately chose to do so at 2:00 a.m. when only a small night staff would be in the building, they are being disingenuous. They know very well that with a power station out of action water can't be pumped, sewage can't be treated, food can't be refrigerated, hospitals can't operate—so that the effects of the strike ripple out from the initial point of impact in both space and time. The target has been chosen to minimize the immediate apprehension of the strike while maximizing those ripple effects that are displaced in time, space, and public consciousness (see Weber 2005).

52. "'Will I Be Next?' U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan," Amnesty International, 18–23, accessed March 18, 2015, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/security-and-human-rights/drones/will-i-be-next. The annotated photograph appears on page 19.

53. There have been several attempts to discredit Amnesty's report, including Michael Lewis's (2013) suggestion that this particular strike was carried out by a Pakistan Air Force F-16. It is perfectly true that the people of the FATA live under the threat of drone strikes and PAF strikes (see D. Gregory 2013a, 2013b). But both are common enough for people to tell the difference. The attack was not carried out by helicopters or strike aircraft, Mamana Bibi's grandson explained, describing their different sounds: "I know the difference."

54. I cannot begin to do justice to these arguments here; for a summary see T. Gregory 2013, and for a more extended discussion with different conclusions, Lewis 2012. The salience of international human rights law was one of the central objections raised by Philip Alston in his capacity as U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions (see Alston 2011).

55. The "box" contains eighteen pallets to ship two partly disassembled MQ-1 Predator aircraft, missiles, and control equipment, which is to constitute a "rapid reaction fleet" provided by the U.S. Air Force to Special Operations Command. The system has been deployed twice since 2012, but it has proved difficult to adapt the model for the larger Reapers (Reed 2013a).

56. The RQ-4 Global Hawk *is* a long-range surveillance drone, but it is unarmed, and in 2011 the U.S. Air Force withdrew from future acquisitions and transferred its early models to other agencies. It currently operates twenty RQ-4s, but after vigorous lobbying from Northrop Grumman Congress overrode air force objections and instructed the Pentagon to add another three to its fleet.

57. "Anti-access" includes long-range measures designed to keep an armed force out of an operational zone, while "area denial" involves short-range measures to restrict freedom of maneuver within an operational zone. A2AD is not new, but when the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) released their Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) in January 2012, they insisted that present and emerging technological conditions have radically

changed its terms: "Deploying forces will find themselves at risk at ever greater ranges" (A2), and less advanced militaries and even nonstate actors can now significantly impede maneuver (AD). Releasing the JOAC, the chairman of the JCS explained that A2AD is "a defining characteristic of today's operational environment"; it is likely to assume even greater importance during the Obama administration's "pivot to Asia." Forward bases are central to the counterstrategies proposed by the JCS, but drones are listed only once, in relation to AD—shorter-range capability—and in concert with conventional weapons systems, cyberattacks, and special forces operations (see U.S. Department of Defense 2012; Tozer 2012).

58. Hostage called for the Pentagon to abandon its mandated plan for the "surge" in the air force's Combat Air Patrols conducted by drones (Reed 2013b).

59. Alfred McCoy was writing before Edward Snowden's revelations about the National Security Agency disclosed the scale and sophistication of the surveillance of telecommunications on both sides of the Atlantic.

60. Rob O'Gorman and Chris Abbott (2013) compare the present situation to the First World War and the transition of military aircraft from reconnaissance to fighting and bombing.

61. Other commentators are more skeptical about the proliferation of armed drones, not least because they depend on a limited supply chain for a systems architecture that can activate the techno-industrial "ecosystem" required for their distant operation (Gilli and Gilli 2013).

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CHAPTER 12

A Bronx Chronicle

CINDI KATZ

> The city [is] a mnemonic for the lonely walker: it conjures up more than his childhood and youth, more than its own history.
> —WALTER BENJAMIN, "The Return of the Flâneur"

Allan Pred was an explorer of "topographical consciousness"—the shape of experience, the architectonics of memory, and the intertwining of memory and history, personal landscapes and geography, biography formation and place making, and place-making biography (Pred 1984; Demetz 1978, xvii). The sedimentations of place are not just what's in place, but also our fleeting encounters with what's there and what's missing, what was, what wasn't, what we imagined, what we dreamed, what we once found and what we have lost, what we hoped to find, what we excavated and what we buried. Geography, like history, is not fixed but drawn forth and made and remade every day. The sedimentations of place are archives that hold all these material social relations and practices, available for excavation and repositories of the new. A walker in city and country, Allan was always alive to the astounding encountered by chance amid the routine.

> *It isn't that the past casts its light on what is present or that what is present casts its light on what is past; rather, an image is that in which the Then [and There] and the [Here and] Now come together into a constellation like a flash of lightning. (Walter Benjamin cited in Pred 1995, first epigraph)*

Memory, like history and geography, is not fixed but is also made, as it were, by the present. Walter Benjamin was fascinated as much by the process of remembering as by his own memories, a fascination I share. Allan was more other-directed in his explorations of consciousness formation and place, less interested in Benjamin's idea of remembrance as a "capacity for endless interpolations into what has been," (Benjamin 1978, 16) and more attentive to the endless interpolations of history and geography, and what's at stake in the particular ways they shoot through and shape each other. How remembering, as situated practice in a particular but constantly shifting present, can shatter everyday taken for granted sensibilities.

To remember, according to Benjamin reflecting on Proust, is to "open the

fan of memory." But, he cautions, one "never comes to the end of its segments; no image satisfies him, for he has seen that it can be unfolded, and only in its folds does the truth reside; that image, that taste, that touch . . . remembrance advances from small to the smallest details, from the smallest to the infinitesimal, while that which it encounters in these microcosms grows ever mightier" (1978, 6). Those giant truths in the folds are inaccessible but approachable through a little unfolding. Who knows what may be shaken loose?

And so I risked opening a fan of memory of place, of time, of biographies unfolding in conjunctures and apart—at first as a "performance" in honor of Allan's retirement and too quickly after that in memoriam. My unfolding encompasses my own memories, but these are overlaid and infused with my mother's memories and Allan's memories as I imagine and have conjured them. Three Bronx childhoods intertwined in time and space, drawn forth in the now-time-space of walking the streets and visiting the spaces of our separately unfolding childhoods alone and with Allan's sister, Suzanne, and in conversation with my mother, Phyllis, and Allan's brother, Ralph. My walks and conversations a methodology for spatializing time and historicizing space, for "blasting" memories, histories, and geographies out of their complacencies to re*cognize* time-spaces in new constellations that might have something to say about present moments—and spaces—of danger (Pred 1995, 23ff.).

> *Reminiscences, even extensive ones, do not always amount to an autobiography. And these quite certainly do not, even for the Berlin years that I am exclusively concerned with here. For autobiography has to do with time, with sequence and what makes up the continuous flow of life. Here, I am talking of a space, of moments and discontinuities. For even if months and years appear here, it is in the form they have at the moment of recollection. This strange form—it may be called fleeting or eternal—is in neither case the stuff that life is made of. (Benjamin 1978, 28)*

These streets and spaces once felt like the world to me, but walking them now I experience how confined they were, almost shockingly so. In the folds of these times and spaces, we meet and can glimpse our shared geographies, diverging paths, (im)possible meeting points, densities of experience, and sedimentations of desire. These paths and nodes and divergences create a sort of magical time-geography, a fusion of Allan's interests in biography formation and place making, and the choreography of bodies in motion through time (Pred 1977).

> *[Memory] goes along the streets in front of him, and each street is a vertiginous experience. Each leads downward . . . to a past that is all the more spellbinding as it is not just the author's own private past. (Benjamin 2005, 262)*

The streets, Benjamin tells us, are the home of the eternally restless. As I wander through this "Bronx Chronicle," which works the present to retrieve glimmers of the past, history and memory brought forth through vertiginous geographies, I proceed in a Predian fashion—infusing (and confusing) my thoughts and speculations with quotations, fragmentary thoughts, images, the drift of other temporalities, and the restless clashing spatialities of memory, dreams, fantasy, and encounter.

> Montage is transgression
> of the (hyper)modern condition(ing)s
> out of which it is created.
> In demanding new associations,
> new connections that transcend taken-for-granted meanings,
> it also demands transgressions
> on the part of those who read it.
>
> The well socialized do not comply with transgressive demands.
> The creative comply in their own way.
> (Pred 1997, 137)

> *I have long, indeed for years, played with the idea of setting out the sphere of life—bios—graphically on a map. First I envisaged an ordinary map, but now I would incline to a general staff's map of a city center, if such a thing existed. Doubtless it does not, because of ignorance of the theater of future wars. I have evolved a system of signs, and on the gray background of such maps they would make a colorful show if I clearly marked in the houses of my friends and girl friends, the assembly halls of various collectives . . . the hotel and brothel rooms that I knew for one night, the decisive benches in the Tiergarten, the ways to different schools and the graves that I saw filled, the sites of prestigious cafés whose long-forgotten names daily crossed our lips, the tennis courts where empty apartment blocks stand today, and the halls emblazoned with gold and stucco that the terrors of dancing classes made almost the equal of gymnasiums. And even without this map, I still have the encouragement provided by an illustrious precursor, . . . Léon Daudet, exemplary at least in the title of his work, which exactly encompasses the best that I might achieve here: "Paris vécu." "Lived Berlin" does not sound so good, but is as real. (Benjamin 1978, 5)*

If "Lived Berlin" doesn't sound so good, what about "Lived Bronx"?

Bios Graphed

On a satellite view map—protected by copyright laws and thus on the cutting room floor—I traced some of what I was able to reconstruct of Allan's paths

using different colors to signify his everyday walks to school, to play, to friends' houses, to candy stores and luncheonettes; his ambles to shopping streets; and the route to his grandmother's house. I also highlighted the street—only two blocks long—that traversed the space between his apartment building and the one where my mother grew up, where I was born and spent the first two years of my life.

My mother, five years older than Allan, went to all the same schools as he and his sister, Suzanne—P.S. 94, P.S. 80, and Evander Childs High School. Their routine geographies traced the same grounds—five years apart but also simultaneously—walks to school; hanging out over egg creams and malteds at the counter of Max's candy store; playing at a neighborhood park, "the Oval," but only on its west side, where my grandfather played shuffleboard, Allan played tennis, I was pushed in my baby carriage, Allan and Ralph played basketball, and my mother splashed in the wading pool. What, who was on the east side? They all scurried past the "haunted house" on the edge of the Oval, which it turns out was originally the reservoir keeper's house. But was that the only thing that scared them? That haunted their hallowed play spaces?

We all went to the same movie theater on Jerome Avenue; established as the Tuxedo, it was called the David Marcus by 1958 when I went to see *Gigi* with my mother's teenage cousins. I felt so grown up going with them to a matinee—I can't believe I was four, but in the dark of that deco theater Leslie Caron vanquished all those Disney cartoon heroines in my imagination. I've been singing ever since, or more accurately, imagining Maurice Chevalier singing to me, since I was already singing standing on chairs in kitchens all over the Bronx, perhaps even in the Preds' building since my father's closest friend grew up there.

The comings and goings, leavings and stayings, trajectories through places the same, but always made different, and yet still resonating with the same, even now. These confluences tantalize me and pique my imagination. Their diverse paths and projects a sort of intergenerational time-geography. In June 1953, Allan graduated from high school, and soon after took leave of the Bronx for Antioch. At that very moment—perhaps even to the day—my grandfather died in that apartment around the corner from the Preds'. Coming in from her job in the city, my mother discovered him, his hair still wet from an after-work shower, before they were to drive up to "the country" for the weekend. In her sadness and shock she wondered if and hoped that my grandmother had told him her secret—that she was pregnant. With me. The arriving, the never returning, the coming, the back and forthing, the staying; all tracing their space-times in these microcosms, resting in the folds of the fan of memory and ready to come alive, be reanimated here, now.

My mother—always alive to shared experience—was electrified by my journeys to find Allan's childhood geographies. I called her from Jerome Avenue as I traced the walk I took every Saturday afternoon with my grandmother until I was about ten years old (figure 12.1). She asks me if I'm getting in touch with her past. Trying to find Allan, I'm finding myself, as well as my mother, each of us now part of my topographical consciousness. I simultaneously wonder if finding myself can even sort of be a way to find Allan, to unfold the fan of his memory through my fantasy and projection; if "the art of straying" can bring us into others' lived geographies. Of course I've got Allan's sister and brother as guides.

FIGURE 12.1. Walking Jerome Avenue.

> *If I chance today to pass through the streets of the quarter, I set foot in them with the same uneasiness that one feels when entering an attic unvisited for years. Valuable things may be lying around, but nobody remembers where. (Benjamin 1978, 20)*

Is it the doors? Surely they were not blood red in the 1940s. The lobby? So typical of the Bronx—deco, spacious, striving, arrived—so not the Lower East Side. Or the view from their first-floor windows, hard by the school? Those windows looked out from the room that Allan and Ralph turned into a nation, *Roomania*, its borders sometimes patrolled to exclude their younger sister, or schvesta, as they sometimes called Suzanne. But then calling her by the Yiddish word for sister was nothing compared to calling her rotunda or wretch, as they sometimes teased. Who is in those rooms now? Are the borders of *Roomania* intact? Do these children, named Hill, named Rios, play under the hallway steps like the Pred children did? Do brothers read bedtime stories to their younger sisters?

Following a young man into my great aunt's building a few blocks away, I explained my connection with the building. I could almost smell her stuffed cabbage as the same old dank lobby smell engulfed me. Holding the door for me, he quietly said, "Oh, it must have been different then." "Not really," I replied, but he wasn't really listening. Crowded working-class strivers then and now—my aunt lived with her husband, two children, and for a long while her father in a one-bedroom apartment. I never even wondered where everybody slept. Maybe I was too absorbed in the scents of my aunt's cooking or maintaining the little bubble of quiet I always tried to keep around me in the vibrant

FIGURE 12.2. Sammy's appetizing.

FIGURE 12.3. Pavement palimpsest.

FIGURE 12.4. A crossroads of empire, revolution, and license plates.

chaos of my family, but I think that it all just made sense—it was our taken-for-granted world. Its geographies of power and inequality embodied and obscured in our everyday practices, made intelligible to me in a flash as I entered and explored this region of my topographical consciousness. That world is still visible in signs, which are everywhere once you look (figures 12.2 and 12.3).

Kings College Place at the corner of Gun Hill Road—a colonial past intersects with a revolutionary war. Where are imaginations formed? Through the alchemy of space and sign? Allan stood at this corner, his corner, counting the out-of-state license plates driving up and down Gun Hill Road—always already a geographer, imagining other worlds (figure 12.4). The Pred apartment was on Kings College Place—a grand name for a one-block street that ends in a cemetery. His elementary school was next door to his building, and just next to it sprawled the huge and beautiful Woodlawn Cemetery (figures 12.5 and 12.6). That was it. Home, school, cemetery. Is it any wonder he didn't stay?

The sedimentations of our everyday spaces ricochet through our becoming. "Ne crack pas," Allan would say, already playing with language as a child. "Ne panic pas."

The Kaiser Friedrich School stands close by the municipal railway yard . . . you can look down into its playground. And because, once liberated from it, I frequently took the opportunity to do this, it now stands before me quite uselessly, similar

FIGURE 12.5. The view from the school.

FIGURE 12.6. Public School 94 and 3508 Kings College Place (the Preds' building).

> *to one of those Mexican temples that were excavated much too early and inexpertly, their frescoes having been long effaced by rain by the time the excavation of ceremonial implements and papyri, which might have thrown some light on these images, could at last seriously begin. So I have to make do with what is resurrected only today, isolated pieces of interior that have broken away and yet contain the whole within them, while the whole, standing out there before me, has lost its details without a trace. (Benjamin 1978, 50)*

> *Between two peals of the bell lay the break, the second precipitating the shuffling, chattering uproar with which the mass of pupils, streaming through only two doors, surged up the narrow stairway from floor to floor. These staircases I have always hated: hated when forced to climb them in the midst of the herd, a forest of calves and feet before me, defenselessly exposed to the bad odors emanating from all the bodies pressing so closely against mine, hated no less when, arriving late, passing deserted corridors . . . woe if the door was already shut. (Benjamin 1978, 52; figure 12.7)*

Did Allan feel such revulsion in these spaces? Did my mother? Entering school was terrifying mostly because the school "officers"—sixth graders in special vests—exulted in their power to keep us to the right on stairways, to march "single file"—no talking—to our classrooms, to "report" us if we transgressed. A rogue "officer" once chased me all the way home. I can still hear him growling, "Walk!!" as I raced to get away, terrorized. I never walked so fast. I couldn't catch my breath enough to remember that his power—bogus in any case—was terri-

FIGURE 12.7. Deserted corridor.

torial, delimited by the school grounds. Power, space, terror. "Defenselessly exposed," I was sure he'd "report" me if I ran.

My mother's brother—also an Allan—did not escape his staircase tormenters. Cornered on the stairway of a nearby apartment building, he was beaten up by kids snarling that he'd killed their Christ.

> *For such a mob of school children is among the most formless and ignoble of all masses. . . . The corridors, and the classrooms that finally came into view, are among the horrors that have embedded themselves most ineradicably in me, that is to say in my dreams; and these have taken revenge on the monotony, the cold torpor that overcame me at each crossing of the classroom thresholds, by turning themselves into the arena of the most extravagant events. (Benjamin 1978, 13)*

Suzanne and I caress the auditorium chairs as if they were ancient tablets (figure 12.8). Their patina of everydayness doesn't hide that. Suzanne, Allan, my mother, my uncle, and the pupils right at that moment imprisoned in their classrooms have touched their ancient solidity, heard that grand piano sitting just under the stage, and wriggled in those seats bored or with excited anticipation. Where in the hieroglyphics are they? Was Allan's name etched in one of the seats? My mother surely would have carved hers, kidding around with her friends during the "cold torpor" of Mrs. Rat's (!) droning introductions to assembly.

FIGURE 12.8. Hieroglyphics of child-time.

The assembled were not homogenous, even in this little corner of Jewish strivers in the Bronx. Anti-Semitism hid in the stairways. The apartments' deco lobbies an ornamentation of racism, an announcement of class distinction. So *not* the Lower East Side. "We *left* there," my grandmother would say, or was it, "*We* left there"? Situated ignorance walked the streets, haunted our everyday spaces. Who *was* on the east side of the Oval?

From school Allan—mirthful but always already Allan—brought home his friend and fellow basketball player, Clinton Jeffries, whose nonwhiteness released a storm of unacknowledged prejudice in his household and in his building. Such everyday encounters with racism, "even in" the left-liberal outer reaches of *Roomania*, were surely foundational to Allan's evolving concerns with injustice and were neither excused nor forgotten by him.

Canny Allan might even have developed some of his spatial awareness in

the course of his everyday paths and projects. Most kids just chafe against being corralled or try to subvert the ways schools spatialize discipline, but perhaps Allan came to consciousness about the spatiality of power walking the school's corridors, inhabiting its well-ordered spaces. He would have daily seen that writing on the doors—carefully stenciled gold on solid wood—formally announcing the importance of the thresholds it marks. Self-importance fused with purpose, "Closet," "Teachers' Rest Room," "Boys," "Principal," "General Medical." Language as power, language as practice (figure 12.9).

FIGURE 12.9. Marks of catastrophic encounters?

> *Just as a certain kind of significant dream survives awakening in the form of words when all the rest of the dream content has vanished, here isolated words have remained in place as marks of catastrophic encounters. (Benjamin 1978, 14)*

And if that was not enough, the cemetery was just outside the school's large windows. No talking, single file.

> *For childhood, knowing no preconceived opinions, has none about life. It is as dearly attached (though with just as strong reservations) to the realm of the dead, where it juts into the living, as to life itself. (Benjamin 1978, 28)*

Walking the school's corridors now, we sensed the warmth of the dark wood, remembered furtive gulps at the water fountain while trying to bend over it in just the right way, recalled the chemical-clean smell of the "lavatories," and practically danced into the light-filled gym. Measuring ourselves against the wooden yardstick built into the gymnasium wall, we thought of how many students—Allan, my mother, Suzanne among them—were measured annually—pressed back, shoulders down, head straight—right there (figure 12.10). Allan must have hung his stuff on the carefully num-

FIGURE 12.10. Embodied time, ordered space (Suzanne Pred Bass).

bered hooks lining the walls of the gym. Measurement, mathematical order, cleanliness, keeping time. Clocks loomed everywhere, many in cages to stop stopping time by the flying objects of the as-yet-undisciplined. Industrial clock time seeping into children's pores. Time disciplined every little body that ever walked those halls. Time measured by clocks, bells, inches, promotion, seasons, death. Signs rusting, bells ringing (figure 12.11).

FIGURE 12.11. No loitering . . .

The school clock that held sway above our heads . . . the invisible bars of our timetable cage . . . the lower panes of the classroom windows were of frosted glass. "Vagabond clouds, sailors of the skies" had for us the absolute precision that the verse holds for prisoners. Moreover, little about the actual classrooms has remained in my memory except these exact emblems of imprisonment: the frosted windows and the infamous carved wooden battlements over the doors. . . . Heraldic and chivalrous obtuseness shone forth wherever possible. (Benjamin 1978, 13–14)

FIGURE 12.12. Keeping time.

Unruly bodies ruled by the orderings of space and time, of history and geography (figure 12.12).

But the city was just outside. Streets where cars with the license plates from far away passed under the elevated train tracks over Jerome Avenue just a few blocks down the hill. Those elevated trains whooshed underground into Manhattan and beyond every few minutes (figure 12.13).

The city splits into its dialectical poles. It becomes a landscape that opens up to him and a parlor that encloses him. (Benjamin 2005, 263)

FIGURE 12.13. Looking southwest.

"Ne panic pas!"

> *To depict a city as a native would call for other, deeper motives—the motives of the person who journeys into the past, rather than to foreign parts. . . . [The native] does not describe, he narrates. (Benjamin 2005, 262)*

My narration, a text of dirt. Bronx dirt, a kaleidoscope of minuscule shards of broken glass, rock dust, and urban debris compacted to near solidity. This dirt, which I would hack at with a teaspoon, was what I thought earth was. I was shocked when I encountered something a little loamier many years later. And granite—sturdy, amphibious—the result of glaciation I now understand. Its formations are my ur-landscape, where I always feel most at home. I've encountered this landscape in Scandinavia—no doubt Allan did too.

> *[The native] does not describe, he narrates. Even more, he repeats what he has heard. (Benjamin 2005, 262)*

What I heard from Suzanne and Ralph was that Allan was even-keeled in an intense, crowded, lively household. That he was a gentle and protective big brother. That his best friend, Howie Orlon, lived on Bainbridge Street, their grandmother around the corner. That Allan and Ralph had their own language (are we surprised?). "Hock the lab" was one of its idioms and meant playing basketball (though Ralph refrained from giving me the etymology of the phrase). Neither one "nonco" (uncoordinated), the brothers and their friends played endless games of basketball in schoolyards, in the gym, in the Oval. Allan, of course, loved to wander the commercial streets of the neighborhood, gazing in the windows and eating at local haunts like the Tuxedo luncheonette (now the Caribe), Max's, Jade Garden, Schweller's Delicatessen.

But it was all so small, "a parlor that enclosed" him, us. I thought the whole world was along Jerome Avenue. I know that sounds clichéd, but to my child eyes it really did seem to have everything. It was years later that I realized the Tuxedo Theater was not the Paramount where my mother had swooned at ten thousand consecutive shows of Frank Sinatra, that when I sat on my father's shoulders watching Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade, we were not in the Bronx. That Katz's deli—now Pollo a la Carbon—was not *the* Katz's Delicatessen (it wasn't even Schweller's, which was down the street), but just a good place to indulge in a frankfurter. My grandmother loved nothing more. As we indulged, she'd always say that the first bite's juicy spurt meant that the frankfurter was kosher. A ridiculous idea that I never really questioned until it came back to me cupping my hands to see inside the steamed-up window of Pollo a la Carbon.

Situated ignorance?

Allan refused the confinement, looked away, went away. But his intellectual commitment to "sites"—sites of origin, sites of production, sites of power, sites of everyday life—and insistence on the local origins of everything global have their roots in *Roomania*. Kings College Place and Gun Hill Road—"a confluence of confluences" as he might call it.

> *Every space of daily life, every site at which women and men bodily engage in everyday practice, every meaning-filled location of the quotidian, is riddled with the unspeakable. (Pred 2001, 119)*

Allan's work reached into the unspeakable, excavated the beauty and horror of its material forms and practices, and brilliantly illuminated their connections to histories' and geographies' unfolding. It still dances off the page, spellbinding.

NOTE

All photos by Cindi Katz, except for figure 12.1 by Suzanne Pred Bass.

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